Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2011 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION ET AL. v.

FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 10–1293. Argued January 10, 2012—Decided June 21, 2012*

Title 18 U. S. C. §1464 bans the broadcast of “any obscene, indecent, or

profane language.” The Federal Communications Commission

(Commission) began enforcing §1464 in the 1970’s. In FCC v. Pacif-

ica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, this Court found that the Commission’s

order banning George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue passed

First Amendment scrutiny, but did not decide whether “an occasional

expletive . . . would justify any sanction,” id., at 750. In the ensuing

years, the Commission went from strictly observing the narrow cir-

cumstances of Pacifica to indicating that it would assess the full con-

text of allegedly indecent broadcasts rather than limit its regulation

to an index of indecent words or pictures. However, it continued to

note the important difference between isolated and repeated broad-

casts of indecent material. And in a 2001 policy statement, it even

included, as one of the factors significant to the determination of

what was patently offensive, “whether the material dwells on or re-

peats at length” the offending description or depiction.

It was against this regulatory background that the three incidents

at issue took place. Two concern isolated utterances of obscene words

during two live broadcasts aired by respondent Fox Television Sta-

tions, Inc. The third occurred during an episode of a television show

broadcast by respondent ABC Television Network, when the nude

buttocks of an adult female character were shown for approximately

seven seconds and the side of her breast for a moment. After these

incidents, but before the Commission issued Notices of Apparent Lia-

——————

* Together with Federal Communications Commission v. ABC, Inc.,

et al. (see this Court’s Rule 12.4), also on certiorari to the same court.

2 FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.

Syllabus

bility to Fox and ABC, the Commission issued its Golden Globes Or-

der, declaring for the first time that fleeting expletives could be ac-

tionable. It then concluded that the Fox and ABC broadcasts violated

this new standard. It found the Fox broadcasts indecent, but de-

clined to propose forfeitures. The Second Circuit reversed, finding

the Commission’s decision to modify its indecency enforcement re-

gime to regulate fleeting expletives arbitrary and capricious. This

Court reversed and remanded for the Second Circuit to address re-

spondents’ First Amendment challenges. FCC v. Fox Television Sta-

tions, Inc., 556 U. S. 502. On remand, the Second Circuit found the

policy unconstitutionally vague and invalidated it in its entirety. In

the ABC case, the Commission found the display actionably indecent,

and imposed a $27,500 forfeiture on each of the 45 ABC-affiliated

stations that aired the episode. The Second Circuit vacated the order

in light of its Fox decision.

Held: Because the Commission failed to give Fox or ABC fair notice

prior to the broadcasts in question that fleeting expletives and mo-

mentary nudity could be found actionably indecent, the Commission’s

standards as applied to these broadcasts were vague. Pp. 11–18.

(a) The fundamental principle that laws regulating persons or enti-

ties must give fair notice of what conduct is required or proscribed,

see, e.g., Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391, is essen-

tial to the protections provided by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Pro-

cess Clause, see United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 304, which

requires the invalidation of impermissibly vague laws. A conviction

or punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute or regu-

lation under which it is obtained “fails to provide a person of ordinary

intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless

that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforce-

ment.” Ibid. The void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two

connected but discrete due process concerns: Regulated parties

should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly;

and precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the

law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way. When speech is

involved, rigorous adherence to those requirements is necessary to

ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech. Pp. 11–12.

(b) These concerns are implicated here, where the broadcasters

claim that the lengthy procedural history of their cases shows that

they did not have fair notice of what was forbidden. Under the 2001

Guidelines in force when the broadcasts occurred, a key consideration

was “whether the material dwell[ed] on or repeat[ed] at length” the

offending description or depiction, but in the 2004 Golden Globes Or-

der, issued after the broadcasts, the Commission changed course and

held that fleeting expletives could be a statutory violation. It then

Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 3

Syllabus

applied this new principle to these cases. Its lack of notice to Fox and

ABC of its changed interpretation failed to give them “fair notice of

what is prohibited.” Williams, supra, at 304. Pp. 12–13.

(c) Neither of the Government’s contrary arguments is persuasive.

It claims that Fox cannot establish unconstitutional vagueness be-

cause the Commission declined to impose a forfeiture on Fox and said

that it would not consider the indecent broadcast in renewing station

licenses or in other contexts. But the Commission has the statutory

power to take into account “any history of prior offenses” when set-

ting a forfeiture penalty, 47 U. S. C. §503(b)(2)(E), and the due pro-

cess protection against vague regulations “does not leave [regulated

parties] . . . at the mercy of noblesse oblige.” United States v. Stevens,

559 U. S. ___, ___. The challenged orders could also have an adverse

impact on Fox’s reputation with audiences and advertisers alike.

The Government argues that ABC had notice that its broadcast

would be considered indecent. But an isolated statement in a 1960

Commission decision declaring that televising nudes might be con-

trary to §1464 does not suffice for the fair notice required when the

Government intends to impose over a $1 million fine for allegedly

impermissible speech. Moreover, previous Commission decisions had

declined to find isolated and brief moments of nudity actionably inde-

cent. In light of these agency decisions, and the absence of any notice

in the 2001 Guidance that seven seconds of nude buttocks would be

found indecent, ABC lacked constitutionally sufficient notice prior to

being sanctioned. Pp. 13–17.

(d) It is necessary to make three observations about this decision’s

scope. First, because the Court resolves these cases on fair notice

grounds under the Due Process Clause, it need not address the First

Amendment implications of the Commission’s indecency policy or re-

consider Pacifica at this time. Second, because the Court rules that

Fox and ABC lacked notice at the time of their broadcasts that their

material could be found actionably indecent under then-existing poli-

cies, the Court need not address the constitutionality of the current

indecency policy as expressed in the Golden Globes Order and subse-

quent adjudications. Third, this opinion leaves the Commission free

to modify its current indecency policy in light of its determination of

the public interest and applicable legal requirements and leaves

courts free to review the current, or any modified, policy in light of its

content and application. Pp. 17–18.

613 F. 3d 317 (first case) and 404 Fed. Appx. 530 (second case), vacated

and remanded.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and SCALIA, THOMAS, BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.

4 FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.

Syllabus

GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. SOTOMAYOR,

J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.

Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 10–1293

_________________

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.,

ET AL.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS v. ABC, INC., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2012]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

In FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502,

529 (2009) (Fox I), the Court held that the Federal Com­

munication Commission’s decision to modify its indecency

enforcement regime to regulate so-called fleeting exple­

tives was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Court

then declined to address the constitutionality of the policy,

however, because the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit had yet to do so. On remand, the Court

of Appeals found the policy was vague and, as a result,

unconstitutional. 613 F. 3d 317 (2010). The case now

returns to this Court for decision upon the constitutional

question.

I

In Fox I, the Court described both the regulatory

framework through which the Commission regulates

broadcast indecency and the long procedural history of

2 FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

this case. The Court need not repeat all that history, but

some preliminary discussion is necessary to understand

the constitutional issue the case now presents.

A

Title 18 U. S. C. §1464 provides that “[w]hoever utters

any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of

radio communication shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not

more than two years, or both.” The Federal Communi­

cations Commission (Commission) has been instructed by

Congress to enforce §1464 between the hours of 6 a.m.

and 10 p.m., see Public Telecommunications Act of 1992,

§15(a), 106 Stat. 954, note following 47 U. S. C. §303,

p. 113 (Broadcasting of Indecent Programming). And the

Commission has applied its regulations to radio and tele­

vision broadcasters alike, see Fox I, supra, at 505–506;

see also 47 CFR §73.3999 (2010) (Commission regulation

prohibiting the broadcast of any obscene material or any

indecent material between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.). Although

the Commission has had the authority to regulate inde­

cent broadcasts under §1464 since 1948 (and its prede­

cessor commission, the Federal Radio Commission, since

1927), it did not begin to enforce §1464 until the 1970’s.

See Campbell, Pacifica Reconsidered: Implications for the

Current Controversy over Broadcast Indecency, 63 Fed.

Com. L. J. 195, 198 (2010).

This Court first reviewed the Commission’s indecency

policy in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978).

In Pacifica, the Commission determined that George

Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue was indecent. It con­

tained “ ‘language that describes, in terms patently offen­

sive as measured by contemporary community standards

for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities

and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable

risk that children may be in the audience.’ ” Id., at 732

(quoting 56 F. C. C. 2d 94, 98 (1975)). This Court upheld

Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 3

Opinion of the Court

the Commission’s ruling. The broadcaster’s statutory

challenge was rejected. The Court held the Commission

was not engaged in impermissible censorship within the

meaning of 47 U. S. C. §326 (1976 ed.), see 438 U. S., at

735–739, and that §1464’s definition of indecency was not

confined to speech with an appeal to the prurient interest,

see id., at 738–741. Finding no First Amendment viola­

tion, the decision explained the constitutional standard

under which regulations of broadcasters are assessed. It

observed that “broadcast media have established a uniquely

pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans,” id., at

748, and that “broadcasting is uniquely accessible to chil­

dren, even those too young to read,” id., at 749. In light

of these considerations, “broadcasting . . . has received the

most limited First Amendment protection.” Id., at 748.

Under this standard the Commission’s order passed con­

stitutional scrutiny. The Court did note the narrowness of

its holding, explaining that it was not deciding whether

“an occasional expletive . . . would justify any sanction.”

Id., at 750; see also id., at 760–761 (Powell, J., concur-

ring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[C]ertainly the

Court’s holding . . . does not speak to cases involving the

isolated use of a potentially offensive word in the course of

a radio broadcast, as distinguished from the verbal shock

treatment administered by respondent here”).

From 1978 to 1987, the Commission did not go beyond

the narrow circumstances of Pacifica and brought no

indecency enforcement actions. See In re Infinity Broad-

casting Corp., 3 FCC Rcd. 930 (1987); see also In re Appli-

cation of WGBH Educ. Foundation, 69 F. C. C. 2d 1250,

1254 (1978) (Commission declaring it “intend[s] strictly to

observe the narrowness of the Pacifica holding”). Recog­

nizing that Pacifica provided “no general prerogative to

intervene in any case where words similar or identical to

those in Pacifica are broadcast over a licensed radio or

television station,” the Commission distinguished between

4 FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

the “repetitive occurrence of the ‘indecent’ words” (such as

in the Carlin monologue) and an “isolated” or “occasional”

expletive, that would not necessarily be actionable. 69

F. C. C. 2d, at 1254.

In 1987, the Commission determined it was applying the

Pacifica standard in too narrow a way. It stated that in

later cases its definition of indecent language would “ap­

propriately includ[e] a broader range of material than the

seven specific words at issue in [the Carlin monologue].”

In re Pacifica Foundation Inc., 2 FCC Rcd. 2698, 2699.

Thus, the Commission indicated it would use the “generic

definition of indecency” articulated in its 1975 Pacifica

order, Infinity Order, 3 FCC Rcd., at 930, and assess the

full context of allegedly indecent broadcasts rather than

limiting its regulation to a “comprehensive index . . . of

indecent words or pictorial depictions,” id., at 932.

Even under this context based approach, the Commis­

sion continued to note the important difference between

isolated and repeated broadcasts of indecent material. See

ibid. (considering variables in determining whether mate­

rial is patently offensive including “whether allegedly

offensive material is isolated or fleeting”). In the context

of expletives, the Commission determined “deliberate and

repetitive use in a patently offensive manner is a requisite

to a finding of indecency.” Pacifica Order, 2 FCC Rcd., at

2699. For speech “involving the description or depiction

of sexual or excretory functions . . . [t]he mere fact that

specific words or phrases are not repeated does not man­

date a finding that material that is otherwise patently

offensive . . . is not indecent.” Ibid.

In 2001, the Commission issued a policy statement

intended “to provide guidance to the broadcast industry

regarding [its] caselaw interpreting 18 U. S. C. §1464 and

[its] enforcement policies with respect to broadcast inde­

cency.” In re Industry Guidance on Commission’s Case

Law Interpreting 18 U. S. C. §1464 and Enforcement

Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 5

Opinion of the Court

Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 FCC Rcd.

7999. In that document the Commission restated that for

material to be indecent it must depict sexual or excretory

organs or activities and be patently offensive as measured

by contemporary community standards for the broadcast

medium. Id., at 8002. Describing the framework of what

it considered patently offensive, the Commission explained

that three factors had proved significant:

“(1) [T]he explicitness or graphic nature of the de­

scription or depiction of sexual or excretory organs or

activities; (2) whether the material dwells on or re­

peats at length descriptions of sexual or excretory or­

gans or activities; (3) whether the material appears to

pander or is used to titillate, or whether the material

appears to have been presented for its shock value.”

Id., at 8003 (emphasis deleted).

As regards the second of these factors, the Commission

explained that “[r]epetition of and persistent focus on

sexual or excretory material have been cited consistently

as factors that exacerbate the potential offensiveness of

broadcasts. In contrast, where sexual or excretory refer­

ences have been made once or have been passing or fleet­

ing in nature, this characteristic has tended to weigh

against a finding of indecency.” Id., at 8008. The Com­

mission then gave examples of material that was not

found indecent because it was fleeting and isolated, id., at

8008–8009 (citing, e.g., L. M. Communications of South

Carolina, Inc. (WYBB(FM)), 7 FCC Rcd. 1595 (MMB 1992)

(finding “a fleeting and isolated utterance” in the context

of live and spontaneous programming not actionable)), and

contrasted it with fleeting references that were found

patently offensive in light of other factors, 16 FCC Rcd., at

8009 (citing, e.g., Tempe Radio, Inc. (KUPD–FM), 12 FCC

Rcd. 21828 (MMB 1997) (finding fleeting language that

clearly refers to sexual activity with a child to be patently

6 FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

offensive)).

B

It was against this regulatory background that the three

incidents of alleged indecency at issue here took place.

First, in the 2002 Billboard Music Awards, broadcast by

respondent Fox Television Stations, Inc., the singer Cher

exclaimed during an unscripted acceptance speech: “I’ve

also had my critics for the last 40 years saying that I was

on my way out every year. Right. So f *** ‘em.” 613 F. 3d,

at 323. Second, Fox broadcast the Billboard Music Awards

again in 2003. There, a person named Nicole Richie

made the following unscripted remark while presenting an

award: “Have you ever tried to get cow s*** out of a Prada

purse? It’s not so f ***ing simple.” Ibid. The third in­

cident involved an episode of NYPD Blue, a regular tele­

vision show broadcast by respondent ABC Television

Network. The episode broadcast on February 25, 2003,

showed the nude buttocks of an adult female character for

approximately seven seconds and for a moment the side

of her breast. During the scene, in which the character

was preparing to take a shower, a child portraying her boy­

friend’s son entered the bathroom. A moment of awk­

wardness followed. 404 Fed. Appx. 530, 533–534 (CA2

2011). The Commission received indecency complaints

about all three broadcasts. See Fox I, 556 U. S., at 510;

404 Fed. Appx., at 534.

After these incidents, but before the Commission issued

Notices of Apparent Liability to Fox and ABC, the Com­

mission issued a decision sanctioning NBC for a comment

made by the singer Bono during the 2003 Golden Globe

Awards. Upon winning the award for Best Original Song,

Bono exclaimed: “ ‘This is really, really, f ***ing brilliant.

Really, really great.’ ” In re Complaints Against Various

Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden

Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4976, n. 4

Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 7

Opinion of the Court

(2004) (Golden Globes Order). Reversing a decision by its

enforcement bureau, the Commission found the use of

the F-word actionably indecent. Id., at 4975–4976. The

Commission held that the word was “one of the most vul­

gar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity

in the English language,” and thus found “any use of that

word or a variation, in any context, inherently has a sex­

ual connotation.” Id., at 4978–4979. Turning to the iso­

lated nature of the expletive, the Commission reversed prior

rulings that had found fleeting expletives not indecent.

The Commission held “the mere fact that specific words or

phrases are not sustained or repeated does not mandate a

finding that material that is otherwise patently offensive

to the broadcast medium is not indecent.” Id., at 4980; see

also id., at 4982 (“Just as the Court [in Pacifica] held

that . . . the George Carlin routine ‘could have enlarged

a child’s vocabulary in an instant,’ we believe that even

isolated broadcasts of the ‘F-Word’ in situations such as

that here could do so as well”).

C

Even though the incidents at issue in these cases took

place before the Golden Globes Order, the Commission

applied its new policy regarding fleeting expletives and

fleeting nudity. It found the broadcasts by respondents

Fox and ABC to be in violation of this standard.

1

As to Fox, the Commission found the two Billboard

Awards broadcasts indecent in In re Complaints Regard-

ing Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2,

2002, and March 8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 2664 (2006). Nu­

merous parties petitioned for a review of the order in the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The Court of Appeals granted the Commission’s request

for a voluntary remand so that it could respond to the

8 FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

parties’ objections. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC,

489 F. 3d 444, 453 (2007). In its remand order, the Com­

mission applied its tripartite definition of patently offen­

sive material from its 2001 Order and found that both

broadcasts fell well within its scope. See In re Complaints

Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Febru-

ary 2, 2002, and March 8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 13299 (2006)

(Remand Order); see also Fox I, supra, at 511–513 (dis­

cussing in detail the Commission’s findings). As pertains

to the constitutional issue in these cases, the Commission

noted that under the policy clarified in the Golden Globes

Order, “categorically requiring repeated use of expletives

in order to find material indecent is inconsistent with

our general approach to indecency enforcement.” Remand

Order, 21 FCC Rcd., at 13308; see also id., at 13325

(“[U]nder our Golden Globe precedent, the fact that Cher

used the ‘F-word’ once does not remove her comment from

the realm of actionable indecency”). Though the Commis­

sion deemed Fox should have known Nicole Richie’s com­

ments were actionably indecent even prior to the Golden

Globes Order, 21 FCC Rcd., at 13307, it declined to pro­

pose a forfeiture in light of the limited nature of the Sec­

ond Circuit’s remand. Id., at 13321. The Commission

acknowledged that “it was not apparent that Fox could be

penalized for Cher’s comment at the time it was broad­

cast.” And so, as in the Golden Globes case it imposed no

penalty for that broadcast. Id., at 13324, 13326.

Fox and various intervenors returned to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, raising ad­

ministrative, statutory, and constitutional challenges to

the Commission’s indecency regulations. See Fox Televi-

sion Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F. 3d 444. In a 2-to-1 deci­

sion, with Judge Leval dissenting, the Court of Appeals

found the Remand Order arbitrary and capricious because

“the FCC has made a 180-degree turn regarding its treat­

ment of ‘fleeting expletives’ without providing a reasoned

Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 9

Opinion of the Court

explanation justifying the about-face.” 489 F. 3d, at 455.

While noting its skepticism as to whether the Commis­

sion’s fleeting expletive regime “would pass constitutional

muster,” the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to ad­

dress the issue. Id., at 462.

The case came here on certiorari. Citing the Adminis­

trative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §551 et seq., this Court

noted that the Judiciary may set aside agency action that

is arbitrary or capricious. In the context of a change in

policy (such as the Commission’s determination that fleet­

ing expletives could be indecent), the decision held an

agency, in the ordinary course, should acknowledge that it

is in fact changing its position and “show that there are

good reasons for the new policy.” Fox I, 553 U. S., at 515.

There is no need, however, for an agency to provide de­

tailed justifications for every change or to show that the

reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for

the old one. Ibid.

Judged under this standard, the Court in Fox I found

the Commission’s new indecency enforcement policy nei­

ther arbitrary nor capricious. Id., at 517. The Court noted

the Commission had acknowledged breaking new ground

in ruling that fleeting and nonliteral expletives could be

indecent under the controlling standards; the Court con­

cluded the agency’s reasons for expanding the scope of its

enforcement activity were rational. Ibid. Not only was it

“certainly reasonable to determine that it made no sense

to distinguish between literal and nonliteral uses of offen­

sive words,” ibid., but the Court agreed that the Commis­

sion’s decision to “look at the patent offensiveness of even

isolated uses of sexual and excretory words fits with the

context-based approach [approved] . . . in Pacifica.” Ibid.

Given that “[e]ven isolated utterances can . . . constitute

harmful ‘first blow[s]’ to children,” the Court held that

the Commission could “decide it needed to step away from

its old regime where nonrepetitive use of an expletive

10 FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

was per se nonactionable.” Id., at 518. Having found the

agency’s action to be neither arbitrary nor capricious, the

Court remanded for the Court of Appeals to address re­

spondents’ First Amendment challenges. Id., at 529–530.

On remand from Fox I, the Court of Appeals held the

Commission’s indecency policy unconstitutionally vague

and invalidated it in its entirety. 613 F. 3d, at 327.

The Court of Appeals found the policy, as expressed in

the 2001 Guidance and subsequent Commission decisions,

failed to give broadcasters sufficient notice of what would

be considered indecent. Surveying a number of Commis­

sion adjudications, the court found the Commission was

inconsistent as to which words it deemed patently offen­

sive. See id., at 330. It also determined that the Com­

mission’s presumptive prohibition on the F-word and the

S-word was plagued by vagueness because the Commission

had on occasion found the fleeting use of those words not

indecent provided they occurred during a bona fide news

interview or were “demonstrably essential to the nature

of an artistic or educational work.” Id., at 331 (internal

quotation marks omitted). The Commission’s application

of these exceptions, according to the Court of Appeals,

left broadcasters guessing whether an expletive would be

deemed artistically integral to a program or whether a

particular broadcast would be considered a bona fide news

interview. The Court of Appeals found the vagueness in­

herent in the policy had forced broadcasters to “choose

between not airing . . . controversial programs [or] risking

massive fines or possibly even loss of their licenses.” Id.,

at 334. And the court found that there was “ample evi­

dence in the record” that this harsh choice had led to a

chill of protected speech. Ibid.

2

The procedural history regarding ABC is more brief.

On February 19, 2008, the Commission issued a forfeiture

Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 11

Opinion of the Court

order finding the display of the woman’s nude buttocks

in NYPD Blue was actionably indecent. See In re Com-

plaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning

Their February 24, 2003 Broadcast of the Program “NYPD

Blue”, 23 FCC Rcd. 3147 (2008). The Commission deter­

mined that, regardless of medical definitions, displays of

buttocks fell within the category of displays of sexual or

excretory organs because the depiction was “widely associ­

ated with sexual arousal and closely associated by most

people with excretory activities.” Id., at 3150. The scene

was deemed patently offensive as measured by contempo­

rary community standards, ibid.; and the Commission

determined that “[t]he female actor’s nudity is presented

in a manner that clearly panders to and titillates the

audience,” id., at 3153. Unlike in the Fox case, the Com­

mission imposed a forfeiture of $27,500 on each of the 45

ABC-affiliated stations that aired the indecent episode. In

a summary order the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit vacated the forfeiture order, determin­

ing that it was bound by its Fox decision striking down the

entirety of the Commission’s indecency policy. See 404

Fed. Appx., at 533.

The Government sought review of both judgments, see

Brief for Petitioners 1, and this Court granted certiorari,

564 U. S. ____ (2011). These are the cases before us.

II

A fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws

which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of

conduct that is forbidden or required. See Connally v.

General Constr. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926) (“[A] statute

which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in

terms so vague that men of common intelligence must

necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its appli­

cation, violates the first essential of due process of law”);

Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 162 (1972)

12 FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

(“Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions,

one of which is that ‘[all persons] are entitled to be in­

formed as to what the State commands or forbids’ ” (quot­

ing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939)

(alteration in original))). This requirement of clarity in

regulation is essential to the protections provided by the

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United

States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 304 (2008). It requires

the invalidation of laws that are impermissibly vague. A

conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process

if the statute or regulation under which it is obtained

“fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair

notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that

it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory en­

forcement.” Ibid. As this Court has explained, a regula­

tion is not vague because it may at times be difficult to

prove an incriminating fact but rather because it is un­

clear as to what fact must be proved. See id., at 306.

Even when speech is not at issue, the void for vagueness

doctrine addresses at least two connected but discrete due

process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know

what is required of them so they may act accordingly;

second, precision and guidance are necessary so that those

enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discrimina­

tory way. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104,

108–109 (1972). When speech is involved, rigorous adher­

ence to those requirements is necessary to ensure that

ambiguity does not chill protected speech.

These concerns are implicated here because, at the out­

set, the broadcasters claim they did not have, and do

not have, sufficient notice of what is proscribed. And

leaving aside any concerns about facial invalidity, they

contend that the lengthy procedural history set forth

above shows that the broadcasters did not have fair notice

of what was forbidden. Under the 2001 Guidelines in

force when the broadcasts occurred, a key consideration

Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 13

Opinion of the Court

was “ ‘whether the material dwell[ed] on or repeat[ed] at

length’ ” the offending description or depiction. 613 F. 3d,

at 322. In the 2004 Golden Globes Order, issued after the

broadcasts, the Commission changed course and held that

fleeting expletives could be a statutory violation. Fox I,

556 U. S., at 512. In the challenged orders now under

review the Commission applied the new principle promul­

gated in the Golden Globes Order and determined fleeting

expletives and a brief moment of indecency were action­

ably indecent. This regulatory history, however, makes it

apparent that the Commission policy in place at the time

of the broadcasts gave no notice to Fox or ABC that a

fleeting expletive or a brief shot of nudity could be action­

ably indecent; yet Fox and ABC were found to be in viola­

tion. The Commission’s lack of notice to Fox and ABC that

its interpretation had changed so the fleeting moments of

indecency contained in their broadcasts were a violation of

§1464 as interpreted and enforced by the agency “fail[ed]

to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of

what is prohibited.” Williams, supra, at 304. This would

be true with respect to a regulatory change this abrupt on

any subject, but it is surely the case when applied to the

regulations in question, regulations that touch upon “sen­

sitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,” Baggett

v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 372 (1964); see also Reno v. Amer-

ican Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 870–871 (1997)

(“The vagueness of [a content-based regulation of speech]

raises special First Amendment concerns because of its ob­

vious chilling effect”).

The Government raises two arguments in response, but

neither is persuasive. As for the two fleeting expletives,

the Government concedes that “Fox did not have reason­

able notice at the time of the broadcasts that the Com­

mission would consider non-repeated expletives indecent.”

Brief for Petitioners 28, n. 3. The Government argues,

nonetheless, that Fox “cannot establish unconstitutional

14 FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

vagueness on that basis . . . because the Commission did

not impose a sanction where Fox lacked such notice.” Ibid.

As the Court observed when the case was here three

Terms ago, it is true that the Commission declined to

impose any forfeiture on Fox, see 556 U. S., at 513, and in

its order the Commission claimed that it would not con­

sider the indecent broadcasts either when considering

whether to renew stations’ licenses or “in any other con­

text,” 21 FCC Rcd., at 13321, 13326. This “policy of for­

bearance,” as the Government calls it, does not suffice to

make the issue moot. Brief for Petitioners 31. Though the

Commission claims it will not consider the prior indecent

broadcasts “in any context,” it has the statutory power

to take into account “any history of prior offenses” when

setting the level of a forfeiture penalty. See 47 U. S. C.

§503(b)(2)(E). Just as in the First Amendment context,

the due process protection against vague regulations “does

not leave [regulated parties] . . . at the mercy of noblesse

oblige.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010)

(slip op., at 18). Given that the Commission found it

was “not inequitable to hold Fox responsible for [the 2003

broadcast],” 21 FCC Rcd., at 13314, and that it has the

statutory authority to use its finding to increase any fu­

ture penalties, the Government’s assurance it will elect

not to do so is insufficient to remedy the constitutional

violation.

In addition, when combined with the legal consequence

described above, reputational injury provides further rea­

son for granting relief to Fox. Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424

U. S. 693, 708–709 (1976) (explaining that an “alteration

of legal status . . . combined with the injury resulting

from the defamation” justifies the invocation of procedural

safeguards). As respondent CBS points out, findings of

wrongdoing can result in harm to a broadcaster’s “reputa­

tion with viewers and advertisers.” Brief for Respondent

CBS Television Network Affiliates Assn. et al. 17. This

Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 15

Opinion of the Court

observation is hardly surprising given that the challenged

orders, which are contained in the permanent Commission

record, describe in strongly disapproving terms the inde­

cent material broadcast by Fox, see, e.g., 21 FCC Rcd., at

13310–13311, ¶30 (noting the “explicit, graphic, vulgar,

and shocking nature of Ms. Richie’s comments”), and Fox’s

efforts to protect children from being exposed to it, see id.,

at 13311, ¶33 (finding Fox had failed to exercise “ ‘rea­

sonable judgment, responsibility, and sensitivity to the

public’s needs and tastes to avoid [a] patently offensive

broadcas[t]’ ”). Commission sanctions on broadcasters for

indecent material are widely publicized. See, e.g., F. C. C.

Fines Fox, N. Y. Times, Feb. 26, 2008, p. E2; F. C. C. Plans

Record Fine for CBS, Washington Post, Sept. 24, 2004,

p. E1. The challenged orders could have an adverse impact

on Fox’s reputation that audiences and advertisers alike

are entitled to take into account.

With respect to ABC, the Government with good reason

does not argue no sanction was imposed. The fine against

ABC and its network affiliates for the seven seconds of

nudity was nearly $1.24 million. See Brief for Respondent

ABC, Inc., et al. 7 (hereinafter ABC Brief). The Govern­

ment argues instead that ABC had notice that the scene in

NYPD Blue would be considered indecent in light of a

1960 decision where the Commission declared that the

“televising of nudes might well raise a serious question of

programming contrary to 18 U. S. C. §1464.” Brief for

Petitioners 32 (quoting Enbanc Programming Inquiry, 44

FCC 2303, 2307 (internal quotation marks omitted)). This

argument does not prevail. An isolated and ambiguous

statement from a 1960 Commission decision does not

suffice for the fair notice required when the Government

intends to impose over a $1 million fine for allegedly im­

permissible speech. The Commission, furthermore, had

released decisions before sanctioning ABC that declined to

find isolated and brief moments of nudity actionably inde­

16 FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

cent. See, e.g., In re Application of WGBH, 69 F. C. C.

2d, at 1251, 1255 (declining to find broadcasts contain-

ing nudity to be indecent and emphasizing the difference

between repeated and isolated expletives); In re WPBN/

WTOM License Subsidiary, Inc., 15 FCC Rcd. 1838,

1840 (2000) (finding full frontal nudity in Schind-

ler’s List not indecent). This is not to say, of course, that

a graphic scene from Schindler’s List involving nude

concentration camp prisoners is the same as the shower

scene from NYPD Blue. It does show, however, that the

Government can point to nothing that would have given

ABC affirmative notice that its broadcast would be consid­

ered actionably indecent. It is likewise not sufficient for

the Commission to assert, as it did in its order, that

though “the depiction [of nudity] here is not as lengthy or

repeated” as in some cases, the shower scene nonetheless

“does contain more shots or lengthier depictions of nudity”

than in other broadcasts found not indecent. 23 FCC Rcd.,

at 3153. This broad language fails to demonstrate that

ABC had fair notice that its broadcast could be found

indecent. In fact, a Commission ruling prior to the airing

of the NYPD Blue episode had deemed 30 seconds of nude

buttocks “very brief ” and not actionably indecent in the

context of the broadcast. See Letter from Norman Gold­

stein to David Molina, FCC File No. 97110028 (May 26,

1999), in App. to Brief for Respondent ABC Television

Affiliates Assn. et al. 1a; see also Letter from Edythe Wise

to Susan Cavin, FCC File No. 91100738 (Aug. 13, 1992),

id., at 18a, 19a. In light of this record of agency decisions,

and the absence of any notice in the 2001 Guidance that

seven seconds of nude buttocks would be found indecent,

ABC lacked constitutionally sufficient notice prior to being

sanctioned.

The Commission failed to give Fox or ABC fair notice

prior to the broadcasts in question that fleeting expletives

and momentary nudity could be found actionably indecent.

Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 17

Opinion of the Court

Therefore, the Commission’s standards as applied to these

broadcasts were vague, and the Commission’s orders must

be set aside.

III

It is necessary to make three observations about the

scope of this decision. First, because the Court resolves

these cases on fair notice grounds under the Due Process

Clause, it need not address the First Amendment implica­

tions of the Commission’s indecency policy. It is argued

that this Court’s ruling in Pacifica (and the less rigorous

standard of scrutiny it provided for the regulation of

broadcasters, see 438 U. S. 726) should be overruled be­

cause the rationale of that case has been overtaken by

technological change and the wide availability of multiple

other choices for listeners and viewers. See, e.g., ABC

Brief 48–57; Brief for Respondent Fox Television Stations,

Inc., et al. 15–26. The Government for its part maintains

that when it licenses a conventional broadcast spectrum,

the public may assume that the Government has its own

interest in setting certain standards. See Brief for Peti­

tioners 40–53. These arguments need not be addressed

here. In light of the Court’s holding that the Commission’s

policy failed to provide fair notice it is unnecessary to

reconsider Pacifica at this time.

This leads to a second observation. Here, the Court

rules that Fox and ABC lacked notice at the time of their

broadcasts that the material they were broadcasting could

be found actionably indecent under then-existing policies.

Given this disposition, it is unnecessary for the Court

to address the constitutionality of the current indecency

policy as expressed in the Golden Globes Order and sub­

sequent adjudications. The Court adheres to its normal

practice of declining to decide cases not before it. See,

e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 631 (1950) (“Broader

issues have been urged for our consideration, but we

18 FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

adhere to the principle of deciding constitutional ques­

tions only in the context of the particular case before the

Court”).

Third, this opinion leaves the Commission free to modify

its current indecency policy in light of its determination of

the public interest and applicable legal requirements. And

it leaves the courts free to review the current policy or any

modified policy in light of its content and application.

* * *

The judgments of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit are vacated, and the cases are re­

manded for further proceedings consistent with the prin­

ciples set forth in this opinion.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR took no part in the consideration

or decision of these cases.

Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 1

GINSBURG, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 10–1293

_________________

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.,

ET AL.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS v. ABC, INC., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2012]

JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring in the judgment.

In my view, the Court’s decision in FCC v. Pacifica

Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978), was wrong when it

issued. Time, technological advances, and the Commis-

sion’s untenable rulings in the cases now before the Court

show why Pacifica bears reconsideration. Cf. FCC v. Fox

Television Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502, 532–535 (2009)

(THOMAS, J., concurring).