Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2004 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. DARUE

ENGINEERING & MANUFACTURING

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 04–603. Argued April 18, 2005—Decided June 13, 2005

The Internal Revenue Service seized real property owned by petitioner

(hereinafter Grable) to satisfy a federal tax delinquency, and gave

Grable notice by certified mail before selling the property to respon-

dent (hereinafter Darue). Grable subsequently brought a quiet title

action in state court, claiming that Darue’s title was invalid because

26 U. S. C. §6335 required the IRS to give Grable notice of the sale by

personal service, not certified mail. Darue removed the case to Fed-

eral District Court as presenting a federal question because the title

claim depended on an interpretation of federal tax law. The District

Court declined to remand the case, finding that it posed a significant

federal-law question, and it granted Darue summary judgment on

the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, and this Court granted cer-

tiorari on the jurisdictional question.

Held: The national interest in providing a federal forum for federal tax

litigation is sufficiently substantial to support the exercise of federal-

question jurisdiction over the disputed issue on removal. Pp. 3–11.

(a) Darue was entitled to remove the quiet title action if Grable

could have brought it in federal court originally, as a civil action

“arising under the . . . laws . . . of the United States,” 28 U. S. C.

§1331. Federal-question jurisdiction is usually invoked by plaintiffs

pleading a cause of action created by federal law, but this Court has

also long recognized that such jurisdiction will lie over some state-

law claims that implicate significant federal issues, see, e.g., Smith v.

Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180. Such federal jurisdiction

demands not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one.

And the jurisdiction must be consistent with congressional judgment

about the sound division of labor between state and federal courts

2 GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. DARUE

ENGINEERING & MFG.

Syllabus

governing §1331’s application. These considerations have kept the

Court from adopting a single test for jurisdiction over federal issues

embedded in state-law claims between nondiverse parties. Instead,

the question is whether the state-law claim necessarily stated a fed-

eral issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum

may entertain without disturbing a congressionally approved balance

of federal and state judicial responsibilities. Pp. 3–6.

(b) This case warrants federal jurisdiction. Grable premised its su-

perior title claim on the IRS’s failure to give adequate notice, as de-

fined by federal law. Whether Grable received notice is an essential

element of its quiet title claim, and the federal statute’s meaning is

actually disputed. The meaning of a federal tax provision is an im-

portant federal-law issue that belongs in federal court. The Govern-

ment has a strong interest in promptly collecting delinquent taxes,

and the IRS’s ability to satisfy its claims from delinquents’ property

requires clear terms of notice to assure buyers like Darue that the

IRS has good title. Finally, because it will be the rare state title case

that raises a federal-law issue, federal jurisdiction to resolve genuine

disagreement over federal tax title provisions will portend only a mi-

croscopic effect on the federal-state division of labor. This conclusion

puts the Court in venerable company, quiet title actions having been

the subject of some of the earliest exercises of federal-question juris-

diction over state-law claims. E.g., Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U. S. 486,

490–491. Pp. 6–7.

(c) Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804, is

not to the contrary. There, in finding federal jurisdiction unavailable

for a state tort claim resting in part on an allegation that the defen-

dant drug company had violated a federal branding law, the Court

noted that Congress had not provided a private federal cause of ac-

tion for such violations. Merrell Dow cannot be read to make a fed-

eral cause of action a necessary condition for federal-question juris-

diction. It disclaimed the adoption of any bright-line rule and

expressly approved the exercise of jurisdiction in Smith, where there

was no federal cause of action. Accordingly, Merrell Dow should be

read in its entirety as treating the absence of such cause as evidence

relevant to, but not dispositive of, the “sensitive judgments about

congressional intent,” required by §1331. Id., at 810. In Merrell

Dow, the principal significance of this absence was its bearing on the

consequences to the federal system. If the federal labeling standard

without a cause of action could get a state claim into federal court, so

could any other federal standards without causes of action. And that

would mean an enormous number of cases. A comparable analysis

yields a different jurisdictional conclusion here, because state quiet

title actions rarely involve contested federal-law issues. Pp. 7–11.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3

Syllabus

377 F. 3d 592, affirmed.

SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. THOMAS, J.,

filed a concurring opinion.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 04–603

_________________

GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC.,

PETITIONER v. DARUE ENGINEERING

& MANUFACTURING

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 13, 2005]

JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question is whether want of a federal cause of ac-

tion to try claims of title to land obtained at a federal tax

sale precludes removal to federal court of a state action

with non-diverse parties raising a disputed issue of federal

title law. We answer no, and hold that the national inter-

est in providing a federal forum for federal tax litigation is

sufficiently substantial to support the exercise of federal

question jurisdiction over the disputed issue on removal,

which would not distort any division of labor between

the state and federal courts, provided or assumed by

Congress.

I

In 1994, the Internal Revenue Service seized Michigan

real property belonging to petitioner Grable & Sons Metal

Products, Inc., to satisfy Grable’s federal tax delinquency.

Title 26 U. S. C. §6335 required the IRS to give notice of

the seizure, and there is no dispute that Grable received

actual notice by certified mail before the IRS sold the

property to respondent Darue Engineering & Manufactur-

2 GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. DARUE

ENGINEERING & MFG.

Opinion of the Court

ing. Although Grable also received notice of the sale itself,

it did not exercise its statutory right to redeem the prop-

erty within 180 days of the sale, §6337(b)(1), and after

that period had passed, the Government gave Darue a

quitclaim deed. §6339.

Five years later, Grable brought a quiet title action in

state court, claiming that Darue’s record title was invalid

because the IRS had failed to notify Grable of its seizure of

the property in the exact manner required by §6335(a),

which provides that written notice must be “given by the

Secretary to the owner of the property [or] left at his usual

place of abode or business.” Grable said that the statute

required personal service, not service by certified mail.

Darue removed the case to Federal District Court as

presenting a federal question, because the claim of title

depended on the interpretation of the notice statute in the

federal tax law. The District Court declined to remand the

case at Grable’s behest after finding that the “claim does

pose a significant question of federal law,” Tr. 17 (Apr. 2,

2001), and ruling that Grable’s lack of a federal right of

action to enforce its claim against Darue did not bar the

exercise of federal jurisdiction. On the merits, the court

granted summary judgment to Darue, holding that al-

though §6335 by its terms required personal service,

substantial compliance with the statute was enough. 207

F. Supp. 2d 694 (WD Mich. 2002).

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 377

F. 3d 592 (2004). On the jurisdictional question, the panel

thought it sufficed that the title claim raised an issue of

federal law that had to be resolved, and implicated a

substantial federal interest (in construing federal tax law).

The court went on to affirm the District Court’s judgment

on the merits. We granted certiorari on the jurisdictional

question alone,1 543 U. S. ___ (2005) to resolve a split

——————

1 Accordingly, we have no occasion to pass upon the proper interpre-

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3

Opinion of the Court

within the Courts of Appeals on whether Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804 (1986),

always requires a federal cause of action as a condition for

exercising federal-question jurisdiction.2 We now affirm.

II

Darue was entitled to remove the quiet title action if

Grable could have brought it in federal district court

originally, 28 U. S. C. §1441(a), as a civil action “arising

under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States,” §1331. This provision for federal-question juris-

diction is invoked by and large by plaintiffs pleading a

cause of action created by federal law (e.g., claims under

42 U. S. C. §1983). There is, however, another longstand-

ing, if less frequently encountered, variety of federal “aris-

ing under” jurisdiction, this Court having recognized for

nearly 100 years that in certain cases federal question

jurisdiction will lie over state-law claims that implicate

significant federal issues. E.g., Hopkins v. Walker, 244

U. S. 486, 490–491 (1917). The doctrine captures the com-

monsense notion that a federal court ought to be able to

hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless

turn on substantial questions of federal law, and thus

justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of

uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues,

see ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between

State and Federal Courts 164–166 (1968).

The classic example is Smith v. Kansas City Title &

Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1921), a suit by a shareholder

claiming that the defendant corporation could not lawfully

——————

tation of the federal tax provision at issue here.

2 Compare Seinfeld v. Austen, 39 F. 3d 761, 764 (CA7 1994) (finding

that federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim requires a

parallel federal private right of action), with Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power

Co., 98 F. 3d 799, 806 (CA4 1996) (finding that a federal private action

is not required).

4 GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. DARUE

ENGINEERING & MFG.

Opinion of the Court

buy certain bonds of the National Government because

their issuance was unconstitutional. Although Missouri

law provided the cause of action, the Court recognized

federal-question jurisdiction because the principal issue in

the case was the federal constitutionality of the bond

issue. Smith thus held, in a somewhat generous state-

ment of the scope of the doctrine, that a state-law claim

could give rise to federal-question jurisdiction so long as it

“appears from the [complaint] that the right to relief

depends upon the construction or application of [federal

law].” Id., at 199.

The Smith statement has been subject to some trimming

to fit earlier and later cases recognizing the vitality of the

basic doctrine, but shying away from the expansive view

that mere need to apply federal law in a state-law claim

will suffice to open the “arising under” door. As early as

1912, this Court had confined federal-question jurisdiction

over state-law claims to those that “really and substan-

tially involv[e] a dispute or controversy respecting the

validity, construction or effect of [federal] law.” Shulthis

v. McDougal, 225 U. S. 561, 569 (1912). This limitation

was the ancestor of Justice Cardozo’s later explanation

that a request to exercise federal-question jurisdiction

over a state action calls for a “common-sense accommoda-

tion of judgment to [the] kaleidoscopic situations” that

present a federal issue, in “a selective process which picks

the substantial causes out of the web and lays the other

ones aside.” Gully v. First Nat. Bank in Meridian, 299

U. S. 109, 117–118 (1936). It has in fact become a con-

stant refrain in such cases that federal jurisdiction de-

mands not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial

one, indicating a serious federal interest in claiming the

advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.

E.g., Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522

U. S. 156, 164 (1997); Merrell Dow, supra, at 814, and

n. 12; Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5

Opinion of the Court

Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U. S. 1, 28 (1983).

But even when the state action discloses a contested and

substantial federal question, the exercise of federal juris-

diction is subject to a possible veto. For the federal issue

will ultimately qualify for a federal forum only if federal

jurisdiction is consistent with congressional judgment

about the sound division of labor between state and fed-

eral courts governing the application of §1331. Thus,

Franchise Tax Bd. explained that the appropriateness of a

federal forum to hear an embedded issue could be evalu-

ated only after considering the “welter of issues regarding

the interrelation of federal and state authority and the

proper management of the federal judicial system.” Id., at

8. Because arising-under jurisdiction to hear a state-law

claim always raises the possibility of upsetting the state-

federal line drawn (or at least assumed) by Congress, the

presence of a disputed federal issue and the ostensible

importance of a federal forum are never necessarily dispo-

sitive; there must always be an assessment of any disrup-

tive portent in exercising federal jurisdiction. See also

Merrell Dow, supra, at 810.

These considerations have kept us from stating a “sin-

gle, precise, all-embracing” test for jurisdiction over fed-

eral issues embedded in state-law claims between non-

diverse parties. Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating

Corp., 486 U. S. 800, 821 (1988) (STEVENS, J., concurring).

We have not kept them out simply because they appeared

in state raiment, as Justice Holmes would have done, see

Smith, supra, at 214 (dissenting opinion), but neither have

we treated “federal issue” as a password opening federal

courts to any state action embracing a point of federal law.

Instead, the question is, does a state-law claim necessarily

raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and sub-

stantial, which a federal forum may entertain without

disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal

and state judicial responsibilities.

6 GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. DARUE

ENGINEERING & MFG.

Opinion of the Court

III

A

This case warrants federal jurisdiction. Grable’s state

complaint must specify “the facts establishing the superi-

ority of [its] claim,” Mich. Ct. Rule 3.411(B)(2)(c) (West

2005), and Grable has premised its superior title claim on

a failure by the IRS to give it adequate notice, as defined

by federal law. Whether Grable was given notice within

the meaning of the federal statute is thus an essential

element of its quiet title claim, and the meaning of the

federal statute is actually in dispute; it appears to be the

only legal or factual issue contested in the case. The

meaning of the federal tax provision is an important issue

of federal law that sensibly belongs in a federal court. The

Government has a strong interest in the “prompt and

certain collection of delinquent taxes,” United States v.

Rodgers, 461 U. S. 677, 709 (1983), and the ability of the

IRS to satisfy its claims from the property of delinquents

requires clear terms of notice to allow buyers like Darue to

satisfy themselves that the Service has touched the bases

necessary for good title. The Government thus has a direct

interest in the availability of a federal forum to vindicate its

own administrative action, and buyers (as well as tax delin-

quents) may find it valuable to come before judges used to

federal tax matters. Finally, because it will be the rare

state title case that raises a contested matter of federal

law, federal jurisdiction to resolve genuine disagreement

over federal tax title provisions will portend only a micro-

scopic effect on the federal-state division of labor. See n. 3,

infra.

This conclusion puts us in venerable company, quiet

title actions having been the subject of some of the earliest

exercises of federal-question jurisdiction over state-law

claims. In Hopkins, 244 U. S., 490–491, the question was

federal jurisdiction over a quiet title action based on the

plaintiffs’ allegation that federal mining law gave them

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 7

Opinion of the Court

the superior claim. Just as in this case, “the facts showing

the plaintiffs’ title and the existence and invalidity of the

instrument or record sought to be eliminated as a cloud

upon the title are essential parts of the plaintiffs’ cause of

action.”3 Id., at 490. As in this case again, “it is plain that

a controversy respecting the construction and effect of the

[federal] laws is involved and is sufficiently real and sub-

stantial.” Id., at 489. This Court therefore upheld federal

jurisdiction in Hopkins, as well as in the similar quiet title

matters of Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U. S.

526, 528 (1903), and Wilson Cypress Co. v. Del Pozo y

Marcos, 236 U. S. 635, 643–644 (1915). Consistent with

those cases, the recognition of federal jurisdiction is in

order here.

B

Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478

U. S. 804 (1986), on which Grable rests its position, is not

to the contrary. Merrell Dow considered a state tort claim

resting in part on the allegation that the defendant drug

company had violated a federal misbranding prohibition,

and was thus presumptively negligent under Ohio law.

Id., at 806. The Court assumed that federal law would

have to be applied to resolve the claim, but after closely

——————

3 The quiet title cases also show the limiting effect of the requirement

that the federal issue in a state-law claim must actually be in dispute

to justify federal-question jurisdiction. In Shulthis v. McDougal, 225

U. S. 561 (1912), this Court found that there was no federal question

jurisdiction to hear a plaintiff’s quiet title claim in part because the

federal statutes on which title depended were not subject to “any contro-

versy respecting their validity, construction, or effect.” Id., at 570. As the

Court put it, the requirement of an actual dispute about federal law was

“especially” important in “suit[s] involving rights to land acquired under a

law of the United States,” because otherwise “every suit to establish title

to land in the central and western states would so arise [under federal

law], as all titles in those States are traceable back to those laws.” Id., at

569–570.

8 GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. DARUE

ENGINEERING & MFG.

Opinion of the Court

examining the strength of the federal interest at stake and

the implications of opening the federal forum, held federal

jurisdiction unavailable. Congress had not provided a

private federal cause of action for violation of the federal

branding requirement, and the Court found “it would . . .

flout, or at least undermine, congressional intent to con-

clude that federal courts might nevertheless exercise

federal-question jurisdiction and provide remedies for

violations of that federal statute solely because the viola-

tion . . . is said to be a . . . ‘proximate cause’ under state

law.” Id., at 812.

Because federal law provides for no quiet title action

that could be brought against Darue,4 Grable argues that

there can be no federal jurisdiction here, stressing some

broad language in Merrell Dow (including the passage just

quoted) that on its face supports Grable’s position, see

Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question

Jurisdiction over State Law Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115

Harv. L. Rev. 2272, 2280–2282 (2002) (discussing split in

Circuit Courts over private right of action requirement

after Merrell Dow). But an opinion is to be read as a

whole, and Merrell Dow cannot be read whole as overturn-

ing decades of precedent, as it would have done by effec-

tively adopting the Holmes dissent in Smith, see supra, at

5, and converting a federal cause of action from a suffi-

cient condition for federal-question jurisdiction5 into a

necessary one.

In the first place, Merrell Dow disclaimed the adoption

of any bright-line rule, as when the Court reiterated that

——————

4 Federal law does provide a quiet title cause of action against the

Federal Government. 28 U. S. C. §2410. That right of action is not

relevant here, however, because the federal government no longer has

any interest in the property, having transferred its interest to Darue

through the quitclaim deed.

5 For an extremely rare exception to the sufficiency of a federal right

of action, see Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U. S. 505, 507 (1900).

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 9

Opinion of the Court

“in exploring the outer reaches of §1331, determinations

about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments

about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal

system.” 478 U. S., at 810. The opinion included a

lengthy footnote explaining that questions of jurisdiction

over state-law claims require “careful judgments,” id., at

814, about the “nature of the federal interest at stake,” id.,

at 814, n. 12 (emphasis deleted). And as a final indication

that it did not mean to make a federal right of action

mandatory, it expressly approved the exercise of jurisdic-

tion sustained in Smith, despite the want of any federal

cause of action available to Smith’s shareholder plaintiff.

478 U. S., at 814, n. 12. Merrell Dow then, did not toss

out, but specifically retained the contextual enquiry that

had been Smith’s hallmark for over 60 years. At the end

of Merrell Dow, Justice Holmes was still dissenting.

Accordingly, Merrell Dow should be read in its entirety

as treating the absence of a federal private right of action

as evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of, the “sensi-

tive judgments about congressional intent” that §1331

requires. The absence of any federal cause of action af-

fected Merrell Dow’s result two ways. The Court saw the

fact as worth some consideration in the assessment of

substantiality. But its primary importance emerged when

the Court treated the combination of no federal cause of

action and no preemption of state remedies for misbrand-

ing as an important clue to Congress’s conception of the

scope of jurisdiction to be exercised under §1331. The

Court saw the missing cause of action not as a missing

federal door key, always required, but as a missing wel-

come mat, required in the circumstances, when exercising

federal jurisdiction over a state misbranding action would

have attracted a horde of original filings and removal

cases raising other state claims with embedded federal

issues. For if the federal labeling standard without a

federal cause of action could get a state claim into federal

10 GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. DARUE

ENGINEERING & MFG.

Opinion of the Court

court, so could any other federal standard without a fed-

eral cause of action. And that would have meant a tre-

mendous number of cases.

One only needed to consider the treatment of federal

violations generally in garden variety state tort law. “The

violation of federal statutes and regulations is commonly

given negligence per se effect in state tort proceedings.”6

Restatement (Third) of Torts (proposed final draft) §14,

Comment a. See also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, &

D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, §36, p. 221, n. 9

(5th ed. 1984) (“[T]he breach of a federal statute may

support a negligence per se claim as a matter of state law”

(collecting authority)). A general rule of exercising federal

jurisdiction over state claims resting on federal mislabel-

ing and other statutory violations would thus have her-

alded a potentially enormous shift of traditionally state

cases into federal courts. Expressing concern over the

“increased volume of federal litigation,” and noting the

importance of adhering to “legislative intent,” Merrell Dow

thought it improbable that the Congress, having made no

provision for a federal cause of action, would have meant

to welcome any state-law tort case implicating federal law

“solely because the violation of the federal statute is said

to [create] a rebuttable presumption [of negligence] . . .

under state law.” 478 U. S., at 811–812 (internal quota-

tion marks omitted). In this situation, no welcome mat

meant keep out. Merrell Dow’s analysis thus fits within

the framework of examining the importance of having a

federal forum for the issue, and the consistency of such a

forum with Congress’s intended division of labor between

state and federal courts.

——————

6 Other jurisdictions treat a violation of a federal statute as evidence

of negligence or, like Ohio itself in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v.

Thompson, 478 U. S. 804 (1986), as creating a rebuttable presumption

of negligence. Restatement (Third) of Torts (proposed final draft) §14,

Comment c. Either approach could still implicate issues of federal law.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 11

Opinion of the Court

As already indicated, however, a comparable analysis

yields a different jurisdictional conclusion in this case.

Although Congress also indicated ambivalence in this case

by providing no private right of action to Grable, it is the

rare state quiet title action that involves contested issues

of federal law, see n. 3, supra. Consequently, jurisdiction

over actions like Grable’s would not materially affect, or

threaten to affect, the normal currents of litigation. Given

the absence of threatening structural consequences and

the clear interest the Government, its buyers, and its

delinquents have in the availability of a federal forum,

there is no good reason to shirk from federal jurisdiction

over the dispositive and contested federal issue at the

heart of the state-law title claim.7

IV

The judgment of the Court of Appeals, upholding federal

jurisdiction over Grable’s quiet title action, is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

——————

7 At oral argument Grable’s counsel espoused the position that after

Merrell Dow, federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims absent

a federal right of action, could be recognized only where a constitutional

issue was at stake. There is, however, no reason in text or otherwise to

draw such a rough line. As Merrell Dow itself suggested, constitutional

questions may be the more likely ones to reach the level of substantial-

ity that can justify federal jurisdiction. 478 U. S., at 814, n. 12. But a

flat ban on statutory questions would mechanically exclude significant

questions of federal law like the one this case presents.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 04–603

_________________

GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC.,

PETITIONER v. DARUE ENGINEERING

& MANUFACTURING

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 13, 2005]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.

The Court faithfully applies our precedents interpreting

28 U. S. C. §1331 to authorize federal-court jurisdiction

over some cases in which state law creates the cause of

action but requires determination of an issue of federal

law, e.g., Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S.

180 (1921); Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson,

478 U. S. 804 (1986). In this case, no one has asked us to

overrule those precedents and adopt the rule Justice

Holmes set forth in American Well Works Co. v. Layne &

Bowler Co., 241 U. S. 257 (1916), limiting §1331 jurisdic-

tion to cases in which federal law creates the cause of

action pleaded on the face of the plaintiff’s complaint. Id.,

at 260. In an appropriate case, and perhaps with the bene-

fit of better evidence as to the original meaning of §1331’s

text, I would be willing to consider that course.*

——————

* This Court has long construed the scope of the statutory grant of

federal-question jurisdiction more narrowly than the scope of the

constitutional grant of such jurisdiction. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-

cals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804, 807–808 (1986). I assume for

present purposes that this distinction is proper—that is, that the

language of 28 U. S. C. §1331, “[t]he district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States” (emphasis added), is narrower than the

2 GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. DARUE

ENGINEERING & MFG.

THOMAS, J., concurring

Jurisdictional rules should be clear. Whatever the

virtues of the Smith standard, it is anything but clear.

Ante, at 4 (the standard “calls for a ‘common-sense ac-

commodation of judgment to [the] kaleidoscopic situations’

that present a federal issue, in ‘a selective process which

picks the substantial causes out of the web and lays the

other ones aside’ ” (quoting Gully v. First Nat. Bank in

Meridian, 299 U. S. 109, 117–118 (1936))); ante, at 5

(“[T]he question is, does a state-law claim necessarily raise

a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial,

which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing

any congressionally approved balance of federal and state

judicial responsibilities”); ante, at 9 (“ ‘[D]eterminations

about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments

about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal

system’ ”; “the absence of a federal private right of action

[is] evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of, the ‘sensi-

tive judgments about congressional intent’ that §1331

requires” (quoting Merrell Dow, supra, at 810)).

Whatever the vices of the American Well Works rule, it

is clear. Moreover, it accounts for the “ ‘vast majority’ ” of

cases that come within §1331 under our current case law,

Merrell Dow, supra, at 808 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of

Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern

Cal., 463 U. S. 1, 9 (1983))—further indication that trying

to sort out which cases fall within the smaller Smith

category may not be worth the effort it entails. See R.

Fallon, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The

Federal Courts and the Federal System 885–886 (5th ed.

2003). Accordingly, I would be willing in appropriate

circumstances to reconsider our interpretation of §1331.

——————

language of Art. III, §2, cl. 1, of the Constitution, “[t]he judicial Power

shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Consti-

tution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which

shall be made, under their Authority . . . ” (emphases added).