Mayle v. Felix

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2004 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MAYLE, WARDEN v. FELIX

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 04–563. Argued April 19, 2005—Decided June 23, 2005

Respondent Felix was convicted of murder and robbery in California

state court and sentenced to life imprisonment. His current applica-

tion for federal habeas relief centers on two alleged trial-court errors,

both involving the admission of out-of-court statements during the

prosecutor’s case-in-chief but otherwise unrelated. Felix had made

inculpatory statements during pretrial police interrogation. He al-

leged that those statements were coerced, and that their admission

violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

He also alleged that the admission of a videotape recording of testi-

mony of a prosecution witness violated the Sixth Amendment’s Con-

frontation Clause.

Felix’s conviction was affirmed on appeal and became final on Au-

gust 12, 1997. Under the one-year limitation period imposed by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28

U. S. C. §2244(d)(1), Felix had until August 12, 1998 to file a habeas

petition in federal court. On May 8, 1998, in a timely filed habeas pe-

tition, Felix asserted his Confrontation Clause challenge to admission

of the videotaped prosecution witness testimony, but did not then

challenge the admission of his own pretrial statements. On January

28, 1999, over five months after the August 12, 1998 expiration of

AEDPA’s time limit and eight months after the court appointed coun-

sel to represent him, Felix filed an amended petition asserting a Fifth

Amendment objection to admission of his pretrial statements. In re-

sponse to the State’s argument that the Fifth Amendment claim was

time barred, Felix asserted the rule that pleading amendments relate

back to the filing date of the original pleading when both the original

plea and the amendment arise out of the same “conduct, transaction,

or occurrence set forth . . . in the original pleading,” Fed. Rule Civ.

2 MAYLE v. FELIX

Syllabus

Proc. 15(c)(2). Because his Fifth Amendment and Confrontation

Clause claims challenged the constitutionality of the same criminal

conviction, Felix urged, both claims arose out of the same “conduct,

transaction, or occurrence.” The District Court dismissed the Fifth

Amendment claim as time barred, and rejected the Confrontation

Clause claim on its merits. The Ninth Circuit affirmed as to the lat-

ter claim, but reversed the dismissal of the coerced statements claim

and remanded it for further proceedings. In the court’s view, the

relevant “transaction” for Rule 15(c)(2) purposes was Felix’s state-

court trial and conviction. Defining transaction with greater specific-

ity, the court reasoned, would unduly strain the meaning of “conduct,

transaction, or occurrence” by dividing the trial and conviction into a

series of individual occurrences.

Held: An amended habeas petition does not relate back (and thereby

avoid AEDPA’s one-year time limit) when it asserts a new ground for

relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those

set forth in the original pleading. Pp. 7–18.

(a) Under §2244(d)(1), a one-year limitation period applies to a

state prisoner’s federal habeas application. Habeas Corpus Rule 11

permits application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in habeas

cases “to the extent [the civil rules] are not inconsistent with any

statutory provisions or [the habeas] rules.” Section 2242 provides

that habeas applications “may be amended . . . as provided in the

rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.” Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(a) allows pleading amendments with “leave of court”

any time during a proceeding. Before a responsive pleading is

served, pleadings may be amended once as a “matter of course,” i.e.,

without seeking court leave. Ibid. Amendments made after the stat-

ute of limitations has run relate back to the date of the original

pleading if the original and amended pleadings “ar[i]se out of the

same conduct, transaction, or occurrence.” Rule 15(c)(2). The “origi-

nal pleading” in a habeas proceeding is the petition as initially filed.

That pleading must “specify all the grounds for relief available to the

petitioner” and “state the facts supporting each ground.” Habeas

Corpus Rule 2(c). A prime purpose of Rule 2(c)’s demand that peti-

tioners plead with particularity is to assist the district court in de-

termining whether the State should be ordered to “show cause why

the writ should not be granted,” §2243, or the petition instead should

be summarily dismissed without ordering a responsive pleading.

Habeas Corpus Rule 4. Pp. 7–9.

(b) Under the Ninth Circuit’s comprehensive definition of “conduct,

transaction, or occurrence,” virtually any new claim introduced in an

amended habeas petition will relate back, for federal habeas claims,

by their very nature, challenge the constitutionality of a conviction or

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3

Syllabus

sentence, and commonly attack proceedings anterior thereto. The

majority of Circuits define “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” in

federal habeas cases far less broadly, allowing relation back only

when the claims added by amendment arise from the same core facts

as the timely filed claims, and not when the new claims depend upon

events separate in both time and type from the originally raised epi-

sodes. Under that view, Felix’s own pretrial statements, newly

raised in his amended petition, would not relate back because they

were separated in time and type from the videotaped witness testi-

mony. This Court is not aware, in the run-of-the-mine civil proceed-

ings Rule 15 governs, of any reading of “conduct, transaction, or oc-

currence” as capacious as the Ninth Circuit’s construction for habeas

cases. Decisions applying Rule 15(c)(2) in the civil context illustrate

that Rule 15(c)(2) relaxes, but does not obliterate, the statute of limi-

tations; hence relation back depends on the existence of a common

core of operative facts uniting the original and newly asserted claims.

The Court disagrees with Felix’s assertion that he seeks, and the

Ninth Circuit accorded, no wider range for Rule 15(c)’s relation-back

provision than was given the words “conduct, transaction, or occur-

rence” in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 323 U. S. 574, 580–581.

There, the amended complaint invoked a legal theory not suggested

in the original complaint and relied on facts not originally asserted.

Relation back was nevertheless permitted. In Tiller, however, there

was but one “occurrence,” the death of the petitioner’s husband,

which she attributed throughout to the respondent’s failure to pro-

vide a safe workplace. In contrast, Felix targeted discrete episodes,

the videotaped witness testimony in his original petition and his own

interrogation at a different time and place in his amended petition.

Pp. 9–13.

Felix’s contention that the trial itself is the appropriate “transac-

tion” or “occurrence” artificially truncates his claims by homing in

only on what makes those claims actionable in a habeas proceeding.

Although his self-incrimination claim did not ripen until the prosecu-

tor introduced his pretrial statements at trial, the essential predicate

for his Fifth Amendment claim was an extrajudicial event, i.e., an

out-of-court police interrogation. The dispositive question in an ad-

judication of that claim would be the character of the police interro-

gation, specifically, did Felix answer voluntarily or were his state-

ments coerced. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 513–514.

Under Habeas Corpus Rule 2(c)’s particularity-in-pleading require-

ment, Felix’s Confrontation Clause claim would be pleaded discretely,

as would his self-incrimination claim. Each separate congeries of

facts supporting the grounds for relief, the Rule suggests, would de-

lineate an “occurrence.” Felix’s and the Ninth Circuit’s approach is

4 MAYLE v. FELIX

Syllabus

boundless by comparison, allowing a miscellany of claims for relief to

be raised later rather than sooner and to relate back. If claims as-

serted after the one-year period could be revived simply because they re-

late to the same trial, conviction, or sentence as a timely filed claim,

AEDPA’s limitation period would have slim significance. Pp. 13–16.

Felix’s argument that a firm check against petition amendments pre-

senting new, discrete claims after AEDPA’s limitation period has run is

provided by Rule 15(a)—which gives district courts discretion to deny

petition amendments once a responsive pleading has been filed—

overlooks a pleader’s right to amend without leave of court “any time be-

fore a responsive pleading is served.” That time can be long under Ha-

beas Corpus Rule 4, pursuant to which a petition is not served until the

judge first examines it to determine whether “it plainly appears . . . that

the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” This Court’s reading that rela-

tion back will be in order so long as the original and amended peti-

tions state claims that are tied to a common core of operative facts is

consistent with Rule 15(c)(2)’s general application in civil cases, with

Habeas Corpus Rule 2(c), and with AEDPA’s tight time line for peti-

tions. Pp. 16–18.

379 F. 3d 612, reversed and remanded.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST,

C. J., and O’CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and BREYER, JJ.,

joined. SOUTER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, J.,

joined.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 04–563

_________________

DENEICE A. MAYLE, WARDEN, PETITIONER v.

JACOBY LEE FELIX

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 23, 2005]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case involves two federal prescriptions: the one-

year limitation period imposed on federal habeas corpus

petitioners by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(1); and

the rule that pleading amendments relate back to the

filing date of the original pleading when both the original

plea and the amendment arise out of the same “conduct,

transaction, or occurrence,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(c)(2).

Jacoby Lee Felix, California prisoner and federal habeas

petitioner, was convicted in California state court of first-

degree murder and second-degree robbery, and received a

life sentence. Within the one-year limitation period

AEDPA allows for habeas petitions, Felix filed a pro se

petition in federal court. He initially alleged, inter alia,

that the admission into evidence of videotaped testimony

of a witness for the prosecution violated his rights under

the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. Five

months after the expiration of AEDPA’s time limit, and

eight months after the federal court appointed counsel to

represent him, Felix filed an amended petition in which he

2 MAYLE v. FELIX

Opinion of the Court

added a new claim for relief: He asserted that, in the

course of pretrial interrogation, the police used coercive

tactics to obtain damaging statements from him, and that

admission of those statements at trial violated his Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination. The ques-

tion presented concerns the timeliness of Felix’s Fifth

Amendment claim.

In ordinary civil proceedings, the governing Rule, Rule 8

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requires only “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases

requires a more detailed statement. The habeas rule

instructs the petitioner to “specify all the grounds for relief

available to [him]” and to “state the facts supporting each

ground.”1 By statute, Congress provided that a habeas

petition “may be amended . . . as provided in the rules of

procedure applicable to civil actions.” 28 U. S. C. §2242.

The Civil Rule on amended pleadings, Rule 15 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, instructs: “An amend-

ment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original

pleading when . . . the claim . . . asserted in the amended

pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occur-

rence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original

pleading.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(c)(2).

The issue before us is one on which federal appellate

courts have divided: Whether, under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(c)(2), Felix’s amended petition, filed after

AEDPA’s one-year limitation and targeting his pretrial

statements, relates back to the date of his original timely

filed petition, which targeted the videotaped witness

——————

1 TheHabeas Corpus Rules were recently amended, effective Decem-

ber 1, 2004. Because the amended Rules are not materially different

from those in effect when Felix filed his habeas petition, this opinion

refers to the current version of the Rules.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3

Opinion of the Court

testimony. Felix urges, and the Court of Appeals held,

that the amended petition qualifies for relation back be-

cause both the original petition and the amended pleading

arose from the same trial and conviction. We reverse the

Court of Appeals’ judgment in this regard. An amended

habeas petition, we hold, does not relate back (and thereby

escape AEDPA’s one-year time limit) when it asserts a

new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both

time and type from those the original pleading set forth.

I

In 1995, after a jury trial in Sacramento, California,

respondent Jacoby Lee Felix was found guilty of murder

and robbery stemming from his participation in a carjack-

ing in which the driver of the car was shot and killed.

App. E to Pet. for Cert. 2–7. He was sentenced to life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole. App. C to

Pet. for Cert. 1–2. The current controversy centers on two

alleged errors at Felix’s trial. Both involve the admission

of out-of-court statements during the prosecutor’s case in

chief, but the two are otherwise unrelated. One prompted

a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination objection originally

raised in the trial court, the other, a Sixth Amendment

Confrontation Clause challenge, also raised in the trial

proceedings.

Felix’s Fifth Amendment claim rested on the prosecu-

tion’s introduction of statements Felix made during pre-

trial police interrogation. These statements were adduced

at trial on direct examination of the investigating officer.

Felix urged that the police used coercive tactics to elicit

the statements. Id., at 8–9. His Sixth Amendment claim

related to the admission of the videotaped statements

prosecution witness Kenneth Williams made at a jailhouse

interview. The videotape records Williams, a friend of

Felix, telling the police that he had overheard a conversa-

tion in which Felix described the planned robbery just

4 MAYLE v. FELIX

Opinion of the Court

before it occurred. When Williams testified at trial that he

did not recall the police interview, the trial court deter-

mined that Williams’ loss of memory was feigned, and that

the videotape was admissible because it contained prior

inconsistent statements. App. E to Pet. for Cert. 10–13.

On direct appeal, Felix urged, inter alia, that the admis-

sion of Williams’ videotaped statements violated Felix’s

constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him.

He did not, however, argue that admission of his own

pretrial statements violated his right to protection against

self-incrimination. The intermediate appellate court

affirmed Felix’s conviction and sentence, id., at 10–13, 17,

and the California Supreme Court denied his petition for

review, App. F to Pet. for Cert. 2. Felix’s conviction be-

came final on August 12, 1997. App. C to Pet. for Cert. 10.

Under AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, Felix

had until August 12, 1998 to file a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus in federal district court. See §2244(d)(1)(A).

Within the one-year period, on May 8, 1998, he filed a pro

se petition for federal habeas relief. Felix’s federal petition

repeated his Sixth Amendment objection to the admission

of the Williams videotape, but he again failed to reassert

the objection he made in the trial court to the admission of

his own pretrial statements. App. G to Pet. for Cert. 1–7.

On May 29, 1998, a Magistrate Judge appointed counsel to

represent Felix. App. C to Pet. for Cert. 6; App. H to Pet.

for Cert. 2. Thereafter, on September 15, 1998, the Magis-

trate Judge ordered Felix to file an amended petition

within 30 days. Id., at 3. On Felix’s unopposed requests,

that period was successively extended. Id., at 4–5. Pend-

ing the filing of an amended petition, the State was not

required to interpose an answer.

On January 28, 1999, over five months after the August

12, 1998 expiration of AEDPA’s time limit, and eight

months after the appointment of counsel to represent him,

Felix filed an amended petition. Id., at 5. In this plead-

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5

Opinion of the Court

ing, he reasserted his Confrontation Clause claim, and

also asserted, for the first time post-trial, that his own

pretrial statements to the police were coerced and there-

fore inadmissible at trial. App. I to Pet. for Cert. 4. Fur-

ther, he alleged that his counsel on appeal to the Califor-

nia intermediate appellate court was ineffective in failing

to raise the coerced confession claim on direct appeal. Id.,

at 18–19.2 In its answer to the amended petition, the

State asserted that the Fifth Amendment claim was time

barred because it was initially raised after the expiration

of AEDPA’s one-year limitation period. Felix argued in

response that the new claim related back to the date of his

original petition. Because both Fifth Amendment and

Confrontation Clause claims challenged the constitutional-

ity of the same criminal conviction, Felix urged, the Fifth

Amendment claim arose out of the “conduct, transaction,

or occurrence set forth . . . in the original pleading,” Fed.

Rule Civ. Proc. 15(c)(2). App. C to Pet. for Cert. 16.

The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of Felix’s

Fifth Amendment coerced statements claim. Relation

back was not in order, the Magistrate said, because Felix’s

“allegedly involuntary statements to police d[id] not arise

out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence as the

videotaped interrogation of [prosecution witness] Kenneth

Williams.” Id., at 16. It did not suffice, the Magistrate

——————

2 Because Felix had not presented his coerced statements Fifth

Amendment claim on appeal to the California courts, the State moved

to dismiss the amended petition on the ground that it contained both

exhausted and unexhausted claims. See 28 U. S. C. §2254(b)(1)(A);

Brief for Respondent 6–7. Before the Magistrate Judge acted on the

motion, Felix presented the coerced statements/ineffective assistance

claim to the California Supreme Court in a habeas petition. Opposition

to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss in No. Civ. S–98–0828 WBS GGH P

(ED Cal.), p. 3. After that court denied the petition without comment,

the State withdrew its motion to dismiss. See Request to Vacate

Hearing on Motion to Dismiss in No. Civ. S–98–0828 WBS GGH P (ED

Cal.), pp. 1–2.

6 MAYLE v. FELIX

Opinion of the Court

observed, that Felix’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims

attack the same criminal conviction. Ibid. Adopting the

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation in full, the

District Court dismissed the Fifth Amendment claim as

time barred, and rejected the Confrontation Clause claim

on its merits. App. B to Pet. for Cert. 1–3.

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of Felix’s

Confrontation Clause claim, but reversed the dismissal of

his coerced statements claim and remanded that claim for

further proceedings. 379 F. 3d 612 (2004). In the major-

ity’s view, the relevant “transaction” for purposes of Rule

15(c)(2) was Felix’s “trial and conviction in state court.”

Id., at 615. Defining the transaction at any greater level

of specificity, the majority reasoned, would “unduly

strai[n] the usual meaning of ‘conduct, transaction, or

occurrence’ ” by dividing the “trial and conviction [into] a

series of perhaps hundreds of individual occurrences.”

Ibid. Judge Tallman concurred in part and dissented in

part. In his view, defining “conduct, transaction, or occur-

rence” under Rule 15(c)(2) “so broadly that any claim

stemming from pre-trial motions, the trial, or sentencing

relates back to a timely-filed habeas petition” would

“obliterat[e] AEDPA’s one year statute of limitation.” Id.,

at 618. “While an amendment offered to clarify or amplify

the facts already alleged in support of a timely claim may

relate back,” he reasoned, “an amendment that introduces

a new legal theory based on facts different from those

underlying the timely claim may not.” Id., at 621.

We granted certiorari, 543 U. S. ___ (2005), to resolve

the conflict among Courts of Appeals on relation back of

habeas petition amendments. Compare 379 F. 3d, at 614

(if original petition is timely filed, amendments referring

to the same trial and conviction may relate back); Ellzey v.

United States, 324 F. 3d 521, 525–527 (CA7 2003) (same),

with United States v. Hicks, 283 F. 3d 380, 388–389

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 7

Opinion of the Court

(CADC 2002) (relevant transaction must be defined more

narrowly than the trial and conviction); United States v.

Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F. 3d 501, 503–505 (CA10 2000)

(same); Davenport v. United States, 217 F. 3d 1341, 1344–

1346 (CA11 2000) (same); United States v. Pittman, 209

F. 3d 314, 317–318 (CA4 2000) (same); United States v.

Duffus, 174 F. 3d 333, 337 (CA3 1999) (same); United

States v. Craycraft, 167 F. 3d 451, 457 (CA8 1999) (same).

We now reverse the Ninth Circuit’s judgment to the extent

that it allowed relation back of Felix’s Fifth Amendment

claim.

II

A

In enacting AEDPA in 1996, Congress imposed for the

first time a fixed time limit for collateral attacks in federal

court on a judgment of conviction. Section 2244(d)(1)

provides: “A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” See

also §2255, ¶6 (providing one-year limitation period in

which to file a motion to vacate a federal conviction).3

A discrete set of Rules governs federal habeas proceed-

ings launched by state prisoners. See Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.4

The last of those Rules, Habeas Corpus Rule 11, permits

application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in

habeas cases “to the extent that [the civil rules] are not

inconsistent with any statutory provisions or [the habeas]

rules.” See also Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 81(a)(2) (The civil

rules “are applicable to proceedings for . . . habeas cor-

pus.”). Rule 11, the Advisory Committee’s Notes caution,

——————

3 Section 2255 establishes a separate avenue for postconviction chal-

lenges to federal, as opposed to state, convictions.

4 Habeas corpus proceedings are characterized as civil in nature. See,

e.g., Fisher v. Baker, 203 U. S. 174, 181 (1906).

8 MAYLE v. FELIX

Opinion of the Court

“permits application of the civil rules only when it would

be appropriate to do so,” and would not be “inconsistent or

inequitable in the overall framework of habeas corpus.”

Advisory Committee’s Note on Habeas Corpus Rule 11, 28

U. S. C., p. 480. In addition to the general prescriptions

on application of the civil rules in federal habeas cases,

§2242 specifically provides that habeas applications “may

be amended . . . as provided in the rules of procedure

applicable to civil actions.”

The Civil Rule governing pleading amendments, Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 15, made applicable to habeas

proceedings by §2242, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

81(a)(2), and Habeas Corpus Rule 11, allows pleading

amendments with “leave of court” any time during a pro-

ceeding. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(a). Before a respon-

sive pleading is served, pleadings may be amended once as

a “matter of course,” i.e., without seeking court leave.

Ibid. Amendments made after the statute of limitations

has run relate back to the date of the original pleading if

the original and amended pleadings “ar[i]se out of the

conduct, transaction, or occurrence.” Rule 15(c)(2).

The “original pleading” to which Rule 15 refers is the

complaint in an ordinary civil case, and the petition in a

habeas proceeding. Under Rule 8(a), applicable to ordi-

nary civil proceedings, a complaint need only provide “fair

notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 47 (1957).

Habeas Corpus Rule 2(c) is more demanding. It provides

that the petition must “specify all the grounds for relief

available to the petitioner” and “state the facts supporting

each ground.” See also Advisory Committee’s Note on

subd. (c) of Habeas Corpus Rule 2, 28 U. S. C., p. 469 (“In

the past, petitions have frequently contained mere conclu-

sions of law, unsupported by any facts. [But] it is the

relationship of the facts to the claim asserted that is im-

portant . . . .”); Advisory Committee’s Note on Habeas

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 9

Opinion of the Court

Corpus Rule 4, 28 U. S. C., p. 471 (“ ‘[N]otice’ pleading is

not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts

that point to a real possibility of constitutional error.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the

model form available to aid prisoners in filing their habeas

petitions instructs in boldface:

“CAUTION: You must include in this petition all

the grounds for relief from the conviction or

sentence that you challenge. And you must

state the facts that support each ground. If you

fail to set forth all the grounds in this petition,

you may be barred from presenting additional

grounds at a later date.” Petition for Relief From a

Conviction or Sentence By a Person in State Custody,

Habeas Corpus Rules, Forms App. (emphasis in

original).

A prime purpose of Rule 2(c)’s demand that habeas

petitioners plead with particularity is to assist the district

court in determining whether the State should be ordered

to “show cause why the writ should not be granted.”

§2243. Under Habeas Corpus Rule 4, if “it plainly appears

from the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to

relief in district court,” the court must summarily dismiss

the petition without ordering a responsive pleading. If the

court orders the State to file an answer, that pleading

must “address the allegations in the petition.” Rule 5.

B

This case turns on the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(c)(2)’s relation-back provision in the context

of federal habeas proceedings and AEDPA’s one-year

statute of limitations. Rule 15(c)(2), as earlier stated,

provides that pleading amendments relate back to the

date of the original pleading when the claim asserted in

the amended plea “arose out of the conduct, transaction, or

10 MAYLE v. FELIX

Opinion of the Court

occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the

original pleading.” The key words are “conduct, transac-

tion, or occurrence.” The Ninth Circuit, whose judgment

we here review, in accord with the Seventh Circuit, de-

fines those words to allow relation back of a claim first

asserted in an amended petition, so long as the new claim

stems from the habeas petitioner’s trial, conviction, or

sentence. Under that comprehensive definition, virtually

any new claim introduced in an amended petition will

relate back, for federal habeas claims, by their very na-

ture, challenge the constitutionality of a conviction or

sentence, and commonly attack proceedings anterior

thereto. See Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F. 3d, at 505 (A “major-

ity of amendments” to habeas petitions raise issues falling

under the “broad umbrella” of “a defendant’s trial and

sentencing.”); Hicks, 283 F. 3d, at 388.

The majority of Circuits, mindful of “Congress’ decision

to expedite collateral attacks by placing stringent time

restrictions on [them],” id., at 388, define “conduct, trans-

action, or occurrence” in federal habeas cases less broadly.

See id., at 388–389; Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F. 3d, at 503–

505; Davenport, 217 F. 3d, at 1344–1346; Pittman, 209

F. 3d, at 317–318; Duffus, 174 F. 3d, at 337; Craycraft, 167

F. 3d, at 457. They allow relation back only when the

claims added by amendment arise from the same core

facts as the timely filed claims, and not when the new

claims depend upon events separate in “both time and

type” from the originally raised episodes. Craycraft, 167

F. 3d, at 457. Because Felix’s own pretrial statements,

newly raised in his amended petition, were separated in

time and type from witness Williams’ videotaped state-

ments, raised in Felix’s original petition, the former would

not relate back under the definition of “conduct, transac-

tion, or occurrence” to which most Circuits adhere.

We are not aware, in the run-of-the-mine civil proceed-

ings Rule 15 governs, of any reading of “conduct, transac-

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 11

Opinion of the Court

tion, or occurrence” as capacious as the construction the

Ninth and Seventh Circuits have adopted for habeas

cases. Compare Maegdlin v. International Assn. of Ma-

chinists and Aerospace Workers, 309 F. 3d 1051, 1052

(CA8 2002) (allowing relation back where original com-

plaint alleged that defendant union had breached its duty

of fair representation by inadequately representing plain-

tiff because of his gender, and amended complaint as-

serted a Title VII gender discrimination claim based on

the same differential treatment); Clipper Exxpress v.

Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F. 2d 1240,

1246, 1259, n. 29 (CA9 1982) (claim asserting that defen-

dant included fraudulent information in rate protests filed

with the Interstate Commerce Commission related back to

original complaint, which asserted that defendant filed the

same rate protests “for the purpose of . . . restricting . . .

competition” (internal quotation marks omitted))5;

Santana v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 686 F. 2d 736, 738 (CA9

1982) (original complaint alleging slander and amendment

alleging interference with employment relations arose out

of the same conduct or occurrence because both were

based on defendant’s making allegedly untruthful state-

ments about plaintiff’s behavior to plaintiff’s employer);

Rural Fire Protection Co. v. Hepp, 366 F. 2d 355, 361–362

——————

5 The dissent asserts that Clipper Exxpress is comparable to this case

in according Rule 15(c)(2) a “ ‘capacious’ ” reading. Post, at 4, n. 2.

Clipper Exxpress involved a series of allegedly sham protests, com-

monly designed to restrain trade, a charge of the pattern or practice

type. The amendment in question added a fraud charge, a new legal

theory tied to the same operative facts as those initially alleged.

Clipper Exxpress, 690 F. 2d, at 1259, n. 29. That unremarkable appli-

cation of the relation-back rule bears little resemblance to the argu-

ment made by Felix and embraced by the dissent—that all manner of

factually and temporally unrelated conduct may be raised after the

statute of limitations has run and relate back, so long as the new and

originally pleaded claims challenge the same conviction. See infra, at

12–15.

12 MAYLE v. FELIX

Opinion of the Court

(CA9 1966) (in a Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 suit

alleging minimum wage violations for certain pay periods,

amendment asserting the same type of violation during an

additional pay period related back), with Nettis v. Levitt,

241 F. 3d 186, 193 (CA2 2001) (disallowing relation back

where Nettis’ original complaint alleged that his employer

retaliated in response to Nettis’ objections to employer’s

sales tax collection procedure, and amendment alleged

retaliation for Nettis’ report of payroll and inventory

irregularities); In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F. 3d 197,

216 (CA5 1999) (Coastal Plains’s claim that creditor inter-

fered with business relations by attempting to sell Coastal

Plains to a third party did not relate back to claim based

on creditor’s failure to return inventory to Coastal Plains,

even though both claims were linked to creditor’s alleged

“broader plan to destroy Coastal [Plains]”); Sierra Club v.

Penfold, 857 F. 2d 1307, 1315–1316 (CA9 1988) (where

original complaint challenged the manner in which an

agency applied a regulation, an amendment challenging

the agency’s “conduct in adopting the regulatio[n]” did not

relate back). See also Jackson v. Suffolk County Homicide

Bureau, 135 F. 3d 254, 256 (CA2 1998) (although all of

plaintiff’s 42 U. S. C. §1983 claims arose out of a single

state-court criminal proceeding, plaintiff’s First Amend-

ment claims did not arise out of the same conduct as the

originally asserted excessive force claims, and therefore

did not relate back). As these decisions illustrate, Rule

15(c)(2) relaxes, but does not obliterate, the statute of

limitations; hence relation back depends on the existence

of a common “core of operative facts” uniting the original

and newly asserted claims. See Clipper Exxpress, 690

F. 2d, at 1259, n. 29; 6A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane,

Federal Practice and Procedure §1497, p. 85 (2d ed. 1990).

Felix asserts that he seeks, and the Ninth Circuit ac-

corded, no wider range for Rule 15(c)’s relation back provi-

sion than this Court gave to the Rule’s key words “con-

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 13

Opinion of the Court

duct, transaction, or occurrence” in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast

Line R. Co., 323 U. S. 574, 580–581 (1945). We disagree.

In Tiller, a railroad worker was struck and killed by a

railroad car. His widow sued under the Federal Employ-

ers Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. §51 et seq., to recover for his

wrongful death. She initially alleged various negligent

acts. In an amended complaint, she added a claim under

the Federal Boiler Inspection Act for failure to provide the

train’s locomotive with a rear light. We held that the

amendment related back, and therefore avoided a statute

of limitations bar, even though the amendment invoked a

legal theory not suggested by the original complaint and

relied on facts not originally asserted.

There was but one episode-in-suit in Tiller, a worker’s

death attributed from the start to the railroad’s failure to

provide its employee with a reasonably safe place to work.

The federal rulemakers recognized that personal injury

plaintiffs often cannot pinpoint the precise cause of an

injury prior to discovery. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure §1215, pp. 138–143 (2d ed.

1990). They therefore included in the Appendix to the

Federal Rules an illustrative form indicating that a per-

sonal injury plaintiff could adequately state a claim for

relief simply by alleging that the defendant negligently

operated a certain instrumentality at a particular time

and place. See Form 9, Complaint for Negligence, Forms

App., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc., 28 U. S. C. App., p. 829. The

widow in Tiller met that measure. She based her com-

plaint on a single “occurrence,” an accident resulting in

her husband’s death. In contrast, Felix targeted separate

episodes, the pretrial police interrogation of witness Wil-

liams in his original petition, his own interrogation at a

different time and place in his amended petition.

Felix contends, however, that his amended petition

qualifies for relation back because the trial itself is the

“transaction” or “occurrence” that counts. See Brief for

14 MAYLE v. FELIX

Opinion of the Court

Respondent 21–23. Citing Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U. S.

760 (2003) (plurality opinion), Felix urges that neither the

videotaped interview with witness Williams nor the pre-

trial police interrogation to which Felix himself was ex-

posed transgressed any constitutional limitation. Until

the statements elicited by the police were introduced at

trial, Felix argues, he had no actionable claim at all. Both

the confrontation right he timely presented and the privi-

lege against self-incrimination he asserted in his amended

petition are “trial right[s],” Felix underscores. Brief for

Respondent 21 (emphasis deleted). His claims based on

those rights, he maintains, are not “separate,” id., at 22;

rather, they are related in time and type, for “they arose

on successive days during the trial and both challenged

[on constitutional grounds] admission of pretrial state-

ments,” id., at 22–23.

Felix artificially truncates his claims by homing in only

on what makes them actionable in a habeas proceeding.

We do not here question his assertion that his Fifth

Amendment right did not ripen until his statements were

admitted against him at trial. See Chavez, 538 U. S., at

766–767. Even so, the essential predicate for his self-

incrimination claim was an extrajudicial event, i.e., an

out-of-court police interrogation. The dispositive question

in an adjudication of that claim would be the character of

Felix’s conduct, not in court, but at the police interroga-

tion, specifically, did he answer voluntarily or were his

statements coerced. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S.

503, 513–514 (1963) (voluntariness is evaluated by examin-

ing the “totality of circumstances” surrounding the “making

and signing of the challenged confession”).

Habeas Corpus Rule 2(c), we earlier noted, see supra, at

8–9, instructs petitioners to “specify all [available]

grounds for relief” and to “state the facts supporting each

ground.” Under that Rule, Felix’s Confrontation Clause

claim would be pleaded discretely, as would his self-

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 15

Opinion of the Court

incrimination claim. Each separate congeries of facts

supporting the grounds for relief, the Rule suggests, would

delineate an “occurrence.” Felix’s approach, the approach

that prevailed in the Ninth Circuit, is boundless by com-

parison. A miscellany of claims for relief could be raised

later rather than sooner and relate back, for “conduct,

transaction, or occurrence” would be defined to encompass

any pretrial, trial, or post-trial error that could provide a

basis for challenging the conviction. An approach of that

breadth, as the Fourth Circuit observed, “views ‘occur-

rence’ at too high a level of generality.” Pittman, 209

F. 3d, at 318.6

Congress enacted AEDPA to advance the finality of

criminal convictions. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U. S. ___,

___ (2005) (slip op., at 6). To that end, it adopted a tight

time line, a one-year limitation period ordinarily running

from “the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review,” 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(1)(A). If claims

asserted after the one-year period could be revived simply

——————

6 The dissent builds a complex discussion on an apparent assumption

that claim preclusion operates in habeas cases largely as it does in

mine-run civil cases. See post, at 9–11. Ironically, few habeas petitions

would survive swift dismissal were that so, for the very objective of the

petition is to undo a final judgment after direct appeals have been

exhausted or are time barred. On judicial and legislative development

of standards governing successive habeas petitions, standards that do

not track the Restatement of Judgments, see Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S.

298, 317–320 (1995); 2 R. Hertz & J. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus

Practice and Procedure §28.2b, pp. 1270–1275 (4th ed. 2001); Note,

Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev.

1038, 1113, 1148–1154 (1970). The dissent would read Rule 15(c)(2)’s

words, “conduct, transaction, or occurrence,” into AEDPA’s provisions

governing second or successive petitions and motions (28 U. S. C.

§§2244(b) and 2255, ¶8), although Congress did not put those words

there. Nor is there any other reason to believe that Congress designed

AEDPA’s confinement of successive petitions and motions with a view

to the relation back concept employed in Rule 15(c)(2).

16 MAYLE v. FELIX

Opinion of the Court

because they relate to the same trial, conviction, or sen-

tence as a timely filed claim, AEDPA’s limitation period

would have slim significance. See 379 F. 3d, at 619

(Tallman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(Ninth Circuit’s rule would permit “the ‘relation back’

doctrine to swallow AEDPA’s statute of limitation”);

Pittman, 209 F. 3d, at 318 (“If we were to craft such a rule,

it would mean that amendments . . . would almost in-

variably be allowed even after the statute of limitations

had expired, because most [habeas] claims arise from a

criminal defendant’s underlying conviction and sen-

tence.”); Duffus, 174 F. 3d, at 338 (“A prisoner should not

be able to assert a claim otherwise barred by the statute of

limitations merely because he asserted a separate claim

within the limitations period.”). The very purpose of Rule

15(c)(2), as the dissent notes, is to “qualify a statute of

limitations.” Post, at 2. But “qualify” does not mean

repeal. See Fuller v. Marx, 724 F. 2d 717, 720 (CA8 1984).

Given AEDPA’s “finality” and “federalism” concerns, see

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420, 436 (2000); Hicks, 283

F. 3d, at 389, it would be anomalous to allow relation back

under Rule 15(c)(2) based on a broader reading of the

words “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” in federal

habeas proceedings than in ordinary civil litigation, see

supra, at 10–12.

Felix urges that an unconstrained reading of Rule

15(c)(2) is not problematic because Rule 15(a) arms district

courts with “ample power” to deny leave to amend when

justice so requires. See Brief for Respondent 31–33.

Under that Rule, once a responsive pleading has been

filed, a prisoner may amend the petition “only by leave of

court or by written consent of the adverse party.” Rule

15(a); see Ellzey v. United States, 324 F. 3d 521, 526 (CA7

2003) (AEDPA’s aim to “expedite resolution of collateral

attacks . . . should influence the exercise of discretion

under Rule 15(a)—which gives the district judge the right

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 17

Opinion of the Court

to disapprove proposed amendments that would unduly

prolong or complicate the case.”). This argument over-

looks a pleader’s right to amend without leave of court

“any time before a responsive pleading is served.” Rule

15(a). In federal habeas cases that time can be rather

long, as indeed it was in the instant case. See supra, at 4.

Under Habeas Corpus Rule 4, a petition is not immedi-

ately served on the respondent. The judge first examines

the pleading to determine whether “it plainly appears . . .

that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Only if the

petition survives that preliminary inspection will the

judge “order the respondent to file an answer.” In the

interim, the petitioner may amend his pleading “as a

matter of course,” as Felix did in this very case. Rule

15(a). Accordingly, we do not regard Rule 15(a) as a firm

check against petition amendments that present new

claims dependent upon discrete facts after AEDPA’s limi-

tation period has run.

Our rejection of Felix’s translation of same “conduct,

transaction, or occurrence” to mean same “trial, convic-

tion, or sentence” scarcely leaves Rule 15(c)(2) “meaning-

less in the habeas context,” 379 F. 3d, at 615. So long as

the original and amended petitions state claims that are

tied to a common core of operative facts, relation back will

be in order.7 Our reading is consistent with the general

——————

7 For example, in Mandacina v. United States, 328 F. 3d 995, 1000–1001

(CA8 2003), the original petition alleged violations of Brady v. Maryland,

373 U. S. 83 (1963), while the amended petition alleged the Government’s

failure to disclose a particular report. Both pleadings related to evidence

obtained at the same time by the same police department. The Court of

Appeals approved relation back. And in Woodward v. Williams, 263 F. 3d

1135, 1142 (CA10 2001), the appeals court upheld relation back where the

original petition challenged the trial court’s admission of recanted state-

ments, while the amended petition challenged the court’s refusal to allow

the defendant to show that the statements had been recanted. See also 3

J. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice §15.19[2], p. 15–82 (3d ed. 2004)

(relation back ordinarily allowed “when the new claim is based on the

18 MAYLE v. FELIX

Opinion of the Court

application of Rule 15(c)(2) in civil cases, see supra, at 10–

12, with Habeas Corpus Rule 2(c), see supra, at 8–9, and

with AEDPA’s installation of a tight time line for §2254

petitions, see supra, at 15–16.8

* * *

As to the question presented, for the reasons stated, the

judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is

reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

——————

same facts as the original pleading and only changes the legal theory”).

8 The dissent is concerned that our decision “creates an unfair dispar-

ity between indigent habeas petitioners and those able to afford their

own counsel.” Post, at 1; see post, at 11 (“[T]oday’s decision . . . will fall

most heavily on the shoulders of indigent habeas petitioners who can

afford no counsel without the assistance of the court.”). The concern is

understandable, although we note that in Felix’s case, counsel was

appointed, and had some two and a half months to amend the petition

before AEDPA’s limitation period expired. See supra, at 4. That was

ample time to add a claim based on the alleged pretrial extraction of

damaging statements from Felix. Ordinarily, as we observed in Halbert

v. Michigan, ante, at 17, n. 8, the government (federal or state) “ ‘need not

equalize economic conditions’ between criminal defendants of lesser and

greater wealth.” (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 23 (1956)

(Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment); see Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481

U. S. 551, 557 (1987) (holding that States need not provide appointed

counsel in postconviction proceedings). This case, it is inescapably true,

does not fit within the confined circumstances in which our decisions

require appointment of counsel for an indigent litigant at a critical stage

to ensure his meaningful access to justice. See Halbert, ante, at 2–4, 17,

n. 8.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1

SOUTER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 04–563

_________________

DENEICE A. MAYLE, WARDEN, PETITIONER v.

JACOBY LEE FELIX

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 23, 2005]

JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins,

dissenting.

This case requires the Court to decide how the relation

back provision of Rule 15(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure ought to apply in federal habeas corpus cases,

when neither text nor precedent provides clear guidance.

I see nothing in habeas law or practice that calls for the

Court’s narrow construction of the rule, and good reasons

to go the other way, including the unfortunate conse-

quence that the Court’s view creates an unfair disparity

between indigent habeas petitioners and those able to

afford their own counsel. I respectfully dissent.

I

At the outset, there is need for care in understanding

the narrow scope of the problem this case presents. A

habeas petitioner’s opportunity to amend as a matter of

course, without permission of the trial court, exists only

before the responsive pleading is served, and even then

only once. Rule 15(a). After one amendment, or after the

government files the answer or other response, assuming

one is even required, see Habeas Corpus Rule 4, the pris-

oner may not amend without the court’s leave or the gov-

ernment’s consent, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(a). While leave

to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires,”

2 MAYLE v. FELIX

SOUTER, J., dissenting

ibid., justice does, after all, have to require it, and the

District Courts will presumably say no, for example, in the

face of unjustifiable delay or threatened prejudice to the

State. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178, 182 (1962); see

also Brief for Professor Arthur R. Miller et al. as Amici

Curiae 20–21 (describing reasons courts regularly deny

leave to amend and citing cases); 6 C. Wright, A. Miller, &

M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §§1487–1488 (2d

ed. 1990) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) (discussing reasons

leave to amend may be and often is denied, including delay

and prejudice). The Court’s concern for “unconstrained”

recourse to petition amendments, ante, at 16, is thus

misplaced.

The limited opportunity to amend also supplies perspec-

tive on the claim that Felix’s reading of the relation back

rule would undermine the 1-year limitation period of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA) and the statute’s concomitant concern for final-

ity of judgments. See ante, at 15–16. In fact, AEDPA’s

objectives bear little weight in the analysis, because the

very point of every relation back rule is to qualify a statute

of limitations, and Rule 15(c) “is based on the notion that

once litigation involving particular conduct or a given

transaction or occurrence has been instituted, the parties

are not entitled to the protection of the statute of limita-

tions against the later assertion by amendment of de-

fenses or claims that arise out of the same conduct, trans-

action, or occurrence as set forth in the original pleading.”

6A Wright & Miller §1496, at 64. That AEDPA’s statute

of limitations, like any other, may be trumped by relating

back when the subject of the amendment arises out of the

same conduct, transaction, or occurrence described in the

original pleading, does not alone help us to figure out what

conduct, transaction, or occurrence is the same.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005)

3

SOUTER, J., dissenting

II

Felix’s disputed right to amend with relation back effect

turns entirely, as the Court says, ante, at 9, on how nar-

rowly or how broadly the tripartite authorization for rela-

tion back ought to be construed: whether the relevant

“conduct, transaction, or occurrence”1 to which a habeas

petition refers includes the underlying trial (which re-

sulted in the custody being challenged) or is limited to the

set of facts underlying each trial ruling claimed to be

constitutionally defective (in this case, the unconfronted

videotaped testimony and the interrogation that produced

the incriminating statement). If the former, a habeas

petitioner will have the benefit of relation back for any

amendment raising trial error, subject to the district

judge’s discretion to deny leave except for the one amend-

ment of right; if the latter, a petitioner is effectively pre-

cluded from making any amendment unless a single trial

ruling amounts to distinct errors or an underlying fact is

the subject of distinct rulings, notwithstanding Congress’s

evident intent to provide relation back in habeas proceed-

ings, see 28 U. S. C. §2242; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 81(a)(2);

Habeas Corpus Rule 11.

The text alone does not tell us the answer, for either the

facts specific to the claim or the trial as a whole could be

the relevant “conduct, transaction, or occurrence.” The

Court assumes that the former approach is correct and

then proceeds to explain, based on that assumption, the

infirmity of a contrary approach. For example, the Court

asserts that under Felix’s rule, “all manner of factually

and temporally unrelated conduct may be raised after the

statute of limitations has run . . . .” Ante, at 11, n. 6. But

in saying this the Court presumes that the relevant trans-

——————

1 There is a tendency toward the gestalt in reading the phrase, but

the three items are distinct, and a party claiming the benefit of the rule

need satisfy only one.

4 MAYLE v. FELIX

SOUTER, J., dissenting

action is what occurred outside the courtroom. Felix’s

entire argument is that the proper transaction is instead

what occurred in court, namely the imposition of the con-

viction that justifies the challenged custody. If he is right,

then the Court’s assertion is incorrect, for what Felix

seeks to add is a claim not about “factually and temporally

unrelated conduct,” ibid., but about conduct that occurred

at the same trial as the conduct addressed in the initial

petition. That newly addressed conduct will hardly be

“temporally unrelated” to what was previously targeted; it

likely will have occurred on the same day of trial as the

original conduct or within a few days. Nor will it be “fac-

tually . . . unrelated” to the previously raised in-court

conduct, for it will almost certainly involve the same

judge, the same parties and attorneys, the same court-

room, and the same jurors. Again, my point is just that

much of the Court’s argument lacks force because it as-

sumes that the proper transaction is what occurred out-

side the courtroom rather than inside, when that is the

question we must answer.

The Court also cautions that “it would be anomalous to

allow relation back under Rule 15(c)(2) based on a broader

reading of the words ‘conduct, transaction, or occurrence’

in federal habeas proceedings than in ordinary civil litiga-

tion.” Ante, at 16. The cases the Court cites to establish

the scope of civil relation back, however, see ante, at 10–

13, simply stand for the proposition that an amendment

relates back only if it deals with the same conduct, trans-

action, or occurrence. Felix does not purport to claim

anything more.2

——————

2 In any event, it is not clear why it is more “capacious,” ante, at 11, to

regard a single trial lasting days or weeks as one transaction or occur-

rence than it is, for example, to view numerous separate protests filed

with the Interstate Commerce Commission over a period of two years

(each in response to a different proposed tariff amendment) as one

transaction or occurrence, see Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5

SOUTER, J., dissenting

At first glance, an argument for the narrow reading

urged by petitioner Mayle inheres in the distinctive plead-

ing requirement for habeas petitions. Unlike the generous

notice-pleading standard for the benefit of ordinary civil

plaintiffs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), see

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 47 (1957), Habeas Corpus

Rule 2(c) requires habeas petitioners to “specify all the

grounds for relief available,” and to “state the facts support-

ing each ground.” The Court implies that because pleading

must be factually specific, the “conduct, transaction, or

occurrence” of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) must be

specifically factual to a parallel degree; as the Court puts it,

a habeas petitioner will plead claims “discretely,” ante, at

14, such that each ground for relief “would delineate an

‘occurrence,’ ” ante, at 15. But this does not follow; all that

follows from “discret[e]” pleading is that each claim would

delineate a separate ground for relief, whatever may be the

conduct, transaction, or occurrence out of which the claims

arise. As Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 323 U. S. 574

(1945), and the other civil cases the Court cites demon-

strate, see ante, at 11–13, relation back is regularly allowed

when an amendment raises a separate claim for relief aris-

ing out of the same transaction or occurrence, no matter

how discretely that claim might be stated. Indeed, this is

——————

Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F. 2d 1240, 1260, n. 29 (CA9 1982) (“The

protests involve a single transaction or occurrence” (emphasis deleted)),

cited ante, at 11.

The Court responds that in Clipper Exxpress the amendment was

“tied to the same operative facts as those initially alleged. ” Ante, at 11,

n. 5. But as just noted, those “operative facts” (i.e., the relevant trans-

action) consisted of a number of separate protests filed with the Inter-

state Commerce Commission over a period of two years, each in re-

sponse to a different proposed tariff amendment. This is, to say the

least, a rather expansive transaction, much more so in my view than a

single trial involving (for all claims stemming from it) the same judge,

the same parties, the same attorneys, the same jury, the same indict-

ment, and so on.

6 MAYLE v. FELIX

SOUTER, J., dissenting

what the text anticipates; Rule 15(c)(2) permits relation

back when “the claim or defense” asserted in the amend-

ment arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occur-

rence set forth in the original pleading. That is, the same

conduct, transaction, or occurrence can support multiple,

discrete claims for relief.

Nor is there any policy underlying the particular habeas

pleading rule that requires a more grudging relation back

standard. As the Court concedes, ante, at 9, the purpose of

the heightened pleading standard in habeas cases is to

help a district court weed out frivolous petitions before

calling upon the State to answer. See Advisory Commit-

tee’s Note on Habeas Corpus Rule 2, 28 U. S. C., p. 469;

Advisory Committee Note on Rule 4, id., at 471 (“[I]t is the

duty of the court to screen out frivolous applications and

eliminate the burden that would be placed on the respon-

dent by ordering an unnecessary answer”); 1 R. Hertz & J.

Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure

§11.6, p. 573, n. 3 (4th ed. 2001) (hereinafter Hertz &

Liebman) (“[F]act pleading, like other habeas corpus rules

and practices, enables courts . . . to separate substantial

petitions from insubstantial ones quickly and without

need of adversary proceedings”); Note, Developments in

the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038,

1175 (1970) (“The justification for stringent pleading

requirements in habeas corpus is thought to lie in the

need to protect the courts from the burden of entertaining

frivolous applications”). Identifying meritless claims has

nothing to do with the effect of amendment to initial peti-

tions for relief, except in the remote sense that an

amendment will require a district judge to examine one

more item. But there is no claim here that Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15(c) has to be narrow to protect judges;

the government is objecting because it wants fewer claims

to defend, and that objection is unrelated to the habeas

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 7

SOUTER, J., dissenting

fact-pleading standard.3

While considerations based on habeas pleading fail to

pan out with support for Mayle’s restricted reading of Rule

15(c), several reasons convince me that Felix’s reading is

right. Most obvious is the fact that both of his claims can

easily fit within the same “transaction or occurrence,” un-

derstood as a trial ending in conviction resulting in a single

ultimate injury of unlawful custody. (“Conduct” sounds

closer to underlying facts, perhaps, but Rule 15(c) turns on

either conduct, transaction, or occurrence.) The Court

acknowledges that Felix’s claims regarding his own interro-

gation and the videotaped testimony of witness Kenneth

Williams are potentially actionable here only because the

resulting incriminating statements were introduced at trial,

ante, at 14, but argues that they nevertheless arise out of

separate transactions or occurrences because they rest on

distinct “essential predicate[s],” ibid., meaning pretrial acts.

It is certainly true that the claims depend on those distinct

pretrial acts, but the claims depend equally on the specified

trial errors, without which there would be no habeas claim:

without the introduction of each set of statements at trial,

Felix would have no argument for habeas relief, regardless

of what happened outside of court.4 The Court’s own opin-

——————

3 Neither does the warning on the model habeas petition (that failure

to set forth every ground for relief may preclude the presentation of

additional grounds later) tell us anything about relation back. The

Court implies that it does, ante, at 9, but the language on the form says

nothing about relation back, and if the Court’s implication were correct

then the warning would also bar amendments filed within the limita-

tions period.

4 By contrast, use at trial of the fruits of the alleged police misconduct

would not be a prerequisite to success in an action under Rev. Stat.

§1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, because such an action would indeed be

challenging the conduct itself rather than the custody obtained by use

at trial of the fruits of that conduct. Cf. ante, at 12 (citing Jackson v.

Suffolk County Homicide Bureau, 135 F. 3d 254 (CA2 1998), where the

Court of Appeals, in a §1983 case, concluded that two different in-

8 MAYLE v. FELIX

SOUTER, J., dissenting

ion demonstrates this, as its descriptions of Felix’s two

claims refer not only to what happened outside court but

also to what happened at trial, and they specifically ground

the alleged constitutional violations on the latter. See ante,

at 1 (“He initially alleged . . . that the admission into

evidence of videotaped testimony of a witness for the

prosecution violated his rights under the Sixth Amend-

ment’s Confrontation Clause”); ante, at 2 (“He asserted

that, in the course of pretrial interrogation, the police used

coercive tactics to obtain damaging statements from him,

and that admission of those statements at trial violated

his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination”).5

Moreover, habeas review will of course look at more of the

underlying trial record than just the ruling admitting the

disputed evidence, for Felix’s claims like a great many

others will call for examining the trial record as a whole for

signs of requisite prejudice or reversible error.6 Here, for

——————

stances of postarrest police conduct were not part of a single transac-

tion or occurrence). The Court’s analysis thus lies in some tension with

our understanding that the signal, defining feature setting habeas

cases apart from other tort claims against the State is that they “neces-

sarily demonstrat[e] the invalidity of the conviction,” Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U. S. 477, 481–482 (1994); see generally Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544

U. S. ___, ___ (2005) (slip op., at 3–7).

5 There are other examples of the Court’s describing Felix’s claims

with reference to the trial. See ante, at 3 (“Felix’s Fifth Amendment

claim rested on the prosecution’s introduction of statements Felix made

during pretrial police interrogation. . . . His Sixth Amendment claim

related to the admission of the videotaped statements prosecution

witness Kenneth Williams made at a jailhouse interview”); ante, at 4

(“On direct appeal, Felix urged . . . that the admission of Williams’

videotaped statements violated Felix’s constitutional right to confront

the witnesses against him. He did not, however, argue that admission

of his own pretrial statements violated his right to protection against

self-incrimination”).

6 See Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 18 (1999) (“The erroneous

admission of evidence in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee

against self-incrimination, and the erroneous exclusion of evidence in

violation of the right to confront witnesses guaranteed by the Sixth

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 9

SOUTER, J., dissenting

example, if a court were to conclude that introducing Felix’s

statements did violate the Fifth Amendment, relief would

still turn on whether the error was harmless. This would

call for a careful look at the other evidence admitted at trial,

including the statements said to have come in contrary to

the Confrontation Clause. In sum, Felix’s claims are not

outside the text of Rule 15(c)(2).

Then there are a number of indications that Congress

would not want the rule read narrowly, the first centering

on the word “transaction.” That term not only goes to the

breadth of relation back, but also to the scope of claim

preclusion. E.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456

U. S. 461, 482, n. 22 (1982) (“Res judicata has recently

been taken to bar claims arising from the same transac-

tion even if brought under different statutes . . .”); accord,

1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments §24(1) (1980) (“[T]he

claim extinguished includes all rights . . . with respect to

all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected

transactions, out of which the action arose”). For purposes

of claim preclusion in habeas cases, the scope of “transac-

tion” is crucial in applying AEDPA’s limitation on second

or successive petitions: with very narrow exceptions,

federal habeas limits a prisoner to only one petition chal-

——————

Amendment are both subject to harmless-error analysis under our cases”

(citations omitted)); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U. S. 782, 795 (2001) (success

on Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim in habeas case requires

showing that the error had “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see

also, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U. S. 668, 691 (2004) (elements of prosecu-

torial misconduct claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963),

include showing of prejudice); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637,

643 (1974) (improper prosecutorial comment not reversible error unless

remarks “so infec[t] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

conviction a denial of due process”); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S.

668, 695 (1984) (to find prejudice for purposes of ineffective assistance

claim, court “must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or

jury”).

10 MAYLE v. FELIX

SOUTER, J., dissenting

lenging his conviction or sentence. See 28 U. S. C.

§2244(b)(1). 7 The provisions limiting second or successive

habeas petitions regard the relevant “transaction” for

purposes of habeas claim preclusion as the trial that

yielded the conviction or sentence under attack; once a

challenge to that conviction or sentence has been rejected,

other challenges are barred even if they raise different

claims. By contrast, under the Court’s view of Rule 15(c)

that the relevant “transaction” is the facts or conduct

underlying each discrete claim, a prisoner should be al-

lowed to file a second habeas petition so long as it is based

on different underlying facts or conduct (i.e., on what the

Court considers a separate “transaction”). The Court thus

adopts, for purposes of relation back in habeas cases, a

definition of “transaction” different from the one Congress

apparently intended for purposes of claim preclusion in

habeas cases. Judge Easterbrook explained this tension in

Ellzey v. United States, 324 F. 3d 521 (CA7 2003), and the

Court offers no evidence that Congress would have de-

creed any such apparent anomaly within the body of ha-

beas standards.8

There is, rather, a fair indication that Congress would

have intended otherwise, in the fact that it has already

placed limits on the right of some habeas petitioners to

——————

7 The Court asserts that my argument here “builds . . . on an appar-

ent assumption that claim preclusion operates in habeas cases largely

as it does in mine-run civil cases.” Ante, at 15, n. 6. In actuality, the

argument rests only on a fact we have previously recognized: that

AEDPA’s “restrictions on successive petitions constitute a modified res

judicata rule . . . .” Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 664 (1996).

8 The Court is mistaken in stating that I “would read Rule 15(c)(2)’s

words, ‘conduct, transaction, or occurrence,’ into . . . 28 U. S. C.

§§2244(b) and 2255, ¶8 . . . .” Ante, at 15, n. 6. What I would do is

adopt, for purposes of reconciling Rule 15(c)(2) with AEDPA’s one-year

statute of limitations, a definition of “transaction” that is consistent

with what other sections of AEDPA, those governing second or succes-

sive petitions, functionally regard as the relevant “transaction.”

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 11

SOUTER, J., dissenting

amend their petitions. In Chapter 154 of Title 28, provid-

ing special procedures for habeas cases brought by peti-

tioners subject to capital sentences in certain States,

Congress specifically prohibited amendment of the origi-

nal habeas petitions after the filing of the answer, except

on the grounds specified for second or successive petitions

under 28 U. S. C. §2244(b). See §2266(b)(3)(B). Congress’s

intent to limit capital petitioners’ opportunity to amend

(and thus to take advantage of relation back) makes sense

owing to capital petitioners’ incentive for delay, but the

provision it enacted also helps us make sense of Rule 15(c)

in the usual habeas case where a prisoner has no incentive

to string the process out. For Congress has shown not

only that it knows how to limit amendment in habeas

cases, but also that it specifically considered the subject of

limiting amendment in such cases and chose not to limit

amendment in the ordinary ones.

The final reason to view the trial as the relevant “trans-

action” in Rule 15(c)(2) lies in the real consequences of

today’s decision, which will fall most heavily on the shoul-

ders of indigent habeas petitioners who can afford no

counsel without the assistance of the court. In practical

terms, the significance of the right to amend arises from

the fact that in the overwhelming majority of cases, the

original petition is the work of a pro se petitioner. See

Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 191 (2001) (BREYER, J.,

dissenting) (93% of habeas petitioners in study were pro se

(citing U. S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,

Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Habeas Corpus Re-

view: Challenging State Court Criminal Convictions 14

(1995))); 1 Hertz & Liebman, §12.2, at 601 (“[N]early all”

federal habeas petitioners commence proceedings either

without legal assistance or with only the aid of a fellow

inmate or a volunteer attorney). Unless required by stat-

ute, appointment of counsel is most often a matter of

discretion on the part of the court. The district judge may

12 MAYLE v. FELIX

SOUTER, J., dissenting

well choose not to exercise that discretion unless and until

a habeas proceeding advances to the stage of discovery or

evidentiary hearing. See Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a) (requir-

ing appointment of counsel for indigent petitioner “[i]f

necessary for effective discovery”); Rule 8(c) (requiring

appointment of counsel “[i]f an evidentiary hearing is

warranted”). And the judge almost certainly will not

appoint counsel until after the preliminary review of the

petition to see whether it plainly warrants dismissal. See

Rule 4. Where a petition (even in its pro se form) has

survived this review by showing enough merit to justify

appointing counsel, it makes no sense to say that counsel

(appointed because of that apparent merit) should be

precluded from exercising professional judgment when

that judgment calls for adding a new ground for relief that

would relate back to the filing of the original petition. For

by hobbling counsel this way, the Court limits the capacity

of appointed counsel to provide the professional service

that a paid lawyer, hired at the outset, can give a client.

The lawyer hired at the start of the proceeding will be able

to draft an original petition containing all the claims

revealed to his trained eye; if the same lawyer is ap-

pointed by the court only after the petitioner has demon-

strated some merit in an original pro se filing, he and his

prisoner client will have no right to state all claims by

adding to the original petition, unless the lawyer happens

to be appointed and able to get up to speed before the

statute of limitations runs out. The rule the Court adopts

today may not make much difference to prisoners with

enough money to hire their own counsel; but it will matter

a great deal to poor prisoners who need appointed counsel

to see and plead facts showing a colorable basis for relief. 9

——————

9 It is not that I see the Court’s rule as constitutionally troubling. But

this case requires us to apply text that is ambiguous, and the Court’s

resolution of that ambiguity is based on the assumption that when

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 13

SOUTER, J., dissenting

The Court of Appeals got it right, and I respectfully

dissent.

——————

Congress authorized the appointment of counsel in habeas cases, it

would have intended the appointed lawyer to have one hand tied

behind his back, as compared with an attorney hired by a prisoner with

money. That is not in my view a sound assumption. (The Court also

observes that in this case counsel had plenty of time to file an amended

petition, but that fact cannot drive this decision, for the rule the Court

adopts today will of course apply in cases other than this one.)