holding that “‘[t]he prosecuting attorney occupies a quasi-judicial position in the trial of a criminal case. In keeping with this position, he is required to avoid the role of a partisan, eager to convict, and must deal fairly with the accused as well as the other participants in the trial. It is the prosecutor's duty to set a tone of fairness and impartiality, and while he may and should vigorously pursue the State’s case, in so doing he must not abandon the quasi-judicial role with which he is cloaked under the law.’ Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Boyd, 160 W.Va. 234 , 233 S.E.2d 710 (1977).”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “‘[t]he prosecuting attorney occupies a quasi-judicial position in the trial of a criminal case. In keeping with this position, he is required to avoid the role of a partisan, eager to convict, and must deal fairly with the accused as well as the other participants in the trial. It is the prosecutor's duty to set a tone of fairness and impartiality, and while he may and should vigorously pursue the State’s case, in so doing he must not abandon the quasi-judicial role with which he is cloaked under the law.’ Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Boyd, 160 W.Va. 234 , 233 S.E.2d 710 (1977).”
- finding that whether exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless entry into a home to secure the arrest of the defendant presents question of fact for jury resolution
- stating that the test for exigent circumstances “is an objective test based on what a reasonable, well- trained police officer would believe”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State of West Virginia v. Ronald Goins, 231 W. Va. 617 (2013)
The State argues that Kendall is distinguishable because the sentences in Kendall were based upon the number of victims in the room.
The opinion
STARCHER, J.,
dissenting.
(Filed Dec. 12, 2006)
The evidence in the record rather clearly demonstrates that the appellant, Michael Lee Kendall, was a “rogue cop” who repeatedly violated both the law and applicable police procedure.
For reasons that are nowhere apparent, the majority opinion repeatedly recites factual assertions by Mr. Kendall that were controverted by the State — and were disbelieved by the jury. In other words, the majority opinion contradicts a fundamental appellate rule — we assume that the facts are in accord with the jury’s verdict. See State v. Easton, 203 W.Va. 631, 638 , 510 S.E.2d 465, 472 (1998).
Properly looking at the factual record, the evidence in this case showed an officer who initiated a dangerous high-speed chase, then rammed and shot point-blank into a vehicle— and then lied about why he did so. (Forensic evidence contradicted the officer’s story that the fleeing suspect tried to strike the officer.)
Then, hours later, the officer broke into a house with his gun drawn, without a warrant or backup, and out of his jurisdiction. This was, of course, the house where the fugitive turned out not to be.
At every step, the officer violated proper police procedure, endangering himself, fellow officers, and innocent people.
On the issue of exigent circumstances, the majority fails to mention that Mr. Kendall first radioed to his headquarters that he had broken off pursuit — and then Mr. Kendall broke into the house with his weapon drawn. As a matter of law, once Mr. Kendall had officially broken off pursuit, and with no legal authority to be on a frolic of his own, there were no “exigent circumstances,” and the trial judge so properly ruled.
It is a rare day when a police officer engages in such egregious misconduct that a prosecuting attorney brings charges. And it is even rarer that a jury disbelieves the officer’s story, and convicts him. The majority opinion is a slap in the face of a courageous trial judge who made proper rulings on the law and an equally courageous jury who did the right thing to protect society against official lawlessness.
Accordingly, I dissent.