Clark v. Riley

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED

________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

FEB 04, 2010

No. 08-11978

JOHN LEY

________________________

ACTING CLERK

D. C. Docket No. 07-00190-CV-W-N

WILLIAM CLARK,

THOMAS FIGURES,

JOE L. REED, Dr.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

BOB RILEY,

Governor, in his official capacity,

ELTON DEAN,

in his official capacity as Chair of the Board of

Trustees of Alabama State University,

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

_________________________

(February 4, 2010)

Before TJOFLAT, CARNES, Circuit Judges, and HOOD,* District Judge.

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:

In this case, Dr. Joe L. Reed, a member of the Board of Trustees for

Alabama State University, seeks a declaratory judgment that an age limit in Ala.

Code § 16-50-20(a) prohibiting a board member from serving beyond September

30 following his seventieth birthday does not apply to him for two reasons: first, §

16-50-20(b) creates an exception shielding him from the age limit; second, and

alternatively, the age limit is facially unconstitutional because it denies persons

over seventy years of age the equal protection of the laws guaranteed them by the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court

rejected both reasons and denied relief.1 Reed now appeals. We affirm.

I.

Before turning to the reasons for our decision, it is helpful to describe the

statute at issue and to explain the proceedings in the district court.

A.

*

Honorable Joseph M. Hood, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of

Kentucky, sitting by designation.

1

The court dismissed Reed’s complaint for failure to state a claim for relief and, at the

same time, denied Reed’s motion for summary judgment.

2

Alabama Code § 16-50-20 governs the composition of the Board of

Trustees for Alabama State University (“ASU”).2 Prior to 1986, the trustees

2

In full, § 16-50-20 reads,

(a) There is hereby created a Board of Trustees for Alabama State University, the

state educational institution at Montgomery, Alabama. The board of trustees shall

consist of two members from the congressional district in which the institution is

located and one member from each of the other congressional districts in the state

as constituted on October 6, 1975, and who shall reside in that district, four

members from the state at large who shall reside in different districts, and the

Governor, who shall be ex officio president of the board. Except for a trustee at

large, the position of any trustee shall be vacated at such time as he shall cease to

reside in the district from which he was appointed. The trustees shall be

appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, in

such manner that the membership shall consist of at least a majority who are

alumni and who have received a bachelor's degree from the said university; at

least one-half of the board shall be from the prevailing minority population of the

state according to the last or any succeeding federal census. Trustees shall hold

office for staggered terms of three, six, nine and 12 years with an equal number

appointed to like terms, such period of terms designated by the appointing

authority, with one-fourth to expire every three years, or until their successors are

appointed. All appointments shall be effective until adversely acted upon by the

Senate. Provided, however, no trustee who is currently serving on the board or

whose term has just expired, who has been previously confirmed by the Senate,

shall be required to be reconfirmed for the new term under this section, once

appointed by the Governor. A member may be appointed to serve a second term

of 12 years, but no member shall be appointed to serve as trustee for more than a

total of two terms. The first members, however, shall be eligible to serve for two

full additional terms in addition to their initial terms. No trustee shall receive any

pay or emolument other than his actual expenses incurred in the discharge of his

duties as such. No member of the governing board or employee or student of any

public postsecondary education institution, no elected or appointed official having

the power of review of the Alabama State University budget, other than the

Governor and no employee of the State of Alabama shall be eligible to serve on

the board. No member shall serve past September 30 following his seventieth

birthday.

(b) No trustee who is serving on the said board on April 30, 1986, shall lose his or

her seat because of this section; provided, however, the Governor may

re-designate the period of the term of these members so as to conform to the

3

served staggered six-year terms, with one-third of the terms expiring every two

years. The governor had the power to appoint trustees and could reappoint each

trustee to serve one additional six-year term. See 1975 Ala. Laws 1581 (creating

§16-50-20); 1983 Ala. Laws 878 (amending § 16-50-20 in ways not material to

this case). In 1986, Alabama’s legislature amended this statute to increase the

number of trustees on the board, to increase the trustee terms from six years to

twelve years, and to stagger the terms to expire every three years instead of every

two. 1986 Ala. Laws 1051. The governor retained his appointment power. Id.

To implement the new staggering scheme, the governor had the authority to divide

the trustees—those on the old board3 plus those appointed to fill the newly created

seats—into four even groups serving initial three, six, nine, and twelve-year terms.

These initial trustees (the new board) were eligible to serve two full twelve-year

terms in addition to their initially designated terms (presumably because most of

their initial terms were for less than twelve years to create the staggering scheme).

provisions of subsection (a).

Ala. Code § 16-50-20.

3

The members of the old board as of April 30, 1986, such as Reed, are the trustees

implicated in his claim that Ala. Code § 16-50-20(b) exempts him from the § 16-50-20(a) age

limit. For convenience, we sometimes refer to those trustees as the “1986 trustees.”

4

Trustees succeeding the initial trustees (each of whom would be appointed for

twelve years) could be reappointed to serve a second twelve-year term. Id.

In addition to requiring staggered terms, § 16-50-20(a) imposes other limits

and requirements on the trustees. For example, one trustee must be drawn from

each congressional district in Alabama (two are drawn from the district in which

ASU is located), and four members are drawn from the state at large; the members

drawn from the state at large must all reside in different districts; trustees

representing congressional districts automatically vacate their seats if they move

out of their district; a majority of the trustees must be ASU alumni; trustees may

not be paid except to cover the expenses incurred in the course of their duties;

trustees may not also be employees, students, or trustees of other public colleges;

state officials with power over ASU’s budget may not be trustees (with the

exception of the governor, who is the ex officio president of the board); and state

employees may not serve as trustees. The statute also sets out the appointment and

confirmation process for the trustees.

Germane to this case, the amended statute retains an age limit, which reads,

“No member shall serve past September 30 following his seventieth birthday.”

Ala. Code § 16-50-20(a). The 1986 amendment also added a new subsection (b)

to the statute, which reads in its entirety, as codified, “No trustee who is serving on

5

the said board on April 30, 1986, shall lose his or her seat because of this section;

provided, however, the Governor may re-designate the period of the term of these

members so as to conform to the provisions of subsection (a).” Id. § 16-50-20(b)

(emphasis added). For brevity, we refer to the first clause of subsection (b) (up to

the semicolon) as the “exemption clause,” and to the second clause as the

“redesignation clause.” These aspects of the statute—the subsection (a) age limit

and subsection (b)—are at issue in this appeal.

B.

Dr. Joe Reed was a member of the ASU board when § 16-50-20 was

amended in 1986. On April 30, 1986, the governor designated Reed’s term as a

twelve-year term to implement the statute’s term-staggering scheme. On February

1, 1999, Reed was reappointed to a second twelve-year term.4 Reed turned

seventy on September 13, 2008. According to the age limit in § 16-50-20(a), Reed

would not have been able to serve on the board beyond September 30, 2008, even

though his second twelve-year term would have lasted longer.

4

As these dates indicate, Reed was reappointed to his second twelve-year term several

months after his first term expired. How this would affect Reed’s term is immaterial because the

parties do not dispute that Reed was properly seated on the board, and even if Reed’s second

term runs from the date his first term ended, it would run beyond September 30 following his

seventieth birthday.

6

Anticipating this problem, Reed, William Clark, an ASU alumnus, and

Thomas Figures, an ASU trustee, brought this action against Bob Riley, the

governor of Alabama, and Elton Dean, the chair of the ASU board (collectively,

the “Governor”) in their official capacities in the Circuit Court of Montgomery

County, Alabama, on February 2, 2007. Their complaint challenged the age limit

in § 16-50-20(a), as it related to the 1986 trustees, on the ground that § 16-50-

20(b) nullifies that limit. They challenged § 16-50-20(a) on the additional ground

that it is barred by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in

two ways: first, the section discriminates on account of age without a rational

basis; second, it treats trustees at ASU differently than trustees at other public

universities who are not subject to age limits.

The Governor removed the suit to the U.S. District Court for the Middle

District of Alabama because it presented a federal question. The Governor then

moved the district court to dismiss the case on the following grounds: (1) Clark’s

interest as an ASU alumnus was insufficient to provide him with standing to sue;

(2) Figures lacked standing because his term would expire prior to his seventieth

birthday; (3) Reed’s claim was moot because his term had been redesignated under

§ 16-50-20(b) so as to expire on September 30, 2008, just as it would under the

7

age limit provision;5 and (4) the age limit in § 16-50-20(a) did deny persons over

seventy the equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The

district court granted the motion as to Clark and Figures, deferred ruling on the

question of whether Reed’s claim was moot, and denied the motion as to the equal

protection claim. The court then instructed Reed to amend his complaint to

respond to the mootness issue.

Reed amended his complaint6 and, at the same time, moved the court for

summary judgment. The Governor countered with a motion to dismiss the

complaint for failure to state a claim for relief. In an order entered on March 31,

2008, the district court found that the term “section” in subsection (b) created

ambiguities and inconsistencies in the statute because if read literally, it would

nullify nearly all of the limits imposed on trustees by subsection (a), giving the

1986 trustees in effect lifetime appointments. The court then turned to the

legislative history of § 16-50-20, which indicated that the legislature had actually

used the word “act,” not “section,” in subsection (b) in the 1986 amendment to

5

The Governor redesignated Reed’s term in a letter he wrote Reed on March 7, 2007,

and attached to his motion to dismiss. The Governor lacked authority to redesignate Reed’s term

in this manner. See infra part III. His attempt to redesignate the term is of no moment, however,

because we determine that Reed is subject to § 16-50-20(a)’s age limit.

6

The amendment effectively eliminated the mootness issue from the case. We refer to

the complaint, as amended, as the complaint because it essentially replicated the complaint Reed

filed in the Montgomery County Circuit Court.

8

§ 16-50-20. The court also observed that the legislature passed the 1986

amendment specifically to implement the revised staggering scheme, which would

be defeated by reading subsection (b) literally. Accordingly, the district court held

that both clauses of subsection (b) should be construed narrowly so as to only

apply when the 1986 amendments first took effect.

The district court also held that the age limit in subsection (a) did not deny

the 1986 trustees or persons over seventy the equal protection of the laws in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court identified multiple rational

bases for treating trustees over the age of seventy differently.7 The court also

found that, contrary to Reed’s assertions, two other Alabama Universities’ boards

had age limits, and thus that ASU trustees were not being treated differently than

their counterparts at other Alabama public universities.

Accordingly, the district court denied Reed’s motion for summary judgment,

granted the Governor’s motion to dismiss and entered judgment pursuant to its

March 31 order. Reed now appeals the court’s judgment, presenting two issues:

first, whether § 16-50-20(b) exempts trustees who were on the board when the

7

A sampling of these bases includes “the difficulty in determining which trustees are

mentally and physically qualified for the job,” “permitting an orderly attrition through

retirement,” and “reduc[ing] the instances of trustees unexpectedly dying before the completion

of their term.”

9

1986 amendments took effect from the age limit imposed by § 16-50-20(a); and

second, whether the age limit denies such trustees and others over seventy the

equal protection of the laws, either because there is no rational basis for

discriminating against such persons over seventy in general, or because there is no

rational basis for discriminating against trustees over seventy at ASU but not at

other similar Alabama universities.

II.

“We review de novo the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, accepting the allegations in the complaint as

true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Hill v.

White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). This case involves the

interpretation of a state statute. “In rendering a decision based on state substantive

law, a federal court must ‘decide the case the way it appears the state’s highest

court would.’” Ernie Haire Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 260 F.3d 1285, 1290

(11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Whitaker Contracting Corp.,

242 F.3d 1035, 1040 (11th Cir. 2001)).

10

We address at length only the statutory interpretation question. We dispose

of Reed’s equal protection challenge in the margin.8

III.

Reed argues that the plain language of the statute calls for what the district

court termed a “broad/narrow” interpretation of Ala. Code § 16-50-20(b): the

8

Reed argues that the age limit violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment in two ways: first, by discriminating against those over seventy, and second, by

treating trustees at ASU differently than trustees at other Alabama state universities. Rational

basis review applies because Reed’s claim involves neither a fundamental right nor a suspect

classification. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101, 124 L.

Ed. 2d 211 (1993). Under rational basis review, we uphold legislation “if the classification

drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne v.

Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985).

As for Reed’s first equal protection argument, the Supreme Court addressed a remarkably

similar mandatory retirement provision in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470–71, 111 S. Ct.

2395, 2406, 115 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1991). In Gregory, the Court upheld under rational basis review

a provision in the Missouri constitution that required that state’s judges to retire at the age of

seventy. 501 U.S. at 473, 111 S. Ct. at 2408. In the present case, the district court identified

multiple reasons for Alabama’s age limit that were similar to the rational bases found in Gregory,

and the district court correctly concluded that the Alabama age limit satisfied rational basis

review.

Turning to Reed’s second argument, Reed mistakenly asserted to the district court that

ASU was the only Alabama state university whose board had an age limit. In fact, both the

University of Alabama and Auburn University have age limits on their trustees. Ala. Const. Art.

XIV, § 264 (requiring University of Alabama trustees to retire following their seventieth

birthday); id. § 266 (requiring that appointees to Auburn University’s board be younger than

seventy years old). Reed now argues that there is no rational basis for imposing an age limit on

ASU’s trustees but not on the boards of all other universities except for Auburn and the

University of Alabama. This argument is frivolous. It is well established that “the legislature

must be allowed leeway to approach a perceived problem incrementally,” Beach Commc'ns, Inc.,

508 U.S. at 316, 113 S. Ct. at 2102, and that “[e]vils in the same field may be of different

dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think,”

Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S. Ct. 461, 465, 99 L. Ed. 563

(1955). The Alabama legislature does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment by organizing its various universities’ boards of trustees differently.

11

exemption language in the first clause should be read broadly to exempt Reed (and

any other 1986 trustees) from the age limit in § 16-50-20(a), but the redesignation

provision in the second clause should be interpreted narrowly as a one-time grant

of power so that the governor could redesignate trustees’ terms only in 1986 to

establish the statutorily created staggering scheme. The Governor asserts that the

language of the original 1986 amendment dictates the “narrow/narrow” reading

adopted by the district court: both provisions of subsection (b) were meant to

apply only when the 1986 amendments took effect.9 After our own review of the

statute, we are convinced that the district court’s so-called “narrow/narrow”

interpretation of the statute is the correct one.

Although the Alabama Supreme Court has considered § 16-50-20(a) on

multiple occasions, those decisions addressed primarily the appointment and

confirmation process for trustees.10 No opinion of record discusses subsection (b)

9

In the district court, the Governor argued for a “broad/broad” view in which both

provisions of subsection (b) apply to Reed. That is, the first clause exempts Reed from the age

limit in subsection (a), but the second clause allows the governor to redesignate Reed’s term to

conform to subsection (a) by setting Reed’s term to end when he turns seventy. On appeal, the

Governor adopts the district court’s interpretation and argues alternatively that the redesignation

clause should be read broadly if the exemption clause is read broadly.

10

See, e.g., Proctor v. Riley, 903 So. 2d 786 (Ala. 2004) (addressing issues relating to the

appointment and confirmation process for ASU trustees); Reed v. Bd. of Trs. for Ala. State

Univ., 778 So. 2d 791 (Ala. 2000) (per curiam) (addressing eligibility requirements for

appointment to the ASU board); Tucker v. Watkins, 737 So. 2d 443 (Ala. 1999) (addressing

appointment and confirmation process issues); Watkins v. Bd. of Trs. of Ala. State Univ., 703

So. 2d 335 (Ala. 1997) (same).

12

or the age limit in subsection (a). Therefore, we must attempt to step into the

shoes of the Alabama Supreme Court and interpret § 16-50-20 as that court would.

In Alabama, “[t]he fundamental rule of construction is to ascertain and

effectuate the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the statute.” League of

Women Voters v. Renfro, 290 So. 2d 167, 169 (Ala. 1974). “‘[T]he court has a

duty to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent expressed in the statute, which

may be gleaned from the language used, the reason and necessity for the act, and

the purpose sought to be obtained.’” Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc. v.

Nielsen, 714 So. 2d 293, 296 (Ala. 1998) (quoting Ex parte Holladay, 466 So. 2d

956, 960 (Ala. 1985)). Determining legislative intent begins with the plain

language of the statute:

Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary,

and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used

a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it

says. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no

room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the

legislature must be given effect.

IMED Corp. v. Sys. Eng’g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992). But

plain language will not be followed to the point of absurdity:

It has been called a golden rule of statutory interpretation that

unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative

possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that

interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable

13

result . . . . It is fundamental . . . that departure from the literal

construction of a statute is justified when such a construction would

produce an absurd and unjust result and would clearly be inconsistent

with the purposes and policies of the act in question. A construction

resulting in absurd consequences as well as unreasonableness will be

avoided.

Ex parte Meeks, 682 So. 2d 423, 428 (Ala. 1996) (quoting Norman J. Singer,

Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45.11, at 61 (5th ed. 1993)). With these

principles of statutory interpretation in mind, we turn to the text of § 16-50-20.

Section 16-50-20(b) reads, in full, “No trustee who is serving on the said

board on April 30, 1986, shall lose his or her seat because of this section;

provided, however, the Governor may re-designate the period of the term of these

members so as to conform to the provisions of subsection (a).” At first blush, the

exemption clause plainly says that a 1986 trustee cannot lose his seat on the board

because of the age limit in subsection (a). But the implications of reading the

clause plainly extend beyond its effect on the age limit. Subsection (a) has many

other provisions that would also divest trustees of their seats. For example,

trustees representing congressional districts must vacate their seats if they move

out of their districts, but under a broad reading of subsection (b), 1986 trustees

would be exempt from this provision. They would also be exempt from the

conflict of interest requirements, the two-term limit, and even the twelve-year term

14

limit, effectively giving them lifetime appointments to the ASU board and

preventing their removal for holding conflicting positions in the state government

or other universities. Indeed, Reed’s plain-language reading of the exemption

clause would undermine nearly the entire ASU board structure established in

subsection (a), including the staggering scheme—an absurd result. Surely the

legislature would not have intended to revamp significantly ASU’s board structure

while simultaneously not only exempting every sitting board member from the

new requirements, but also giving them in effect lifetime appointments (which

were never permissible under the previous board scheme).

If the exemption clause were to be read broadly based on plain language,

then the redesignation clause would likewise be read broadly because there is no

indication that the two clauses in subsection (b), which are separated by a mere

semicolon, should be interpreted differently than one another. The redesignation

clause clearly lets the governor redesignate the 1986 trustees’ terms to conform

with subsection (a). The plain text of the clause contains no limiting temporal

language, so at first glance the clause would seem to grant the governor authority

to redesignate terms at any time, not just when the 1986 act was initially passed.

Conceivably, then, the legislature may have been creating a default rule that

15

exempts 1986 trustees from the requirements in subsection (a) while giving the

governor the power to override the exemptions on a case-by-case basis.

But importantly, the governor may only redesignate terms; the redesignation

clause does not permit the governor to force a 1986 trustee to vacate his seat. The

governor could thus force compliance with the twelve-year term limits and the age

limit, but he would still be powerless to enforce the provisions in subsection (a)

that do not relate to term length—namely the requirements (already discussed) that

one trustee represent each congressional district, the prohibitions on trustees

holding certain other positions to prevent conflicts of interest, and the limits on the

number of terms a trustee may serve. Moreover, interpreting the redesignation

clause this way would upset the carefully crafted staggering scheme and the

twelve-year terms because the governor could redesignate terms at will. It is

inconceivable that the Alabama legislature would subject its newly created board

scheme to undermining in such an arbitrary manner.11 Because a literal

11

The Alabama Supreme Court, reviewing § 16-50-20 in another context, made a similar

attempt to reconcile different provisions of the section. When analyzing the interplay between

the appointment and confirmation procedures in § 16-50-20(a) and the governor’s recess trustee-

appointment powers under § 16-50-25, the Alabama Supreme Court observed that it first would

“‘consider the statute as a whole and . . . construe the statute reasonably so as to harmonize [its]

provisions.’” Proctor, 903 So. 2d at 789 (quoting McRae v. Sec. Pac. Hous. Servs., Inc., 628 So.

2d 429, 432 (Ala. 1993)) (alterations in original). We too read the statute as a whole in an effort

to harmonize its provisions.

16

interpretation of subsection (b) would lead to absurd consequences, we turn for

guidance, as did the district court, to the legislative history behind § 16-50-20.

The Alabama legislature created § 16-50-20 in 1975, 1975 Ala. Acts. 1581,

and amended it in 1983, 1983 Ala. Acts, 878, and 1986, 1986 Ala. Acts 1051. As

written in the 1986 Amendment, subsection (b) stated, “No trustee who is serving

on the said board on the effective date of this act shall lose his or her seat because

of this act; provided, however the governor may re-designate the period of the

term of these members so as to conform to the provisions of Section 16-50-20(a).”

1986 Ala. Acts 1052–53 (emphasis added).12

The difference between the word “act” used in the amendment and the word

“section” that appears in the codified version is significant and demonstrates how

the Alabama legislature actually intended subsection (b) to operate. “Section”

refers to a portion of the code, whereas “act” refers to the legislative action

creating the statute. A “section” operates indefinitely, but an “act” is a transient

process, operating only to create the statute. Although the word “act” can be

changed to a word like “section” during the codification process, see Ala. Code §

29-7-8(a) (“The Code Commissioner . . . . may . . . . [s]ubstitute the proper

12

The emphasized phrase “this act” seems to have been changed to “this section” during

the codification process. Subsection (a) is codified as it was written in the 1986 amendment.

17

hierarchy unit for the terms ‘this act,’ ‘the preceding section,’ and the like.”), the

two are not always synonymous, and context is important.13 As explained supra,

for the legislature to have meant that “act” be changed to “section” during the

codification process, it necessarily would have to have intended to undermine the

very changes that it was making to the ASU board. Given this context, it is much

more likely that the legislature intended that “act” refer to the actual passage of the

legislation, thus declaring its intention not to strip any 1986 trustees of their seats

in the process of passing the amendment to restructure the ASU board. The title of

the amendment confirms this reading, describing the amendment as an act

[t]o amend Section 16-50-20, Code of Alabama 1975, as amended, so

as to enlarge the membership of the Alabama State University Board

of Trustees, prescribe the qualifications, balance, terms of office and

appointment; to provide that no current member may be removed as a

result of this bill, but allows the governor to redesignate the

respective terms of office to conform to the staggered terms.

13

In his appellate brief, Reed points to Alabama Supreme Court cases purportedly

standing for the proposition that the codified version of a statute is dispositive. It generally is

true in Alabama that, “[o]nce the Code Commission modifies an act and the Legislature

thereafter adopts a Code containing the modification, the modification has the force of law.”

Swift v. Gregory, 786 So. 2d 1097, 1100 (Ala. 2000). In Swift, the Alabama Supreme Court held

that the codified version of the statute was “plain and unambiguous.” Id. at 1100. On the other

hand,

[w]hen a doubt or ambiguity result [sic] from codifying a statute or statutes, the

Court will refer to the original enactment or enactments, and give effect to its or

their provisions as originally framed, notwithstanding a change in the

phraseology, unless a clear intention is manifest to change its operation and effect.

Miller v. State ex rel. Peek, 29 So. 2d 411, 416 (Ala. 1947). Because the word “section” creates

doubt or ambiguity in the statute, normal rules of statutory construction apply and we may look

to the original enactment for guidance.

18

1986 Ala. Acts at 1051–52 (emphasis added).14 This original legislative language

makes clear that the legislature intended for subsection (b) to apply only when the

governor initially implemented the new staggering scheme created by the 1986

amendment.

Viewed in light of the actual enacting legislation, subsection (b)’s operation

becomes clear. The Alabama legislature amended § 16-50-20 to change the

structure of and the rules governing the ASU board. One of those changes altered

the staggering of the trustees’ terms. Because there was already a board of trustees

governing ASU in 1986, someone had to sort the existing board members into the

newly created staggered terms. The legislature tasked the governor with this

reorganization by adding the redesignation clause, but at the same time it included

the exemption clause to ensure that no then-sitting trustees lost their seats in the

process. Hence, the legislature included subsection (b) not to give the 1986

trustees in effect life tenures, but rather to provide for an orderly reshuffling of the

board. Accordingly, “the letter of the statute yield[s] to the true meaning and

14

Section 45 of the Alabama Constitution requires every bill to have a title, which shall

clearly express its subject. Ala. Const. art. IV, § 45. Alabama courts have used the title of

legislation as an aid in interpretation. See, e.g., Jordan v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 589 So. 2d 699,

702 (Ala. 1991) (“Clearly, the title of an act may serve as an aid to statutory interpretation.”);

Hamrick v. Thompson, 165 So. 2d 386, 390 (Ala. 1964) (“[T]he recitals of the title are available

aids to the removal of ambiguity or uncertainty in the enacting clause.”); State v. Bd. of Revenue

& Rd. Com’rs, 80 So. 368, 369–70 (Ala. 1918) (referring to the title of an act to help ascertain its

meaning).

19

intent of the lawmakers.” League of Women Voters, 290 So. 2d at 169.

Subsection (b)—both the exemption clause and the redesignation clause—applied

only to the initial reshuffling of the board that occurred when the 1986 amendment

was passed, as clearly indicated by the language of the 1986 amendment.

The district court thus correctly applied its “narrow/narrow” interpretation

to subsection (b) and correctly applied the age limit in subsection (a) to Reed.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court dismissing

Reed’s complaint for failure to state a claim for relief is

AFFIRMED.

20