Opinion

Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co., LLC

  • 681 F.3d 274
  • 18 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1831
  • 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9291
  • 2012 WL 1592670
Court
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Filed
May 8, 2012
Status
Published
On the bench
Siler, Griffin, Tarnow
Cited by
498 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.7%

concluding, in addressing causal-link requirement for establishing prima facie case of retaliation under federal Family and Medical Leave Act, that “the nearness in time between [the plaintiffs] return from FMLA leave and his termination — three weeks after his reinstatement and less than two months after he first notified [the defendant] of his medical leave — suffices in these circumstances to meet the low threshold of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge”

How later courts described this case

  • concluding, in addressing causal-link requirement for establishing prima facie case of retaliation under federal Family and Medical Leave Act, that “the nearness in time between [the plaintiffs] return from FMLA leave and his termination — three weeks after his reinstatement and less than two months after he first notified [the defendant] of his medical leave — suffices in these circumstances to meet the low threshold of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge”
  • finding that “the nearness in time between [the plaintiff’s protected activity] and his termination—three 29 weeks after his reinstatement and less than two months after he first notified [the defendant] of his medical leave—suffices in these circumstances to meet the low threshold of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge”
  • concluding that the district court properly treated “indistinguishable” FMLA interference and retaliation claims as a retaliation claim
  • finding that “the essence of Seeger’s claim is retaliation, not interference” when he received all of the FMLA leave to which he was entitled and returned to the same position he previously held

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 12a0124p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

X

-

TOM SEEGER,

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Plaintiff-Appellant,

-

-

No. 10-6148

v.

,

>

-

-

CINCINNATI BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee. -

LLC,

-

N

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Covington.

No. 08-00207—David L. Bunning, District Judge.

Argued: January 11, 2012

Decided and Filed: May 8, 2012

Before: SILER and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; TARNOW, District Judge.*

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Sheila M. Smith, FREKING & BETZ, LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, for

Appellant. Nathaniel Lampley, Jr., VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR AND PEASE LLP,

Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Sheila M. Smith, FREKING & BETZ,

LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Nathaniel Lampley, Jr., VORYS, SATER,

SEYMOUR AND PEASE LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee.

GRIFFIN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SILER, J., joined.

TARNOW, D. J. (pp. 20–24), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

*

The Honorable Arthur J. Tarnow, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of

Michigan, sitting by designation.

1

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 2

_________________

OPINION

_________________

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Tom Seeger appeals the district court’s order

granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co., LLC

(“CBT”), and dismissing his claim that CBT violated the Family and Medical Leave Act

(“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654, when it terminated his employment on the ground

of disability fraud. Seeger took FMLA leave and concurrent paid leave under CBT’s

own disability plan to treat and recover from a herniated disc in his back. CBT

terminated him for disability fraud after Seeger’s co-workers saw him at the Oktoberfest

in downtown Cincinnati during his FMLA leave period.

The district court held that, although Seeger established a prima facie case of

retaliatory discharge, CBT’s unrebutted honest belief that Seeger committed disability

fraud shielded it from liability. We agree and affirm.

I.

Tom Seeger was employed as a network technician by CBT from September

1979 through October 2007. He was a member of a collective bargaining unit

represented by the Communications Workers of America (the “Union”). CBT and the

Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) that governed the terms

and conditions of employment for CBT’s network technicians, including Seeger. Under

the CBA, CBT employees who were on FMLA leave were also eligible to receive paid

disability leave pursuant to CBT’s Sickness and Accident Disability Plan. The two

benefits were separate and distinct – an employee who qualified for FMLA leave might

not be eligible for paid disability leave, and vice versa. CBT’s paid disability plan

imposed two additional requirements on employees beyond those in the FMLA: (1) the

employee must allow CBT to have access to his or her medical records for review by

CBT, and (2) the employee was required to work in a modified or light-duty position

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 3

tailored to meet the individual’s needs and medical restrictions, if the employee was

medically able to do so.

Seeger’s relevant medical issues began on August 20, 2007, when he experienced

pain and numbness in his left leg. He went to the emergency room, where he was

prescribed pain medications. Three days later, he sought follow-up care at the office of

his primary-care physician, Dr. Michael Grainger. One of Dr. Grainger’s colleagues

administered a steroid injection and a muscle relaxer. From August 20 through August

26, Seeger was on an approved FMLA leave. Seeger returned to work on September 4,

but his leg pain persisted. The following day, he was seen again by a physician at Dr.

Grainger’s office. An MRI confirmed that Seeger suffered from a herniated lumbar disc

at L4-5 and L5-S1. Seeger was referred to a neurosurgeon at the Mayfield Clinic for

surgical and pain management consultations.

On September 5, Seeger commenced a leave of absence, which was approved as

both FMLA leave and paid disability leave by Theresa Greenwald, a registered nurse and

the manager of CBT’s Medical Department. Greenwald had over thirty-five years of

experience, and she was certified in rehabilitation nursing and case management. In her

position with CBT, Greenwald made the ultimate determinations regarding whether to

approve or disapprove medical leave for CBT employees, and whether such leave

qualified as FMLA or paid disability leave.

In the initial intake information that Seeger provided to the Mayfield Clinic, he

reported left-leg numbness and intermittent lower-back and hip pain. He rated his pain

level as 10 on a scale of 0 to 10 (with 10 being the worst), but stated that the pain

improved when he was lying down. His neurosurgeon recommended physical therapy

and an epidural steroid injection consultation with another specialist.

Seeger started a course of physical therapy, which consisted of three therapy

sessions per week for four weeks, spanning from September 17 through October 12. At

his first physical therapy session on September 17, Seeger reported that his level of pain

had decreased, but he indicated that he could only sit or stand for thirty-minute intervals.

On the same day, Greenwald wrote to Dr. Grainger, informing him that “[s]ince no

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 4

surgery is imminent and [Seeger] has been off work almost three weeks receiving non-

surgical care, we could provide part-time sedentary telephone work for Mr. Seeger.

Please consider this temporary restricted duty.” In her correspondence, Greenwald

further explained that employees on restricted duty are not required to work full time and

such work may involve as few as two hours a day.

Dr. Grainger examined Seeger on September 19, 2007. Seeger complained of

pain in his lower back and numbness in his left leg. Dr. Grainger observed that Seeger

had difficulty changing positions, getting in and out of a chair, and walking. Based upon

his symptoms, Grainger estimated that Seeger’s pain level was at 7 or 8 on the 1 to 10

scale. Dr. Grainger diagnosed Seeger with left sciatica and lumbar radiculopathy caused

by Seeger’s herniated disc. According to Dr. Grainger, the pain from this condition

could vary considerably during a twenty-four hour period, even after an epidural steroid

injection. The treatment goal for Seeger was increased activity. Dr. Grainger instructed

Seeger to continue physical therapy, engage in tolerable physical activity, and confer

with the neurosurgeons at the Mayfield Clinic. In his notes recording this office visit,

Dr. Grainger wrote “no work” for Seeger. The next day, in response to Greenwald’s

earlier inquiry, Dr. Grainger’s physician’s assistant left a voicemail message for

Greenwald indicating that Seeger was unable to perform any restricted work. Seeger

therefore continued to receive paid leave and was not required to perform light-duty

work.

Four days later, on September 23, Seeger and his wife Rose attended the

Oktoberfest in downtown Cincinnati for approximately ninety minutes, during which

time Seeger admittedly walked a total of ten blocks to and from the festival and

consumed one or two beers. There, they had separate chance encounters with several

co-workers. They chatted with Michael Caplinger for fifteen minutes. Caplinger only

witnessed Seeger walking a few steps in the opposite direction after their conversation

ended. Glen Adkins, a CBT transportation engineer, also saw Seeger at the Oktoberfest

– first while Seeger was talking to Caplinger and later when Seeger was walking,

seemingly unimpaired, for approximately fifty to seventy-five feet through the crowd.

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 5

Two other CBT employees – Larry Curless and James Schulten – also saw Seeger at

Oktoberfest. Curless noted that Seeger “appeared to be in a lot of pain” because his

steps off the curb were very labored. Seeger told Schulten that his back was bothering

him so he had to go home.1

Adkins was aware that Seeger was on disability leave and reported his sighting

of Seeger to Tracy Wilson, CBT’s Human Resources Manager.2 Wilson instructed

Adkins to send his observations in an e-mail. Adkins sent the e-mail to Wilson on

September 25, and Wilson eventually forwarded it to his supervisor, Michelle Simpson,

Director of Employee Relations and Recruiting.

On September 26, Greenwald called Seeger to discuss his health status. Seeger

told her that he still suffered from shooting pain and altered sensation in his left leg, and

that he had good and bad days. Seeger advised Greenwald that he had been to five

physical therapy sessions and had scheduled a pain-management consultation with one

of the physicians at the Mayfield Clinic. The next day, at his Mayfield Clinic

appointment, Seeger complained of numbness radiating down his left leg and difficulty

walking. He received the first of two epidural steroid injections.

On October 3, Seeger saw Dr. Grainger again and reported that his pain and

range of motion had improved following the injection. Seeger told Dr. Grainger that he

wanted to return to work, but according to Seeger, Dr. Grainger would not allow it. On

October 4, Seeger called Greenwald and updated her as to his medical progress.

Greenwald did not bring up the topic of light-duty work with Seeger during either this

conversation or the previous one on September 26. On October 11, Seeger had a second

1

Although Seeger proffered the affidavits of Curless and Schulten in his response to CBT’s

motion for summary judgment filed in this case, he never mentioned these two witnesses to CBT during

the course of its disability fraud investigation.

2

Adkins and the Seegers did not have a good working relationship. In January 2007, Seeger’s

wife Rose, also an employee of CBT, filed a grievance against Adkins alleging that he was doing tasks

reserved only for union members. In June 2007, Seeger complained to his supervisors that Adkins was

creating a hostile work environment for Seeger and Rose.

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 6

injection, followed by a physical therapy session the next day. On October 15,3 Seeger

had another appointment with Dr. Grainger and reported that he had been asymptomatic

for two days. Dr. Grainger authorized his return to work, and Seeger resumed his full-

time position as a CBT network technician on October 16, 2007.

In the meantime, upon hearing of Seeger’s attendance at Oktoberfest, Simpson

instructed Wilson to investigate Adkins’ report. Wilson interviewed Caplinger and

forwarded his notes of the meeting to Simpson. CBT obtained sworn statements from

Caplinger and Adkins regarding their contact with Seeger at Oktoberfest. In their

affidavits, Caplinger and Adkins stated that they saw Seeger drinking a beer and

“walking unassisted and seemingly unimpaired through the crowded festival.” Adkins

said that Seeger “did not appear to be impaired or disabled.”

Simpson independently reviewed Seeger’s medical records, disability file, and

employment history. She consulted with Greenwald about Seeger’s medical issues, but

neither Simpson nor Greenwald directly contacted Seeger’s treating physicians to

discuss his medical condition. Based upon perceived inconsistencies between Seeger’s

reported medical condition and his behavior at Oktoberfest, Simpson decided to suspend

Seeger’s employment and instructed Wilson to schedule a suspension meeting, which

was held on October 31, 2007.

At the meeting, Wilson questioned Seeger about the details of his back injury and

why he was able to attend Oktoberfest, yet he was unable to perform light-duty work

pursuant to CBT’s paid-leave policy. Seeger explained his treatment regimen to Wilson

and told him that it was Dr. Grainger’s decision that he should not perform any light-

duty work. Because Seeger did not know what the light-duty assignment might entail,

he did not question the doctor’s assessment. He defended his actions and denied

committing disability fraud. Nonetheless, at the conclusion of the meeting, Wilson

suspended Seeger pending the completion of CBT’s investigation and invited Seeger to

3

There is some dispute as to whether Seeger saw Dr. Grainger on October 12 or October 15, or

both.

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 7

submit any information that might be relevant to the inquiry. Seeger thereafter provided

a letter dated October 31, 2007, from Dr. Grainger, which stated:

Walking for one and a half hours at one’s own pace doesn’t equal

working for an eight hour day nor is it reasonable to assume that he could

perform even limited duties for an eight hour day. Most patients with

herniated discs are most comfortable standing and/or walking but [are]

unable to sit or change positions.

In addition, Seeger provided his own written statement in which he explained that

I have tried to do everything in my power to satisfy the documented

needs of [CBT’s] medical [department] and so has my doctor. As far as

the time in question I saw my doctor on [October] 19th and had 2 therapy

sessions between that day and the day I went to Octoberfest. It is true I

went to Octoberfest for about an hour, to get out of the house and walk

around. I was in pain the whole time, but did get some relief when I took

short walks. My doctor specifically told me that walking was good for

my condition and I tried to take short walks. He specified no working,

lifting or even seated work, since being seated put increased pressure on

my low back and caused me additional pain. I mostly stood or laid on

the floor through my whole disability. On two [occasions] I discussed

with my doctor about the option of returning to work due to the

perceived pressure of [CBT’s] medical [department]. He said absolutely

not. When I had my steroid injection on 8/23 I came right back to work.

A week later when the pain returned the doctor said I could not return to

work . . . . I still have pain and do daily physical therapy at home. I have

been under my doctor[’s] care since day one. No one knows what kind

of pain I am in but me, not a nurse who has ever examined me nor two

people on the street who [only] saw me for a few minutes.

Simpson considered the letters from Seeger and Dr. Grainger, the written

statements of Adkins and Caplinger, additional information submitted by the Union, and

Seeger’s medical records. Based upon the information compiled in the investigation and

after further review of Seeger’s disability file with Greenwald, Simpson concluded that

Seeger had “over reported” his symptoms in order to avoid the part-time light-duty work

called for in the paid-leave policy. In her opinion,

Tom Seeger had reported himself in excruciating pain and reported

difficulty changing positions and ambulating to the extent where, when

we inquired about him being able to do a light duty-type position, the

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 8

doctor responded, “No work.” Yet, he was seen by two independent

witnesses walking around Oktoberfest where it’s a crowded venue, and

not easily accessed. I thought that . . . was fraudulent on his part. To

report excruciating pain and difficulty walking, yet attending Oktoberfest

[only days later].

On November 8, 2007, Simpson terminated Seeger’s employment on the ground

of disability fraud, a violation of CBT’s code of conduct. The termination was effective

October 31, 2007, the date of Seeger’s suspension.

Ultimately, Greenwald approved Seeger for paid disability leave from

September 5 until September 24, including the additional date of September 27, when

Seeger received his first steroid injection. She approved Seeger for unpaid FMLA leave

from September 24 until October 16, 2007.

On November 5, 2008, Seeger filed the present action against CBT, alleging age

discrimination contrary to federal and Kentucky law, and a violation of his rights under

the FMLA.4 In February 2010, CBT filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Although Seeger opposed the motion with respect to his FMLA

claims, he did not challenge CBT’s motion as it pertained to his age discrimination

claims. Following oral argument, the district court granted summary judgment in favor

of CBT on all counts.

In its written decision addressing Seeger’s FMLA claims, the district court found

that because plaintiff “ma[de] no distinction between his retaliation and interference

claims, . . . the Court will address both claims under the retaliation theory.” Analyzing

Seeger’s claim under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the district court held that the close temporal proximity

between Seeger’s FMLA leave and his termination provided a sufficient causal

4

On the day Seeger’s employment was terminated, his Union filed a grievance contesting his

discharge and the matter was submitted to arbitration pursuant to the terms of the CBA. On July 15, 2010,

after a hearing on the matter, the arbitrator issued a written opinion finding that Seeger was terminated

without just cause. The arbitrator denied reinstatement because Seeger had accepted a retirement package,

but awarded him back pay for a six-month period between October 31, 2007, and April 30, 2008.

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 9

connection to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge.5 However, the court

further held that CBT articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating

Seeger – disability fraud – and Seeger, in turn, failed to show that this reason was

pretextual in nature. Specifically, the district court held that Seeger failed to refute

CBT’s evidence that it had an “honest belief” in its nondiscriminatory basis for Seeger’s

termination. The court therefore granted CBT’s motion for summary judgment on

Seeger’s FMLA claim and dismissed the case with prejudice. Seeger now timely

appeals.

II.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Hunter v.

Valley View Local Sch., 579 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is

appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any

affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “In

evaluating summary judgment, we must view all the facts and the inferences drawn from

it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Daugherty, 544 F.3d at 702.

“The ‘mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat

an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that

there be no genuine issue of material fact.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)) (emphasis in original). Summary judgment is

appropriate “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear

the burden of proof at trial.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The FMLA entitles employees to an annual total of twelve weeks of leave for a

number of reasons including, inter alia, because of a “‘serious health condition that

makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.’”

5

CBT did not dispute the other two necessary elements of a prima facie case, i.e., that Seeger

engaged in a statutorily protected activity and that he suffered an adverse employment action. See

generally Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 707 (6th Cir. 2008). CBT did, however, argue

that Seeger lacked any evidence of retaliatory intent.

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 10

Arban v. West Publ’g Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 400 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting 29 U.S.C.

§ 2612(a)(1)(D)). Upon returning from FMLA leave, an employee must be reinstated

to his position or an equivalent position in terms of pay, benefits, and other conditions

of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1).

The FMLA does not preclude employers from offering employees paid medical-

leave benefits in tandem with FMLA unpaid leave; in fact, an employer may require an

eligible employee to substitute accrued paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave, with such

paid leave to run concurrently with the FMLA leave. Allen v. Butler Cnty. Comm’rs,

331 F. App’x 389, 393 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(a)). “‘If an employee

does not comply with the additional requirements in an employer’s paid leave policy, the

employee is not entitled to substitute accrued paid leave, but the employee remains

entitled to take unpaid FMLA leave.’” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(a)).

The FMLA makes it unlawful for any employer “to interfere with, restrain, or

deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided [by the Act],”

29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), or to “discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any

individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by [the Act].” Id. at § 2615(a)(2).

Consistent with these proscriptions, “[e]mployers may not discriminate against

employees on FMLA leave in the administration of their paid leave policies.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 825.207(a). Employers who violate the FMLA are liable to the employee for damages

and such equitable relief as may be appropriate. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1).

As a preliminary matter, Seeger contends that the district court erred when it

found the FMLA retaliation and interference claims alleged in his complaint to be

indistinguishable and thus analyzed them solely as an FMLA retaliation claim under

§ 2615(a)(2). We disagree.

Our court has recognized two discrete theories of recovery under the FMLA:

(1) the so-called “interference” or “entitlement” theory arising from § 2615(a)(1), and

(2) the “retaliation” or “discrimination” theory arising from § 2615(a)(2). Hunter,

579 F.3d at 691; Arban, 345 F.3d at 400-01. Although we have held that a claim for

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 11

retaliatory discharge is cognizable under either theory,6 the requisite proofs differ. The

interference theory has its roots in the FMLA’s creation of substantive rights, and “[i]f

an employer interferes with the FMLA-created right to medical leave or to reinstatement

following the leave, a violation has occurred,” regardless of the intent of the employer.

Arban, 345 F.3d at 401. The central issue raised by the retaliation theory, on the other

hand, is “whether the employer took the adverse action because of a prohibited reason

or for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.” Edgar v. JAC Prods., Inc., 443 F.3d 501,

508 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast to the

interference theory, “[t]he employer’s motive is relevant because retaliation claims

impose liability on employers that act against employees specifically because those

employees invoked their FMLA rights.” Id.

Generally, “a plaintiff ha[s] not waived a claim based on the interference theory

where the complaint alleged general violations of 29 U.S.C. § 2615 that could apply to

both interference and retaliation claims.” Morris v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc.,

320 F. App’x 330, 335 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Wysong, 503 F.3d at 446). However, the

essence of Seeger’s claim is retaliation, not interference with his substantive FMLA

rights. In analogous circumstances, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has

convincingly rejected the same argument made by Seeger. In Stallings v. Hussmann

Corp., 447 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 2006), the employer terminated the plaintiff (Stallings)

for “calling in FMLA [leave] for non-FMLA reasons, fraudulent . . . misuse of the leave

of absence policy, . . . and causing falsification of the company’s records in this regard.”

Id. at 1045. Stallings filed an action alleging, inter alia, both FMLA interference and

retaliation claims, but the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

employer. Id. On appeal, Stallings argued that the district court improperly consolidated

his FMLA claims and considered them as one for retaliation under § 2615(a)(2). Id. at

1050. The Eighth Circuit disagreed, stating:

6

See Weimer v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 356 F. App’x 812, 815 (6th Cir. 2009); Bryant v. Dollar

Gen. Corp., 538 F.3d 394, 400-01 (6th Cir. 2008); Wysong v. Dow Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441, 446-47 &

n.2 (6th Cir. 2007); Arban, 345 F.3d at 403; Chandler v. Specialty Tire of Am. (Tenn.), Inc., 283 F.3d 818,

825 (6th Cir. 2002).

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 12

In the present case, we conclude that the district court did not improperly

analyze Stalling’s FMLA claim as one of retaliation instead of

interference. First, [the defendant corporation] granted every request

Stallings made to take FMLA leave; therefore, Stallings has failed to

establish that [the defendant corporation and the defendant manager]

denied him a benefit to which he was entitled because he received all of

the FMLA leave he requested. . . . Second, neither [defendant] ever

impeded Stallings’ use of FMLA leave. Third, only after Stallings

returned from FMLA leave did [the defendant corporation] question

whether Stallings fraudulently used his FMLA leave and fire Stallings.

Therefore, Stalling’s claim is fundamentally a claim for retaliation and

should be analyzed as such.

Id. at 1051.

We find the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit to be persuasive and applicable to

Seeger’s case. Although Seeger was denied some paid leave, he, like Stallings, received

all of the FMLA leave to which he was entitled. His FMLA leave request was approved

in full by Greenwald, and Seeger returned to work on October 16, the date certified by

Dr. Grainger, at which time he was reinstated by CBT to his former position as a

network technician. He resumed his normal work routine until he was terminated on

November 8, 2007. Consequently, CBT did not shortchange his leave time, deny

reinstatement, or otherwise interfere with his substantive FMLA rights. See Arban, 345

F.3d at 401 (“The issue [under the interference theory] is simply whether the employer

provided its employee the entitlements set forth in the FMLA – for example, a twelve

week leave or reinstatement after taking a medical leave.”) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted); cf. Culpepper v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 321 F.

App’x 491, 496 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[The plaintiff’s] FMLA [interference] claim . . . must

fail. Culpepper received exactly what her doctor ordered – six days of FMLA leave. No

additional leave was authorized by the Certification, and Culpepper has not shown that

the five [unexcused] absences at issue were taken for one of the reasons enumerated in

the FMLA.”). We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in confining its

analysis of Seeger’s FMLA claim to the retaliation theory of § 2615(a)(2).

Where, as here, Seeger sets forth an FMLA claim based on circumstantial

evidence alleging a single motive for discrimination, it is evaluated under the familiar

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 13

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757,

762 (6th Cir. 2012); Hunter, 579 F.3d at 692 n.2. To establish a prima facie case of

retaliation under the FMLA, Seeger must show that: (1) he was engaged in a statutorily

protected activity; (2) CBT knew that he was exercising his FMLA rights; (3) he

suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection existed between the

protected FMLA activity and the adverse employment action. Donald, 667 F.3d at 761.

“The burden of proof at the prima facie stage is minimal; all the plaintiff must do is put

forth some credible evidence that enables the court to deduce that there is a causal

connection between the retaliatory action and the protected activity.” Dixon v. Gonzales,

481 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 2007).

The parties dispute only the fourth criterion – the causal link connecting Seeger’s

FMLA leave to his termination. We agree with the district court that the nearness in

time between Seeger’s return from FMLA leave and his termination – three weeks after

his reinstatement and less than two months after he first notified CBT of his medical

leave – suffices in these circumstances to meet the low threshold of proof necessary to

establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. Seeger’s termination followed on

the heels of CBT’s investigation, which commenced during Seeger’s FMLA leave.

“[T]his Circuit has embraced the premise that in certain distinct cases where the

temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse employment action

is acutely near in time, that close proximity is deemed indirect evidence such as to

permit an inference of retaliation to arise.” DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421 (6th

Cir. 2004); see also Clark v. Walgreen Co., 424 F. App’x 467, 473 (6th Cir. 2011) (per

curiam) (“[T]he court correctly credited the temporal proximity [two months] of [the

plaintiff’s] leave and his firing as sufficient evidence of a causal connection between the

two. Our precedents stand for the principle that timing matters.”); Mickey v. Zeidler

Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Where an adverse employment

action occurs very close in time after an employer learns of a protected activity, such

temporal proximity between the events is significant enough to constitute evidence of

a causal connection for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation.”);

Bryson v. Regis Corp., 498 F.3d 561, 571 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the three-month

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 14

time lapse between the plaintiff’s request for FMLA leave and her termination on the

day she was scheduled to return to work established a causal connection at the prima

facie stage). Here, Seeger has shown causality by a preponderance of the evidence

through close temporal proximity that is suggestive of retaliation.

We further agree with the district court that at the next step of the McDonnell

Douglas analysis, CBT has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

discharging Seeger. Bryson, 498 F.3d at 570. “‘Nothing in the FMLA prevents

employers from ensuring that employees who are on leave from work do not abuse their

leave.’” Allen, 331 F. App’x at 395 (emphasis added) (quoting Callison v. City of Phila.,

430 F.3d 117, 121 (3d Cir. 2005)). Fraud and dishonesty constitute lawful, non-

retaliatory bases for termination. See Bentley v. Orange Cnty., Fla., 445 F. App’x 306,

309-10 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendant

employer where the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant’s legitimate reasons for

firing her – fraud and dishonesty, and violating the leave policy – were more likely

motivated by her use of FMLA leave or lacking credibility); Weimer, 356 F. App’x at

818 (“Honda presented evidence from which the jury could have found that Weimer lied

to company physicians about his activities at home while on leave, as well as about his

medical symptoms. If the jury did find that Weimer made such misrepresentations, they

could then conclude that Honda terminated him for the legitimate reason of violating

Honda’s Standards of Conduct, and not for taking FMLA leave.”); Joostberns v. United

Parcel Servs., Inc., 166 F. App’x 783, 794 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Defendant argues that it

terminated Plaintiff pursuant to its dishonesty policy for mailing packages without

paying for them. This is a legitimate reason to terminate Plaintiff because it is legally

sufficient to justify a judgment for Defendant.”).

Moreover, an employee on FMLA leave may be terminated for violating the

more stringent requirements of a concurrent paid leave policy, as long as that policy is

reasonable and “neither conflicts with nor diminishes the protections guaranteed by the

FMLA.” Allen, 331 F. App’x at 396 (holding that an employer did not violate the

FMLA in terminating its employee who violated a “last chance agreement” by his failure

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 15

to abide by the collective bargaining agreement’s call-in policy and his improper use of

flex time).

CBT rightfully considered workplace disability fraud to be a serious issue.

According to Simpson, CBT previously had terminated other employees for disability

fraud. In policing this workplace problem, CBT’s termination of Seeger because of his

alleged dishonesty in over-reporting his symptoms to avoid the reasonable light-duty

work requirement and continue to receive paid leave constituted a non-retaliatory basis

for his discharge.

Having rebutted the presumption of discrimination raised by Seeger’s prima facie

case, the question remains whether, under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell

Douglas, Seeger then produced adequate evidence demonstrating that CBT’s proffered

reason was a pretext for discrimination. Bryson, 498 F.3d at 570. “[A] reason cannot

. . . be a pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and

that discrimination was the real reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,

515 (1993) (emphases and quotation marks omitted).

Unlike its role in establishing a prima facie case, “the law in this circuit is clear

that temporal proximity cannot be the sole basis for finding pretext.” Donald, 667 F.3d

at 763. However, “suspicious timing is a strong indicator of pretext when accompanied

by some other, independent evidence.” Bell v. Prefix, Inc., 321 F. App’x 423, 431 (6th

Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff may establish

pretext by showing that the employer’s proffered reasons (1) have no basis in fact;

(2) did not actually motivate the action; or (3) were insufficient to warrant the action.

Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1021 (6th Cir. 2000). “Whichever method the

plaintiff employs, he always bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence from

which the jury could reasonably reject [the defendant’s] explanation and infer that the

defendant[] intentionally discriminated against him.” Clark, 424 F. App’x at 474

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Seeger seeks to demonstrate pretext by

means of the first method – no basis in fact – which is

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 16

essentially an attack on the credibility of the employer’s proffered reason

. . . [and] consists of showing that the employer did not actually have

cause to take adverse action against the employee based on its proffered

reason, and thus, that the proffered reason is pretextual. Where the

employer can demonstrate an honest belief in its proffered reason,

however, the inference of pretext is not warranted. Thus, this Circuit has

adopted the “honest belief rule.” Under [this] rule, an employer’s

proffered reason is considered honestly held where the employer can

establish it reasonably reli[ed] on particularized facts that were before it

at the time the decision was made. Thereafter, the burden is on the

plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer’s belief was not honestly held.

An employee’s bare assertion that the employer’s proffered reason has

no basis in fact is insufficient to call an employer’s honest belief into

question, and fails to create a genuine issue of material fact.

Joostberns, 166 F. App’x at 791 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The ground rules for application of the honest belief rule are clear. A plaintiff

is required to show “more than a dispute over the facts upon which the discharge was

based.” Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 493-94 (6th Cir. 2001). We have not

required that the employer’s decision-making process under scrutiny “be optimal or that

it left no stone unturned. Rather, the key inquiry is whether the employer made a

reasonably informed and considered decision before taking an adverse employment

action.” Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, “the

falsity of [a] [d]efendant’s reason for terminating [a] plaintiff cannot establish pretext

as a matter of law” under the honest belief rule. Joostberns, 166 F. App’x at 794

(footnote omitted). As long as the employer held an honest belief in its proffered reason,

“the employee cannot establish pretext even if the employer’s reason is ultimately found

to be mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless.” Smith, 155 F.3d at 806; see also Majewski

v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 274 F.3d 1106, 1117 (6th Cir. 2001).

An employer’s invocation of the honest belief rule does not automatically shield

it, because the employee must be afforded the opportunity to produce evidence to the

contrary, such as an error on the part of the employer that is “too obvious to be

unintentional.” Smith, 155 F.3d at 807 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 17

CBT contends, and the district court agreed, that it has shown that it reasonably

relied upon particularized facts in determining that Seeger committed disability fraud

and, therefore, given Seeger’s lack of evidence disputing its honest belief, summary

judgment in its favor was appropriate. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to Seeger, we, too, conclude that CBT made a “reasonably informed and considered

decision” before it terminated him, and Seeger has failed to show that CBT’s decision-

making process was “unworthy of credence.” Id. at 808.

In arguing that CBT’s reason for termination was pretextual, Seeger contends

that CBT willfully ignored medical evidence in its possession that he was responding to

treatment and his pain level had improved well before he attended Oktoberfest. He

maintains that CBT should have gleaned from his medical records available at the time

of the investigation that: (1) he was in pain, although it was lessening due to the steroid

injection, prednisone, and physical therapy sessions; (2) further physical therapy was

expected to provide further relief from pain; (3) consistent with the fluctuating nature

of sciatica described by Dr. Grainger, although his sitting and standing tolerance was

limited, he felt better when walking; (4) his condition had improved by the time he

attended Oktoberfest due to the three intervening physical therapy sessions between

September 17 and September 23; (4) Dr. Grainger specified “no work” on September 19;

(5) he was a good employee, with no disciplinary infractions during his 28-year career

with CBT, and he reported to Dr. Grainger that he was anxious to return to work; and

(6) the long-term goal was to reduce his radiculopathy to zero within four weeks,

allowing him to return to work without restrictions. Seeger also takes issue with the fact

that neither Greenwald nor Simpson sought clarification of his medical condition from

his treating physicians or proposed that he should be evaluated by a different doctor.

However, as we have already noted, an “optimal” investigation – i.e.,

interviewing the employee and some or all of his witnesses – is not a prerequisite to

application of the honest belief rule. Smith, 155 F.3d at 807; McConnell v. Swifty

Transp., Inc., 198 F. App’x 438, 444 (6th Cir. 2006). Further, the fact that Seeger was

a reliable employee with a good employment record is not relevant, “as it proves no

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 18

more than that absent any misconduct on [Seeger’s] part, [CBT] was unlikely to

terminate his employment.” McConnell, 198 F. App’x at 443.

Seeger’s argument and presentation of competing facts is misdirected because

it does not question CBT’s investigatory process. The determinative question is not

whether Seeger actually committed fraud, but whether CBT reasonably and honestly

believed that he did. Weimer, 356 F. App’x at 818.

CBT never disputed that Seeger suffered from a herniated disc and sciatica. Yet

Seeger’s reports of excruciating pain on September 13, his inability to stand for more

than thirty minutes on September 17, his difficulty ambulating on September 19, and Dr.

Grainger’s communication to Greenwald on that very same day that Seeger was unable

to perform sedentary light-duty work, stood in stark contrast to Seeger’s seemingly

unimpaired appearance at Oktoberfest on September 23. While at Oktoberfest, he spoke

to co-workers and drank a beer or two without any indication that his movements were

painful or restricted. Seeger’s ability to walk unaided for ten blocks and remain at the

crowded festival for ninety minutes understandably raised a red flag for CBT, giving it

reason to suspect that Seeger was misrepresenting his medical condition in an attempt

to defraud CBT’s paid-leave policy.

CBT’s investigation was thorough. It interviewed Caplinger and Adkins and

took their formal statements. Simpson, who was unaware of Seeger’s FMLA leave of

absence until Wilson’s report reached her desk, scrutinized Seeger’s medical records

with the assistance of Greenwald, whose long-term experience as a nurse allowed her

to put the records into context. Simpson reasonably requested documentation from

Seeger and, before concluding her inquiry, gave him the opportunity to submit additional

relevant information. While Dr. Grainger’s October 31 brief letter to CBT contained

general comments about Seeger’s inability to work an eight-hour day, it did not confirm

that Seeger was unable to work a light-duty schedule. Simpson perused the medical

records from Dr. Grainger, the Mayfield Clinic, the Kentucky Diagnosis Center which

performed the MRI, and the physical therapists. She testified that she had all of the

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 19

medical facts she needed, and therefore had no need to contact any of Seeger’s medical

providers for clarification of any points.

All in all, the record reflects that CBT made a reasonably informed and

considered decision before terminating Seeger. That Seeger or the court might have

come to a different conclusion if they had conducted the investigation is immaterial.

Seeger has not refuted CBT’s honest belief that the inconsistent facts before it were the

result of fraud on his part, and his claim that his termination was a pretext for

discrimination necessarily fails. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err

in granting summary judgment in CBT’s favor.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 20

_________________

DISSENT

_________________

TARNOW, Senior District Judge, dissenting. I cannot agree with the majority’s

conclusion that Appellee Cincinnati Bell has established its right to judgment as a matter

of law. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Appellant, a reasonable jury could

conclude that Appellee’s given reason for firing Appellant was pretextual and was not

an “honest belief.” There is therefore a genuine issue of material fact, and summary

judgment for Appellee is inappropriate.

Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and [] the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hunter v. Valley View

Local Sch., 579 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The

function of the court in examining a motion for summary judgment is not “to weigh the

evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

Further, “[i]n evaluating summary judgment, we must view all the facts and the

inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Daugherty

v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 702 (6th Cir. 2008). Thus, summary judgment is

only appropriate if, viewing all facts and inferences drawn from them in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party has failed to present “sufficient

evidence to permit a reasonable jury” to find in the nonmoving party’s favor. Lindsay

v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407, 416 (6th Cir. 2009). If a reasonable jury could find for the non-

moving party, summary judgment is “inappropriate.” Cockrel v. Shelby Cty. Sch. Dist.,

270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir. 2001). Here, the majority concludes that no reasonable

jury could find that Appellee’s stated reason for firing Appellant was pretextual.

The majority focuses on the “honest belief” rule, that is, that an employer’s

honestly-held belief that it has a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for firing a

person is sufficient, even if the factual basis of said belief is later shown to be false.

While this Court does not require that an investigation “be optimal or that it left no stone

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 21

unturned,” Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807-08 (6th Cir. 1998), an employer

must demonstrate that it “reasonably relied on the particularized facts that were before

it at the time the decision was made.” Majewski v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 274

F.3d 1106, 1117 (6th Cir. 2001). When an employer’s decision-making process is

“unworthy of credence,” or where error on the part of the employer is “too obvious to

be unintentional,” reliance on such a process does not constitute an “honest belief.”

Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807-08 (6th Cir. 1998).

In the summary judgment context as it relates to the “honest belief” rule, the

court should look to determine whether “sufficient evidence [exists] to permit a

reasonable jury” to find that the employer did not have an “honest belief” based on an

investigation that is “unworthy of credence.” If “the evidence is susceptible of different

interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact,” summary judgment is “inappropriate.”

Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1056. Thus, whether the court finds “that CBT made a reasonably

informed and considered decision before terminating Seeger” is immaterial. The proper

question is whether a reasonable jury could have concluded that Appellee’s investigation

was “unworthy of credence.”

Appellee’s only reason for its purported “honest belief” that Appellant engaged

in disability fraud are the statements of two fellow employees who say they saw

Appellant walking for approximately fifty to seventy-five feet. In Appellant’s favor are

the statements of other employees who said Appellant was in extreme pain while

walking, the statements of Appellant’s treating physician, and the undisputed medical

evidence that Appellant was suffering from a condition that would have caused him to

be unable to work but was ameliorated by physical exercise such as walking. Despite

possessing all of this evidence, Appellee chose to neither consult an independent medical

expert nor even to consult Appellant’s physician prior to its decision to suspend and then

fire him.

In this case Appellee focused on isolated and flimsy evidence while ignoring

strong contrary evidence. Additionally, Appellee took no steps to obtain easily

accessible information that would have helped Appellee arrive at an informed decision.

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 22

While this Court does not require that an investigation “be optimal or that it left no stone

unturned,” the lackluster nature of Appellee’s investigation strains the bounds of

credulity. Moreover, at the summary judgment stage the question is not whether

Appellee’s investigation was, in fact, “unworthy of credence,” but whether a reasonable

jury could have come to such a conclusion

The following facts can be said to fall in Appellant’s favor, and are undisputed:

a. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a herniated disc, sciatica, and lumbar

radiculopathy.

b. Appellee approved Appellant for FMLA and disability leave based on

medical evidence he presented to Theresa Greenwald, manager of

Appellee’s Medical Department and a Registered Nurse.

c. Prior to attending Oktoberfest, Appellant had several physical therapy

sessions.

d. On September 19, Appellant was instructed by Dr. Grainger, his treating

physician, to engage in increased physical activity as part of his

treatment. Dr. Grainger observed that Appellant had difficulty getting in

and out of a chair, changing positions, and walking. In his notes, Dr.

Grainger concluded that Appellant should engage in “no work.”

e. On September 20, Dr. Grainger called Theresa Greenwald and left a

message indicating that Plaintiff was unable to perform even restricted

work.

f. A CBT employee who saw Appellant at Oktoberfest, Larry Curless, said

Appellant “appeared to be in a lot of pain.”

g. Dr. Grainger, in a letter provided to Appellee by Appellant after his

suspension, stated that walking for one-and-a-half hours was not

equivalent to working an eight-hour day of even limited work and that

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 23

many patients with herniated discs were more comfortable standing or

walking than sitting.

h. Various additional medical evidence existed and was available to

Appellee. However, Appellee did not contact Appellant’s treating

physician, and confined its investigation to reviewing the medical

evidence it already possessed (and upon which FMLA and disability

leave had been granted), his employment history (which was excellent),

and the statements of persons who saw Appellant at Oktoberfest.

The following facts constitute the evidence that support Defendant’s “honest

belief” that Plaintiff engaged in disability fraud:

a. On September 23, Appellant walked a total of ten blocks to and from the

Oktoberfest festival in downtown Cincinnati, and remained at the festival

for a total of ninety minutes.

b. Michael Caplinger, one of the CBT employees who saw Appellant at

Oktoberfest, chatted with Appellant for fifteen minutes and saw him walk

“a few steps.” In a signed statement (identical to that of Glen Adkins,

below) he stated that Appellant was “seemingly unimpaired.”

c. Glen Adkins, a CBT employee who personally disliked Seeger, saw

Seeger through the crowd walking “seemingly unimpaired,” for fifty to

seventy-five feet. Adkins was aware Seeger was on disability leave and

reported seeing Seeger at Oktoberfest to Theresa Greenwald. Adkins

said that Appellant “did not appear to be impaired or disabled.”

d. Michelle Simpson, Appellee’s Director of Employee Relations and

Recruiting, consulting with Greenwald, reviewed Appellant’s medical

file and determined that Seeger’s reported medical condition and his

behavior at Oktoberfest were not consistent, and therefore to decided to

suspend and, later, fire Appellant.

No. 10-6148 Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Page 24

e. Simpson’s conclusion was that, because Appellant had reported himself

in excruciating pain, “reported difficult changing positions,” and his

doctor had told Appellee “no work,” but was seen “by two independent

witnesses walking around Oktoberfest where it’s a crowded venue and

not easily accessed . . . I thought that . . . was fraudulent on his part.”

I would conclude that the overwhelming weight of evidence supports Appellant’s

contention that Appellee’s investigation was so poor and one-sided as to be “unworthy

of credence” and thus not sufficient to satisfy an “honest belief.” At a minimum,

Appellant has presented sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find the same.

Summary judgment for Appellee is inappropriate. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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