Sabrina Brown v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1200

SABRINA RENEE BROWN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

HUNTINGTON INGALLS INCORPORATED,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Raymond A. Jackson,

District Judge. (4:11-cv-00044-RAJ-FBS)

Submitted: June 22, 2012 Decided: July 19, 2012

Before MOTZ, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sabrina Renee Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Scott William Kezman,

Anna Richardson Smith, KAUFMAN & CANOLES, PC, Norfolk, Virginia,

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Sabrina Renee Brown appeals the district court’s order

granting summary judgment to the defendant, Huntington Ingalls,

Inc., on her claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act,

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012) (“ADA”) and

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), 29

U.S.C.A. §§ 701-796 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012). Brown also

challenges the magistrate judge’s denial of several discovery

motions, seeks to supplement the record on appeal, and moves

this court to compel the production of discovery materials. For

the following reasons, we decline to supplement the record or

compel discovery, and we affirm the judgment below.

I. Discovery motions *

We review the denial of discovery prior to the grant

of summary judgment for an abuse of discretion. See Harrods

Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir.

*

Huntington contends that Brown has waived review of the

magistrate judge’s denial of her various discovery motions

because she did not challenge their disposition in the district

court. Because Brown, proceeding pro se, did not receive notice

of the consequences of failing to file timely objections to the

magistrate judge’s orders, however, her failure to object to

them below does not waive appellate review. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(a); Wells v. Shriners Hosp., 109 F.3d 198, 200-01 (4th Cir.

1997); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir.

1984).

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2002). A trial court necessarily has broad discretion in

managing pretrial discovery and an appellate court should not

disturb its orders absent a clear abuse of discretion. Ardrey

v. United Parcel Serv., 798 F.2d 679, 682 (4th Cir. 1986).

Having carefully reviewed the record, we find no abuse

of discretion in the magistrate judge’s denial of Brown’s

various discovery motions. Further, to the extent that Brown

seeks to supplement the record with additional materials and

information that were not considered by the district court, she

has failed to show that such supplementation would be

appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(e)(2)(C). Nor is her

present appeal the proper venue for her to seek the production

of additional discovery materials.

II. Summary judgment

We review de novo a district court’s order granting

summary judgment. See Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605, 607

(4th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment shall be granted when “there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). A district court should grant summary judgment unless a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party

on the evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Only disputes over facts that might

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affect the outcome of the suit under governing law, i.e.,

material facts, will properly preclude summary judgment. Id. at

248-49. “Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice

[to generate a genuine dispute of material fact], nor does a

mere scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving party’s

case. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649

(4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under the ADA, an employer may not discriminate

against a “qualified individual” based on her disability. 42

U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West Supp. 2012). A “qualified individual”

is one “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can

perform the essential functions of the employment position that

such individual holds or desires.” Id. It was Brown’s burden

at the summary judgment stage to project evidence that she could

perform the essential functions of the position in question

here, with or without reasonable accommodations. Tyndall v.

Nat’l Educ. Ctrs., Inc. of California, 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th

Cir. 1994). As the district court noted, Brown has failed to

produce competent or admissible evidence tending to contradict

Huntington’s well-documented determination that she was not a

“qualified individual.” Accordingly, summary judgment in favor

of Huntington on Brown's ADA claim was appropriate. For the

same reasons, any claim Brown sought to raise under the

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Rehabilitation Act also fails. See Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med.

Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1264-65 (4th Cir. 1995).

Therefore, we affirm the judgment below and deny

Brown’s pending motion to compel discovery. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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