The opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 11 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY CLARKE, No. 11-56635
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:05-cv-04448-MMM-
FFM
v.
G. BROWN, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 4, 2013**
Pasadena, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, TROTT, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Clarke appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Brown, the medical technical assistant responsible for scheduling doctors’
appointments at the Lancaster State Prison where he was housed. Clarke averred
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
that Brown was deliberately indifferent to his pain and medical condition when she
turned him away from an appointment to see a doctor on July 28, 2003 and did not
promptly process his request for another appointment.
As correctly recognized by the district court, Clarke submitted no admissible
evidence whatsoever that Brown acted with actionable deliberate indifference to
his medical needs. Clarke admitted he had no idea why his appointment was
cancelled and did not provide any evidence to contradict Brown’s claim that he
was turned away for legitimate reasons, i.e., the appointments that day had been
over-scheduled. Clarke’s assertions that Brown’s behavior was in retaliation for
complaints he had filed against prison staff, and that her actions were done to
deliberately obstruct his medical request, amount to rank speculation and would
not support a verdict in his favor. Additionally, Clarke failed to offer evidence that
the delay in treatment he attributed to Brown’s behavior caused Clarke any harm.
The pain he complained about was not alleviated when he saw the doctor eleven
days later -- by his own account it continued unrelieved for another six years -- so
the brief delay did not cause him any injury. Thus, his evidence was insufficient to
create a genuine issue of fact, and summary judgment against him as a matter of
law was appropriate.
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Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Clarke’s “Motion to Access.”
AFFIRMED.
3