holding that to show conspiracy,” [a]n express agreement among all conspirators is not necessary. A plaintiff ... need not prove that each participant in a conspiracy knew the exact limits of the illegal plan or the identity of all participants therein. The conspirators must share the general conspiratorial objective, but they need not know all the details of the plan ... or possess the same motives. Thus, to demonstrate the existence of a conspiratorial agreement, it simply must be shown that there was a single plan, the essential nature and general scope of which [were] known to each person who is to be held responsible for its consequences”
How later courts described this case
- holding that to show conspiracy,” [a]n express agreement among all conspirators is not necessary. A plaintiff ... need not prove that each participant in a conspiracy knew the exact limits of the illegal plan or the identity of all participants therein. The conspirators must share the general conspiratorial objective, but they need not know all the details of the plan ... or possess the same motives. Thus, to demonstrate the existence of a conspiratorial agreement, it simply must be shown that there was a single plan, the essential nature and general scope of which [were] known to each person who is to be held responsible for its consequences”
- recognizing, in a federal constitutional law case, that courts must "distinguish between acts that are self-concealing (such as frauds) and acts where, absent a subsequent act of concealment, only the perpetrator, but not the fact that a cause of action might exist, would be unknown (such as a burglary)”
- holding that actual notice requires "awareness of sufficient facts to identify a particular cause of action" and "to file suit"
- holding that "[t]he doctrine of fraudulent concealment does not come into play, whatever the lengths to which a defendant has gone to conceal the wrongs, if a plaintiff is on notice of the claim he now brings"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part, on other grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993)
737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Int. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 , 113 S. Ct. 1160 , 122 L. Ed. 2d 517
The opinion
On Petition for Rehearing
On consideration of the petition for rehearing of Appellants Brennan, Moore, Pangburn and Grimaldi, filed July 23, 1984, it is
ORDERED, by the Court, that the petition is denied.
A statement of the Court is attached.
PER CURIAM.
We deny the petition for rehearing in this case. Two points raised by the FBI defendants in their petition, however, merit comment. The FBI defendants’ principal argument is that it is unjust to find mid- and low-level government officials liable for conspiracy when they merely participated in an illegal program approved by higher authorities. In this case, however, the' defendants found liable by the jury (and whose liability has been sustained) could only have been found to have participated in the conspiracy, if at all, in a supervisory capacity, exercising substantial responsibility for developing and implementing a policy knowingly designed to thwart plaintiffs’ exercise of their First Amendment rights. We are simply not dealing with federal agents who were acting without knowledge of or responsibility for the illegal objective of a government program, *285 and we need not and do not hold that such agents may be held liable under a conspiracy theory.
Second, the FBI defendants argue for the first time that compliance with an agency’s approved policy should be deemed one of the “extraordinary circumstances” (as yet undefined) giving rise to immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In its most extreme form, this argument amounts to the contention that obedience to higher authority should excuse disobedience to law, no matter how central the law is to the preservation of citizens’ rights. We have no hesitation in rejecting this new argument.
In this case, we had no occasion to consider and we therefore did not address, the contention that in some circumstances compliance with approved policy, such as compliance only after protesting the policy at issue, could excuse liability. Appellants have never raised and, indeed, the record could not support any such contention. We thus leave open the question whether the “extraordinary circumstances’’ prong of Harlow is satisfied under circumstances not presented by this case.