noting that the plaintiff had produced no direct evidence of the defendants' unconstitutional motive
How later courts described this case
- noting that the plaintiff had produced no direct evidence of the defendants' unconstitutional motive
- "when the governing precedent identifies the defendant's intent (unrelated to knowledge of the law) as an essential element of plaintiff's constitutional claim, the plaintiff must be afforded an opportunity to overcome an asserted immunity with an offer of proof of the defendant's alleged unconstitutional purpose."
- “where intent ... [is] an essential element of plaintiff’s claim, plaintiff must be afforded an opportunity to overcome an asserted immunity with an offer of proof of the defendant’s alleged unconstitutional purpose”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Leonard Rollon Crawford-El v. Patricia Britton and the District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 813 (1996)
812 F.2d 1425 (D.C.Cir.1987), overruled on other grounds by Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813 (D.C.Cir.1996) (en banc),
The opinion
HARRY T. EDWARDS, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur fully in Judge Ginsburg’s thoughtful opinion, including her reading of this court’s decision in Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 , 105 S.Ct. 1843 , 85 L.Ed.2d 142 (1985). Contrary to the protestations of our dissenting colleague, the majority opinion is not unfaithful to the teachings of Hobson . The majority opinion merely instructs the district court to permit carefully circumscribed discovery focused precise *45 ly on the events of the November 29, 1982 meeting. Allowing such limited discovery in this context is fully consistent with our position in Hobson that plaintiffs who are unable to allege specific facts to support a claim of unconstitutional motive should not be permitted to involve government actors in “protracted” discovery and trial. 737 F.2d at 30 . It is also fully consistent with this court’s twin goals in Hobson : to limit the litigation burdens placed on government officials by “insubstantial” lawsuits, while preserving the opportunity for plaintiffs to vindicate constitutional rights. Id. at 29-31 . After sharply limited discovery, Martin will be required to allege nonconclusory evidence of unconstitutional intent; if he is unable to sustain this burden, the district court will be required to dismiss his claim, thereby precluding burdensome, protracted discovery and trial. Hobson , which emphasized the need to maintain some flexibility in this context, certainly does not require that we completely foreclose Martin from pursuing a potentially meritorious constitutional claim.