holding school board bears the "heavy burden of showing that actions that increased or continued the effects of the dual system serve important and legitimate ends" (quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- holding school board bears the "heavy burden of showing that actions that increased or continued the effects of the dual system serve important and legitimate ends" (quotation marks omitted)
- "[W]e must determine whether the [district court's] legal error resulted in an erroneous judgment."
- noting that the School Board "operated [prior to the 1970s] a dual, segregated school system with separate schools for blacks and whites"
- "Since the Board operated de jure segregated schools in the past, there is a presumption that any current racial disparities in these areas are the result of its past unlawful conduct."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
RONDA EVERETT; MELISSA GRIMES;
SUTTON CAROLINE; CHRISTOPHER W.
TAYLOR, next friends of minor
children attending Pitt County
Schools; THE PITT COUNTY
COALITION FOR EDUCATING BLACK
CHILDREN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and No. 11-2000
JUVENILE FEMALE 1; THE
GREENVILLE PARENTS ASSOCIATION,
Intervenors/Plaintiffs,
v.
THE PITT COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION, public body corporate,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Greenville.
Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge.
(6:69-cv-00702-H)
Argued: January 26, 2012
Decided: May 7, 2012
Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
2 EVERETT v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wynn
wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Diaz concurred.
Judge Niemeyer wrote a dissenting opinion.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Mark Dorosin, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAR-
OLINA CENTER FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Chapel Hill, North
Carolina, for Appellants. Kenneth Alexander Soo, THAR-
RINGTON SMITH, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appel-
lee. ON BRIEF: Elizabeth Haddix, UNIVERSITY OF
NORTH CAROLINA CENTER FOR CIVIL RIGHTS,
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellants. Deborah R.
Stagner, THARRINGTON SMITH, LLP, Raleigh, North Car-
olina, for Appellee.
OPINION
WYNN, Circuit Judge:
In 2010, Appellants1 unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the
implementation of the 2011-2012 student assignment plan
("2011-2012 Assignment Plan") by the Pitt County Board of
Education ("School Board" or "Appellee"2). On appeal,
Appellants argue that the district court committed legal error
by failing to apply, and requiring the School Board to rebut,
a presumption that racial disparities in the 2011-2012 Assign-
ment Plan resulted from the School Board’s prior unconstitu-
tional conduct in operating a racially segregated school
1
Appellants comprise parents of minor children attending schools in Pitt
County and the Pitt County Coalition for Educating Black Children.
2
Appellee, the consolidated "Pitt County Board of Education," was
formed following the merger of boards of education of Pitt County and
Greenville City in 1986, and is the successor in interest of the original
school board defendants.
EVERETT v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 3
district. We agree and, therefore, vacate the district court’s
order and remand for reconsideration consistent with this
opinion.
I.
A.
In the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), hundreds of school districts in the United States
became, and remain today, subject to school desegregation
orders issued by federal courts. See, e.g., UNITED STATES
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BECOMING LESS SEPARATE?
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ENFORCEMENT,
AND THE PURSUIT OF UNITARY STATUS 1-2 (2007). As a condi-
tion precedent to lifting these desegregation orders, school
districts must: (1) comply in good faith with the orders; (2)
eliminate the vestiges of former de jure segregation to the
maximum extent practicable; and (3) be adjudicated, by a fed-
eral court, as operating racially "unitary"—as opposed to
"dual"—school systems. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S.
237, 248-50 (1991). Notably, prior to being declared "unitary"
by a federal court, school districts operate under an affirma-
tive obligation to eliminate unconstitutional dual school sys-
tems, as well as under a rebuttable presumption that any
current racial disparities are the result of past unconstitutional
conduct. School Bd. v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308, 1311 (4th Cir.
1987); N.A.A.C.P., Jacksonville Branch v. Duval Cnty. Sch.,
273 F.3d 960, 966 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Jacksonville
N.A.A.C.P.").
B.
In the 1960s, the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of North Carolina determined that the School
Board was operating a racially segregated dual school district
in violation of students’ rights to equal protection under the
law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
4 EVERETT v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
United States Constitution. See Edwards v. Greenville City
Bd. of Educ., Civ. A. No. 702; Teel v. Pitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
Civ. A. No. 569. Subsequently, the district court approved
desegregation plans that, through busing and other means,
were designed to "eliminate the racial identity" of schools
within the district. J.A. 34. Among other mandates and
instructions in the desegregation orders, the district court spe-
cifically ordered the School Board in Teel "to the extent con-
sistent with the proper administration and operation of the
school system, [to] locate any new school or addition with the
objective of eradicating the vestiges of the dual school system
and of eliminating the effects of segregation." J.A. 36-37. In
1972, the district court ordered Edwards and Teel administra-
tively closed and removed from the court’s active docket, sub-
ject to being reopened whenever a pleading was filed in either
case to warrant reopening. For over thirty years, although the
School Board remained subject to the Edwards and Teel
desegregation orders, the actions remained dormant.
C.
In 2006, the Greenville Parents Association filed a com-
plaint with the Office of Civil Rights within the United States
Department of Education objecting to the School Board’s use
of race in its student assignment plan for the 2006-2007 aca-
demic year ("2006-2007 Assignment Plan"). The 2006-2007
Assignment Plan was adopted under the School Board’s Pol-
icy 10.107 for school attendance areas ("Policy 10.107"). Pol-
icy 10.107 obliged the School Board to balance several
factors "to the degree possible" when drawing school atten-
dance areas, including "student proximity to facilities" and a
"racial balance" defined by the policy as a student population
in which no one race constituted more than seventy percent of
the students at a given school. J.A. 44. To this end, the 2006-
2007 Assignment Plan "used satellite school districts and a
EVERETT v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 5
racial balance ratio in an effort to reduce the racial isolation
of elementary schools" in the school district.3 J.A. 79.
In March 2008, as part of the School Board’s settlement of
the Office of Civil Rights complaint, the School Board filed
a motion requesting that the district court approve: (1) the
2006-2007 Assignment Plan; and (2) a revised version of Pol-
icy 10.107 ("Revised Policy 10.107"), which proposed to
reduce the School Board’s reliance on race as a factor by
replacing the prior policy’s explicit racial balancing with a
definition of "student diversity" that balanced a number of
factors, including student achievement, socio-economic sta-
tus, and ethnic, racial and educational sub-groups.4 The
Greenville Parents Association, as a plaintiff-intervenor in the
litigation, filed a motion requesting the district court’s denial
of the 2006-2007 Assignment Plan and Revised Policy
10.107, as well as the district court’s declaration of the school
district’s "unitary status," which, as a consequence, would
have lifted the desegregation orders in Edwards and Teel. The
district court reopened and consolidated the Edwards and Teel
cases and ordered discovery.
Early in the discovery period, the parties participated in
court-ordered mediation resulting in a settlement. As part of
the settlement, the Greenville Parents Association agreed to
withdraw its motion with the district court for a declaration of
the school district’s unitary status, and the School Board
agreed to involve Appellants and the Greenville Parents Asso-
3
As of 2005, a number of elementary schools in the school district
remained racially identifiable. For example, the student body at Sadie
Saulter was 95.1% African-American and only 1.7% White.
4
Although the School Board conceded the existence of "continuing
racial isolation of certain schools in Pitt County," the School Board
asserted that "it was justified in revising its Policy 10.107 to make student
achievement and socio-economic status factors" in student diversity
because the School Board’s previous efforts at using racial balancing "re-
sulted in less racial and socio-economic diversity in some of [its] elemen-
tary schools." J.A. 50.
6 EVERETT v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
ciation in the planning and discussion stages of the 2011-2012
Assignment Plan. On November 4, 2009, the district court
issued an order approving the settlement ("2009 Consent
Order"), which included the district court’s determination that
the 2006-2007 Assignment Plan and Revised Policy 10.107
"were [issued] by the School Board in good faith compliance
[with] the remedial plans approved by this court’s 1970
desegregation orders." J.A. 87.
The 2009 Consent Order obligated the parties to "work
toward attaining unitary status so that the [district] court may
relinquish jurisdiction over this case and restore to the School
Board full responsibility for the operation of its schools." J.A.
89. Accordingly, the 2009 Consent Order directed the parties
to submit, on or before December 31, 2012, "a report detailing
the School Board’s efforts and progress in achieving unitary
status and eliminating the vestiges of past discrimination to
the extent practicable." J.A. 89.
D.
In 2010, the School Board began developing, and ulti-
mately selected, the 2011-2012 Assignment Plan, which was
needed to accommodate: the opening of a new elementary
school ("Lakeforest Elementary"); the conversion of an exist-
ing elementary school into a pre-kindergarten program; and
overcrowding at existing middle schools. The School Board,
with the assistance of an independent consultant, designed
student assignment proposals in accordance with the follow-
ing criteria: (1) school proximity; (2) building capacity; (3)
academic proficiency; and (4) impact area.5 Notably, rather
than utilizing "race" or "student diversity" as defined in
Revised Policy 10.107, consideration of diversity in the pro-
posals was limited to measures of "student achievement." J.A.
147.
5
With respect to the fourth factor, the School Board directed the inde-
pendent consultant to consider only fourteen of the thirty-six schools in
the district.
EVERETT v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 7
As required by the settlement agreement, the School Board
invited Appellants to discuss the student assignment proposals
during two retreats. Initially, the parties considered two stu-
dent assignment scenarios: one using only proximity and
capacity as criteria ("Scenario 1"); and the other using student
achievement in addition to proximity and capacity ("Scenario
2"). Whereas Scenario 1 projected a relative increase in
racially-identifiable schools with lower student achievement,
Scenario 2 projected better diversity but a relative increase in
satellite neighborhoods, which, presumably, would have
required more satellite busing. After discussion of these two
scenarios, a third student assignment plan was considered,
which, while retaining Scenario 2’s consideration of student
achievement, limited the number of satellite neighborhoods
by prioritizing proximity ("Scenario 3"). Scenario 3 projected
more racial diversity than Scenario 1, less racial diversity than
Scenario 2, and fewer satellite areas than Scenario 2.
On November 15, 2010, the School Board selected Sce-
nario 3 as its 2011-2012 Assignment Plan. Prior to the School
Board’s adoption of Scenario 3, the Appellants urged the
School Board to adopt Scenario 2 because Scenario 2 pro-
jected the best outcomes for student achievement and diver-
sity. The School Board was specifically asked, "how can we
open a new elementary school [Lakeforest Elementary] that is
racially identifiable with low performance . . . and follow
[the] Court Order?" J.A. 188. Appellants urged the School
Board to consider "the impact [that] this [assignment] deci-
sion will make [on the district court’s determination of] uni-
tary status," and Appellants further asserted that Scenario 2
"created the least amount of personal bias" and "the most
equitable picture considering all factors." J.A. 189, 193.
After the School Board’s adoption of Scenario 3 as the
2011-2012 Assignment Plan, Appellants urged the School
Board to reconsider its decision because, according to Appel-
lants, the 2011-2012 Assignment Plan’s increase in racially-
identifiable schools with low student achievement moved the
8 EVERETT v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
school district further away from unitary status. Appellants
advised the School Board to seek the district court’s guidance
regarding whether the 2011-2012 Assignment Plan complied
with existing desegregation orders. The School Board
declined to revisit its adoption of Scenario 3 or to seek guid-
ance from the district court.
E.
On April 15, 2011, Appellants sought the district court’s
intervention by filing a motion for injunctive and other relief.
Appellants’ motion alleged that the 2011-2012 Assignment
Plan violated the district court’s existing desegregation orders
because it: (1) established Lakeforest Elementary as a racially
identifiable, low-achieving school, further stigmatizing stu-
dents and aggravating the vestiges of racial segregation and
discrimination; (2) failed to address imbalances in existing
racially-identifiable schools because only fourteen of the
thirty-six schools in the school district were included in the
"impact area"; (3) was adopted despite the existence of less
discriminatory alternatives; and (4) "mov[ed] the [school] dis-
trict further away from unitary status in contravention of" the
2009 Consent Order. J.A. 100. Appellants sought an order "to
stop implementation of this regressive student reassignment,"
as well as an order requiring the School Board "to submit for
judicial review . . . a[n] assignment plan which moves the dis-
trict towards unitary status." J.A. 100-01.
The School Board, on the other hand, urged the district
court to deny Appellants’ motion, arguing that: (1) the School
Board followed the Revised Policy 10.107 in adopting the
2011-2012 Assignment Plan and, therefore, its actions consti-
tuted a reasonable, good faith effort to achieve diversity goals
and maintain progress toward the school district’s attainment
of unitary status; (2) Appellants’ motion was premature
because the 2009 Consent Order set a timetable of December
2012 for considering the school district’s progress toward uni-
tary status; and (3) halting implementation of the 2011-2012
EVERETT v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 9
Assignment Plan would create an undue burden on the school
system.
On August 16, 2011, four months after Appellants’ motion
was filed and just nine days before the start of the school year,
the district court issued its order denying Appellants’ motion.
The district court characterized Appellants’ motion as a
request for a preliminary injunction and held that the Appel-
lants did "not demonstrate[ ] a likelihood of success on the
merits of their claim so as justify the extraordinary relief they
request." J.A. 375. The district court also found that granting
Appellants’ motion would result in irreparable harm because
of the "disruption to the administration" of the schools within
the school district. J.A. 376. Finally, the district court held
that equities tipped in favor of denying Appellants’ motion
because the district court anticipated a review of the school
district’s progress toward unitary status in December 2012.
Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal.
II.
A.
As an initial matter, the School Board claims that this Court
lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. Specifically, the School
Board argues that the district court’s denial of Appellants’
motion is not a "final order" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
because the district court "has expressed its clear intention to
take up the issue of unitary status after submission of the par-
ties’ reports no later than 31 December 2012." Appellee Br.
at 14-15. We initially note that a request for the parties to sub-
mit "a report" is not at all a clear indication that the district
court will fully and finally resolve the issue of unitary status
in December 2012.
Further, we reject the School Board’s jurisdictional argu-
ment. First, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) provides this Court with
jurisdiction over district court decisions "granting, continuing,
10 EVERETT v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions." See also Lid-
dell v. Bd. of Educ., 693 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 1981) ("We
conclude that the challenged orders" approving aspects of a
desegregation plan "are presently appealable because they
amount to mandatory injunctions under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1)."). Second, as further discussed below, even if
we assume that the district court will fully consider the issue
of unitary status in December 2012, this does not absolve the
School Board from the burden of demonstrating to the district
court, as Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), and
its progeny require, that the 2011-2012 Assignment Plan
moves the school district toward unitary status, particularly
where this plan allegedly causes immediate and substantial
adverse effects on students. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979) (holding school board
bears the "heavy burden of showing that actions that increased
or continued the effects of the dual system serve important
and legitimate ends" (quotation marks omitted)). Any other
conclusion would necessarily, but impermissibly, provide the
School Board with latitude to discriminate pending the resolu-
tion of some future hearing.
B.
We review a district court’s order on a motion for injunc-
tive relief for an abuse of discretion, reviewing factual find-
ings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. PBM
Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 125 (4th
Cir. 2011). A court "has abused its discretion if its decision
is guided by erroneous legal principles." Brown v. Nucor
Corp., 576 F.3d 149, 161 (4th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks
omitted). "No deference . . . is owed to the district court on
conclusions of law, including the district court’s understand-
ing of controlling law or the various burdens of proof and pre-
sumptions; . . . such conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo." Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d
305, 379 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Motz, J. and King, J., con-
EVERETT v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 11
curring in part, dissenting in part) (citing In re Brice, 188 F.3d
576, 577 (4th Cir. 1999)).
On appeal, Appellants argue that the district court commit-
ted legal error by failing to apply, and requiring the School
Board to rebut, a presumption that any racial disparities in the
2011-2012 Assignment Plan resulted from the School Board’s
prior unconstitutional conduct in operating a racially segre-
gated school district before 1970. We agree.
C.
"It is well established that once a court has found an unlaw-
ful dual school system, the plaintiffs are entitled to the pre-
sumption that current disparities are causally related to prior
segregation, and the burden of proving otherwise rests on the
defendants." Baliles, 829 F.2d at 1311; see also Freeman v.
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992) ("The school district bears the
burden of showing that any current imbalance is not traceable,
in a proximate way, to the prior violation."); Jacksonville
N.A.A.C.P., 273 F.3d at 966 ("Since the Board operated de
jure segregated schools in the past, there is a presumption that
any current racial disparities in these areas are the result of its
past unlawful conduct."); Green, 391 U.S. at 439 ("It is
incumbent upon the school board to establish that its proposed
plan promises meaningful and immediate progress toward dis-
establishing state imposed segregation."); cf. United States v.
Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 745 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(acknowledging that the Supreme Court’s "decisions follow-
ing Green [have] indulged the presumption, often irrebuttable
in practice, that a presently observed imbalance has been
proximately caused by intentional state action during the prior
de jure era"); Freeman, 503 U.S. at 505 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (acknowledging that the Supreme Court’s "post-Green
cases provide that, once state-enforced school segregation is
shown to have existed . . . there arises a presumption, effec-
tively irrebuttable (because the school district cannot prove
the negative), that any current racial imbalance is the product
12 EVERETT v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
of that violation."). "[I]n school desegregation cases th[is]
burden does not shift back to the plaintiffs until the school
system achieves unitary status."6 Baliles, 829 F.2d at 1311.
The existence of this evidentiary burden does not preclude
school boards from implementing new desegregation plans or
modifying existing plans. Clark v. Bd. of Educ., 705 F.2d 265,
271 (8th Cir. 1983). However, "the [school] board must show
that the proposed changes are consistent with its continuing
affirmative duty to eliminate discrimination." Riddick v. Sch.
Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 535 (4th Cir. 1986); see also Brinkman,
443 U.S. at 538 (explaining that the school board of a pre-
unitary district bears the "heavy burden of showing that
actions that increased or continued the effects of the dual sys-
tem serve important and legitimate ends" (quotation marks
omitted)); Green, 391 U.S. at 439 ("[T]he availability to the
[school] board of other more promising courses of action may
indicate a lack of good faith; and at the least it places a heavy
burden upon the [school] board to explain its preference for
an apparently less effective method."). Again, "[t]his pre-
sumption [only] ends once the school district has achieved
unitary status." Baliles, 829 F.2d at 1311.
6
The "term ‘unitary’ is not a precise concept . . . [but instead] descri-
be[s] a school system which has been brought into compliance with the
command of the Constitution." Freeman, 503 U.S. at 487 (quotation
marks omitted). Pursuant to Green, 391 U.S. 430, to achieve unitary status
a school district must eliminate, to the extent practicable, the vestiges of
de jure segregation in six areas: (1) student assignment, (2) faculty assign-
ment, (3) staff assignment, (4) transportation, (5) extracurricular activities,
and (6) facilities. A declaration of unitary status by a district court is
appropriate after a school district demonstrates, by way of the Green fac-
tors, that "[first,] the [School] Board ha[s] complied in good faith with the
desegregation [order] since it was entered, and [second,] . . . the vestiges
of past [de jure] discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practi-
cable." Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50 (footnote omitted).
EVERETT v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 13
D.
Here, it is undisputed that in Teel and Edwards the School
Board was found to have operated a dual school system "to-
tally segregated on the basis of race" prior to the 1965-66
school year. J.A. 17. Consequently, under the Teel and
Edwards orders and our precedents, the School Board was
"charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps
might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which
racial discrimination [within the school district] would be
eliminated root and branch." Green, 391 U.S. at 437-438.
However, in the decades following the issuance of Teel and
Edwards, the School Board has yet to discharge this obliga-
tion and demonstrate to the district court its attainment of uni-
tary status. To the contrary, the 2009 Consent Order
specifically confirms that the desegregation orders in Teel and
Edwards remain effective and applicable. J.A. 87-89 (explain-
ing that "the parties have not requested the court to lift the
1970 desegregation orders," and further opining that "[i]t is
time for the School Board to follow course and fulfill its obli-
gation to attain unitary status so that it may reclaim complete
control over its schools"). Indeed, the 2009 Consent Order
expressly orders the School Board "to work toward attaining
unitary status." J.A. 89.
Given that there is no dispute that the school district has not
attained unitary status, the evidentiary burden should have
been on the School Board to prove that the 2011-12 Assign-
ment Plan is consistent with the controlling desegregation
orders and fulfills the School Board’s affirmative duty to
eliminate the vestiges of discrimination and move toward uni-
tary status.7 Brinkman, 443 U.S. at 537 (explaining that, in
7
The School Board asserts that Appellants’ motion was a request for a
preliminary injunction, and, therefore, that the district court properly
applied the preliminary injunction standard and placed the burden on
Appellants to establish, among other things, a likelihood of success on the
merits. The problem with this argument is that Appellants’ motion was not
14 EVERETT v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
considering challenge to pre-unitary school district’s desegre-
gation plan, "the Court of Appeals was quite right in holding
that the Board was thereafter under a continuing duty to eradi-
cate the effects of that system . . . . [and that t]hus, judgment
for the plaintiffs was authorized and required absent sufficient
countervailing evidence by the defendant school officials"
(internal citation omitted)). Therefore, we find that the district
court erroneously placed the evidentiary burden on Appellants.8
"preliminary" in any sense of the word. The underlying merits of this case
were resolved more than forty years ago in Edwards and Teel when the
School Board was found liable for a constitutional violation in its opera-
tion of a racially segregated school system. The School Board’s sugges-
tion that this procedural posture was altered—apparently by the district
court’s request for "a report detailing the School Board’s efforts and prog-
ress in achieving unitary status"—is unpersuasive. J.A. 89 (emphasis
added). Indeed, irrespective of whether the injunctive relief sought is char-
acterized as preliminary or permanent, our precedents clearly establish that
pre-unitary school districts bear the evidentiary burden of proving, among
other things, that "current [racial] disparities are [not] causally related to
prior segregation." Baliles, 829 F.2d at 1311; see also Freeman, 503 U.S.
at 494.
8
Our colleague in dissent is of the view that the 2009 Consent Order
"settle[d] all disputes [between the parties] going back to the 1960s and
1970s" and, accordingly, the district court properly placed the evidentiary
burden on Appellants to demonstrate a breach of the settlement agreement
or the 2009 Consent Order. Post at 16-17.
On its face, however, the 2009 Consent Order does not settle the core
dispute that arose in the 1960s and 1970s, namely, the School Board’s
unconstitutional operation of a dual school system and its continuing affir-
mative obligation to eliminate the vestiges of discrimination and move
toward unitary status. See J.A. 87 ("[T]he parties have not requested the
court to lift the 1970 desegregation orders."); id. (noting that the School
Board "operated [prior to the 1970s] a dual, segregated school system with
separate schools for blacks and whites"); id. at 89 ("It is time for the
School Board to follow course and fulfill its obligation to attain unitary
status."); id. ("The court ORDERS the parties to work toward attaining
unitary status.").
Under our precedents, the pre-unitary status of the school system—a
status initially determined by Teel and Edwards and recognized by the
2009 Consent Order—is determinative of the placement of the evidentiary
burden on the School Board, irrespective of procedural posture.
EVERETT v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 15
E.
"[W]e review judgments, not opinions" and, consequently,
we are "entitled to affirm the district court on any ground that
would support the judgment in favor of the party prevailing
below." Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 643 n. 10
(4th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted); see also Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842 (1984) ("[W]e must determine whether the [dis-
trict court’s] legal error resulted in an erroneous judgment.").
Accordingly, the School Board argues that even if it "must
bear the burden of proof in defending its 2011-2012 Assign-
ment Plan . . . the evidence presented by the [School] Board
was clearly sufficient to establish that the plan does not move
[the school district] further from a unitary system." Appellee
Br. at 27. In this regard, the School Board asserts that the
2011-2012 Assignment Plan "was developed in accordance
with [Revised] Policy 10.107, . . . which [ ] was approved by
the court’s 2009 [Consent] Order." Appellee Br. at 28-29.
In two distinct respects, the School Board’s arguments
highlight the prudence of remanding this matter to the district
court for reconsideration and, if appropriate, further develop-
ment of the record. First, the School Board’s articulation of its
evidentiary burden is inaccurate. Whereas the School Board’s
argument is premised on its claim that the 2011-2012 Assign-
ment Plan does not move the school district further from a
unitary system, the School Board’s actual burden is to estab-
lish that the 2011-2012 Assignment Plan moves the school
district toward unitary status. See, e.g., Green, 391 U.S. at
437-438. Second, the School Board’s assertion that the 2011-
2012 Assignment Plan is consistent with Revised Policy
10.107 is vigorously contested by Appellants. Among other
things, Appellants argue that the School Board "neglected
even to follow [Revised] [P]olicy [10.107] as approved by the
court" as evidenced by the 2011-2012 Assignment Plan’s fail-
ure "to consider either race or socio-economic status," as well
as in the plan’s consideration of only "a small subset of
16 EVERETT v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
schools in the [school] district." Reply Br. at 10-11 n. 2. We
think it is proper that the parties’ competing factual claims be
considered in the first instance by the district court, applying
the correct evidentiary burdens.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s
order and remand for reconsideration consistent with this
opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
In imposing on the Pitt County Board of Education the bur-
den of proof with respect to the plaintiffs’ motion for an
injunction, the majority overlooks, I respectfully submit, the
procedural posture of this case and, most importantly, the
impact of the settlement agreement reached by the parties "as
to all matters in dispute" from the date of the original desegre-
gation orders to the date of the court’s approval of the settle-
ment agreement in a consent order, dated November 4, 2009.
While the settlement agreement and consent order envisioned
further work by the parties, as well as a culminating report
from the parties on or before December 31, 2012, the agree-
ment disposed of the foundational disputes, replacing them
with the terms of the agreement.
More particularly, the settlement in this case purported to
settle all disputes going back to the 1960s and 1970s and to
replace those disputes with the terms of the agreement encom-
passed in the consent order issued by the district court. In that
order, dated November 4, 2009, the district court found the
settlement agreement to be "fair and reasonable," and it incor-
porated the terms of the agreement as the terms of the consent
order. The order provides:
EVERETT v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 17
Accordingly, the court APPROVES the parties’ set-
tlement and GRANTS the School Board’s motion
for judicial approval of its 2006-2007 student assign-
ment plan and revised Policy 10.107 (DE # 23). The
court ORDERS the parties to work toward attaining
unitary status so that the court may relinquish juris-
diction over this case and restore to the School
Board full responsibility for the operation of its
schools. The court further ORDERS the parties to
submit, on or before December 31, 2012, a report
detailing the School Board’s efforts and progress in
achieving unitary status and eliminating the vestiges
of past discrimination to the extent practicable.
Thus any claim the plaintiffs could make after November
2009 against the Board of Education based on the earlier seg-
regation conduct would have to be couched as a breach of the
settlement agreement and consent order. And such a breach is
precisely what the plaintiffs alleged in this case in their
motion for an injunction.
In their motion for an injunction, the plaintiffs recounted
the history of discrimination in the school district and the res-
olution of all disputes arising from the discrimination with the
2009 settlement agreement and consent order. The plaintiffs
also alleged that after the court approved the settlement agree-
ment, the parties worked well together "throughout 2010" in
developing a new student reassignment plan for 2011-2012, to
replace the 2006-2007 plan. They pointed out how the Board
of Education conducted retreats, during which the plaintiffs
were able to participate and provide input. But after the Board
adopted its 2011-2012 student reassignment plan on Novem-
ber 15, 2010, the plaintiffs found the plan objectionable inas-
much as the Board "rejected a reassignment plan that would
have resulted in much better outcomes for racial balance and
academic achievement." They alleged that despite the fact
they tried to work with the Board, the Board "has ignored
these efforts." For that reason, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin
18 EVERETT v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
the Board’s implementation of the 2011-2012 reassignment
plan.
Addressing the plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction, the dis-
trict court disposed of the motion as it would have disposed
of any motion for an injunction, imposing the burden of dem-
onstrating the need for an injunction on the party bringing the
motion. After reviewing all the evidence, the court made find-
ings and concluded that the Board of Education did not breach
the undertakings of the 2009 settlement agreement and con-
sent order. It found that in accordance with the settlement
agreement and consent order, the Board had held two retreats
—one on July 1 and one on October 11, 2010—to which the
plaintiffs were invited, and at those retreats, the "plaintiffs
provided input and participated in the discussions concerning
the development of a proposed reassignment plan." The court
then found:
While the school board ultimately rejected the
[plaintiffs’] plan that plaintiffs maintain better
accomplishes the School Board’s stated objectives,
the record reveals that the School Board utilized a
methodical, reasonable and race-neutral process in
developing the 2011-2012 reassignment plan. . . .
Based on the record presently before the court, the
court determines that plaintiffs have not demon-
strated a likelihood of success on the merits of their
claim so as to justify the extraordinary relief they
request.
In this manner, the district court applied a burden of proof that
is consistent with the disposition of any motion that would
endeavor to demonstrate a breach of an agreement and con-
sent order. The one who alleges the breach must carry the bur-
den of demonstrating that it occurred. In this case, the court
simply concluded that the breach which the plaintiffs alleged
in their motion had not been demonstrated.
EVERETT v. PITT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 19
Of course, the ultimate question of whether unitary status
will have been achieved by December 31, 2012, is a different
question and will have to be satisfied by evidence produced
by the Board. But the settlement agreement does not antici-
pate any review of this issue until the December 31, 2012
report is filed by the parties and the issue is presented to the
court. At that time, the Board will have to show that its efforts
satisfied the requirements of the settlement agreement and
consent order in seeking to achieve unitary status.
Accordingly, I would conclude that the district court did
not clearly err in its factual findings and did not abuse its
broad discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion for an
injunction. I would therefore affirm the court’s order, dated
August 16, 2011, denying the motion.