explaining that the statutory privilege “was simply designed, for reasons of fairness and public policy, to insulate a particular category of defendants from specified tort liability when they had probable cause to believe that the plaintiff had committed theft.”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the statutory privilege “was simply designed, for reasons of fairness and public policy, to insulate a particular category of defendants from specified tort liability when they had probable cause to believe that the plaintiff had committed theft.”
- explaining that the elements of the torts listed in C.J. § 5-402 (formerly C.J. § 5-307) were not meant to be changed by stating, “lack of probable cause, while pertinent in some false imprisonment actions, is not an element of the false imprisonment tort”
- holding “where the basis of a false imprisonment action is an arrest by a police officer, the liability of the police officer for false imprisonment will ordinarily depend upon whether or not the officer acted within his legal authority to arrest’
- noting that where a plaintiff is arrested pursuant to a warrant that was procured based on the defendant’s false information, a claim for false arrest will not lie and plaintiff's sole recourse is an action for malicious prosecution
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BELL, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. I agree with the Court of Special Appeals when it concluded that the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County “correctly instructed the jury that a finding of implied malice could support an award of punitive damages in this case.” Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 101 Md.App. 535, 548-49 , 647 A.2d 1218, 1225 (1994). See also my dissenting opinions in Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 478 , 601 A.2d 633, 661 (1992) and Komornik v. Sparks, 331 Md. 720, 740 , 629 A.2d 721, 731 (1993).
Nor do I agree with the majority’s conclusion that “[t]he evidence at trial did not suggest that Bresnahan acted maliciously.” 339 Md. 701, 736 , 664 A.2d 916, 933 (1995). The majority opines that the plaintiff’s testimony denying making credit card purchases at Montgomery Ward, did not conflict with the testimony by two of her accusers that they informed Bresnahan that the plaintiff had made the unauthorized credit transactions. That testimony, the majority asserts, was uncontradicted. I do not agree.
Although indirect, the contradiction is implicit and sharp. The jury was not required to, and did not, believe the defense testimony. Indeed, given the sharpness of the contradiction and the fact that the plaintiffs version of the facts could not be reconciled with that of the defense the jury very likely determined that the defense evidence, concerning the source of Bresnahan’s knowledge of the plaintiffs wrongdoing was fabricated. That certainly would establish the malice necessary to support the award of punitive damages.