Echo River Sanctuary, LLC f/k/a TSE Plantation, LLC v. 21st Mortgage Corp., Meri L. Harrell Curtis R. Harrell

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D21-1940

_____________________________

ECHO RIVER SANCTUARY, LLC

f/k/a TSE PLANTATION, LLC,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.

21ST MORTGAGE CORP., MERI L.

HARRELL; CURTIS R. HARRELL, et

al.,

Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Suwannee County.

David W. Fina, Judge.

September 14, 2022

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING/REHEARING EN BANC

JAY, J.

We deny the motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc, and/or

certification. We withdraw our previous opinion, however, and

substitute the following in its place.

Appellant, Echo River Sanctuary, LLC (“Echo River”), appeals

the trial court’s judgment that awarded Appellee, 21st Mortgage

Corporation (“21st Mortgage”), the right to possess a mobile home

that sits on a parcel of land in Live Oak, Florida. For the reasons

that follow, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

I.

Curtis and Meri Harrell—husband and wife—owned a 160-

acre parcel of land in Live Oak. They initially resided in a

singlewide trailer on the property. First Guaranty Bank and Trust

Company of Jacksonville (“First Guaranty”) held a mortgage on

the land, which originated in 2006. The mortgage contained an

after-acquired property clause, meaning that the mortgage

encumbered the land as well as all future fixtures and

improvements. The Harrells defaulted on their mortgage, and in

November 2010, First Guaranty initiated foreclosure proceedings.

In November 2011, while the foreclosure process was ongoing,

the Harrells purchased a 2009 Scotbilt doublewide mobile home

and installed it as their new residence on the 160-acre lot. They

financed their purchase with a loan from 21st Mortgage and

granted 21st Mortgage a security interest in the mobile home. In

December 2011, approximately one month after the purchase,

Curtis Harrell filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the United

States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Ultimately, Mr. Harrell breached the terms of his settlement

agreement with the bankruptcy trustee, and in June 2014, the

bankruptcy court revoked Mr. Harrell’s bankruptcy discharge and

dismissed the bankruptcy case.

First Guaranty’s mortgage of the Harrells’ land passed to

CenterState Bank of Florida (“CenterState”). In December 2017,

CenterState obtained a final judgment of foreclosure and became

the owner of the 160-acres. In February 2018, pursuant to an

option contract that it executed in June 2013, Echo River bought

the property from CenterState.

Meanwhile, the Harrells also defaulted on their mobile home

loan from 21st Mortgage. In November 2017, 21st Mortgage filed

a replevin action against the Harrells to repossess the mobile

home. Echo River intervened in the case as the owner of the land.

Echo River asserted ownership of the mobile home, alleging that it

was a fixture to the land that Echo River acquired from

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CenterState. 21st Mortgage amended its complaint to add a

replevin claim against Echo River. In response, Echo River

asserted that 21st Mortgage never perfected its mobile home lien

and that 21st Mortgage acted with unclean hands in Mr. Harrell’s

bankruptcy case.

In the first installment of the trial proceedings, the court

granted summary judgment for Echo River, finding that 21st

Mortgage’s claim failed because 21st Mortgage acted with unclean

hands in the bankruptcy proceedings by misrepresenting the

mobile home’s value and Mr. Harrell’s equity. See 21st Mortg.

Corp. v. TSE Plantation, LLC, 301 So. 3d 1120, 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA

2020) (the doctrine of unclean hands is an equitable defense that

applies when “the plaintiff has engaged in some manner of

unscrupulous conduct, overreaching, or trickery,” and it may be

raised by a defendant who claims the plaintiff’s unscrupulous

conduct toward a third party also injured the defendant). In the

appeal from that judgment, this Court summarized the mobile

home’s role in the bankruptcy proceeding:

When the bankruptcy trustee sought to bring the mobile

home into the bankruptcy estate, 21st Mortgage filed an

objection, arguing that the mobile home was only worth

$30,000 and the Harrells owed more than $60,000 on the

loan. 21st Mortgage asserted that there was no equity in

the mobile home and, therefore, the bankruptcy trustee

should abandon its interest in that asset. Neither the

Harrells nor 21st Mortgage notified the bankruptcy

trustee or the bankruptcy court that the mobile home at

issue was not the old mobile home originally on the

property, but a brand new Scotbilt mobile home recently

financed for $81,000.

Id. at 1121.

This Court, finding that there was a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether Echo River was injured by 21st Mortgage’s

purported misconduct in the bankruptcy proceeding, reversed the

summary judgment. Id. at 1122–23 (noting that the unclean hands

defense is “generally not suitable for resolution on summary

judgment because it requires the determination of factual

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disputes” and holding that Echo River’s alleged injury was not

clear from the record). On remand, the trial court held a non-jury

trial. Before this trial, the parties stipulated to the following facts:

1. Meri and Curtis Harrell first executed documents

granting a security interest in the Scotbilt mobile home

on November 4 and 8, 2011.

2. Plaintiff [21st Mortgage] entered into a contract to

fund the purchase of a Scotbilt Mobile Home by

Defendants Meri and Curtis Harrell on November 18,

2011.

3. Meri and Curtis Harrell have not responded to this suit

or the related claims.

4. The mobile home was installed on Defendant Harrell’s

property on November 18, 2011, including connecting to

septic and utilities.

5. Defendant Curtis Harrell filed a Chapter 7 petition in

the bankruptcy court on December 11, 2011, in the

Middle District of Florida Jacksonville Division.

6. Plaintiff [21st Mortgage] first filed lien papers with the

Department of Motor Vehicles on January 4, 2012.

7. Defendant TSE [Echo River] entered into an option

contract to purchase the real property on June 18, 2013,

from Park Properties, Inc., a subsidiary of CenterState

Bank, should it acquire title to the property.

8. The property was sold to Echo River Sanctuary, LLC

when it was known as TSE Plantation, LLC on February

2, 2018. 1

1 Paragraph 8 of the stipulation states that Echo River

acquired the land on February 2, 2012. However, at the start of

trial, the parties acknowledged that the 2012 date was a

4

Two witnesses testified at trial: Jeffrey Warkins, a staff

attorney for 21st Mortgage, and Thomas S. Edwards, Jr., Echo

River’s managing member. Warkins testified that the Harrells

defaulted on the mobile home loan in 2017. The Harrells’ contract

with 21st Mortgage characterized the mobile home as personal

property. Because it is a doublewide, the mobile home has two

certificates of title from the Department of Highway Safety and

Motor Vehicles (“DHSMV”). The DHSMV issued those certificates

on January 4, 2012. Each identifies 21st Mortgage as the sole lien

holder. Warkins agreed that 21st Mortgage had not perfected its

security interest in the mobile home at the time that Mr. Harrell

filed his bankruptcy petition on December 11, 2011. Warkins also

acknowledged that 21st Mortgage did not notify the bankruptcy

court that 21st Mortgage attempted to perfect its security interest

after Mr. Harrell filed his bankruptcy petition.

Edwards testified that during the time between when Echo

River exercised its option contract with CenterState and when the

closing occurred, he went to the property to inspect it. While there,

he saw the mobile home—which bore a permanent real property

sticker and had no license plate. The mobile home was affixed to

the ground and had no wheels. It was connected to a septic system

and utilities. It was also surrounded by trees and plants. Edwards

concluded that “it was made a part of the property in that it was

not going to be removed without doing damage [].” Records from

the Suwanee County tax collector’s office showed that the mobile

home was classified as real property. Edwards contacted

CenterState about the mobile home. While CenterState would not

issue a title warranty on the doublewide, as part of the land sale,

it granted Echo River any rights or interests it had in the mobile

home.

After completion of the non-jury trial, the court entered a

boilerplate final judgment—in the form proposed by 21st Mortgage

with little alteration—which concluded that 21st Mortgage’s right

to possess the mobile home was superior to that of Echo River’s.

typographical error, and that the correct purchase date was

February 2, 2018.

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The judgment directed the clerk to issue a writ of possession 2 in

favor of 21st Mortgage and declared that Echo River was not

entitled to relief on its counterclaims. This appeal followed.

II.

The trial court’s determination that 21st Mortgage has a

possessory interest in the mobile home that is superior to Echo

River’s is a legal conclusion that we review de novo. 3 See Young v.

Young, 96 So. 3d 478, 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). The central

question in this appeal is whether 21st Mortgage has a valid lien

on the mobile home that is enforceable against Echo River.

Because the certificates of title that reflect 21st Mortgage’s lien are

void, we hold that 21st Mortgage cannot enforce its lien on the

mobile home against Echo River.

The Effect of the Bankruptcy Stay

The parties agree that the Harrells granted 21st Mortgage a

security interest in the mobile home in November 2011 when the

Harrells signed their security agreement and 21st Mortgage

loaned them the money to buy the mobile home. See § 679.2031(1),

Fla. Stat. (a creditor’s security interest in collateral attaches when

it becomes enforceable against the debtor). To guard its security

interest in the mobile home against claims by third parties, 21st

Mortgage had to perfect its interest. See HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v.

Perez, 165 So. 3d 696, 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015); Bay Cty. Sheriff’s

2 21st Mortgage alleges that the writ of “possession” language

is a scrivener’s error, and that the judgment should instead say

writ of “replevin.” In its cross-appeal, 21st Mortgage asks this

Court to affirm the trial court’s judgment and grant leave for the

trial court to correct the scrivener’s error. Because we reverse the

trial court’s judgment, this issue is moot.

3 The judgment on appeal does not contain any findings of fact,

to which we would have deferred if they were supported by

competent, substantial evidence. See Van v. Schmidt, 122 So. 3d

243, 258 (Fla. 2013); South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Wolf, 331 So. 2d

337, 339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).

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Office v. Tyndall Fed. Credit Union, 738 So. 2d 456, 458 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1999). To perfect a security interest in a mobile home, a

creditor must file its lien with the DHSMV. See § 319.27, Fla. Stat.

Indeed, the statute provides that no lien on a mobile home shall be

enforceable in any Florida court against other creditors or

subsequent purchasers unless the lienholder files notice of its lien

with the DHSMV and the DHSMV issues a certificate of title that

notes the lien. See § 319.27(2), Fla. Stat.

If a creditor files lien documents with the DHSMV within

fifteen days after the debtor receives possession of the mobile home

and signs the security agreement, the date of perfection relates

back to the date of attachment. § 319.27(3)(b). Stated differently,

a creditor who follows the statutory procedure is deemed to have

perfected its lien on the day of the lien’s creation. However, when

a creditor waits more than fifteen days to file the lien documents,

the date of perfection is the date that the DHSMV receives the

documents. Id.; see, e.g., In re Perkins, 73 B.R. 317, 318 (Bankr.

N.D. Fla. 1987).

Here, the pre-trial stipulation establishes that 21st Mortgage

“first filed lien papers” with the DHSMV on January 4, 2012—

which is also the date of issue shown on the certificates of title. The

parties do not dispute that this date was more than fifteen days

after the Harrells took possession of the mobile home. Therefore,

21st Mortgage is not eligible for the “relates back” protection of

section 319.27(3)(b). Nevertheless, because it filed lien documents

with the DHSMV on January 4, 2012, 21st Mortgage argues that

it perfected its lien on that date.

The trouble with this argument is that on December 11,

2011—nearly a month before 21st Mortgage attempted to perfect

its lien—Mr. Harrell filed for bankruptcy. Filing a bankruptcy

petition triggers “an automatic stay of all proceedings against a

debtor effective the date the petition is filed and actions taken in

violation of the stay are void even if there is no actual notice of the

stay.” Personalized Air Conditioning, Inc. v. C.M. Sys. of Pinellas

Cty., Inc., 522 So. 2d 465, 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); see 11 U.S.C. §

362 (the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision); Borg-

Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Hall, 685 F.2d 1306, 1308 (11th Cir.

1982) (“Actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void

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and without effect.”). The stay includes “any act to create, perfect,

or enforce any lien against property of the estate.” 11. U.S.C.

§362(a)(4); see Matter of Fla. Dairy, Inc., 22 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr.

M.D. Fla. 1982) (“Section 362(a) of the [Bankruptcy] Code provides

that the filing of a petition for relief under the Code operates as a

stay of any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against

property of the Debtor’s estate or the property of the Debtor. The

stay is effective upon the date of filing and actions taken in

violation of the stay are void even if there is no actual notice of the

stay.”).

Thus, the lien reflected on the mobile home’s title certificates

is a nullity because 21st Mortgage recorded that lien in violation

of the automatic stay. See Void and Voidable, BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY (11th. ed. 2019) (whereas a voidable act is “[v]alid

until annulled,” a void act is “an absolute nullity” that has “no legal

effect”); In re Hambright, 635 B.R. 614, 631 n.6 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.

2022) (“In the Eleventh Circuit, actions that violate the stay are

void and without effect (not merely voidable).”); see also In re

Jocelyn, 574 B.R. 771, 772 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2017) (because

“actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void ab initio,”

a foreclosure sale that occurred days after the stay began was

void); McMahon v. Ryan, 964 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)

(because an action taken in violation of the automatic bankruptcy

stay is a nullity, service of process in a state court proceeding is

void as to a party who filed a bankruptcy petition before being

served).

21st Mortgage could have perfected its lien any time in the

weeks between when its security interest attached and when Mr.

Harrell filed his bankruptcy petition. In fact, given that First

Guaranty initiated foreclosure proceedings against the Harrells’

land in November 2010—a year before the Harrells bought the

mobile home—21st Mortgage should have recognized the prudence

of timely perfecting its security interest. Alternatively, 21st

Mortgage could have sought the bankruptcy court’s permission to

perfect its lien after the onset of the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C.

§ 362(d); McMahon, 964 So. 2d at 200 (“While it is true that actions

taken in violation of the automatic stay are void, bankruptcy

courts are authorized to validate such actions by retroactively

annulling the stay when the circumstances warrant such relief.”);

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see also In re Crisco, 9 B.R. 641 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (granting

a creditor’s motion for relief from the automatic stay). It chose to

do neither.

Because 21st Mortgage recorded its lien with the DHSMV in

violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay, the title certificates

bearing that lien are nullities, meaning that it is as though the

certificates proving the lien never existed. And because the title

certificates are nullities, 21st Mortgage may not rely upon them to

enforce its security interest in the mobile home against third

parties like Echo River. See § 319.27(2), Fla. Stat.

The absence of valid certificates of title that reflect a creditor’s

lien is the distinguishing feature of this case. When confronted

with a similar dispute between a real property purchaser and a

mobile home creditor, the Fourth District held that the mobile

home creditor prevailed. See Ark Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. 21st

Mortg. Corp., 300 So. 3d 1210 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020). As in this case,

the mobile home creditor in Ark was 21st Mortgage. However, in

Ark—a case which did not involve a bankruptcy petition—21st

Mortgage properly perfected its security interest by timely filing

paperwork with the DHSMV. The Ark opinion repeatedly

referenced this fact. First, it noted that the trial court entered

judgment for 21st Mortgage in part because 21st Mortgage

“perfected its lien on the mobile home according to Florida law.”

Id. at 1213. Next, it quoted section 319.27(2) for the proposition

that a lien on a mobile home is not enforceable against other

creditors and subsequent purchasers unless it is perfected via the

DHSMV’s certificate of title process. Id. at 1213–14.

The Ark Court held that because 21st Mortgage “established

its lien in the mobile home” under section 319.27(2), the mobile

home’s status as a fixture was immaterial. Id. at 1214. The Ark

Court relied extensively on Barnett Bank of Clearwater, N.A., v.

Rompon, 377 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979):

Rompon is instructive here. . . . [T]he court explained

[that] even when a mobile home becomes a fixture to real

property after a lender has financed the purchase of the

mobile home, any interest in the mobile home obtained

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by the purchaser of the land at a Sheriff’s sale is subject

to the lender’s perfected security interest:

At the time of financing the Rompon purchase of

the mobile home, the appellant perfected its

security interest according to law. There is no

requirement that appellant reperfect its security

interest pursuant to Chapter 679 in the event

the mobile home subsequently becomes a fixture

to real property. Under the provisions of

Chapters 319 and 320, Florida Statutes,

appellees’ interest in the mobile home is subject

to appellant’s perfected security interest.

Id. at 1214–15 (quoting Rompon, 377 So. 2d at 983) (emphasis

added).

In this case, however, because it filed lien documents in

violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay, 21st Mortgage never

lawfully perfected its security interest. Accordingly, unlike the

creditors in Ark and Rompon, it does not have a lien that is

enforceable against third parties in the courts of this state. See §

319.27(2), Fla. Stat.; see also Bay Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 738 So. 2d

at 459 (“A lienholder’s interest whose lien has not been perfected

according to the requirements of section 319.27(1) is subject to

forfeiture.”) (quoting In re Forfeiture of One 1979 Chevrolet C10

Van, 490 So. 2d 240, 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)).

Effect of the Foreclosure Action

As noted above, the 2006 mortgage on the Harrells’ land

contained an after-acquired property clause. Such clauses

generally allow a foreclosure action to cover not only the

mortgaged property, but also any additions to the property. Rose

v. Lurton Co., 149 So. 557, 558 (Fla. 1933) (“a mortgage on after-

acquired property of the mortgagor will be held valid, and

enforceable between the parties to it, by a suit for foreclosure.”);

Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (“It is well

established that one can enter into a mortgage agreement to create

a lien against property which the mortgagor will only acquire in

the future.”). When a mortgage contains an after-acquired

10

property clause, the mortgage holder’s interest in an item that is

covered by the clause is superior to a creditor’s unperfected

security interest in that item. See Regan v. ITT Indus. Credit Co.,

469 So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (a mortgage on a hotel, which

included an after-acquired property clause, was superior to a

creditor’s purchase money security interest in the hotel’s office

equipment if the creditor did not timely perfect its lien on the

equipment), approved, 487 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1986).

The Scotbilt mobile home—which the Harrells paid property

taxes on, 4 declared to be their homestead, connected to a septic

tank, and affixed to the land—qualifies as a fixture within the

scope of the after-acquired property clause. See Commercial Fin.

Co. v. Brooksville Hotel Co., 123 So. 814, 816 (Fla. 1929)

(identifying three factors for distinguishing between real property

fixtures and personal property: whether the item is physically

attached to the realty; the item’s utility as a fixture; and the

owner’s intention for the item); Strickland’s Mayport, Inc. v.

Kingsley Bank, 449 So. 2d 928, 928–29 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (citing

the factors from Brooksville Hotel, and noting that the “[e]xistence

of a security agreement does not necessarily preclude

characterization of an object as a fixture if other facts clearly

indicate the annexor’s intent to make a permanent accession to the

realty.”); see also § 193.075(1), Fla. Stat. (“A mobile home shall be

considered permanently affixed [for property tax purposes] if it is

tied down and connected to the normal and usual utilities.”). And

because 21st Mortgage never established a lien on the mobile home

that is enforceable in court against the claims of third parties like

Echo River, it was unprotected when the mobile home became a

fixture within the scope of the mortgage’s after-acquired property

clause.

21st Mortgage draws our attention to Section 320.015(2),

Florida Statutes (“Taxation of mobile homes”), which provides that

“any mobile home classified by a seller or a lender as personal

property at the time a security interest was granted therein to

secure an obligation shall continue to be so classified for all

4 The record reflects that 21st Mortgage paid the property

taxes using funds from the Harrells’ escrow account.

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purposes relating to the loan and security interest, at least as long

as any part of such obligation, or any extension or renewal thereof,

remains outstanding.” 21st Mortgage argues that this statute

prevented, as a matter of law, the mobile home from becoming a

fixture to the Harrells’ land.

Subsection (1) of the statutory text describes when a mobile

home becomes real property for tax purposes. See Nordbeck v.

Wilkinson, 529 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Subsection (2)

provides that a mobile home’s conversion to real property for tax

purposes does not alter the mobile home’s status as personal

property “for all purposes relating to the loan and security

interest” while the loan remains outstanding. This subsection

makes clear that a debtor cannot—by declaring his mobile home to

be real property—unilaterally override the portion of his contract

with a creditor that classifies a mobile home as personal property.

However, it is less clear that this restriction universally binds

third parties, who are not signatories to the debtor’s security

agreement. See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Sohn, 566 So. 2d 841

(Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (rejecting a creditor’s argument, which was

based on its security agreement with a debtor and section

320.015(2), that its security interest in a mobile home survived a

tax deed sale: “According to appellant, this part of the statute

demonstrates that even if the mobile home was taxed with the lot

as real property, the court should have found as a matter of law

that the valid outstanding security interest in the mobile home

rendered it personal property for the purpose of determining

whether such indebtedness secured by the property would survive

a valid tax deed. We disagree. . . . The fact that the contract

classified the mobile home as personal property is not

dispositive.”). Indeed, Florida has long recognized that an item

annexed to mortgaged real property can become part of the land—

regardless of the terms of a security contract between a landowner

and a creditor—if the mortgage holder does not consent to the

item’s classification as personal property. See Burbridge v.

Therrell, 148 So. 204, 206 (Fla. 1933) (“If annexation to the realty

has actually or constructively taken place, any agreement or

understanding between mortgagor and a third party that the

annexed thing shall continue to be considered as personalty, or

regarded as severed, or understood to be subject to future

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severance from the freehold, without the consent of the mortgagee,

is unenforceable and will not be recognized as against the

mortgagee’s rights to foreclose his mortgage against the land and

its annexed improvements.”).

And here, there is no evidence that First Guaranty or

CenterState consented to or had knowledge of the Harrells’

installation of the doublewide on the mortgaged land or to the

mobile home’s classification as personal property. To the contrary,

21st Mortgage’s corporate representative acknowledged that 21st

Mortgage never notified First Guaranty or CenterState about the

mobile home loan and the agreement securing the loan. This is

consistent with the trial court’s finding in its earlier summary

judgment order that “[t]here is no evidence of record that either

the Harrells or 21st Mortgage informed the [Bankruptcy] Court or

CenterState Bank of the disposal of the old mobile home or the

installation of the new Scotbilt mobile home.” This is not

surprising given that—as we noted in the first appeal—21st

Mortgage issued the Harrells’ loan at a time when First Guaranty

had already initiated foreclosure proceedings against the

mortgaged land:

When the Harrells defaulted on their loan, First

Guaranty Bank sought to foreclose on the property.

During the pendency of the foreclosure case, the Harrells

financed the purchase of a brand new Scotbilt mobile

home for $81,000 through 21st Mortgage. The Harrells

disposed of the existing mobile home on the land and

substituted the Scotbilt mobile home in its place. Then,

they filed for bankruptcy. . . .

Neither the Harrells nor 21st Mortgage notified the

bankruptcy trustee or the bankruptcy court that the

mobile home at issue was not the old mobile home

originally on the property, but a brand new Scotbilt

mobile home recently financed for $81,000.

TSE Plantation, 301 So. 3d at 1121.

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Moreover, the common characteristic of mobile home creditors

who prevail over competing claimants is that they all properly

perfected their liens under section 319.27. See Ark, 300 So. 3d 1210

(a creditor’s perfected security interest in a mobile home survived

the foreclosure sale of the real property where the mobile home

sits); USA Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Steward, 588 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1st DCA

1991) (a creditor’s perfected security interest in a mobile home was

superior to the holder of a final judgment imposing a constructive

trust and lien against the mobile home); Rompon, 377 So. 2d 981

(a creditor’s perfected security interest survived a sheriff’s sale of

the land where the mobile home was situated). In contrast, here,

because of the bankruptcy stay as explained above, 21st Mortgage

did not properly perfect its lien under the statute.

III.

To summarize, we conclude that 21st Mortgage’s unperfected

security interest in the mobile home—which was a fixture to

mortgaged real property—did not survive the real property’s

foreclosure by CenterState Bank (Echo River’s predecessor-in-

interest). 5 Thus, on the unusual facts of this case, the trial court

erred in ruling that 21st Mortgage had a possessory interest in the

mobile home that was superior to Echo River’s. Accordingly, we

remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

LEWIS and BILBREY, JJ., concur.

5 This conclusion is not meant to suggest that 21st Mortgage

is somehow precluded from seeking damages from the Harrells for

the balance remaining on their loan.

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_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331.

_____________________________

Thomas S. Edwards, Jr., of Edwards & Ragatz, P.A., Jacksonville,

for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Laura H. Mirmelli of Busch Mills & Slomka LLP, Atlanta, Georgia,

for Appellee/Cross-Appellant 21st Mortgage Corporation.

Thomas W. Thagard III of Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C.,

Birmingham, Alabama, pro hac vice, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant

21st Mortgage Corporation.

James C. Lester of Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Birmingham,

Alabama, pro hac vice, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant 21st Mortgage

Corporation.

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