Logar v. West Virginia University Board of Governors

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1133

CYRIL M. LOGAR; R. STEPHEN SEARS,

Plaintiffs – Appellants,

v.

WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY BOARD OF GOVERNORS, including

members from 2008 through the present, a West Virginia

state board; MARY ROBERTA BRANDT, individually and as

former Vice President for Legal Affairs and General Counsel

at West Virginia University and adjunct professor of law;

BEVERLY D. KERR, individually and as Deputy General Counsel

for West Virginia University; MAJORIE A. MCDIARMID,

individually and as Steptoe and Johnson Professor of Law

and Technology and Academic Integrity Officer for West

Virginia University; MICHAEL S. GARRISON, individually and

as former President of West Virginia University; C. PETER

MCGRATH, individually and as former interim President of

West Virginia University; JAMES P. CLEMENTS, individually

and as current President of West Virginia University; E.

JANE MARTIN, individually and as former Provost of West

Virginia University,

Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Frederick P. Stamp,

Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:10-cv-00201-FPS)

Submitted: August 30, 2012 Decided: September 7, 2012

Before DAVIS, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas A. Clare, P.C., KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, Washington, D.C.;

John H. Tinney, Jr., Wesley M. Jarrell, II, THE TINNEY LAW FIRM

PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia; Robert J. Ridge, Ryan P.

Stewart, THORP REED & ARMSTRONG, LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,

for Appellants. Stephen M. LaCagnin, Wendy G. Adkins, Seth P.

Hayes, JACKSON KELLY PLLC, Morgantown, West Virginia; Debra H.

Scudiere, KAY CASTO & CHANEY PLLC, Morgantown, West Virginia;

Scott A. Curnutte, Elkins, West Virginia; Robert P. Fitzsimmons,

Robert J. Fitzsimmons, FITZSIMMONS LAW OFFICES, Wheeling, West

Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

The Appellants, Drs. Cyril M. Logar and R. Stephen

Spears, appeal the district court’s orders granting summary

judgment in favor of the Appellees on the Appellants’ 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (2006) claims, and denying reconsideration and leave to

amend the complaint. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The Appellants first argue that the district court

erred in converting the Appellees’ motions to dismiss into

summary judgment motions because the Appellants had not had a

reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery. We review a

district court’s conversion of a motion to dismiss to a summary

judgment motion for abuse of discretion. See Laughlin v. Metro.

Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 1998). Under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), if a district court considers matters

outside of the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “the motion must be treated as one for

summary judgment under Rule 56.” Moreover, “[a]ll parties must

be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material

that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

We have held that “the term reasonable opportunity

requires that all parties be given some indication by the court

that it is treating the 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary

judgment, with the consequent right in the opposing party to

file counter affidavits or pursue reasonable discovery.” Gay v.

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Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). Here, the district court provided

notice to the parties of its intention to convert the motions,

and allowed the parties an opportunity to submit any additional

information regarding the statute of limitations issue. We

conclude, therefore, that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in converting the motions to summary judgment

motions.

The Appellants next argue that the court erred in

granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees and denying

reconsideration. Specifically, the Appellants take issue with

the court’s application of the legal standards with respect to

determining that their claims were time-barred under the

applicable statute of limitations. We review de novo a district

court’s order granting summary judgment. Providence Square

Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.D.F., Inc., 211 F.3d 846, 850 (4th Cir.

2000). Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is

sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to

return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment”

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is proper. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

249-50 (1986) (citations omitted).

Moreover, we review the denial of a Fed. R. Civ. P.

59(e) motion “under the deferential abuse of discretion

standard.” Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 407

(4th Cir. 2010). To merit relief under Rule 59(e), a movant has

to demonstrate (1) an intervening change in controlling law;

(2) new evidence not available at trial; or (3) that there has

been a clear error of law or a manifest injustice. Pac. Ins.

Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir.

1998).

To determine the applicable statute of limitations for

a § 1983 claim, a court must look to the state statute of

limitations for personal injury torts. Wallace v. Kato, 549

U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In this case, the West Virginia statute

of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. See

W. Va. Code § 55-2-12 (2009). “[T]he accrual date of a § 1983

action[, however,] is a question of federal law that is not

resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388.

We have carefully considered the relevant legal authorities and

conclude that the district court did not err in determining when

the Appellants’ claims accrued. We also conclude that the court

did not abuse its discretion in denying the Appellants’ motion

for reconsideration.

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Finally, the Appellants argue that the district court

abused its discretion in denying their post-judgment motion for

leave to amend the complaint to add new claims. We review a

district court’s denial of leave to file an amended complaint

for abuse of discretion. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 428

(4th Cir. 2006) (en banc). Once a defendant has filed a

responsive pleading, a plaintiff has only a limited time to

amend his complaint as a matter of course; after that, he may

amend his complaint only with leave of the court. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a)(1), (2). The Rules provide that leave should be

freely given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a)(2). This is so because of “the federal policy in favor of

resolving cases on their merits instead of disposing of them on

technicalities.” Laber, 438 F.3d at 426 (citation omitted).

Therefore, we have “interpreted Rule 15(a) to provide

that leave to amend a pleading should be denied only when the

amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has

been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment

would have been futile.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Moreover, “a post-judgment motion to amend

is evaluated under the same legal standard as a similar motion

filed before judgment was entered.” Id. at 427 (citation

omitted). In addition, while a district court must vacate its

judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) prior

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to granting a post-judgment motion for leave to amend a

complaint, “[a] conclusion that the district court abused its

discretion in denying a motion to amend . . . is sufficient

grounds on which to reverse the district court’s denial of a

Rule 59(e) motion.” Id. at 427-28 (citations omitted). Here,

however, we have thoroughly reviewed the record and the relevant

legal authorities and conclude that the district court’s

decision to deny leave to amend the complaint was not an abuse

of discretion.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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