observing, in accordance with Mead, that because definition of unfair insurance settlement practice for purposes of CUIPA requires proof that conduct at issue constituted general business practice, isolated instances of such conduct do not violate this state's public policy as articulated by legislature under CUIPA
How later courts described this case
- observing, in accordance with Mead, that because definition of unfair insurance settlement practice for purposes of CUIPA requires proof that conduct at issue constituted general business practice, isolated instances of such conduct do not violate this state's public policy as articulated by legislature under CUIPA
- discussing the pleading standards for a CUIPA-based CUTPA claim in both federal and Connecticut state courts
- affirming trial court's granting of motion to strike CUTPA claim on ground that dispute did not arise between consumer and commercial vendor, but rather between employer and employee
- ‘‘[F]or a plaintiff to allege CUIPA and CUTPA violations successfully the plaintiff must allege more than a singular failure to settle a plaintiff’s claim fairly. The plaintiff must allege that the defendant has committed the alleged wrongful acts with such frequency as to indicate a general busi- ness practice. . . . [The plaintiff] makes no allegations that the defendant has similarly failed to settle similar claims presented by other claimants . . . .’’
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Itech Consulting Partners v. Briand, No. Cv02-034 55 40 S (Feb. 26, 2003), 2003 Conn. Super. Ct. 2747 (2003)
The court's conclusions in Quimby and the subsequent case law following that decision are inapplicable to the case at bar because of factual differences and the court's decision in LarsenChelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 232 Conn. 480, 656 A.2d 1009 (1995).
Distinguished by Diversified Financial Systems v. Mushkin, No. Cv 95 68796 (Apr. 23, 1996), 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 3173 (1996)
The case of Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp., supra, 28 Conn. App. 660, CT Page 3175 however, is inapposite to the case presently before the court.
Distinguished by Benway v. Laidlaw Transit Inc., No. Cv 95 0050910 S (Apr. 12, 1996), 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 2935-T (1996)
The plaintiff's attempts to distinguish the present claim from those proffered in Quimby, supra, are inapposite.
Distinguished by Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 232 Conn. 480 (1995)
Having determined that the Appellate Court’s decision in Quimby is inapposite to this case, the issue then becomes whether the jury reasonably could have found that Larsen’s activities implicated trade or commerce.
The opinion
Daly, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur with the well reasoned majority opinion sustaining the motion to strike counts one, three, four, five, six, seven and eight of the plaintiff’s amended complaint. As to count two, however, the trial court’s granting of the defendant’s motion to strike should be reversed because the complaint stated a cause of action pursuant to General Statutes § 31-290a. 1
*673 The majority opinion correctly sets forth our standard of review of a trial court’s motion to strike. “ ‘Where an appeal is taken from a judgment following the granting of a motion to strike, we take the facts to be those alleged in the amended complaint construed in a manner most favorable to the pleader.’ ” Biro v. Hill, 214 Conn. 1, 2 , 570 A.2d 182 (1990), quoting Amodio v. Cunningham, 182 Conn. 80, 82 , 438 A.2d 6 (1980). On appeal, “all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.” Amodio v. Cunningham, supra, 83 . The motion to strike should be granted if the allegations in the complaint only allege legal conclusions unsupported by facts. Mora v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 13 Conn. App. 208, 211 , 535 A.2d 390 (1988).
Count two, although inartfully drafted, alleged that the defendant acted in bad faith by “wrongfully discharging the plaintiff and thereby violating § 31-290a” because she sought workers’ compensation benefits from the defendant. Construing this allegation in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it was sufficient to state a statutory cause of action under § 31-290a.
In D’Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, 202 Conn. 206, 217 , 520 A.2d 217 (1987), the plaintiff’s allegation that “ ‘[t]he defendants negligently misrepresented the facts to the plaintiff, caus *674 ing her damages as pled’ ” sufficiently stated a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. Id. Our Supreme Court noted that “[although the complaint could have alleged the nature of the defendants’ negligence more precisely, the lack of linguistic specificity does not warrant striking the second count. As the Appellate Court noted, under the rules of practice governing pleading, a party may plead legal effect as long as the pleading ‘fairly [apprises] the adverse party of the state of facts which it intended to prove.’ Practice Book § 109; see Practice Book § 108.” Id., 220.
The allegations in count two of this case fairly apprised the defendant that the plaintiff intended to prove she was wrongfully discharged because she exercised her rights under the workers’ compensation act. Therefore, the allegations in count two stated a cause of action under § 31-290a. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
General Statutes § 31-290a provides in pertinent part: “(a) No employer who is subject to the provisions of this chapter shall discharge, or cause to be discharged, or in any manner discriminate against any employee *673 because the employee has filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits or otherwise exercised the rights afforded to him pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.
“(b) Any employee who is so discharged or discriminated against may either: (1) Bring a civil action in the superior court for the judicial district where the employer has its principal office for the reinstatement of his previous job, payment of back wages and reestablishment of employee benefits to which he would have otherwise been entitled if he had not been discriminated against or discharged and any other damages caused by such discrimination or discharge. The court may also award punitive damages. Any employee who prevails in such a civil action shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to be taxed by the court . . . .”