Treasa Fennie v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 12-272C

(Filed: January 4, 2013)

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TREASA FENNIE,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant,

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ORDER

Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed her complaint on April 27, 2012,

alleging a violation of “Civil, Privacy and Constitutional Rights.” Compl. 1.1

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Plaintiff has not responded. Nevertheless, when “the court

determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must

dismiss the action.” RCFC 12(h)(3). For the reasons contained herein, we

grant the motion to dismiss.2

We hold pro se litigants to “less stringent standards,” but this does not

obviate the need to establish subject matter jurisdiction. See Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (holding pro se complaints to “less stringent

standards” than those drafted by lawyers); see also Bernard v. United States,

59 Fed. Cl. 497, 498 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (noting that jurisdictional requirements

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Plaintiff also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. For the

limited purpose of addressing jurisdiction, we grant plaintiff’s motion.

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We would have dismissed the complaint even absent defendant’s

motion as the complaint’s jurisdictional failings are patently evident.

must be met despite leniency). The Tucker Act represents the primary grant

of jurisdiction to this court:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have

jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the

United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act

of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or

upon any express or implied contract with the United States, for

liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in

tort.

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006). “The Tucker Act, however, ‘is itself only a

jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable

against the United States for money damages.’” James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d

573, 580 (Fed Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398

(1976)). “Thus, ‘in order to invoke jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, a

plaintiff must point to a substantive right to money damages against the United

States.’” Id. at 580 (quoting Hamlet v. United States, 63 F.3d 1097, 1101 (Fed.

Cir. 1995)).

There are few facts presented in the complaint. Plaintiff apparently

became embroiled in a fair housing dispute with a housing provider in New

Jersey. Although plaintiff alleges success in that context, her complaint could

be read to challenge the administrative process. The complaint does not,

however, clearly address whether the actors in that process acted as federal or

state authorities. Defendant’s motion to dismiss clarifies that certain of the

named individuals are federal officials and others are state officials and private

non-profit entities. In general, this court has no jurisdiction over claims

against actors other than the federal government. See Shalhoub v. United

States, 75 Fed. Cl. 584, 585 (2007). Further, even if plaintiff means to

challenge federal administrative action, this court would not be the place to

bring such a challenge. The Administrative Procedures Act, the primary

avenue for challenging administrative processes, does not fall within this

court’s purview. See Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1313 (Fed Cir.

2003). To the extent that the complaint could be construed to allege a

violation of the Fair Housing Act, the Act directs litigants to district court, 42

U.S.C. § 3612(o)(1); § 3613 (2006), not this court.

The complaint alleges few other facts and offers little specificity as to

how the plaintiff has suffered harm. It states that various actors have “violated

Plaintiff’s Civil, Privacy and Constitutional Rights.” Compl 1. This court

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does not have jurisdiction over civil rights claims, however. See, e.g.,

Hernandez v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 193, 198 (Fed. Cl. 2010) (stating that

the Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over civil rights actions

such as those brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Plaintiff offers no

specifics about how her privacy rights have been violated. We are not aware,

in any event, of any privacy rights that can be vindicated against the United

States in this court. As to her allegations of other unspecified constitutional

rights violations, this court is not the proper forum to adjudicate privacy and

due process rights. See, e.g., James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d at 581 (noting the

well-established point that the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over

violations of due process and double jeopardy rights). This court could hear

a claim for a taking under the Fifth Amendment, but plaintiff has not alleged

facts which could sustain a takings claim.

The complaint also uses language indicative of a tort claim. For

example, plaintiff claims the named actors “have conspired and subjects [sic]

Plaintiff to Reprisal, Slander and Defamation of character.” Compl 1.

Plaintiff also cites several statutes forming part of the Tort Claims Act. Such

allegations are misplaced in this court. We have no jurisdiction over tort

claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (granting jurisdiction “in cases not sounding in

tort”); Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d at 623 (stating that the Court of

Federal Claims “lacks jurisdiction over tort actions against the United States”);

see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006) (granting district courts exclusive

jurisdiction over claims against the United States brought pursuant to the Tort

Claims Act).

For the reasons stated above, defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.

The clerk of court is directed to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. No

costs.

ERIC G. BRUGGINK

Judge

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