San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City & County of San Francisco

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2004 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P., ET AL. v. CITY AND COUNTY

OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 04–340. Argued March 28, 2005—Decided June 20, 2005

Petitioners, hoteliers in respondent city, initiated this litigation over

the application of an ordinance requiring them to pay a $567,000 fee

for converting residential rooms to tourist rooms. They initially

sought mandamus in California state court, but that action was

stayed when they filed suit in Federal District Court asserting, inter

alia, facial and as-applied challenges to the ordinance under the Fifth

Amendment’s Takings Clause. Although the District Court granted

the city summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit abstained from ruling

on the facial challenge under Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman

Co., 312 U. S. 496, because the pending state mandamus action could

moot the federal question. The court did, however, affirm the District

Court’s ruling that the as-applied claim was unripe. Back in state

court, petitioners attempted to reserve the right to return to federal

court for adjudication of their federal takings claims. Ultimately, the

California courts rejected petitioners’ various state-law takings

claims, and they returned to the Federal District Court, advancing a

series of federal takings claims that depended on issues identical to

those previously resolved in the state courts. In order to avoid being

barred from suit by the general rule of issue preclusion, petitioners

asked the District Court to exempt their federal takings claims from

the reach of the full faith and credit statute, 28 U. S. C. §1738. Rely-

ing on the Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamil-

ton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172, 195, holding that takings

claims are not ripe until a State fails “to provide adequate compensa-

tion for the taking,” petitioners argued that, unless courts disregard

§1738 in takings cases, plaintiffs will be forced to litigate their claims

in state court without any realistic possibility of ever obtaining fed-

2 SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P. v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO

Syllabus

eral review. Holding, inter alia, that petitioners’ facial attack was

barred by issue preclusion, the District Court reasoned that §1738

requires federal courts to give preclusive effect to any state-court

judgment that would have such effect under the State’s laws. The

court added that because California courts had interpreted the rele-

vant substantive state takings law coextensively with federal law, pe-

titioners’ federal claims constituted the same claims the state courts

had already resolved. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit rejected petition-

ers’ contention that general preclusion principles should be cast aside

whenever plaintiffs must litigate in state court under Pullman and/or

Williamson County.

Held: This Court will not create an exception to the full faith and credit

statute in order to provide a federal forum for litigants seeking to ad-

vance federal takings claims. Pp. 11–23.

(a) The Court rejects petitioners’ contention that whenever plain-

tiffs reserve their federal takings claims in state court under England

v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, federal courts

should review the reserved federal claims de novo, regardless of what

issues the state court may have decided or how it may have decided

them. The England Court’s discussion of the “typical case” in which

reservations of federal issues are appropriate makes clear that the

decision was aimed at cases fundamentally distinct from petitioners’.

England cases generally involve federal constitutional challenges to a

state statute that can be avoided if a state court construes the statute

in a particular manner. Id., at 420. In such cases, the purpose of ab-

stention is not to afford state courts an opportunity to adjudicate an

issue that is functionally identical to the federal question, but to

avoid resolving the federal question by encouraging a state-law de-

termination that may moot the federal controversy. See id., at 416–

417, and n. 7. Additionally, the Court made clear that the effective

reservation of a federal claim was dependent on the condition that

plaintiffs take no action to broaden the scope of the state court’s re-

view beyond deciding the antecedent state-law issue. Id., at 419. Be-

cause the Ninth Circuit invoked Pullman abstention after determin-

ing that a ripe federal question existed as to the petitioners’ facial

takings challenge, they were entitled to insulate from preclusive ef-

fect that one federal issue while they returned to state court to re-

solve their mandamus petition. Petitioners, however, chose to ad-

vance broader issues than the limited ones in the mandamus

petition, putting forth facial and as-applied takings challenges to the

city ordinance in their state action. By doing so, they effectively

asked the state court to resolve the same federal issue they had pre-

viously asked it to reserve. England does not support the exercise of

any such right. Petitioners’ as-applied takings claims fare no better.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3

Syllabus

The Ninth Circuit found those claims unripe under Williamson

County, and therefore affirmed their dismissal. They were never

properly before the District Court, and there was no reason to expect

that they could be relitigated in full if advanced in the state proceed-

ings. Pp. 11–17.

(b) Federal courts are not free to disregard §1738 simply to guaran-

tee that all takings plaintiffs can have their day in federal court. Pe-

titioners misplace their reliance on the Second Circuit’s Santini deci-

sion, which held that parties who are forced to litigate their state-law

takings claims in state court pursuant to Williamson County cannot

be precluded from having those very claims resolved by a federal

court. The Santini court’s reasoning is unpersuasive for several rea-

sons. First, both petitioners and Santini ultimately depend on an as-

sumption that plaintiffs have a right to vindicate their federal claims

in a federal forum. This Court has repeatedly held to the contrary.

See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 103–104. Second, petition-

ers’ argument assumes that courts may simply create exceptions to

§1738 wherever they deem them appropriate. However, this Court

has held that no such exception will be recognized unless a later

statute contains an express or implied partial repeal. E.g., Kremer v.

Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 468. Congress has not ex-

pressed any intent to exempt federal takings claims from §1738.

Third, petitioners have overstated Williamson County’s reach

throughout this litigation. Because they were never required to ripen

in state court their claim that the city ordinance was facially invalid

for failure to substantially advance a legitimate state interest, see

Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 534, they could have raised the heart

of their facial takings challenges directly in federal court. With re-

spect to those federal claims that did require ripening, petitioners are

incorrect that Williamson County precludes state courts from hearing

simultaneously a plaintiff’s request for compensation under state law

together with a claim that, in the alternative, the denial of compensa-

tion would violate the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.

Pp. 17–23.

364 F. 3d 1088, affirmed.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA,

SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C. J., filed an

opinion concurring in the judgment, in which O’CONNOR, KENNEDY, and

THOMAS, JJ., joined.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 04–340

_________________

SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P., ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 20, 2005]

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether federal courts

may craft an exception to the full faith and credit statute,

28 U. S. C. §1738, for claims brought under the Takings

Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Petitioners, who own and operate a hotel in San Fran-

cisco, California (hereinafter City), initiated this litigation

in response to the application of a city ordinance that

required them to pay a $567,000 “conversion fee” in 1996.

After the California courts rejected petitioners’ various

state-law takings claims, they advanced in the Federal

District Court a series of federal takings claims that de-

pended on issues identical to those that had previously

been resolved in the state-court action. In order to avoid

the bar of issue preclusion, petitioners asked the District

Court to exempt from §1738’s reach claims brought under

the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Petitioners’ argument is predicated on Williamson

County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of

Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985), which held that tak-

2 SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P. v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO

Opinion of the Court

ings claims are not ripe until a State fails “to provide

adequate compensation for the taking.” Id., at 195.

Unless courts disregard §1738 in takings cases, petitioners

argue, plaintiffs will be forced to litigate their claims in

state court without any realistic possibility of ever obtain-

ing review in a federal forum. The Ninth Circuit’s rejection

of this argument conflicted with the Second Circuit’s deci-

sion in Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Manage-

ment Service, 342 F. 3d 118 (2003). We granted certiorari to

resolve the conflict, 543 U. S. ___ (2004),1 and now affirm

the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.

I

The San Remo Hotel is a three-story, 62-unit hotel in

the Fisherman’s Wharf neighborhood in San Francisco. In

December 1906, shortly after the great earthquake and

fire destroyed most of the city, the hotel—then called the

“New California Hotel”—opened its doors to house dislo-

cated individuals, immigrants, artists, and laborers. The

City officially licensed the facility to operate as a hotel and

restaurant in 1916, and in 1922 the hotel was given its

current name. When the hotel fell into financial difficul-

ties and a “dilapidated condition” in the early 1970’s,

Robert and Thomas Field purchased the facility, restored

it, and began to operate it as a bed and breakfast inn. See

San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and County of San Fran-

cisco, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 5 (Cal. App. 2000) (officially

——————

1 Although petitioners asked this Court to review two separate ques-

tions, our grant of certiorari was limited exclusively to the question

whether “a Fifth Amendment Takings claim [is] barred by issue preclu-

sion based on a judgment denying compensation solely under state law,

which was rendered in a state court proceeding that was required to

ripen the federal Takings claim?” Pet. for Cert. i. Thus, we have no

occasion to reach petitioners’ claim that, under California law, the

substantive state takings law decision of the California Supreme Court

was not entitled to preclusive effect in federal court. See Brief for

Petitioners 19–21.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3

Opinion of the Court

depublished).

In 1979, San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors responded

to “a severe shortage” of affordable rental housing for

elderly, disabled, and low-income persons by instituting a

moratorium on the conversion of residential hotel units

into tourist units. San Francisco Residential Hotel Unit

Conversion and Demolition Ordinance (hereinafter Hotel

Conversion Ordinance or HCO) §§41.3(a)–(g), Pet. for

Cert. 195a–197a. Two years later, the City enacted the

first version of the Hotel Conversion Ordinance to regulate

all future conversions. San Francisco Ordinance No. 330–

81, codified in §41.1 et seq. Under the 1981 version of the

HCO, a hotel owner could convert residential units into

tourist units only by obtaining a conversion permit. And

those permits could be obtained only by constructing new

residential units, rehabilitating old ones, or paying an “in

lieu” fee into the City’s Residential Hotel Preservation

Fund Account. See §§41.12–41.13, Pet. for Cert. 224a–

231a. The City substantially strengthened the HCO in

1990 by eliminating several exceptions that had existed in

the 1981 version and increasing the size of the “in lieu” fee

hotel owners must pay when converting residential units.

See 145 F. 3d 1095, 1099 (CA9 1998).

The genesis of this protracted dispute lies in the 1981

HCO’s requirement that each hotel “file an initial unit

usage report containing” the “number of residential and

tourist units in the hotel[s] as of September 23, 1979.”

§41.6(b)(1), Pet. for Cert. 206a. Jean Iribarren was operat-

ing the San Remo Hotel, pursuant to a lease from peti-

tioners, when this requirement came into effect. Iribarren

filed the initial usage report for the hotel, which errone-

ously reported that all of the rooms in the hotel were

“residential” units.2 The consequence of that initial classi-

——————

2 It seems that despite this initial classification, the San Remo Hotel

has operated as a mixed hotel for tourists and long-term residents since

4 SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P. v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO

Opinion of the Court

fication was that the City zoned the San Remo Hotel as

“residential hotel”—in other words, a hotel that consisted

entirely of residential units. And that zoning determina-

tion ultimately meant that, despite the fact that the San

Remo Hotel had operated in practice as a tourist hotel for

many years, 145 F. 3d, at 1100, petitioners were required

to apply for a conditional use permit to do business offi-

cially as a “tourist hotel,” 27 Cal. 4th 643, 654, 41 P. 3d

87, 94 (2002).

After the HCO was revised in 1990, petitioners applied

to convert all of the rooms in the San Remo Hotel into

tourist use rooms under the relevant HCO provisions and

requested a conditional use permit under the applicable

zoning laws. In 1993, the City Planning Commission

granted petitioners’ requested conversion and conditional

use permit, but only after imposing several conditions, one

of which included the requirement that petitioners pay a

$567,000 “in lieu” fee.3 Petitioners appealed, arguing that

the HCO requirement was unconstitutional and otherwise

improperly applied to their hotel. See id., at 656, 41 P. 3d,

at 95. The City Board of Supervisors rejected petitioners’

appeal on April 19, 1993.

In March 1993, Petitioners filed for a writ of adminis-

trative mandamus in California Superior Court. That

action lay dormant for several years, and the parties

——————

long before the HCO was enacted. According to the California Supreme

Court, in “a 1992 declaration by [petitioners], Iribarren filed the ‘incor-

rect’ initial unit usage report without their knowledge. They first

discovered the report in 1983 when they resumed operation of the hotel.

They protested the residential use classification in 1987, but were told

it could not be changed because the appeal period had passed.” 27 Cal.

4th 643, 654, 41 P. 3d 87, 94 (2002).

3 The application specifically required petitioners (1) to pay for 40

percent of the cost of replacement housing for the 62 lost residential

units; (2) to offer lifetime leases to any then-current residential users;

and (3) to “obtain variances from floor-area ratio and parking require-

ments.” Id., at 656, 41 P. 3d, at 95.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5

Opinion of the Court

ultimately agreed to stay that action after petitioners filed

for relief in Federal District Court.

Petitioners filed in federal court for the first time on

May 4, 1993. Petitioners’ first amended complaint alleged

four counts of due process (substantive and procedural)

and takings (facial and as-applied)4 violations under the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution, one count seeking damages under Rev. Stat.

§1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, for those violations, and one

pendent state-law claim. The District Court granted

respondents summary judgment. As relevant to this

action, the court found that petitioners’ facial takings

claim was untimely under the applicable statute of limita-

tions, and that the as-applied takings claim was unripe

under Williamson County, 473 U. S. 172.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

petitioners took the unusual position that the court should

not decide their federal claims, but instead should abstain

under Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S.

496 (1941), because a return to state court could conceiva-

bly moot the remaining federal questions. See App. 67–68;

see also 145 F. 3d, at 1101. The Court of Appeals obliged

petitioners’ request with respect to the facial challenge, a

request that respondents apparently viewed as an “outra-

geous act of chutzpah.” Id., at 1105. That claim, the court

reasoned, was “ripe the instant the 1990 HCO was en-

acted,” id., at 1102, and appropriate for Pullman absten-

——————

4 Specifically, count 3 alleged that the HCO was facially unconstitu-

tional under the Takings Clause because it “fails to substantially

advance legitimate government interests, deprives plaintiffs of the

opportunity to earn a fair return on its investment, denies plaintiffs

economically viable use of their property, and forces plaintiffs to bear

the public burden of housing the poor, all without just compensation.”

First Amended and Supplemental Complaint, No. C–93–1644–DLJ (D.

Cal., Jan. 24, 1994), p. 20, ¶49. Count 4, which advanced petitioners’

as-applied Takings Clause violation, was predicated on the same

rationale. Id., at 21.

6 SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P. v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO

Opinion of the Court

tion principally because petitioners’ “entire case” hinged

on the propriety of the planning commission’s zoning

designation—the precise subject of the pending state

mandamus action, 145 F. 3d, at 1105.5 The court, how-

ever, affirmed the District Court’s determination that

petitioners’ as-applied takings claim—the claim that the

application of the HCO to the San Remo Hotel violated the

Takings Clause—was unripe. Because petitioners had

failed to pursue an inverse condemnation action in state

court, they had not yet been denied just compensation as

contemplated by Williamson County. 145 F. 3d, at 1105.

At the conclusion of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, the

court appended a footnote stating that petitioners would

be free to raise their federal takings claims in the Califor-

nia courts. If, however, they wanted to “retain [their]

right to return to federal court for adjudication of [their]

federal claim, [they] must make an appropriate reserva-

tion in state court.” Id., at 1106, n. 7 (citations omitted).6

That is precisely what petitioners attempted to do when

they reactivated the dormant California case. Yet peti-

tioners advanced more than just the claims on which the

federal court had abstained, and phrased their state

claims in language that sounded in the rules and stan-

dards established and refined by this Court’s takings

jurisprudence. Petitioners claimed, for instance, that

“imposition of the fee ‘fails to substantially advance a

legitimate government interest’ and that ‘[t]he amount of

the fee imposed is not roughly proportional to the impact’

of the proposed tourist use of the San Remo Hotel.” 27

——————

5 The Court of Appeals did not answer the question whether this

claim was barred by the statute of limitations, as the District Court had

held.

6 The reservation discussed in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion was the

common reservation of federal claims made in state litigation under

England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 420–

421 (1964).

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 7

Opinion of the Court

Cal. 4th, at 656, 41 P. 3d, at 95 (quoting petitioners’ sec-

ond amended state complaint).7 The state trial court

dismissed petitioners’ amended complaint, but the inter-

mediate appellate court reversed. The court held that

petitioners’ claim that the payment of the “in lieu” fee

effected a taking should have been evaluated under

heightened scrutiny. Under more exacting scrutiny, the

fee failed this Court’s “essential nexus” and “rough propor-

tionality” tests because, inter alia, it was based on the

original flawed designation that the San Remo Hotel was

an entirely “residential use” facility. See id., at 657–658,

41 P. 3d, at 96–97 (summarizing appellate court opinion).

The California Supreme Court reversed over the partial

dissent of three justices.8 The court initially noted that

petitioners had reserved their federal causes of action and

had sought no relief for any violation of the Federal Con-

stitution. Id., at 649, n. 1, 41 P. 3d, at 91, n. 1.9 In the

portion of its opinion discussing the Takings Clause of the

California Constitution, however, the court noted that “we

appear to have construed the clauses congruently.” Id., at

664, 41 P. 3d, at 100–101 (citing cases). Accordingly,

despite the fact that petitioners sought relief only under

——————

7 With respect to claims that a regulation fails to advance a legitimate

state interest, see generally Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 544 U. S.

___, (2005) (slip op., at 6–15). With respect to “rough proportionality”

claims, see generally Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U. S.

825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374 (1994).

8 Justice Baxter and Justice Chin opined that because some hotel

rooms had been previously rented to tourists, the “in lieu” payment was

excessive. 27 Cal. 4th, at 691, 41 P. 3d, at 119–120. Justice Brown

opined that a 1985 statute had effectively superseded the HCO and

disagreed with the majority’s analysis of the constitutional issues. Id.,

at 699, 700–704, 41 P. 3d, at 125–128.

9 “Plaintiffs sought no relief in state court for violation of the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. They explicitly re-

served their federal causes of action. As their petition for writ of

mandate, as well, rests solely on state law, no federal question has been

presented or decided in this case.” Ibid.

8 SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P. v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO

Opinion of the Court

California law, the state court decided to “analyze their

takings claim under the relevant decisions of both this

court and the United States Supreme Court.” Ibid., 41

P. 3d, at 101.10

The principal constitutional issue debated by the parties

was whether a heightened level of scrutiny applied to the

claim that the housing replacement fee “ ‘does not substan-

tially advance legitimate state interests.’ ” Ibid. (quoting

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003,

1016 (1992)). In resolving that debate the court focused on

our opinions in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483

U. S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S.

374 (1994). Rejecting petitioners’ argument that height-

ened scrutiny should apply, the court emphasized the

distinction between discretionary exactions imposed by

executive officials on an ad hoc basis and “ ‘generally ap-

plicable zoning regulations’ ” involving “ ‘legislative deter-

minations.’ ” 27 Cal. 4th, at 666–668, 41 P. 3d, at 102–104

(quoting, e.g., Dolan, 512 U. S., at 385, 391, n. 8). The

court situated the HCO within the latter category, reason-

ing that the ordinance relied upon fixed fees computed

under a formula that is generally applicable to broad

classes of property owners.11 The court concluded that the

——————

10 Seealso id., at 665, 41 P. 3d, at 101 (“[I]t is the last mentioned

prong of the high court’s takings analysis that is at issue here” (empha-

sis added)).

11 See id., at 669, 41 P. 3d, at 104 (noting that the “HCO is generally

applicable legislation in that it applies, without discretion or discrimi-

nation, to every residential hotel in the city” and that “no meaningful

government discretion enters into either the imposition or the calcula-

tion of the in lieu fee”). The court noted that the general class of

property owners included more than 500 properties containing over

18,000 rooms, id., at 669, n. 12, 41 P. 3d, at 104, n. 12, and concluded

that the HCO “applies to all property in the class logically subject to its

strictures, that is, to all residential hotel units; no more can rationally

be demanded of local land use legislation in order to qualify for deferen-

tial review,” id., at 669, 41 P. 3d, at 104.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 9

Opinion of the Court

less demanding “reasonable relationship” test should

apply to the HCO’s monetary assessments, 27 Cal. 4th, at

671, 41 P. 3d, at 105.

Applying the “reasonable relationship” test, the court

upheld the HCO on its face and as-applied to petitioners.

As to the facial challenge, the court concluded that the

HCO’s mandated conversion fees “bear a reasonable rela-

tionship to the loss of housing . . . in the generality or great

majority of cases. . . .” Id., at 673, 41 P. 3d, at 107. With

respect to petitioners’ as-applied challenge, the court

concluded that the conversion fee was reasonably based on

the number of units designated for conversion, which itself

was based on petitioners’ own estimate that had been

provided to the City in 1981 and had remained unchal-

lenged for years. Id., at 678, and n. 17, 41 P. 3d, at 110–

111, and n. 17. The court therefore reversed the appellate

court and reinstated the trial court’s order dismissing

petitioners’ complaint.

Petitioners did not seek a writ of certiorari from the

California Supreme Court’s decision in this Court. In-

stead, they returned to Federal District Court by filing an

amended complaint based on the complaint that they had

filed prior to invoking Pullman abstention.12 The District

——————

12 The third amended complaint, which was filed on November 14,

2002, alleged two separate counts. See App. 88–93. Count 1 alleged

that the HCO was facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as-

applied to petitioners because (a) it failed “to substantially advance

legitimate government interests”; (b) it forced petitioners “to bear the

public burden of housing the poor”; and (c) it imposed unreasonable

conditions on petitioners’ request for a conditional use permit (the in

lieu fee and the required lifetime leases to residential tenants). Id., at

88–89. Count 2 sought relief under 42 U. S. C. §1983 based on (a)

extortion through the imposition of the $567,000 fee; (b) an actual

taking of property under Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,

438 U. S. 104 (1978); (c) the failure of the HCO as applied to petitioners

to advance legitimate state interests; (d) the City’s requirement that

petitioners bear the full cost of providing a general public benefit

10 SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P. v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO

Opinion of the Court

Court held that petitioners’ facial attack on the HCO was

not only barred by the statute of limitations, but also by

the general rule of issue preclusion. See Pet. for Cert.

85a–86a.13 The District Court reasoned that 28 U. S. C.

§1738 requires federal courts to give preclusive effect to

any state-court judgment that would have preclusive effect

under the laws of the State in which the judgment was

rendered. Because California courts had interpreted the

relevant substantive state takings law coextensively with

federal law, petitioners’ federal claims constituted the

same claims that had already been resolved in state court.

The Court of Appeals affirmed. The court rejected

petitioners’ contention that general preclusion principles

should be cast aside whenever plaintiffs “must litigate in

state court pursuant to Pullman and/or Williamson

County.” 364 F. 3d 1088, 1096 (CA9 2004). Relying on

unambiguous Circuit precedent and the absence of any

clearly contradictory decisions from this Court, the Court

of Appeals found itself bound to apply general issue pre-

clusion doctrine. Given that general issue preclusion

principles governed, the only remaining question was

whether the District Court properly applied that doctrine;

the court concluded that it did. The court expressly re-

jected petitioners’ contention “that California takings law

is not coextensive with federal takings law,” id., at 1096,

and held that the state court’s application of the “reason-

able relationship” test was an “ ‘equivalent determination’

of such claims under the federal takings clause,” id., at

1098.14 We granted certiorari and now affirm.

——————

(public housing) without just compensation.

13 The District Court found that most of petitioners’ as-applied claims

amounted to nothing more than improperly labeled facial challenges.

See Pet. for Cert. 82a–85a. The remainder of petitioners’ as-applied

claims, the court held, was barred by the statute of limitations. Id., at

84a–85a.

14 California courts apply issue preclusion to a final judgment in ear-

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005)

11

Opinion of the Court

II

Article IV, §1, of the United States Constitution de-

mands that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each

State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings

of every other State. And the Congress may by general

Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records

and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”

In 1790, Congress responded to the Constitution’s invita-

tion by enacting the first version of the full faith and

credit statute. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat.

122.15 The modern version of the statute, 28 U. S. C.

§1738, provides that “judicial proceedings . . . shall have

the same full faith and credit in every court within the

United States and its Territories and Possessions as they

have by law or usage in the courts of such State . . . .”

This statute has long been understood to encompass the

doctrines of res judicata, or “claim preclusion,” and collat-

eral estoppel, or “issue preclusion.” See Allen v. McCurry,

449 U. S. 90, 94–96 (1980).16

——————

lier litigation between the same parties if “(1) the issue decided in the

prior case is identical with the one now presented; (2) there was a final

judgment on the merits in the prior case, and (3) the party to be es-

topped was a party to the prior adjudication.” 364 F. 3d 1088, 1096

(CA9 2004). The court reasoned that the California Supreme Court’s

decision satisfied those criteria because petitioners’ takings challenges

“raised in state court are identical to the federal claims . . . and are

based on the same factual allegations.” Ibid. Our limited review in

this case does not include the question whether the Court of Appeals’

reading of California preclusion law was in error.

15 “This statute has existed in essentially unchanged form since its

enactment just after the ratification of the Constitution . . . .” Allen v.

McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 96, n. 8 (1980).

16 “Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action

precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were

or could have been raised in that action. Under collateral estoppel,

once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judg-

ment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a

different cause of action involving a party to the first case.” Id., at 94

12 SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P. v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO

Opinion of the Court

The general rule implemented by the full faith and

credit statute—that parties should not be permitted to

relitigate issues that have been resolved by courts of

competent jurisdiction—predates the Republic.17 It “has

found its way into every system of jurisprudence, not only

from its obvious fitness and propriety, but because without

it, an end could never be put to litigation.” Hopkins v. Lee,

6 Wheat. 109, 114 (1821). This Court has explained that

the rule

“is demanded by the very object for which civil courts

have been established, which is to secure the peace

and repose of society by the settlement of matters ca-

pable of judicial determination. Its enforcement is es-

sential to the maintenance of social order; for, the aid

of judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vin-

dication of rights of person and property, if, as be-

tween parties and their privies, conclusiveness did not

attend the judgments of such tribunals in respect of

all matters properly put in issue and actually deter-

mined by them.” Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United

States, 168 U. S. 1, 49 (1897).

As this case is presented to us, under our limited grant

of certiorari, we have only one narrow question to decide:

whether we should create an exception to the full faith

and credit statute, and the ancient rule on which it is

based, in order to provide a federal forum for litigants who

seek to advance federal takings claims that are not ripe

——————

(citations omitted).

17 “The authority of the res judicata, with the limitations under which

it is admitted, is derived by us from the Roman law and the Canonists.”

Washington, Alexandria, & Georgetown Steam-Packet Co. v. Sickles, 24

How. 333, 341 (1861); see also id., at 343 (noting that the rule also has

its pedigree “[i]n the courts upon the continent of Europe, and in the

courts of chancery and admiralty in the United States and Great

Britain, where the function of adjudication is performed entire by a

tribunal composed of one or more judges . . .”).

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 13

Opinion of the Court

until the entry of a final state judgment denying just

compensation. See Williamson County, 473 U. S. 172.18

The essence of petitioners’ argument is as follows: be-

cause no claim that a state agency has violated the federal

Takings Clause can be heard in federal court until the

property owner has “been denied just compensation”

through an available state compensation procedure, id., at

195, “federal courts [should be] required to disregard the

decision of the state court” in order to ensure that federal

takings claims can be “considered on the merits in . . .

federal court.” See Brief for Petitioners 8, 14. Therefore,

the argument goes, whenever plaintiffs reserve their

claims under England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Exam-

iners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964), federal courts should review

the reserved federal claims de novo, regardless of what

issues the state court may have decided or how it may

have decided them.

We reject petitioners’ contention. Although petitioners

were certainly entitled to reserve some of their federal

claims, as we shall explain, England does not support

their erroneous expectation that their reservation would

fully negate the preclusive effect of the state-court judg-

ment with respect to any and all federal issues that might

arise in the future federal litigation. Federal courts,

moreover, are not free to disregard 28 U. S. C. §1738

simply to guarantee that all takings plaintiffs can have

their day in federal court. We turn first to England.

——————

18 We did not grant certiorari on many of the issues discussed by the

parties and amici. We therefore assume for purposes of our decision

that all other issues in this protracted controversy have been correctly

decided. We assume, for instance, that the Ninth Circuit properly

interpreted California preclusion law; that the California Supreme Court

was correct in its determination that California takings law is coextensive

with federal law; that, as a matter of California law, the HCO was

lawfully applied to petitioners’ hotel; and that under California law, the

“in lieu” fee was imposed evenhandedly and substantially advanced

legitimate state interests.

14 SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P. v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO

Opinion of the Court

III

England involved a group of plaintiffs who had gradu-

ated from chiropractic school, but sought to practice in

Louisiana without complying with the educational re-

quirements of the State’s Medical Practice Act. 375 U. S.,

at 412. They filed suit in federal court challenging the

constitutionality of the Act. The District Court invoked

Pullman abstention and stayed the proceedings to enable

the Louisiana courts to decide a preliminary and essential

question of state law—namely, whether the state statute

applied at all to chiropractors. 375 U. S., at 413.19 The

state court, however, reached beyond the state-law ques-

tion and held not only that the statute applied to the

plaintiffs but also that its application was consistent with

the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

The Federal District Court then dismissed the federal

action without addressing the merits of the federal claim.

On appeal, we held that when a federal court abstains

from deciding a federal constitutional issue to enable the

state courts to address an antecedent state-law issue, the

plaintiff may reserve his right to return to federal court

for the disposition of his federal claims. Id., at 419. In

that case, the antecedent state issue requiring abstention

was distinct from the reserved federal issue. See id., at

418–419. Our discussion of the “typical case” in which

reservations of federal issues are appropriate makes clear

that our holding was limited to cases that are fundamen-

tally distinct from petitioners’. “Typical” England cases

generally involve federal constitutional challenges to a

state statute that can be avoided if a state court construes

——————

19 We stressed in England that abstention was essential to prevent

the district court from deciding “ ‘questions of constitutionality on the

basis of preliminary guesses regarding local law.’ ” 375 U. S., at 416,

n. 7 (quoting Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101,

105 (1944)).

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 15

Opinion of the Court

the statute in a particular manner.20 In such cases, the

purpose of abstention is not to afford state courts an op-

portunity to adjudicate an issue that is functionally identi-

cal to the federal question. To the contrary, the purpose of

Pullman abstention in such cases is to avoid resolving the

federal question by encouraging a state-law determination

that may moot the federal controversy. See 375 U. S., at

416–417, and n. 7.21 Additionally, our opinion made it

perfectly clear that the effective reservation of a federal

claim was dependent on the condition that plaintiffs take

no action to broaden the scope of the state court’s review

beyond decision of the antecedent state-law issue.22

Our holding in England does not support petitioners’

attempt to relitigate issues resolved by the California

courts. With respect to petitioners’ facial takings claims,

the Court of Appeals invoked Pullman abstention after

determining that a ripe federal question existed—namely,

“the facial takings challenge to the 1990 HCO.” 145 F. 3d,

at 1105.23 It did so because “ ‘land use planning is a sensi-

——————

20 375 U. S., at 420 (describing the “typical case” as one in which “the

state courts are asked to construe a state statute against the backdrop

of a federal constitutional challenge”).

21 As we explained in Allen, 449 U. S., at 101–102, n. 17, “[t]he hold-

ing in England depended entirely on this Court’s view of the purpose of

abstention in such a case: Where a plaintiff properly invokes federal-

court jurisdiction in the first instance on a federal claim, the federal

court has a duty to accept that jurisdiction. Abstention may serve only

to postpone, rather than to abdicate, jurisdiction, since its purpose is to

determine whether resolution of the federal question is even necessary,

or to obviate the risk of a federal court’s erroneous construction of state

law.” (Emphasis added and citations omitted.)

22 375 U. S., at 419 (“[I]f a party freely and without reservation submits

his federal claims for decision by the state courts, litigates them there, and

has them decided there, then . . . he has elected to forgo his right to return

to the District Court”).

23 Petitioners’ facial challenges to the HCO were ripe, of course, under

Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 534 (1992), in which we held that facial

challenges based on the “substantially advances” test need not be ripened

16 SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P. v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO

Opinion of the Court

tive area of social policy’ ” and because petitioners’ pending

state mandamus action had the potential of mooting their

facial challenge to the HCO by overturning the City’s

original classification of the San Remo Hotel as a “residen-

tial” property. Ibid. Thus, petitioners were entitled to

insulate from preclusive effect one federal issue—their

facial constitutional challenge to the HCO—while they

returned to state court to resolve their petition for writ of

mandate.

Petitioners, however, chose to advance broader issues

than the limited issues contained within their state peti-

tion for writ of administrative mandamus on which the

Ninth Circuit relied when it invoked Pullman abstention.

In their state action, petitioners advanced not only their

request for a writ of administrative mandate, 27 Cal. 4th,

at 653, 41 P. 3d, at 93, but also their various claims that

the HCO was unconstitutional on its face and as applied

for (1) its failure to substantially advance a legitimate

interest, (2) its lack of a nexus between the required fees

and the ultimate objectives sought to be achieved via the

ordinance, and (3) its imposition of an undue economic

burden on individual property owners. Id., at 672–676, 41

P. 3d, at 106–109. By broadening their state action be-

yond the mandamus petition to include their “substan-

tially advances” claims, petitioners effectively asked the

state court to resolve the same federal issues they asked it

to reserve. England does not support the exercise of any

such right.

Petitioners’ as-applied takings claims fare no better. As

an initial matter, the Court of Appeals did not abstain

with respect to those claims. Instead, the court found that

they were unripe under Williamson County. The court

——————

in state court—the claims do “not depend on the extent to which petition-

ers are deprived of the economic use of their particular pieces of property

or the extent to which these particular petitioners are compensated.” Ibid.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 17

Opinion of the Court

therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal of those

claims. 145 F. 3d, at 1106. Unlike their “substantially

advances” claims, petitioners’ as-applied claims were

never properly before the District Court, and there was no

reason to expect that they could be relitigated in full if

advanced in the state proceedings. See Allen, 449 U. S., at

101, n. 17. In short, our opinion in England does not

support petitioners’ attempt to circumvent §1738.

IV

Petitioners’ ultimate submission, however, does not rely

on England alone. Rather, they argue that federal courts

simply should not apply ordinary preclusion rules to state-

court judgments when a case is forced into state court by

the ripeness rule of Williamson County. For support,

petitioners rely on the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit’s decision in Santini, 342 F. 3d, at 130.

In Santini, the Second Circuit held that parties “who

litigate state-law takings claims in state court involuntar-

ily” pursuant to Williamson County cannot be precluded

from having those very claims resolved “by a federal

court.” 342 F. 3d, at 130. The court did not rest its deci-

sion on any provision of the federal full faith and credit

statute or our cases construing that law. Instead, the

court reasoned that “[i]t would be both ironic and unfair if

the very procedure that the Supreme Court required

[plaintiffs] to follow before bringing a Fifth Amendment

takings claim . . . also precluded [them] from ever bringing

a Fifth Amendment takings claim.” Ibid. We find this

reasoning unpersuasive for several reasons.

First, both petitioners and Santini ultimately depend on

an assumption that plaintiffs have a right to vindicate

their federal claims in a federal forum. We have repeat-

edly held, to the contrary, that issues actually decided in

valid state-court judgments may well deprive plaintiffs of

the “right” to have their federal claims relitigated in fed-

18 SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P. v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO

Opinion of the Court

eral court. See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd.

of Ed., 465 U. S. 75, 84 (1984); Allen, 449 U. S., at 103–

104. This is so even when the plaintiff would have pre-

ferred not to litigate in state court, but was required to do

so by statute or prudential rules. See id., at 104. The

relevant question in such cases is not whether the plaintiff

has been afforded access to a federal forum; rather, the

question is whether the state court actually decided an

issue of fact or law that was necessary to its judgment.

In Allen, the plaintiff, Willie McCurry, invoked the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in an unsuccessful

attempt to suppress evidence in a state criminal trial.

After he was convicted, he sought to remedy his alleged

constitutional violation by bringing a suit for damages

under 42 U. S. C. §1983 against the officers who had

entered his home. Relying on “ ‘the special role of federal

courts in protecting civil rights’ ” and the fact that §1983

provided the “only route to a federal forum,” the court of

appeals held that McCurry was entitled to a federal trial

unencumbered by collateral estoppel. 449 U. S., at 93. We

rejected that argument emphatically.

“The actual basis of the Court of Appeals’ holding ap-

pears to be a generally framed principle that every

person asserting a federal right is entitled to one un-

encumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a fed-

eral district court, regardless of the legal posture in

which the federal claim arises. But the authority for

this principle is difficult to discern. It cannot lie in

the Constitution, which makes no such guarantee, but

leaves the scope of the jurisdiction of the federal dis-

trict courts to the wisdom of Congress. And no such

authority is to be found in §1983 itself . . . . There is,

in short, no reason to believe that Congress intended

to provide a person claiming a federal right an unre-

stricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already de-

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 19

Opinion of the Court

cided in state court simply because the issue arose in

a state proceeding in which he would rather not have

been engaged at all.” Id., at 103–104.24

As in Allen, we are presently concerned only with issues

actually decided by the state court that are dispositive of

federal claims raised under §1983. And, also as in Allen, it

is clear that petitioners would have preferred not to have

been forced to have their federal claims resolved by issues

decided in state court. Unfortunately for petitioners, it is

entirely unclear why their preference for a federal forum

should matter for constitutional or statutory purposes.

The only distinction between this case and Allen that is

possibly relevant is the fact that petitioners here origi-

nally invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court,

which abstained on Pullman grounds while petitioners

returned to state court. But petitioners’ as-applied tak-

ings claims were never properly before the District Court

because they were unripe. And, as we have already ex-

plained, the Court of Appeals invoked Pullman abstention

only with respect to petitioners’ “substantially advances”

takings challenge, which petitioners then gratuitously

presented to the state court. At a bare minimum, with

respect to the facial takings claim, petitioners were “in an

offensive posture in [their] state court proceeding, and

could have proceeded first in federal court had [they]

wanted to litigate [their “substantially advances”] federal

claim in a federal forum.” Migra, 465 U. S., at 85, n. 7.

——————

24 We expressed similar views in Migra v. Warren City School Dist.

Bd. of Ed., 465 U. S. 75, 84 (1984):

“Although such a division may seem attractive from a plaintiff’s per-

spective, it is not the system established by §1738. That statute embod-

ies the view that it is more important to give full faith and credit to

state-court judgments than to ensure separate forums for federal and

state claims. This reflects a variety of concerns, including notions of

comity, the need to prevent vexatious litigation, and a desire to con-

serve judicial resources.”

20 SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P. v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO

Opinion of the Court

Thus, the only distinction between this case and Allen is a

distinction of no relevant significance.

The second reason we find petitioners’ argument unper-

suasive is that it assumes that courts may simply create

exceptions to 28 U. S. C. §1738 wherever courts deem

them appropriate. Even conceding, arguendo, the laud-

able policy goal of making federal forums available to

deserving litigants, we have expressly rejected petitioners’

view. “Such a fundamental departure from traditional

rules of preclusion, enacted into federal law, can be justi-

fied only if plainly stated by Congress.” Kremer v. Chemi-

cal Constr. Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 485 (1982). Our cases

have therefore made plain that “an exception to §1738 will

not be recognized unless a later statute contains an ex-

press or implied partial repeal.” Id., at 468 (citing Allen,

449 U. S., at 99). Even when the plaintiff’s resort to state

court is involuntary and the federal interest in denying

finality is robust, we have held that Congress “must

‘clearly manifest’ its intent to depart from §1738.” 456

U. S., at 477.

The same concerns animate our decision here. Congress

has not expressed any intent to exempt from the full faith

and credit statute federal takings claims. Consequently,

we apply our normal assumption that the weighty inter-

ests in finality and comity trump the interest in giving

losing litigants access to an additional appellate tribunal.

As we explained in Federated Department Stores, Inc. v.

Moitie, 452 U. S. 394, 401 (1981),

“we do not see the grave injustice which would be

done by the application of accepted principles of res

judicata. ‘Simple justice’ is achieved when a complex

body of law developed over a period of years is even-

handedly applied. The doctrine of res judicata serves

vital public interests beyond any individual judge’s

ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 21

Opinion of the Court

case. There is simply ‘no principle of law or equity

which sanctions the rejection by a federal court of the

salutary principle of res judicata’ ” (quoting Heiser v.

Woodruff, 327 U. S. 726, 733 (1946)).

Third, petitioners have overstated the reach of William-

son County throughout this litigation. Petitioners were

never required to ripen the heart of their complaint—the

claim that the HCO was facially invalid because it failed

to substantially advance a legitimate state interest—in

state court. See Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 534

(1992). Petitioners therefore could have raised most of

their facial takings challenges, which by their nature

requested relief distinct from the provision of “just com-

pensation,” directly in federal court.25 Alternatively,

petitioners had the option of reserving their facial claims

while pursuing their as-applied claims along with their

petition for writ of administrative mandamus. Petitioners

did not have the right, however, to seek state review of the

same substantive issues they sought to reserve. The

purpose of the England reservation is not to grant plain-

tiffs a second bite at the apple in their forum of choice.

With respect to those federal claims that did require

ripening, we reject petitioners’ contention that Williamson

County forbids plaintiffs from advancing their federal

claims in state courts. The requirement that aggrieved

property owners must seek “compensation through the

procedures the State has provided for doing so,” 473 U. S.,

at 194, does not preclude state courts from hearing simul-

taneously a plaintiff’s request for compensation under

state law and the claim that, in the alternative, the denial

of compensation would violate the Fifth Amendment of the

——————

25 Inall events, petitioners may no longer advance such claims given

our recent holding that the “ ‘substantially advances’ formula is not a

valid takings test, and indeed . . . has no proper place in our takings

jurisprudence.” Lingle, 544 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 18).

22 SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P. v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO

Opinion of the Court

Federal Constitution. Reading Williamson County to

preclude plaintiffs from raising such claims in the alterna-

tive would erroneously interpret our cases as requiring

property owners to “resort to piecemeal litigation or oth-

erwise unfair procedures.” MacDonald, Sommer & Frates

v. Yolo County, 477 U. S. 340, 350, n. 7 (1986).

It is hardly a radical notion to recognize that, as a prac-

tical matter, a significant number of plaintiffs will neces-

sarily litigate their federal takings claims in state courts.

It was settled well before Williamson County that “a claim

that the application of government regulations effects a

taking of a property interest is not ripe until the govern-

ment entity charged with implementing the regulations

has reached a final decision regarding the application of

the regulations to the property at issue.” 473 U. S., at

186. As a consequence, there is scant precedent for the

litigation in federal district court of claims that a state

agency has taken property in violation of the Fifth

Amendment’s takings clause. To the contrary, most of the

cases in our takings jurisprudence, including nearly all of

the cases on which petitioners rely, came to us on writs of

certiorari from state courts of last resort.26

Moreover, this is not the only area of law in which we

have recognized limits to plaintiffs’ ability to press their

federal claims in federal courts. See, e.g., Fair Assessment

in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100, 116

(1981) (holding that taxpayers are “barred by the principle

of comity from asserting §1983 actions against the validity

——————

26 See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U. S., at 383; Yee, 503 U. S., at 526; Nollan, 483

U. S., at 830; First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.

County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 310–311 (1987); Penn Central, 438

U. S., at 120–122. Indeed, Justice Holmes’ famous “too far” formulation,

which spawned our regulatory takings jurisprudence, was announced

in a case that came to this Court via a writ of certiorari to Pennsyl-

vania’s highest court. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393,

415 (1922).

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 23

Opinion of the Court

of state tax systems in federal courts”). State courts are

fully competent to adjudicate constitutional challenges to

local land-use decisions. Indeed, state courts undoubtedly

have more experience than federal courts do in resolving

the complex factual, technical, and legal questions related

to zoning and land-use regulations.

At base, petitioners’ claim amounts to little more than

the concern that it is unfair to give preclusive effect to

state-court proceedings that are not chosen, but are in-

stead required in order to ripen federal takings claims.

Whatever the merits of that concern may be, we are not

free to disregard the full faith and credit statute solely to

preserve the availability of a federal forum. The Court of

Appeals was correct to decline petitioners’ invitation to

ignore the requirements of 28 U. S. C. §1738. The judg-

ment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.

It is so ordered

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1

REHNQUIST, C. J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 04–340

_________________

SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P., ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 20, 2005]

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE

O’CONNOR, JUSTICE KENNEDY, and JUSTICE THOMAS join,

concurring in the judgment.

I agree that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should

be affirmed. Whatever the reasons for petitioners’ chosen

course of litigation in the state courts, it is quite clear that

they are now precluded by the full faith and credit statute,

28 U. S. C. §1738, from relitigating in their 42 U. S. C.

§1983 action those issues which were adjudicated by the

California courts. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist.

Bd. of Ed., 465 U. S. 75, 84 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449

U. S. 90, 103–105 (1980). There is no basis for us to except

from §1738’s reach all claims brought under the Takings

Clause. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456

U. S. 461, 485 (1982). I write separately to explain why I

think part of our decision in Williamson County Regional

Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473

U. S. 172 (1985), may have been mistaken.

In Williamson County, the respondent land developer

filed a §1983 suit in federal court alleging a regulatory

takings claim after a regional planning commission disap-

proved respondent’s plat proposals, but before respondent

appealed that decision to the zoning board of appeals. Id.,

at 181–182. Rather than reaching the merits, we found

2 SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P. v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO

REHNQUIST, C. J., concurring in judgment

the claim was brought prematurely. Id., at 200. We first

held that the claim was “not ripe until the government

entity charged with implementing the regulations [had]

reached a final decision regarding the application of the

regulations to the property at issue.” Id., at 186. Because

respondent failed to seek variances from the planning

commission or the zoning board of appeals, we decided

that respondent had failed to meet the final-decision

requirement. Id., at 187–191. We then noted a “second

reason the taking claim [was] not yet ripe”: “respondent

did not seek compensation through the procedures the

State [had] provided for doing so.” Id., at 194. Until the

claimant had received a final denial of compensation

through all available state procedures, such as by an

inverse condemnation action, we said he could not “claim a

violation of the Just Compensation Clause.” Id., at 195–

196.

It is not clear to me that Williamson County was correct

in demanding that, once a government entity has reached

a final decision with respect to a claimant’s property, the

claimant must seek compensation in state court before

bringing a federal takings claim in federal court. The

Court in Williamson County purported to interpret the

Fifth Amendment in divining this state-litigation re-

quirement. See, e.g., id., at 194, n. 13 (“The nature of the

constitutional right . . . requires that a property owner

utilize procedures for obtaining compensation before

bringing a §1983 action”). More recently, we have referred

to it as merely a prudential requirement. Suitum v. Tahoe

Regional Planning Agency, 520 U. S. 725, 733–734 (1997).

It is not obvious that either constitutional or prudential

principles require claimants to utilize all state compensa-

tion procedures before they can bring a federal takings

claim. Cf. Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U. S. 496,

516 (1982) (holding that plaintiffs suing under §1983 are

not required to have exhausted state administrative

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3

REHNQUIST, C. J., concurring in judgment

remedies).1

The Court today attempts to shore up the state-

litigation requirement by referring to Fair Assessment in

Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100 (1981).

Ante, at 22–23. There, we held that the principle of comity

(reflected in the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. §1341)

bars taxpayers from asserting §1983 claims against the

validity of state tax systems in federal courts. 454 U. S.,

at 116. Our decision that such suits must be brought in

state court was driven by the unique and sensitive inter-

ests at stake when federal courts confront claims that

States acted impermissibly in administering their own tax

systems. Id., at 102–103, 107–113. Those historically

grounded, federalism-based concerns had led to a long-

standing, “fundamental principle of comity between fed-

eral courts and state governments . . . , particularly in the

area of state taxation,” a principle which predated the

enactment of §1983 itself. Id., at 103, 107–114. We de-

cided that those interests favored requiring that taxpayers

bring challenges to the validity of state tax systems in

state court, despite the strong interests favoring federal-

court review of alleged constitutional violations by state

officials. Id., at 115–116.

The Court today makes no claim that any such long-

standing principle of comity toward state courts in han-

dling federal takings claims existed at the time William-

son County was decided, nor that one has since developed.

The Court does remark, however, that state courts are

more familiar with the issues involved in local land-use

——————

1 In creating the state-litigation rule, the Court, in addition to relying

on the Fifth Amendment’s text, analogized to Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto

Co., 467 U. S. 986 (1984), and Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981). As

several of petitioners’ amici in this case have urged, those cases provided

limited support for the state-litigation requirement. See Brief for Defend-

ers of Property Rights et al. as Amici Curiae 9–12; Brief for Elizabeth J.

Neumont et al. as Amici Curiae 10–14.

4 SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P. v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO

REHNQUIST, C. J., concurring in judgment

and zoning regulations, and it suggests that this makes it

proper to relegate federal takings claims to state court.

Ante, at 23. But it is not apparent that any such expertise

matches the type of historically grounded, federalism-

based interests we found necessary to our decision in Fair

Assessment. In any event, the Court has not explained

why we should hand authority over federal takings claims

to state courts, based simply on their relative familiarity

with local land-use decisions and proceedings, while allow-

ing plaintiffs to proceed directly to federal court in cases

involving, for example, challenges to municipal land-use

regulations based on the First Amendment, see, e.g.,

Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41 (1986);

Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50 (1976),

or the Equal Protection Clause, see, e.g., Cleburne v. Cle-

burne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432 (1985); Village of

Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 (1974). In short, the

affirmative case for the state-litigation requirement has

yet to be made.

Finally, Williamson County’s state-litigation rule has

created some real anomalies, justifying our revisiting the

issue. For example, our holding today ensures that liti-

gants who go to state court to seek compensation will

likely be unable later to assert their federal takings claims

in federal court. Ante, at 22. And, even if preclusion law

would not block a litigant’s claim, the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine might, insofar as Williamson County can be read

to characterize the state courts’ denial of compensation as

a required element of the Fifth Amendment takings claim.

See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.,

544 U. S. ___ (2005). As the Court recognizes, ante, at 22,

Williamson County all but guarantees that claimants will

be unable to utilize the federal courts to enforce the Fifth

Amendment’s just compensation guarantee. The basic

principle that state courts are competent to enforce federal

rights and to adjudicate federal takings claims is sound,

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5

REHNQUIST, C. J., concurring in judgment

see ante, at 23, and would apply to any number of federal

claims. Cf. 28 U. S. C. §2254 (providing for limited federal

habeas review of state-court adjudications of alleged viola-

tions of the Constitution). But that principle does not

explain why federal takings claims in particular should be

singled out to be confined to state court, in the absence of

any asserted justification or congressional directive.2

* * *

I joined the opinion of the Court in Williamson County.

But further reflection and experience lead me to think

that the justifications for its state-litigation requirement

are suspect, while its impact on takings plaintiffs is dra-

matic. Here, no court below has addressed the correctness

of Williamson County, neither party has asked us to re-

consider it, and resolving the issue could not benefit peti-

tioners. In an appropriate case, I believe the Court should

reconsider whether plaintiffs asserting a Fifth Amend-

ment takings claim based on the final decision of a state or

local government entity must first seek compensation in

state courts.

——————

2 Indeed, in some States the courts themselves apply the state-

litigation requirement from Williamson County Regional Planning

Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985),

refusing to entertain any federal takings claim until the claimant

receives a final denial of compensation through all the available state

procedures. See, e.g., Breneric Assoc. v. City of Del Mar, 69 Cal. App.

4th 166, 188–189, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 324, 338–339 (1998); Melillo v. City

of New Haven, 249 Conn. 138, 154, n. 28, 732 A. 2d 133, 138, n. 28

(1999). This precludes litigants from asserting their federal takings

claim even in state court. The Court tries to avoid this anomaly by

asserting that, for plaintiffs attempting to raise a federal takings claim

in state court as an alternative to their state claims, Williamson County

does not command that the state courts themselves impose the state-

litigation requirement. Ante, at 21–22. But that is so only if William-

son County’s state-litigation requirement is merely a prudential rule,

and not a constitutional mandate, a question that the Court today

conspicuously leaves open.