State v. Reynolds

Opinion

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. THE FACTS................. 18

II. GUILT PHASE ISSUES........... 24

A. Sufficiency of the Information .... 24

B. The Defendant’s Challenge to the Panel’s Interpretation of § 53a-54b (1) 28

C. Motion to Suppress Statements ... 35

1. The Search.............. 43

2. The Arrest.............. 46

3. Miranda Violation......... 50

4. The Defendant’s Claim of Involuntariness................ 53

D. The Court’s Limitation on the Defendant’s Right of Cross-Examination . 57

III. PENALTY PHASE ISSUES......... 61

A. Issues Concerning the Aggravating Factor Enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (D.................... 61

1. Facial Constitutionality of § 53a-46a (h) (1).............. 61

2. The State’s Burden of Satisfying the “Same Felony” Element of § 53a-46a (h)(1)........... 67

3. The Right to a Jury Determination on the Existence of the Aggravating Factor Enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (1).............. 83

*13 4. The Sufficiency of Evidence of the Defendant’s Attempt to Commit the Crime of Sale of a Narcotic Substance During the Course of Committing the Capital Felony..... 87

B. Issues Concerning the Aggravating Factor Enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (4).................... 89

1. Evidentiary Insufficiency...... 89

2. Denial of the Defendant’s Prepenalty Phase Motion to Dismiss the Aggravating Factor Enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (4)........... 98

C. The Court’s Instructions on Reasonable Doubt............... 103

D. Effect of the Jury’s Invalid Finding as to the Existence of One Aggravating Factor on the Jury’s Finding as to the Existence of Another Aggravating Factor.................. 107

E. Three Judge Panel........... 110

F. Excusal of Juror for Cause...... 115

G. The Role of the Jury as Sentencer. . 120

H. The Right to a Bifurcated Penalty Phase Hearing............. 129

I. Issues Regarding the Mitigating Factors and Evidence........... 131

1. Evidence Establishing the Existence of One or More Mitigating Factors................ 131

2. Proof of Mitigating Value..... 136

3. Special Verdict Form—Mitigation 137

4. The Cumulative Effect of the Mitigating Evidence as an Independent Mitigating Factor.......... 138

5. Catchall Mitigating Factors .... 141

*14 6. The Defendant’s Request to Present as an Independent Mitigating Factor the Inappropriateness of the Death Penalty Under the Circumstances of the Case...... 143

7. Mercy as a Mitigating Factor . . . 146

J. Vagueness Challenge to § 53a-46a (d) 148

K. State’s Use of Evidence Purportedly Admissible During the Guilt Phase Only................... 152

L. The Admissibility of Anthony Crawford’s Testimony............ 153

M. Alleged Juror Misconduct....... 156

N. Preliminary Determination of the Evidentiary Sufficiency of the Aggravating Factors............... 157

IV. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT..... 160

A. References to Officer Williams’ Family .................... 166

B. Inviting the Jury to Ignore the Law 176

C. Expression of Personal Opinions and Beliefs During Closing Arguments. . 199

D. Conclusion............... 214

V. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES......... 217

A. Change of Venue............ 217

B. The Trial Court’s Denial of the Defendant’s Postverdict Motions for the Imposition of a Life Sentence and an Evidentiary Hearing in Connection Therewith........ 226

C. Mandatory Sentence Review..... 234

VL THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONNECTICUT’S DEATH PENALTY STATUTES ..................... 235

VII. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW....... 237

ADDENDUM.................... 252B

PALMER, J.

Officer Walter Williams of the Waterbury police department was on patrol in the vicinity of Orange and Ward Streets in Waterbury in the early morning hours of December 18, 1992, when he was fatally shot in the head at point blank range by the defendant, Richard Reynolds, whom Williams had stopped for questioning. The defendant fled but was apprehended and arrested shortly thereafter and charged with one count of capital felony in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-54b (l) 1 and one count of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a). 2 A three judge panel (panel) consisting of West, Fasano and Keller, Js., found the defendant guilty of both counts and, thereafter, the trial court, Fasano, J. , 3 conducted the penalty phase hearing before *16 a jury pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-46a. 4 At the conclusion of the penalty phase hearing, the jury returned a special verdict finding the existence *17 of two aggravating factors and no mitigating factors. In accordance with the panel’s finding of guilt and the juiy’s special verdict, the trial court rendered judgment *18 of guilty and sentenced the defendant to death. 5 On appeal to this court, the defendant raises a total of fifty-two challenges to the judgment of conviction and to the sentence of death. We affirm both the judgment of conviction and the death sentence.

I

THE FACTS

The panel reasonably could have found the following facts. In late 1992, the defendant, also known as “Kilt,” resided with his girlfriend, Karen Smith, and her four children, in Smith’s apartment on the second floor of 47 Wood Street in Waterbury. The defendant, a convicted drug dealer, was a member of a cocaine trafficking organization that used Smith’s apartment to process and package crack cocaine (cocaine) for sale to street level dealers. Other members of the organization included its leader, Kneshon Carr, and Anthony Crawford, Robert Bryant and Terry Brown.

*19 The members of Carr’s organization were together at Smith’s apartment early in the morning of December 18,1992, preparing cocaine for sale. The defendant and Crawford were each given approximately 175 bags of cocaine, worth about $3500, for sale to an individual located at an apartment on Locust Street. The two men left Smith’s residence and headed for Locust Street shortly before 4 a.m. Before leaving Smith’s apartment, however, Crawford loaded a .38 caliber semiautomatic pistol and handed it to the defendant, who put it in his right coat pocket. The defendant was carrying cocaine in his left coat pocket.

When the defendant and Crawford reached Orange Street on their way to Locust Street, they crossed paths with Margaret Powell, who previously had purchased cocaine from both the defendant and Crawford. Crawford offered to sell Powell some cocaine, but Powell declined because she had no money.

As the defendant and Crawford were approaching the intersection of Orange and Ward Streets, Officer Williams, who was on patrol alone in a marked police cruiser, turned onto Ward Street from Orange Street and parked near the intersection of those two streets. Williams was in uniform and wearing a bulletproof vest. Upon observing the defendant and Crawford, Williams exited his vehicle and ordered the two men to “[g]et up against” the cruiser. Crawford ignored Williams’ command and kept walking. The defendant complied with Williams’ order. Specifically, the defendant stopped and placed his left hand on the hood of the cruiser. The defendant, however, kept his right hand in his right coat pocket.

Williams, who was standing behind and slightly to the left of the defendant, repeatedly instructed the defendant to remove his right hand from his coat pocket. The defendant, however, refused to do so. Wil *20 liams then took hold of the defendant’s right arm in an effort to remove the defendant’s hand from his coat pocket. Williams could not wrest the defendant’s hand from the pocket, however, and, as Williams released his grip on the defendant, the defendant took his left hand off the hood of the cruiser and bumped his left elbow against Williams’ chest, which was protected by a bulletproof vest. The defendant then withdrew the pistol that he was carrying from his right coat pocket, spun around, and shot Williams behind the left ear from a distance of between one and two feet. Williams fell to the ground, and Crawford and the defendant fled the scene, returning to Smith’s apartment. As the defendant and Crawford ran, the defendant turned and fibred between three and six additional gunshots in Williams’ direction. 6 Upon arriving at Smith’s apartment, the defendant told Bryant that he realized that he had to shoot Williams in the head when he bumped Williams’ chest and learned that Williams was wearing a bulletproof vest. 7

Jesse Strohecker was driving north on Orange Street at about 4 a.m. the same day when he noticed a police cruiser parked at the intersection of Orange and Ward Streets. 8 As Strohecker drove through the intersection, he saw Williams lying in the road. Strohecker stopped, *21 exited his car and approached Williams. Strohecker knelt down next to Williams and asked him if he was okay. Williams took a deep breath and said: “I’ve been hit. . . . I’ve been hit . . . .” Williams then started mumbling unintelligibly, and his body began to shake. Strohecker used the police radio in Williams’ cruiser to request assistance for Williams.

Officers Timothy Jackson and John Perugini were riding together in a cruiser approximately two blocks from the shooting when they heard Strohecker’s request for assistance on their radio. They arrived at the scene within one minute of receiving Strohecker’s transmission. Jackson ran to Williams and knelt beside him. Williams grasped Jackson’s shoulder for three to five seconds and attempted unsuccessfully to speak. Officer Joseph Flaherty arrived soon after Jackson and Perugini and observed that Williams’ eyes were open and that he was moving his arms or head. Williams’ lips also were moving, but it was impossible to discern what, if anything, he was saying. Flaherty and a second officer removed Williams’ equipment belt with Williams’ handgun still secured in its holster.

Moments later, an ambulance arrived and transported Williams, who, by that time, was unconscious, to Saint Mary’s Hospital in Waterbury. Williams lapsed into a coma at approximately 5:30 a.m. and died at 7 p.m. from complications resulting from the gunshot wound to his head.

The defendant was apprehended and charged with one count of capital felony in violation of § 53a-54b (1) and one count of murder in violation of § 53a-54a (a). The court, Murray, J., held a probable cause hearing in accordance with article first, § 8, of the state constitution, as amended by article seventeen of the amendm *22 ents, 9 and General Statutes § 54-46a, 10 at which the court, Murray, J., found probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed the crimes with which he was charged. Thereafter, the state notified the defendant of three aggravating factors that it intended to prove at the defendant’s penalty phase hearing, namely, that the defendant had committed the capital felony: (1) “during the . . . attempted commission of ... a felony and he had previously been convicted of the same felony”; General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-46a (h) (1); (2) in such a manner as “knowingly [to create] a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense”; General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-46a (h) (3); and (3) “in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner . . . .” General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-46a (h) (4). The defendant waived his right to a jury trial and elected to be tried by a three judge court in accordance with General Statutes § 53a-45. 11

*23 Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress certain statements that he had made to the police during the investigation of the shooting of Williams. After an evidentiary hearing, the court, Kulawiz, denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. The defendant also filed a motion for a change of venue, which the trial court denied following an evidentiary hearing.

The trial then was held before the panel, which found the defendant guilty of both capital felony and murder. Thereafter, the defendant elected to have the penalty phase hearing held before a jury rather than the panel. 12 The jury returned a special verdict finding that the state had established two aggravating factors, namely, that the defendant had committed the capital felony during the attempted commission of a felony having previously been convicted of the same felony, and that the defendant had committed the capital felony in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-46a (h) (1) and (4). The jury also found, however, that the state did not satisfy its burden of proving that the defendant had committed the capital felony in such a manner as knowingly to create a grave risk of death to another person in addition to Officer *24 Williams. General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-46a (h) (3). Finally, the jury found that the defendant did not satisfy his burden of proving any mitigating factors. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s special verdict, sentencing the defendant to death in connection with the defendant’s conviction of capital felony. 13 This appeal followed.

II

GUILT PHASE ISSUES A

Sufficiency of the Information

The defendant contends that he is entitled to a new probable cause hearing because the information, in which he was charged with the crime of capital felony in violation of § 53a-54b (l), 14 failed to allege an essential element of that offense, namely, that Officer Williams was “acting within the scope of his duties” at the time he was murdered. We disagree. 15

On December 21, 1992, the state filed a short form information charging the defendant with the crime of capital felony in violation of § 53a-54b (1). On February 3,1993, in response to the defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars, the state filed a long form information charging the defendant with the crime of capital felony *25 as well as the crime of murder in violation of § 53a-54a (a). The state alleged in the long form information that the defendant “did commit the crime of [murder] . . . in that on or about [December 18, 1992], at approximately 4:00 a.m., at or near the intersection of Orange and Ward Streets . . . the [defendant], with the intent to cause the death of another person, [namely, Officer Williams] a member of the Waterbury . . . [p]olice [department, caused the death of [Officer Williams] by shooting him in the head with a handgun.” With respect to the capital felony count, the state alleged in relevant part that the defendant “did commit [murder] of a member of the local police department, [namely, Officer Williams] . . . .” After a hearing conducted in accordance with article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended by article seventeen of the amendments, 16 of the Connecticut constitution and § 54-46a, 17 the trial court, Murray, J., found probable cause to try the defendant on the capital felony and murder charges.

The defendant claims for the first time on appeal that he is entitled to a new probable cause hearing because the information did not specify that Williams was “acting within the scope of his duties”; General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-54b (1); when the defendant shot and killed him. The defendant further maintains that “a proper finding of probable cause ... is a constitutional prerequisite to the exercise of trial jurisdiction over a person charged with [the] crime [of capital felony],” and, as a consequence of the “deficiency in the state’s charging document, there was no such probable cause finding with respect to the acting within the scope of duties element [of] the capital felony charge . . . .” *26 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) According to the defendant, this alleged deficiency vitiated the finding of probable cause, thereby requiring a new probable cause hearing.

The defendant’s argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, the defendant waived his claim inasmuch as he had failed to raise it in the trial court. “The defendant correctly asserts that a finding of probable cause is necessary to establish that a court has jurisdiction to try a suspect as to a certain charge. See State v. Mitchell, 200 Conn. 323, 332 , 512 A.2d 140 (1986). As we stated in State v. John, 210 Conn. 652 , 665 n.8, 557 A.2d 93 , cert. denied, 493 U.S. 824 , 110 S. Ct. 84 , 107 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1989), however, our reference in State v. Mitchell, [supra, 330 ], to a determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to subsequent jurisdiction to hear the trial pertains, not to subject matter jurisdiction, but only to jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. General Statutes § 54-46a (a) expressly allows the waiver of a preliminary hearing to determine probable cause, so it obviously cannot be essential for subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, like other defects relating to jurisdiction of the person, any infirmity in the evidence presented at a probable cause hearing is deemed to be waived if not seasonably raised.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 309-10 , 746 A.2d 150 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855 , 121 S. Ct. 136 , 148 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2000). Having failed to raise a claim in the trial court that the evidence did not comport either with the charge or the allegations contained in the information, the defendant is barred from raising such a claim on appeal.

The defendant’s claim fails for a second, more fundamental reason. The particular allegations contained in an information do not limit or otherwise define the scope of the trial court’s responsibility to determine whether probable cause exists to proceed with the pros *27 ecution of an accused charged with an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment. In other words, it is the responsibility of the court, pursuant to § 54-46a, to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense with which he has been charged. In the present case, the state charged the defendant with committing, inter alia, the crime of capital felony. Consequently, the trial court was responsible for determining whether the evidence adduced at the probable cause hearing was sufficient to warrant the continued prosecution of the defendant on the capital felony charge, and the trial court properly upheld its responsibility.

Under the view advanced by the defendant, the probable cause hearing may be used as a vehicle to test the sufficiency of the allegations contained in the information. That simply is not a purpose of a probable cause hearing. The probable cause hearing is designed to safeguard an accused’s rights by requiring the state to demonstrate, at an early stage of the prosecution, that the evidence of the defendant’s guilt is sufficient to warrant a prosecution in connection with the particular charge.

Moreover, the defendant’s argument regarding the variance between the “acting within the scope of his duties” language of § 53a-54b (1) and the allegations contained in the information, reflects a fundamental misperception of the purpose of the information. That purpose is not to set the parameters of the probable cause hearing but, rather, to “inform the defendant of the charge against him with sufficient precision to enable him to prepare his defense and to avoid prejudicial suxprise and to make the charge definite enough to enable [the defendant] to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of any future prosecution for the same offense . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McMurray, 217 Conn. 243, 249 , 585 A.2d 677 (1991). Thus, contrary to the defendant’s claim, there *28 is no substantial relation between the information, on the one hand, and the probable cause hearing, on the other. Inasmuch as the defendant’s claim is predicated on the erroneous premise that such a relation exists, his claim must fail. 18

B

The Defendant’s Challenge to the Panel’s Interpretation of § 53a-54b (1)

The defendant next claims that the panel improperly determined that, in order to satisfy the element of § 53a-54b (1) requiring proof that Officer Williams had been “acting within the scope of his duties” when he conducted a Terry 19 stop of the defendant, 20 the state was *29 required to prove merely that he was acting in the discharge of his official duties as a police officer at that time. The defendant claims that § 53a-54b (1) requires proof both that Williams was acting within the scope of his duties as a police officer when he was murdered and that his conduct was lawful. The defendant further claims that the state failed to satisfy its burden of proof in that respect because the evidence was insufficient to establish that Williams’ investigative stop of the defendant comported with the dictates of the fourth amendment to the United States constitution. The defendant claims, therefore, that his conviction of the crime of capital felony should be dismissed. The defendant further maintains that, even if the evidence established that Williams’ conduct was constitutionally permissible, the panel, in applying the wrong legal standard, failed to make such a finding and, consequently, the defendant is entitled to a new guilt phase hearing. We conclude that the state was required to prove only that Williams was acting in the good faith discharge of his official duties as a police officer when he stopped the defendant and attempted to subdue him. 21 Because *30 the evidence adduced at the guilt phase hearing satisfied this statutory requirement, we need not, and, therefore, do not, address the defendant’s remaining two claims, both of which are predicated on an erroneous interpretation of § 53a-54b (1).

At the conclusion of its deliberations, the panel issued a memorandum of decision in which it found that Williams was acting within the scope of his duties as a member of the Waterbury police department when he was shot and killed by the defendant while investigating the activities of the defendant and Anthony Crawford. The panel also expressly stated, however, that it “makes no finding as to the legality of the stop [and] investigation, since it finds no authority for the defendant’s claim that the state must prove as an element of the crime of capital felony, that the officer was acting in the lawful performance of his duties at the time and place of the incident.” (Emphasis in original.) The defendant does not contest that Williams was on duty and acting in his capacity as a police officer when he stopped the defendant for investigative purposes. The defendant claims, rather, that § 53a-54b (1) applies only to law enforcement officers who, in the discharge of their official duties, act in accordance with constitutional requirements. We disagree.

*31 The defendant’s claim raises an issue of statutory construction and, therefore, our review is plenary. E.g., State v. Russo, 259 Conn. 436, 447 , 790 A.2d 1132 (2002). It is axiomatic that, in construing statutes, our fundamental task is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. Id. “As with all issues of statutory interpretation, we look first to the language of the statute.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gipson v. Commissioner of Correction, 257 Conn. 632, 639 , 778 A.2d 121 (2001). On its face, the statutory language at issue, “acting within the scope of his duties”; General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-54b (1); broadly encompasses any activity that falls within the officer’s official duties, which, of course, include the investigation of suspected criminal conduct. The language contains no limitation on the nature of that activity as long as it involves the discharge of the officer’s responsibilities as a sworn law enforcement officer. Thus, the wording of the statute strongly supports the conclusion that § 53a-54b (1) was intended to apply to circumstances such as those in the present case, in which the officer, acting in good faith, engages in an activity that falls within the officer’s official responsibilities, regardless of whether the officer’s conduct later may be found to have exceeded constitutional boundaries.

In interpreting statutes, we also look to the pertinent legislative history and circumstances surrounding the statute’s enactment, to the legislative policy the statute was designed to promote and to its relationship to existing legislation governing the same or related subject matter. E.g., State v. Vickers, 260 Conn. 219, 223-24 , 796 A.2d 502 (2002). These considerations also lead us to reject the defendant’s construction of § 53a-54b (1) as unduly narrow.

It is clear- from the legislative history of § 53a-54b (1) that a primary purpose of that provision is to deter violence against police officers and certain other law *32 enforcement officers while they are performing their official duties. For example, during the Senate debate on the legislation implementing the current capital felony statutory scheme; see Public Acts 1973, No. 73-137 (P.A. 73-137); Senator George C. Guidera, the Senate chairman of the judiciary committee and a sponsor of the legislation, stated that the drafters of the bill had “selected those crimes in which there is a deterrent value to impose the death penalty.” 16 S. Proc., Pt. 4, 1973 Sess., p. 1871. In explaining that a principal purpose of the proposed legislation was to protect law enforcement officers, Guidera thereafter stated: “[W]e’re trying to protect, in this [b]ill, those individuals who are out on the street day in and day out who are trying to protect our lives and property including the police [men], the deputy sheriffs, the constables . . . and the Judiciary Committee simply felt that they should receive the protection that they are really due.” Id., pp. 1873-74.

Similarly, Representative James F. Bingham, also a member of the judiciary committee, explained during the debate on the proposed capital felony legislation in the House of Representatives that, “[i]t is the view of the judiciary committee that . . . the death penalty has deterrent value and that it may provide a measure of protection against incorrigible and dangerous individuals. The potential criminal will know that if his intended victims die, he may also die. The murderer of a member of the State Police ... or a local police department . . . will know that [he] may have to pay with [his] own [life] for any lives that [he] take[s].” 16 H.R. Proc., Pt. 6, 1973 Sess., p. 2975. Bingham further explained: “[T]he reason for this particular law is that society must be protected. We have come to this stage in our history in the [s]tate of Connecticut that society itself is crying out for protection and that those people who commit heinous crimes, such as the murder of a *33 policeman during the [performance] of his duties . . . must know that if they commit those crimes, the state will exact . . . the highest penalty.” Id., pp. 2976-77.

Our interpretation of the relevant statutory language of § 53a-54b (1) is consistent with the statute’s underlying purpose; when a police officer carries out his official duties—irrespective of whether his conduct eventually may be deemed to be unlawful—he is particularly vulnerable to the kind of murderous assault that the legislature sought to deter in enacting § 53a-54b (1). By contrast, the statutory construction urged by the defendant would thwart this legislative purpose because there is no logical reason why the legislature would have intended to deprive a police officer of this protection when that officer, acting in the good faith discharge of his duties, mistakenly engages in conduct that ultimately is determined to transgress constitutional boundaries. “It is not our practice to construe a statute in a way to thwart its purpose or lead to absurd results ... or in a way that fails to attain a rational and sensible result that bears directly on the purpose the legislature sought to achieve.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 245 Conn. 710, 725 , 714 A.2d 1209 (1998).

Furthermore, our construction of the phrase “acting within the scope of his duties” contained in § 53a-54b (1) is guided by our interpretation of General Statutes § 53a-167c, 22 which categorizes an assault of a law enforcement officer “acting in the performance of his or her duties” as a class C felony. In explaining that phrase, we recently stated: “[A] police officer has the *34 duty to enforce the laws and to preserve the peace. Whether he is acting in the performance of his duty . . . must be determined in the light of that purpose and duty. If he is acting under a good faith belief that he is carrying out that duty, and if his actions are reasonably designed to that end, he is acting in the performance of his duties. . . . Although from time to time a police officer may have a duty to make an arrest, his duties are not coextensive with his power to arrest. [His] official duties may cover many functions which have nothing whatever to do with making arrests. . . . The phrase in the performance of his official duties means that the police officer is simply acting within the scope of what [he] is employed to do. The test is whether the ¡police officer] is acting within that compass oris engaging in a personal frolic of his own.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Casanova, 255 Conn. 581, 592-93, 767 A.2d 1189 (2001), quoting State v. Privitera, 1 Conn. App. 709, 722 , 476 A.2d 605 (1984). Thus, § 53a-167c simply requires evidence establishing that the police officer had been performing his or her official duties in good faith when the officer was assaulted. Under § 53a-167c, the state need not prove that the officer had been performing his duties lawfully when the officer was assaulted. For purposes of the present case, we see no material difference between the phrase “acting within the scope of his duties” contained in § 53a-54b (1) and the phrase “acting in the performance of his or her duties” contained in § 53a-167c. Consequently, we see no reason to impute a requirement into the former phrase that is not contained in the latter. 23 Accordingly, we reject the *35 defendant’s claim that the panel improperly dispensed with an essential element of § 53a-54b (1).

C

Motion to Suppress Statements

The defendant claims that the trial court, Kulawiz, J., 24 improperly denied his motion to suppress incriminating statements that he had made at police headquarters in response to questioning by investigating officers. In particular, the defendant contends that the statements should have been suppressed because they were the product of his illegal arrest, which, the defendant maintains, itself, was the product of an illegal search of the apartment in which he resided. The defendant further contends that he did not make the challenged statements voluntarily, and that they were obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). We reject the defendant’s claim that the court improperly denied his motion to suppress.

*36 The essential facts relevant to the defendant’s claim are set forth in the memorandum of decision of the court denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. “At approximately 4 a.m. on December 18, 1992, Officer . . . Williams of the Waterbury police department was shot in the head at the intersection of Orange Street and Ward Street and later that morning died from said injuries. Upon learning that [Joselyn Campos] was a possible witness, officers spoke with . . . Campos, who told officers at the scene and thereafter at headquarters, that she had observed two black males walking on Orange Street at approximately 4 a.m. and that she then heard gunshots and saw the same two men running down Ward Street. She stated to police that she saw them run into one of three houses that she pointed out to [Detective Sergeant Neil] O’Leary. . . . O’Leary testified that he ordered police to seal off the area and search houses pointed out by Campos. [Investigating] [o]fficers checked buildings and reported [that] nobody [was] considered a suspect. A call was received by police at around 6:30 a.m. that someone at 227 Walnut Street in the third floor apartment might have some information concerning the shooting. . . . O’Leary, [Detective Peter] Keegan and others went to that address [where they] found . . . Lucinda Crawford, George Washington and Robert ‘Po’ Bryant. . . . Lucinda Crawford told . . . O’Leary that . . . Bryant had information about the shooting. . . . O’Leary talked with . . . Bryant who told him that he had been at Karen Smith’s apartment on the second floor at Ward Street when [a man] he knew as Anthony Crawford and a guy he knew as ‘Kilt’ ran up the stairs to the apartment and said [that they had just shot a cop].

“At about 7:30 a.m. on December 18, 1992 . . . O’Leary . . . [Sergeant James] Griffin . . . Keegan [and two other police officers accompanied by Bryant] went to 47 Ward Street, one of the three buildings that *37 had been pointed out by Campos earlier. Officers had their guns drawn as they knocked on the door. 25 . . . Smith answered the door and O’Leary told her why the police were there and she allowed them to enter. 26 Directly in front of the door was a bed occupied by a black male. O’Leary told the male to get out of the bed. In response to the officer, he said his name was David Robinson .... [In fact, his real name was Richard Reynolds, the defendant.] Another black male was on the couch in the living room. This man gave his name as Jamal James. [In fact, his real name was Anthony Crawford.] [The] [p]olice [then] told Robinson to go into the living room. [The] [officers no longer had guns drawn at this point. [The] [p]olice asked for identification and the men said they had none. The man identifying himself as Jamal James gave a date of birth of November 7, 1974, and stated that he was twenty years old.

“While O’Leary was asking [for the] identity of [the] men, Keegan summoned [O’Leary] into the next room where Smith had [informed the officers] that the men were Anthony Crawford and David Robinson, known as ‘Kilt.’ Both men denied knowledge of the shooting. [Investigating officers] asked them where they had been earlier and they stated that they both had been at the apartment all night. O’Leary informed them that a police officer had been shot and seriously injured. O’Leary asked them if they were willing to go to police headquarters. Both agreed to go. [The investigating] [officers *38 asked them to put on shoes. The two men were not handcuffed and at no time [did they ask] to leave. [The] [officers proceeded to take [both men] to separate cars to transport them to headquarters.

“Immediately after they had left the apartment and before they were transported to headquarters . . . Smith told . . . Keegan that at about [3:50 a.m.] she was in bed sleeping when ‘Kilt’ . . . jumped in her bed, his heart pounding and said [that he] ‘shot a cop.’ . . . Keegan stayed with . . . Smith at Ward Street until [Smith] had [made child care arrangements].

“At about 8 a.m., [the] defendant and [Anthony] Crawford arrived at headquarters and were taken in through the police entrance rather than the public entrance. [The] [defendant and Crawford were placed in separate interview rooms. At about 8:20 [a.m.] . . . Smith arrived at headquarters. The [m]ayor and various officials were at headquarters. Officers [James] Egan and [James Clary] interviewed Crawford. . . . Keegan and . . . Griffin interviewed . . . Smith . . . and [another officer] interviewed Bryant.

“From about 8 a.m. until 10 a.m., [the] defendant was in a room by himself in police headquarters. O’Leary asked him if he wanted a soda or coffee or to use the bathroom during that time.

“Between 8 and 10 a.m., statements were being taken from Crawford and Bryant. At about 10:15 [a.m.] O’Leary decided to interview [the] defendant after others had said that [the] defendant had shot [Williams]. Inspector John Maia in the presence of . . . O’Leary read [the] defendant his [Miranda] 27 rights using as a guide a form entitled ‘Voluntary Statement’ normally used for written statements. Maia informed [the] defendant of his right to remain silent, that anything he said *39 could be used against him, that he had the right to an attorney and that if he could not afford one, an attorney would be appointed for him, that an attorney could be with him while he was being questioned, [and] that he had the right to stop answering and refuse to answer any questions. [The] [defendant was not asked to initial this form. O’Leary asked [the] defendant if he had been arrested before to which he responded [that he had]. He also asked [the defendant] if he understood the rights read and [the defendant] responded [that he did]. [O’Leary] asked [the] defendant if he would talk and [the] defendant said [that he would but denied any involvement in the crime].

“O’Leary then observed high ranking officers at his door and asked Maia to move [the] defendant out of his office to another room so that O’Leary could talk with the officers. Maia complied. [The] [defendant said [that] he didn’t shoot the cop, Derrick did. Mala asked who Derrick was and [the] defendant said that Crawford would know. Maia went out and asked Crawford who said that there was no Derrick, ‘just me . . . and Kilt did it.’

“[Keegan] told O’Leary at this point that . . . Smith had given a written statement that [the] defendant had shot . . . Williams. O’Leary told Keegan to go in and tell [the] defendant. Keegan went into the room with [the] defendant and Maia and asked Maia if [the] defendant had been advised of his rights. Maia replied affirmatively. Keegan then told [the] defendant that . . . Smith had told him that [the] defendant had told her that he had shot a cop. Maia said to [the] defendant, ‘get it off your chest,’ and Keegan told him to take responsibility. [The] defendant put his head down and said, T did it, I shot the cop.’ [The] defendant [then] was asked if he would give a [written] statement and he said [that he would], Keegan went out of the room and told O’Leary that [the] defendant ‘went for it.’ Kee *40 gan went back into the room and asked about the weapon and [the] defendant said that it was in transit and nowhere to be found.

“[The] [defendant then said that he wanted an attorney. He was asked if he wanted a public defender or a private attorney to be called. No farther questions were asked. State’s Attorney [John A.] Connelly who was also at the police station was informed and [he] called Public Defender Alan McWhirter who arrived shortly thereafter. After speaking with [the] defendant . . . McWhirter stated that his client would make no statement. All questioning stopped when [the] defendant stated that he wanted an attorney. No audio or video recording had been taken of the interview . . . .”

In rejecting the defendant’s claims, the court found that, with respect to the police entry into Smith’s apartment, she voluntarily had allowed the officers in. The court emphasized that, although those officers had their guns drawn as they knocked on Smith’s door, they returned their guns to their holsters after observing that the occupants of the apartment were not armed. 28

*41 The court also found that the defendant, who never was handcuffed, voluntarily consented to be driven to police headquarters and, furthermore, that he was not in custody until he entered the police vehicle for the ride to police headquarters. 29 With respect to the existence of probable cause to arrest the defendant at that time, the court expressly credited the testimony adduced by the state that investigating officers previously had been told by Campos that she saw two men running into Smith’s apartment building from the area where she had heard gunshots, and by Bryant that he was at Smith’s apartment when he observed the defendant and Crawford run up the stairs, enter the apartment and exclaim, “[w]e just shot a cop.” The court concluded that this information constituted probable cause to arrest the defendant and Crawford. The court further noted that, “as soon as the two men left the apartment on their way downstairs to the police cars . . . Smith informed . . . Keegan that [the] defendant . . . earlier that morning, had jumped into bed with her and, with his heart pounding, said, ‘I just shot a cop.’ ” The court concluded that because the police had obtained this information immediately before the defendant was in custody, this information served to buttress the probable cause that the police already had to arrest the defendant.

Finally, the court found that the defendant’s statements were not the product of police coercion or over *42 reaching, and that they were freely and voluntarily made. The court also found that the defendant was properly advised of his Miranda rights, that he fully understood those rights and that he knowingly and intelligently waived them.

Our review of the defendant’s claim 30 is governed by well established principles. “Under the exclusionary rule, evidence must be suppressed if it is found to be the fruit of prior police illegality. Wong Sun v. United States, [ 371 U.S. 471, 485 , 83 S. Ct. 407 , 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963)].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blackman, 246 Conn. 547, 553 , 716 A.2d 101 (1998). 31 Accordingly, we must determine whether the court properly concluded that the defendant’s statements were not the product of any police illegality. On appeal, we apply a familiar standard of review to a trial court’s findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress. “A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record .... [W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision .... Whether the trial court properly found that the facts submitted were *43 enough to support a finding of probable cause is a question of law. . . . The trial court’s determination on the issue, therefore, is subject to plenary review on appeal.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Clark, 255 Conn. 268, 279 , 764 A.2d 1251 (2001). “Because a trial court’s determination of the validity of a . . . search [or seizure] implicates a defendant’s constitutional rights, however, we engage in a careful examination of the record to ensure that the court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vivo, 241 Conn. 665, 674-75 , 697 A.2d 1130 (1997). “However, [w]e [will] give great deference to the findings of the trial court because of its function to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Clark, supra, 280 .

With these standards in mind, we now turn to the defendant’s claim that his statements should have been suppressed: (1) as the product of an illegal search and illegal arrest; and (2) because they were involuntary and obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. We discuss, in turn, the search, the arrest and the police questioning that prompted the defendant’s statements.

1

The Search

Under both the fourth amendment to the federal constitution 32 and article first, § 7, of the state constitution, *44 33 a warrantless search of a home is presumptively unreasonable. E.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 , 100 S. Ct. 1371 , 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980); State v. Gant, 231 Conn. 43 , 63 and n.15, 646 A.2d 835 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1038 , 115 S. Ct. 1404 , 131 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1995). A search is not unreasonable, however, if a person with authority to do so has voluntarily consented to the search. E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 242—43, 93 S. Ct. 2041 , 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973); State v. Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 314 , 743 A.2d 1 (1999) (Cobb II), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 841 , 121 S. Ct. 106 , 148 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2000); State v. Reagan, 209 Conn. 1, 7 , 546 A.2d 839 (1988). “The state bears the burden of proving that the consent was free and voluntary and that the person who purported to consent had the authority to do so.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reagan, supra, 7 . “The state must affirmatively establish that the consent was voluntary; mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority is not enough to meet the state’s burden.” State v. Jones, 193 Conn. 70, 79 , 475 A.2d 1087 (1984). “The question [of] whether consent to a search has . . . been freely and voluntarily given, or was the product of coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Reagan, supra, 7-8 ; and, ultimately, requires a determination regarding the putative consenter’s state of mind. Poulos v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 Conn. 598, 609 , 711 A.2d 688 (1998).

There is no dispute that Smith, a resident and lessee of the apartment that the officers entered, had the authority to consent to the officers’ request to enter *45 the apartment. The sole issue, therefore, is whether Smith freely and voluntarily agreed to that request or whether her will was overborne by the officers. The defendant contends that the latter conclusion is the only one that reasonably may be drawn in light of what he characterizes as “a strong showing of armed police authority.” We disagree.

“Although the presence of drawn weapons is certainly a factor in determining voluntariness ... it is not dispositive.” State v. Boyd, 57 Conn. App. 176, 181 , 749 A.2d 637 , cert. denied, 253 Conn. 912 , 754 A.2d 162 (2000). Indeed, in the present case, the officers who requested permission to enter the apartment were not in uniform but, rather, in plainclothes. Furthermore, “the manner in which the police encountered the defendant minimized the potentially coercive effect of their brandished weapons. [In the present case], the armed officers did not rouse the defendant out of bed in the middle of the night; cf. Harless v. Turner, 456 F.2d 1337, 1338 (10th Cir. 1972); break down the door to the defendant’s apartment in the early hours of the morning; cf. United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1973); or use threatening language. See Ex parte Tucker, 667 So. 2d 1339, 1344 (Ala.), cert. denied sub nom. Alabama v. Tucker, 516 U.S. 944 , 116 S. Ct. 382 , 133 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1995).” State v. Boyd, supra, 181-82 . Rather, the officers arrived at Smith’s apartment at approximately 7:30 a.m., knocked on the door and, when greeted by Smith, explained to her why they were there. It was at that point that they requested permission to enter. The record indicates that the officers did not use loud or threatening language, nor did they point their handguns at anyone in the apartment. Moreover, Smith already was aware that the police were in search of a suspect in a police shooting because officers had spoken to her briefly several hours earlier in connection with then1 canvass of the area. Finally, it is significant *46 that Smith, herself, never has suggested, during her trial testimony or otherwise, that her decision to let the officers into her apartment was anything but the product of her own free will.

We conclude that the evidence amply supports the court’s finding that Smith voluntarily consented to the officers’ request for permission to enter her apartment. We next must address the issue of whether the defendant’s arrest properly was predicated upon probable cause.

2

The Arrest

“A lawful warrantless felony arrest requires that the arrest be supported by probable cause. . . . Probable cause to arrest exists if (1) there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed; and (2) there is probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed that crime. . . . Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that a felony has been committed. . . . The probable cause test [therefore] is an objective one. . . .

“While probable cause requires more than mere suspicion . . . the line between mere suspicion and probable cause necessarily must be drawn by an act of judgment formed in light of the particular situation and with account taken of all the circumstances. . . . The existence of probable cause does not turn on whether the defendant could have been convicted on the same available evidence.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Trine, 236 Conn. 216, 236-37 , 673 A.2d 1098 (1996). Indeed, proof of probable cause requires less than proof by a preponderance of *47 the evidence. State v. Clark, supra, 255 Conn. 293 . Finally, “[i]n dealing with probable cause ... as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Trine, supra, 237 .

“In determining the threshold question of whether there has been a seizure, we examine the effect of the police conduct at the time of the alleged seizure, applying an objective standard. Under [article first, § § 7 34 and 9 35 of] our state constitution, a person is seized only if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. State v. Oquendo, [ 223 Conn. 635, 647 , 613 A.2d 1300 (1992)]; see United States v. Mendenhall, [ 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 , 100 S. Ct. 1870 , 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980)]. Therefore, a seizure may take place under [our] state constitution even in a case [in which] there is no submission by the defendant to a show of authority or use of physical force by the police. State v. Oquendo, supra, 650-52 .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Greenfield, 228 Conn. 62, 68 , 634 A.2d 879 (1993). “Under the federal constitution, in contrast, a seizure occurs only if there is a show of physical force . . . or . . . submission to the assertion of authority. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 , 111 S. Ct. 1547 , 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. James, 237 Conn. 390, 404-405 , 678 A.2d 1338 (1996). 36

*48 The defendant contends, first, that he was seized when O’Leary ordered police to seal off the neighborhood, which included Smith’s apartment building. 37 He further claims that, because the police lacked probable cause to arrest him at that time, the seizure was unlawful. Alternatively, the defendant argues that he was seized when the police entered Smith’s apartment and told him to get out of bed; according to the defendant, the police lacked probable cause to arrest him at that point as well. Finally, the defendant claims that even if, as the court found, he was not seized until he left Smith’s apartment with the police, the police still lacked probable cause to arrest him at that time. The defendant’s claims require a two part analysis. First, we must determine when the defendant was seized. Second, we must determine whether the police had probable cause when the seizure occurred. E.g., id., 404 .

The defendant’s claims lack merit. With respect to his contention that he was seized when the police sealed off the general area in which Smith’s apartment is located, there is nothing in the record to establish either that the defendant believed that he was not free to leave or that he submitted to a show of police force or authority. Indeed, the defendant was in bed at the time, and although he may have suspected that a police investigation of the shooting had commenced, there is no indication that he was aware of O’Leary’s order to seal off the area. 38 In the absence of any such evidence, the *49 defendant cannot prevail on his claim that he was seized upon execution of that order.

Nor can the defendant prevail on his claim that he was seized when the police told him to get out of bed and go into the living room. At that point, the police no longer had their guns drawn, and there is no evidence that they threatened or otherwise intimidated the defendant. He was not handcuffed or otherwise physically restrained in any way, and he gave no indication either that he wished to leave or that he wished to stop answering the questions asked of him by the investigating officers. Moreover, the police did not demand that the defendant go to headquarters with them; rather, they asked him if he would be willing to do so.

Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that, as the defendant claims, he was seized when the police entered Smith’s apartment and told him to get out of bed, the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant at that time. Prior to arriving at Smith’s apartment, O’Leary had been informed by Bryant that he was present at that apartment when the defendant and Crawford ran in and stated that they just shot a police officer. 39 This information was corroborated by Campos’ report that the two men that she had observed on Orange Street just prior to the shooting ran down Ward Street moments after the shooting and disappeared into any one of three apartment buildings, one of *50 which was the building in which Smith resided. Because that information was sufficiently detailed and credible to give rise to a reasonable belief that the defendant and Crawford were involved in the shooting, the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant at that time. Consequently, the defendant’s contention that his statements were the product of an illegal arrest is without merit.

3

Miranda Violation

The defendant next claims that the court improperly concluded that the defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. We also reject this claim.

“To be valid, a waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Miranda v. Arizona, [supra, 384 U.S. 475 , 478]; State v. Gonzalez, 206 Conn. 213, 217 , 537 A.2d 460 (1988); State v. Boscarino, 204 Conn. 714, 743 , 529 A.2d 1260 (1987). The state has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. 40 State v. Hernandez, 204 Conn. 377, 395 , 528 A.2d 794 (1987); State v. Chung, 202 Conn. 39, 48 , 519 A.2d 1175 (1987); State v. Smith, 200 Conn. 465, 481 , 512 A.2d 189 (1986). Whether a purported waiver satisfies those requirements is a question of fact that depends on the circumstances of the particular case. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75 , 99 S. Ct. 1755 , 60 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1979); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 , 82 L. Ed. 2d *51 1461 (1938); State v. Boscarino, supra [743]; State v. Chung, supra [48].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stanley, 223 Conn. 674, 686 , 613 A.2d 788 (1992).

“Whether the defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his rights under Miranda depends in part on the competency of the defendant, or, in other words, on his ability to understand and act upon his constitutional rights. . . . Factors which may be considered by the trial court in determining whether an individual had the capacity to understand the warnings include the defendant’s experience with the police and familiarity with the warnings ... his level of intelligence, including his IQ . . . his age . . . his level of education . . . his vocabulary and ability to read and write in the language in which the warnings were given . . . intoxication . . . his emotional state . . . and the existence of any mental disease, disorder or retardation.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Toste, 198 Conn. 573, 580-81 , 504 A.2d 1036 (1986). “Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 580 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1983).

The crux of the defendant’s claim is that the state failed to adduce substantial evidence establishing a valid waiver of his Miranda rights. This claim is belied by the record. Maia testified without contradiction that he orally advised the defendant of his Miranda rights by reading from a preprinted waiver form. After informing the defendant of his rights, Maia asked the defendant: “Now, do you feel like talking to us freely and voluntarily?” The defendant answered “yes.” Fur *52 thermore, the defendant indicated that he previously had been arrested and that he understood his rights. O’Leary then asked the defendant once again: “Do you waive your rights?” The defendant replied: “Yes, but I had nothing to do with it.” Shortly thereafter, the defendant was confronted with Smith’s statement that the defendant told her that he had shot a police officer. Keegan then suggested to the defendant that he “get it off [his] chest . . . .” The defendant bowed his head and stated, “I did it. I shot the cop.” After stating that the police would never find the gun used in the shooting, the defendant initially agreed to provide a written statement. Before a written statement could be taken, however, the defendant stated that he first wanted to speak to an attorney. Shortly thereafter, a public defender, Alan McWhirter, was permitted to consult with the defendant. After consulting with the defendant, McWhirter told the police that the defendant did not wish to speak to them.

The evidence clearly establishes, and the court found, that the defendant properly was advised of his Miranda rights, that he understood those rights and that he knowingly and intelligently waived them. “An express written or oral waiver is strong proof of the validity of the waiver.” State v. Negron, 221 Conn. 315 , 319 n.5, 603 A.2d 1138 (1992), citing North Carolina v. Butler, supra, 441 U.S. 373 . Moreover, the record established that the defendant previously had been arrested and that, consequently, he already was familiar with the nature of the rights that he is afforded under Miranda. See, e.g., State v. Stanley, supra, 223 Conn. 687 ; State v. Usry, 205 Conn. 298, 305 , 533 A.2d 212 (1987). Furthermore, after the defendant waived his rights and spoke with the police, he invoked his right to stop answering questions and to consult with counsel. “[W]e have held that the [invocation] of the right to remain silent after an initial willingness to speak with police *53 is a strong indication that the defendant understood his rights.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 78 , 621 A.2d 728 (1993); accord State v. Barrett, 205 Conn. 437, 451 , 534 A.2d 219 (1987). Finally, the defendant, who was twenty-four years old at the time of the offense and who is reasonably intelligent, 41 expressed no uncertainty regarding his rights; on the contrary, it is apparent that he fully understood them. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or any narcotic substance when he was advised of his rights, nor does the evidence indicate that he was suffering from any mental illness or defect that could have adversely affected his ability to comprehend fully his rights. Consequently, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Accordingly, the defendant’s claim of a Miranda violation is without merit.

4

The Defendant’s Claim of Involuntariness

The defendant further contends that his postarrest statements were involuntary and, therefore, in contravention of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. 42 This claim also is without merit. 43

*54 “Irrespective of Miranda, and the fifth amendment itself . . . any use in a criminal trial of an involuntary confession is a denial of due process of law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hafford, supra, 252 Conn. 298 . “In order to be voluntary a confession must be the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by the maker. ... If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of the confession offends due process. . . . The determination of whether a confession is voluntary must be based on a consideration of the totality of circumstances surrounding it . . . including both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Correa, 241 Conn. 322, 328 , 696 A.2d 944 (1997).

“Under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, [however] in order for a confession to be deemed involuntary and thus inadmissible at trial, [t]here must be police conduct, or official coercion, causally related to the confession . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lapointe, 237 Conn. 694, 728-29 , 678 A.2d 942 , cert. denied, 519 U.S. 994 , 117 S. Ct. 484 , 136 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1996); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 , 107 S. Ct. 515 , 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986). Because of this “essential link between coercive activity of the [s]tate, on the one hand, and a resulting confession by a defendant, on the other”; Colorado v. Connelly, supra, 165 ; “mere examination of the [defendant’s] state of mind [although relevant to an assessment of the defendant’s susceptibility to police coercion] can never conclude the due process inquiry.” Id.

*55 “We have stated that the test of voluntariness is whether an examination of all the circumstances discloses that the conduct of law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the defendant’s] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined .... Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, [supra, 412 U.S. 225 ].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hafford, supra, 252 Conn. 298 -99.

“The trial court’s findings as to the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s interrogation and confession are findings of fact . . . which will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. ... On the ultimate issue of voluntariness, however, we will conduct an independent and scrupulous examination of the entire record to ascertain whether the trial court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Correa, supra, 241 Conn. 328 -29.

In support of his claim, the defendant refers to the allegedly coercive nature of the police conduct that preceded his statements, specifically, the officers’ entry into Smith’s apartment, the ride to police headquarters and the two hours of questioning to which the defendant was subjected “in the context of the pandemonium created by all of the high city and police officials who had crowded into the detective bureau just to watch until this important case was solved.”

Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the court properly concluded that the police conduct was neither intimidating nor coercive, and certainly was not of such a nature as to overcome the defendant’s will. With respect *56 to the search of Smith’s apartment, the police did not threaten the defendant, and, although they initially had their guns drawn, they never pointed their guns at the defendant. Moreover, they holstered the guns as soon as they were assured that no occupant of the apartment was armed. In addition, the police merely asked the defendant if he would be willing to go to police headquarters to answer some additional questions. Although the defendant remained at police headquarters for approximately two hours before he confessed to the shooting, there simply is nothing in the record to suggest that he was subjected to any coercive police tactics.

In the absence of any evidence of improper coercion on the part of police officers, the mere fact that the defendant remained at police headquarters for two hours provides no support for the defendant’s claim. Indeed, he never asked to leave and did not seek to have the police stop questioning him until after he had confessed to shooting Williams; when he eventually requested an attorney, one was provided immediately. 44 The record also is devoid of any suggestion that the presence of certain city officials at headquarters had any effect on the defendant; in fact, the evidence does not establish that he even was aware of the presence of those officials. 45 Finally, at the time of the events in question, the defendant, a reasonably bright adult, was not suffering from any physical or mental impairment that might have affected his ability to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to remain silent. We therefore reject the defendant’s claim that his statements were obtained in violation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause.

*57 D

The Court’s Limitation on the Defendant’s Right of Cross-Examination

The defendant next contends that his rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment 46 were violated because the court, during the guilt phase hearing, improperly precluded him from asking Detective Keegan whether he knew “how the decision was made as to what charges to bring against Anthony Crawford . . . ,” 47 We reject the defendant’s claim.

The following additional facts are relevant to our disposition of the defendant’s claim. During the guilt phase of the defendant’s case, Crawford testified for the state that he and the defendant each possessed a substantial quantity of cocaine when they were stopped by Officer Williams and that he witnessed the defendant shoot Williams in the head when Williams attempted to subdue the defendant. Crawford further testified that he had been charged with the crime of hindering prosecution in connection with the police investigation of the shooting, and that he had been acquitted of that charge.

Defense counsel cross-examined Crawford extensively about his recollection of the events, focusing, in particular, on discrepancies between his statements to the police and his testimony on direct examination. Defense counsel also elicited testimony from Crawford that: (1) he is a convicted felon; (2) he was incarcerated at the time of the defendant’s trial; (3) he was on parole *58 at the time of the shooting; and (4) he had a pending escape charge for which he had not yet negotiated a plea bargain. Although Crawford had not been charged in connection with his possession of cocaine on December 18,1992, defense counsel did not question Crawford about whether the state had promised him leniency in return for his testimony against the defendant. In addition, defense counsel did not question Crawford about whether he had received any other benefit from the state in connection with his cooperation in the state’s case against the defendant.

Thereafter, Keegan testified for the state. On cross-examination, the defendant asked Keegan whether he was “responsible for deciding what criminal charges would be lodged against . . . Crawford.” The state objected on relevancy grounds, to which defense counsel responded: “[I]t’s clearly relevant to any question of bias or motive for testifying or for giving a statement that . . . Crawford may have had . . . with respect to the relative [ly] minor criminal charges that were immediately brought against him.” The court then sustained the state’s objection.

“Our analysis of the defendant’s claim is guided by the familiar constitutional guidelines relevant to cross-examination by the defendant in a criminal trial. It is axiomatic that the defendant is entitled fairly and fully to confront and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. . . . The primary interest seemed by confrontation is the right to cross-examination . . . and an important function of cross-examination is the exposure of a witness’ motivation [for] testifying. . . . Cross-examination to elicit facts tending to show motive, interest, bias and prejudice is a matter of right and may not be unduly restricted. ... In order to comport with the constitutional standards embodied in the confrontation clause, the trial court must allow a defen *59 dant to expose to the jury facts from which [the] jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. . . .

“The confrontation clause does not, however, suspend the rules of evidence to give the defendant the right to engage in unrestricted cross-examination. . . . Only relevant evidence may be elicited through cross-examination. . . . The court determines whether the evidence sought on cross-examination is relevant by determining whether that evidence renders the existence of [other facts] either certain or more probable. . . .

“The trial court has wide discretion to determine the relevancy of evidence and the scope of cross-examination. Every reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion. . . .

“The proffering party bears the burden of establishing the relevance of the offered testimony. Unless a proper foundation is established, the evidence is irrelevant.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Beliveau, 237 Conn. 576, 584-86 , 678 A.2d 924 (1996).

The specific question that defense counsel asked of Keegan regarding what charges were to be filed against Crawford was, at most, only marginally relevant to the issue of Crawford’s bias or motive. As the members of the three judge panel certainly knew, the ultimate responsibility of charging a person with the commission of a crime is vested with the office of the state’s attor *60 ney, not the police. 48 See General Statutes § 51-286a; 49 see also Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 234 Conn. 539, 575 , 663 A.2d 317 (1995) (“Prosecutors have enormous discretion in deciding which citizens should be prosecuted and for what charges they are to be held accountable. . . . The prosecutor is also the one to decide whether to offer a certain plea or disposition.” [Citations omitted.]). We need not decide, however, whether the question bore sufficient relevance to Crawford’s motive or bias such that the court should have allowed it because, even if we assume, arguendo, that the ruling was improper, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the court prohibited the defendant from asking that one question, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the court would have precluded the defendant from making further, more direct inquiries of Keegan as to Crawford’s possible bias or motive. Specifically, although defense counsel was not prohibited from questioning Keegan about whether he or anyone else had made any promises to Crawford in return for Crawford’s cooperation, or from asking Keegan whether, to Keegan’s knowledge, the state had afforded Crawford leniency as a consequence of Crawford’s cooperation, defense counsel opted not to do so. Thus, although *61 defense counsel had failed to elicit any information from Keegan regarding Crawford’s possible bias or motive, that failure cannot be attributed to the challenged evidentiary ruling but, rather, to defense counsel’s decision not to ask Keegan any additional questions about that issue. Consequently, the defendant’s claim of a constitutional violation is without merit.

Ill

PENALTY PHASE ISSUES

A

Issues Concerning the Aggravating Factor Enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (1)

The defendant claims that the finding of the jury regarding the existence of the aggravating factor enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (1) cannot stand. Specifically, the defendant contends that: (1) the aggravating factor is facially unconstitutional; (2) the state failed to satisfy the “same felony” element of § 53a-46a (h) (1); (3) the trial court improperly deprived him of his right to a jury determination as to the existence of the aggravating factor; and (4) the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was attempting to commit the crime of sale of a narcotic substance during the commission of the capital felony. We reject each of these claims, which we address in turn.

1

Facial Constitutionality of § 53a-46a (h) (1)

The defendant claims that § 53a-46a (h) (1), which requires proof that the defendant committed the capital felony during the commission or attempted commission of a felony and that the defendant previously had been convicted of the same felony, is unconstitutional on its face. Specifically, the defendant contends that because *62 § 53a-46a (h) (1) requires only a temporal relationship between the capital felony and the felony committed dining the commission of the capital felony, § 53a-46a (h) (1) violates the constitutional requirement that a capital sentencing scheme “meaningfully distinguish in a principled way [between] those . . . defendants who should receive the death penalty [and] those who should not.” We disagree.

“The United States Supreme Court has held that if a [s]tate wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty. Part of a [s]tate’s responsibility in this regard is to define the crimes for which death may be the sentence in a way that obviates standardless [sentencing] discretion. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 , 100 S. Ct. 1759 , 64 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1980). Thus, where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 , 96 S. Ct. 2909 , 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, Js.).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Breton, 212 Conn. 258, 263-64 , 562 A.2d 1060 (1989) (BretonI). Consequently, “[t]o avoid [a] constitutional flaw, an aggravating [factor] must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 , 103 S. Ct. 2733 , 77 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983).

In State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183 , 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1165 , 115 S. Ct. 1133 , 130 L. Ed. 2d 1095 (1995), we considered and rejected a constitutional challenge to the facial validity of our capital sen *63 tencing statutes. As we explained in Ross , “[i]n General Statutes §§ 53a-46a through 53a-46c, the legislature has established a three-tiered pyramid, in which each tier narrows the class of defendants that may be found eligible for the death penalty. At the first tier above the base of the pyramid, our statute separates capital felony homicides from other homicides, and authorizes bifurcated death penalty hearings only for those who have been found guilty of or have pleaded guilty to a capital felony. ... At the second tier, the statute further limits the death penalty by requiring the sentence!' to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of at least one statutorily delineated aggravating factor. ... At the third and final tier, our statute separates, from all cases in which a penalty of death may be imposed, those cases in which it shall be imposed ... by requiring a sentencer to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether a mitigating factor exists. . . .

“In their overall configuration, our death penalty statutes facially satisfy the constitutional requirements of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. The multitiered pyramid meets the prerequisite of consistency and reliability by guiding the capital sentencer’s discretion with clear and objective standards that narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty and by providing a meaningful basis for distinguishing between those cases in which the death penalty is imposed and those in which it is not.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 236-38. Section 53a-46a (h) (1), as part of the second tier of our capital sentencing scheme, further narrows the group of persons who already have been convicted of a felony that, according to the legislature, warrants designation as a capital felony.

The defendant does not claim that § 53a-46a (h) (1) fails to reduce the number of defendants charged with a capital felony who are eligible to receive the death *64 penalty; certainly it does. Nor does he claim that it is too vague or indefinite, for certainly it is not. Rather, the defendant maintains that § 53a-46a (h) (1) does not narrow the category of death penalty eligible defendants in a meaningful or principled way because it requires only a temporal connection between the capital felony and the felony committed during the commission of the capital felony. In other words, the defendant contends that “it could be purely a matter of coincidence that the capital felony and the current felony [occur] at the same time, in which case the commission [of] the capital felony would have absolutely nothing to do with the commission of the current felony.” 50 (Emphasis in original.) The defendant asserts that the *65 imposition of the death penalty under such circumstances would be so lacking in justification as to violate the eighth amendment 51 to the United States constitution. 52

It is well settled that, “[i]n the absence of weighty countervailing circumstances, it is improvident for the court to invalidate a statute on its face. . . . A judicial holding that a legislative [a]ct is unconstitutional is one of very grave concern. We ought not, and will not, declare a statute to be unconstitutional unless our judgment is formed in the light of this rule of our law: It is our duty to approach the question with caution, examine it with infinite care, make every presumption and intendment in its favor, and sustain the [a]ct unless its invalidity is, in our judgment, beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sweetman v. State Elections Enforcement Commission, 249 Conn. 296, 320 , 732 A.2d 144 (1999); accord Hall v. Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 241 Conn. 282, 306-307 , 695 A.2d 1051 (1997). Furthermore, “outside the context of the first amendment, in order to challenge successfully the facial validity of a statute, [the challenging] party [must] demonstrate as a threshold matter that the statute may not be applied constitu *66 tionaUy to the facts of his case.” Packer v. Board of Education, 246 Conn. 89, 106 , 717 A.2d 117 (1998).

The defendant cannot sustain his burden of demonstrating that § 53a-46a (h) (1) is facially unconstitutional because he cannot establish that it is unconstitutional as applied to him. In the present case, the state claimed, and the jury found during the penalty phase hearing, that the defendant shot and killed Officer Williams after being stopped by Williams and during the defendant’s attempted commission of a narcotics felony. In such circumstances, the link between the capital murder and the narcotics felony was more than merely temporal or coincidental.

Indeed, the defendant acknowledges that the evidence adduced by the state indicates more than just a temporal connection between the capital felony and the drug felony committed by the defendant during the commission of the capital felony. The defendant asserts, however, that, because the court instructed the jury in accordance with the language of § 53a-46a (h) (1), the jury could have found the existence of that aggravating factor without also having found anything more than a temporal nexus between the capital felony and the narcotics offense. We disagree. On the basis of the specific facts that the state had presented and that the jury necessarily had found as reflected in its special verdict—i.e., that the defendant murdered an on-duty police officer while committing or attempting to commit a felony narcotics offense—a constitutionally sufficient nexus clearly existed between those two offenses.

Although, as the defendant asserts, it is possible to conjure up a situation in which there is only a coincidental relationship between the capital felony and the other felony committed during the course of the commission of the capital felony, the present case does not resemble *67 such a situation. 53 Accordingly, the defendant’s constitutional claim is without merit.

2

The State’s Burden of Satisfying the “Same Felony” Element of § 53a-46a (h) (1)

The defendant claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the state had alleged and proven facts sufficient to establish the aggravating factor of § 53a-46a (h) (1). In particular, the defendant contends that the term “same felony” in § 53a-46a (h) (1) includes only Connecticut felonies and not out-of-state felonies. We disagree.

The following additional facts and procedural history are necessary to our resolution of this claim. At trial, the defendant stipulated to the fact that he had been convicted in 1989 of the criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fourth degree in violation of § 220.34 of the New York Penal Law. 54 Criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fourth degree was categorized as a class C felony when the defendant committed the acts *68 that led to his conviction in 1989. 55 N.Y. Penal Law § 220.34 (McKinney 1980). In support of its claim regarding the existence of the aggravating factor enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (1), the state alleged that the defendant had murdered Williams during the attempted commission of a felony, namely, the sale of a narcotic substance in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277 (a), 56 and that he previously had been convicted of the same felony, namely, the sale of a controlled substance in New York. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the aggravating factor on the ground that, as a matter of law, the sale of a narcotic substance in violation of § 21a-277 (a) and the sale of a controlled substance in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 220.34 do not constitute the “same felony” within the meaning of § 53a-46a (h) (1). The defendant’s motion was denied. 57 On appeal, the defendant renews his claim that, for purposes of § 53a-46a (h) (1), the term “same felony” means the same Connecticut felony. Because the defendant previously has not been convicted of the sale of a narcotic substance in violation of § 21a-277 (a), he claims that he is entitled to dismissal *69 of the aggravating factor enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (!)•

“The [defendant’s] claim raises an issue of statutory construction over which our review is plenary. . . . Our resolution of [this claim] is governed by well established principles. [I]t is axiomatic that the process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. ... In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Russo, supra, 259 Conn. 447 .

“When the statute in question is one of a criminal nature, we are guided by additional tenets of statutory construction. First . . . we must refrain from imposing criminal liability whe[n] the legislature has not expressly so intended. . . . Second, [c]riminal statutes are not to be read more broadly than their language plainly requires and ambiguities are ordinarily to be resolved in favor of the defendant. . . . Finally, unless a contrary interpretation would frustrate an evident legislative intent, criminal statutes are governed by the fundamental principle that such statutes are strictly construed against the state.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782, 788-89 , 772 A.2d 559 (2001). Moreover, “in this case we are construing [a death penalty] statute. The resolution of this issue could result in the imposition of the death penalty on this defendant and on other defendants charged with similar offenses. It is axiomatic that any statutory construction implicating the death penalty must be based on a conclusion that the legislature has clearly and unambiguously made its *70 intention known. . . . [Thus] [t]he rules of strict construction and lenity applicable to penal statutes generally are especially pertinent to a death penalty [provision] such as [§ 53a-46a (h) (1)].” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Harrell, 238 Conn. 828, 832-33 , 681 A.2d 944 (1996).

“The rule of strict construction, however, does not require that the most narrow, technical and exact meaning be given to the language of a statute in frustration of an obvious legislative intent. . . . Common sense should be applied to the language of a penal statute, particularly if otherwise absurdity or frustration of the evident design of the legislature results.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Albert, 50 Conn. App. 715, 726 , 719 A.2d 1183 (1998), aff'd, 252 Conn. 795 , 750 A.2d 1037 (2000). “No rule of construction . . . requires that a penal statute be strained and distorted in order to exclude conduct clearly intended to be within its scope—nor does any rule require that the act be given the narrowest meaning. It is sufficient if the words are given their fair meaning in accord with the evident intent of [the legislature]. . . . The rule that terms in a statute are to be assigned their ordinary meaning, unless context dictates otherwise; General Statutes § 1-1 (a); State v. Mattioli, [ 210 Conn. 573, 579 , 556 A.2d 584 (1989)]; also guides our interpretive inquiry.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Scott, 256 Conn. 517, 531-32 , 779 A.2d 702 (2001).

As with all issues of statutory construction, our starting point is the relevant statutory language. General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-46a (h) provides in relevant part: “If no mitigating factor is present, the court shall impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the jury . . . finds by a special verdict . . . that (1) the defendant committed the [capital] offense during the commission or attempted commission of ... a felony *71 and he had previously been convicted of the same felony . . . .” The term “same felony” is not defined in § 53a-46a (h) or in any other provision of the General Statutes.

The term “felony,” however, is defined by statute. General Statutes § 53a-25 (a) 58 defines the term “felony” as “[a]n offense for which a person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year . . . .” General Statutes § 53a-24 (a), 59 in turn, provides in relevant part that “[t]he term ‘offense’ means any crime or violation which constitutes a breach of any law of this state or any other state, federal law or local law or ordinance of a political subdivision of this state, for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine, or both, may be imposed . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Thus, under the pertinent statutory definitions, the term “felony” clearly encompasses out-of-state felonies. We, of course, “are bound to accept the legislative *72 definition of terms in a statute . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Texas-Ohio Power, Inc., 243 Conn. 635, 653 , 708 A.2d 202 (1998); accord Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217, 225 , 602 A.2d 1019 (1992). Inasmuch as the defendant’s conviction under N.Y. Penal Law § 220.34 carried the possibility of a term of imprisonment of more than one year; see footnote 55 of this opinion; the defendant’s New York conviction constitutes a conviction of a “felony” as that term is defined in the General Statutes. See General Statutes § 53a-25 (a); see also General Statutes § 53a-24 (a). Consequently, we must determine whether the felony proscribed by N.Y. Penal Law § 220.34 is the “same felony” as the felony proscribed by § 21a-277 (a). If they constitute the same felony, then the defendant’s prior conviction under N.Y. Penal Law § 220.34 falls squarely within the purview of § 53a-46a (h) (1).

Notwithstanding the clear import of the literal statutory language, the defendant contends that the context and legislative history of the relevant statutory provisions compel the conclusion that the legislature did not intend for out-of-state felonies to be included under § 53a-46a (h) (1). Before addressing the merits of the defendant’s contention, we briefly review the pertinent legislative genealogy.

As the defendant notes, the legislature revised Connecticut’s death penalty statutory scheme in 1973. 60 See *73 generally P.A. 73-137. At that time, the definition of “felony” was virtually 61 the same as it is today, that is, “[a]ny offense for which a person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year . . . .” General Statutes (Rev. to 1972) § 53a-25 (a). In 1973, however, the term “offense” had a materially different meaning than it does today. In 1973, General Statutes (Rev. to 1972) § 53a-24 (a) defined the term “offense” as “any crime or violation which constitutes a breach of any law of this state or local law or ordinance of a political subdivision of this state, for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine, or both, may be imposed, except one that defines a motor vehicle violation.” (Emphasis added.) Consequently, in 1973, when the legislature revised our death penalty statutoiy scheme; see P.A. 73-137; the term “felony” was limited to crimes in violation of the laws of this state for which a term of imprisonment of more than one year could be imposed. It therefore is evident that, in 1973, the term “same felony,” as that term is used in § 53a-46a (h) (l) 62 did not include out-of-state felonies. Just two years later, in 1975, however, the legislature passed Substitute Senate Bill No. 1453, which was enacted as Public Acts 1975, No. 75-380 (P.A. 75-380). Section 15 of P.A. 75-380 amended General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 53a-24 (a) by enlarging the definition of the term “offense” to include out-of-state and federal crimes and violations. In so doing, the legislature also expanded the definition of the term “felony” under § 53a-25 (a) *74 to include out-of-state and federal crimes carrying a possible prison term in excess of one year.

Because the conduct that led to the defendant’s conviction of capital felony in the present case occurred in 1992, long after the legislature expanded the meaning of “felony” to include out-of-state felonies, a literal application of the relevant statutory language to the facts of this case compels the conclusion that the defendant’s conviction for the criminal sale of a controlled substance pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 220.34 is a “felony” within the meaning of § 53a-46a (h) (1). Despite its facial applicability, however, the defendant maintains that the legislature did not intend for that expanded definition of the term “felony” to apply to § 53a-46a (h) (1). The defendant advances three arguments in support of his claim. First, the defendant claims that, because the legislature made express reference to out-of-state felony convictions in subdivision (2) of § 53a-46a (h), 63 its failure to do so in subdivision (1) of § 53a-46a (h) indicates that the legislature intended to exclude out-of-state felonies from subdivision (1). Second, the defendant claims that the primary purpose of the legislation that enlarged the definition of the term “felony,” namely, P.A. 75-380, entitled “An Act Concerning the Offenses with Firearms,” was to create enhanced mandatory minimum penalties for certain designated offenses when those offenses are committed with a firearm, 64 and that there is nothing in the *75 text of P.A. 75-380 to suggest that it was intended to enlarge the scope of the death penalty in any way. Third, the defendant claims that legislative amendments to our death penalty statutory scheme invariably are accompanied by considerable legislative debate, and because the legislative history of P.A. 75-380 contains no such debate, 65 we cannot conclude that the legislature intended to change the definition of the term “felony” as that term is used in § 53a-46a (h) (1). None of these arguments provides persuasive support for the interpretation advanced by the defendant.

The defendant first claims that if the legislature had intended for the “same felony” requirement of § 53a-46a (h) (1) to apply to convictions for out-of-state felonies, the legislature would have used the language that it used in § 53a-46a (h) (2), which requires proof that the defendant, prior to committing the capital felony, had been convicted of a certain number and kind of “federal” or “state” offenses “for . . . which a penalty of more than one year imprisonment may be imposed . . . .” General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-46a (h) (2). We agree with the defendant that the legislature evidently did intend to exclude out-of-state felony convictions from the coverage of § 53a-46a (h) (1) when that provision first was enacted in 1973 as part of P.A. 73-173, § 4, and codified at General Statutes (Rev. *76 to 1975) § 53a-46a (g) (1), because, as we have explained, at that time, the statutory definition of the term “felony” included felonies committed in this state only. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 53a-24 (a). We must presume, therefore, that, in 1973, the legislature used the term “same felony” in subdivision (1), rather than the language that it used in subdivision (2), because it intended for the aggravating factor of subdivision (1), in contrast to the aggravating factor of subdivision (2), to apply only to prior Connecticut felony convictions.

That the legislature apparently intended to limit the scope of the term “same felony” when P.A. 73-173, § 4, was enacted in 1973, however, provides no support for the defendant’s argument. As we have explained, the legislature enlarged the definition of “felony” in 1975 to include out-of-state felonies; P.A. 75-380, § 15, codified at General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 53a-24 (a); see also General Statutes § 53a-25 (a) (defining term “felony” as “[a]n offense [as defined in § 53a-24 (a)] for which a person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year”); and there is nothing in the relevant statutoiy language or history to suggest that the expanded definition of “felony” is not applicable to § 53a-46a (h) (1). Indeed, it makes perfect sense that the legislature, having decided to include out-of-state and federal felonies in the group of felonies qualifying under § 53a-46a (h) (2), also would have chosen to include out-of-state and federal felonies in the group of felonies qualifying under § 53a-46a (h) (1). We therefore reject the defendant’s argument predicated on the language of § 53a-46a (h) (2).

The defendant next contends that because the legislature, in enacting P.A. 75-380, primarily was concerned with setting mandatory minimum penalties for certain offenses involving the use of firearms, it could not have intended for that act to bear upon the death penalty. *77 We disagree. We note, first, that there is absolutely nothing in P.A. 75-380 to indicate that the legislature intended to limit the definition of “offense,” and thus the definition of “felony,” to the offenses established by the act. Indeed, the defendant makes no such claim. Rather, the defendant apparently argues that § 53a-46a (h) (1) is the only provision of our Penal Code to which the expanded definition of “offense” does not apply. There simply is no reason to presume, however, that the legislature intended for that definition to apply in all but one instance. In fact, General Statutes § 53a-2 66 dictates the opposite conclusion. General Statutes § 53a-2 provides in relevant part that “[t]he provisions of [title 53a of the General Statutes] shall apply to any offense defined in [title 53a] of the general statutes, unless otherwise expressly provided or unless the context otherwise requires ....’' (Emphasis added.) Sections 53a-24, 53a-25 and 53a-46a all fall within title 53a of the General Statutes. 67 There is nothing either express or implied in any provision of our statutes to indicate that §§ 53a-24 and 53a-25 do not apply to § 53a-46a (h) (1), and there is no contextual support for the defendant’s contention. Consequently, § 53a-2 renders the defendant’s argument unavailing.

The defendant’s argument would fail even in the absence of § 53a-2, moreover, because it flies in the face of well established principles of statutory construction. “In interpreting statutes . . . [w]e presume that laws are enacted in view of existing relevant statutes . . . and that [sjtatutes are to be interpreted with regard to other relevant statutes because the legislature *78 is presumed to have created a consistent body of law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miranda, 260 Conn. 93, 131 , 794 A.2d 506 , cert. denied, 537 U.S. 902 , 123 S. Ct. 224 , 154 L. Ed. 2d 175 (2002). “An identical term used in [statutory provisions] pertaining to the same subject matter should not be read to have differing meanings unless there is some indication from the legislature that it intended such a result.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nancy G. v. Dept. of Children & Families, 248 Conn. 672, 686 , 733 A.2d 136 (1999). These presumptions apply with particular force to the present case because §§ 53a-24 and 53a-25 are definitional provisions of general applicability. Consequently, the possibility that the legislature intended for those statutory provisions to be applied selectively rather than universally is especially remote.

Finally, the legislature had completed its post-Fur- man 68 revision of our death penalty statutes just two years prior to amending § 53a-24 in 1975. In light of the brief interval between the revisions to Connecticut’s death penalty statutory scheme in 1973 and the amendment to § 53a-24 (a) in 1975, it is difficult to imagine that the legislature would have declined to exclude § 53a-46a (h) (1) from the purview of General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 53a-24 (a), as amended by P.A. 75-380, § 15, if the legislature had intended to limit the scope of § 53a-24 (a) in that manner.

The defendant’s last argument also is unpersuasive. Although it undoubtedly is true that modifications to our death penalty statutory scheme generally are accompanied by spirited legislative debate, we simply cannot place on the absence of such debate the conclusive weight that the defendant’s argument would require. In light of the clarity of the language of the *79 statute, the fact that our death penalty legislation is as much a part of our Penal Code as any other part, and the fact that the application of the language yields reasonable results in keeping with the general purposes of our death penalty statutes, we cannot conclude that the absence of debate trumps all other factors ordinarily applied in the process of statutory construction. In sum, we cannot conclude that the legislature did not mean what its language plainly appears to mean simply because of the absence of legislative history affirming that meaning. Of course, this court frequently reviews statutory history as an aid in determining the meaning of particular statutory language. This court, however, never has suggested that a statute may be interpreted as the defendant would have us construe § 53a-46a (h) (1), that is, in complete disregard of its clear, unambiguous and reasonable import due solely to the absence of any legislative history substantiating that clear and rational meaning. Thus, we recently have reiterated that “[rjeliance on legislative silence is misplaced. It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that we rely on the intent of the legislature as that intent has been expressed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Spears v. Garcia, 263 Conn. 22, 34 , 818 A.2d 37 (2003), quoting Dept. of Social Services v. Saunders, 247 Conn. 686, 706 , 724 A.2d 1093 (1999). Indeed, to rely on the absence of legislative history, as the defendant proposes we do in the present case, would turn the process of statutory construction on its head. More importantly, we would be exceeding our constitutional limitations by infringing on the prerogative of the legislature to set public policy through its statutory enactments.

Finally, there is compelling reason to reject the statutoiy construction advanced by the defendant, namely, that the state’s contrary interpretation furthers the fundamental purpose of § 53a-46a (h) (1), whereas the defendant’s construction is inconsistent with that pur *80 pose. It is apparent that § 53a-46a (h) (1) comprises part of our capital sentencing scheme because the legislature believed that a person who has been convicted of a noncapital felony, and who then commits a capital felony while committing the same noncapital felony for which he already has been convicted, falls within a small class of especially culpable recidivists who deserve to be eligible for the death penalty. 69 The fact that a defendant may have been convicted of the same felony in federal court or the court of another state does not detract from the seriousness of that defendant’s conduct because, by definition, that prior felony is no different from the felony that the defendant committed or attempted to commit in this state during the commission of the capital felony. In other words, the legislative purpose behind the aggravating factor enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (1) is promoted to the same extent regardless of whether the defendant’s prior felony was successfully prosecuted in Connecticut, another state or under federal law. By contrast, the statutory interpretation proposed by the defendant undermines the objective behind § 53a-46a (h) (1) by eliminating from its coverage a class of defendants with prior, out-of-state felony convictions, who are equally as culpable, for purposes of the aggravating factor, as those defendants with the same prior in-state felony convictions. In our view, it would be untenable for us to distinguish between these two classes of defendants in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary. We construe statutes so as not to thwart their intended purpose; e.g., *81 BEC Corp. v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 256 Conn. 602, 622 , 775 A.2d 928 (2001); and in a manner that will not lead to bizarre or irrational consequences. E.g., Modern Cigarette, Inc. v. Orange, 256 Conn. 105, 120 , 774 A.2d 969 (2001). We therefore reject the defendant’s contention that an out-of-state felony cannot satisfy the “same felony” element of § 53a-46a (h) (1).

This conclusion does not end our inquiry, however, for we still must determine whether, for purposes of § 53a-46a (h) (1), the felony that the defendant committed during the commission of the capital felony, namely, sale of a narcotic substance, is the same as the New York felony for which he was convicted in 1989. We conclude that it is.

Again, our inquiry is one of statutory construction. Because the term “same” is not statutorily defined, we look to the commonly approved meaning of the word as defined in the dictionary. See, e.g., Perodeau v. Hartford, 259 Conn. 729, 736 , 792 A.2d 752 (2002). The word “same” is defined as “resembling in every way: not different in relevant essentials at one time . . . conforming in every respect . . . corresponding so closely as to be indistinguishable: closely similar: comparable . . . .” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.

Having determined that the term “same felony” in § 53a-46a (h) (1) encompasses out-of-state felonies, we conclude that our legislature likely did not intend to impose a requirement that the title and wording of the out-of-state provision under which the defendant previously had been convicted be identical to the title and wording of the Connecticut statutory provision that embraces the felony that the defendant is alleged to have committed or to have attempted to commit during the commission of the capital felony. The legislature *82 undoubtedly was aware that the penal statutes of other states generally are not precisely the same as the analogous statutory provisions of this state. More importantly, however, those linguistic differences frequently will have no bearing on whether a particular out-of-state felony reasonably may be considered the “same felony” within the meaning and purpose of § 53a-46a (h) (1). In other words, when viewed in context, the word “same” cannot mean exactly the same in all respects, whether the difference in the language of the statutes is material or immaterial.

We therefore conclude that, for purposes of § 53a-46a (h) (1), the term “same felony” means a felony that is the same in all material respects as the felony that is committed in this state during the commission of the capital felony. That requirement is fully satisfied only if the two felonies share the same essential elements. 70 Inasmuch as the trial court properly concluded that the essential elements of the offense of sale of a narcotic substance in violation of § 21a-277 (a) are the same as the essential elements of the offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fourth degree in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 220.34 (McKinney 1980), 71 we reject the defendant’s claim that those two offenses are not the “same felony” within the meaning of § 53a-46a (h) (!)•

*83 3

The Right to a Jury Determination on the Existence of the Aggravating Factor Enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (1)

The defendant claims that the trial court improperly deprived him of his right to have the jury decide all of the factual issues relating to the existence of the aggravating factor of § 53a-46a (h) (1) and, in so doing, also improperly relieved the state of its burden of proving all of the elements of that aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.

With respect to the requirement of § 53a-46a (h) (1) that the defendant previously have been convicted of the “same felony” that he committed or attempted to commit during the commission of the capital felony, the state relied on the defendant’s stipulation that he has a prior felony conviction in New York for the sale of a controlled substance. 72 Although the defendant did not dispute his conviction under N.Y. Penal Law § 220.34 , he did not agree that the offense enumerated therein and the offense that the state alleged he was attempting to commit when he shot and killed Williams, were the “same felony” within the meaning of § 53a-46a (h) (l). 73 See part III A 2 of this opinion.

*84 At the conclusion of the penalty phase hearing, the court charged the jury on the elements of § 53a-46a (h) (1) as follows: “The first statutory aggravant alleged is that the defendant committed the offense of capital felony during an attempt to commit a felony, specifically, a violation of § 21a-277 (a) of the General Statutes, in that the defendant was attempting to sell to another person a narcotic substance, cocaine, specifically in this case crack cocaine, and [that] he had been previously convicted of the same felony. The state has the burden of proving each and every element of [the] aggrava[ting] [factor] beyond a reasonable doubt.”

The court next instructed the jury on the crime of sale of a narcotic substance in violation of § 21a-277 (a) 74 and explained that, if the state had satisfied its burden of proving that the defendant had committed or had attempted to commit that felony, then the jury also was required to determine whether the evidence established that the defendant had murdered Williams during the commission of that felony. The court then informed the jury: “ [T] o find that the defendant commit *85 ted this [§ 53a-46a (h) (1)] aggravant, you would first have to find that, at some point in time prior to the commission of the above stated attempt to commit a violation of § 2la-277 (a), the defendant had previously been charged with and convicted of the same felony which he allegedly attempted in this instance. As you recall, the parties have agreed and stipulated that the defendant had previously been convicted in New York of the crime of sale of a controlled substance in the fourth degree and that that crime is a felony. I charge you further that, for the purpose of this matter, the essential elements of [the] sale of a controlled substance in the fourth degree and § 2 la-277 (a) of our General Statutes, inasmuch as they relate to the sale of narcotics, are the same. Thus, for your purpose, the two felonies are the same. So if you find the prior elements of that aggravant proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as I’ve explained them to you, you may consider this final element proven also, that is, that the defendant was previously convicted of the same felony attempt in this mMter.” 75 (Emphasis added.)

The defendant contends that he was entitled to have the jury, rather than the court, decide whether the criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fourth degree, *86 of which the defendant was convicted in 1989, and the felony that the jury found he was attempting to commit when he fatally shot Williams, were the “same felony” within the meaning of § 53a-46a (h) (1). Although the defendant acknowledges that it is the province of the trial court to ascertain the elements of the two offenses and to instruct the jury on those elements, 76 he claims that the issue of whether the two sets of elements are the same for purposes of § 53a-46a (h) (1) is a factual one for the jury. In other words, the defendant contends that the jury, not the trial court, should have compared the elements of the two offenses to determine whether the state had satisfied the “same felony” element of § 53a-46a (h) (1).

We agree with the trial court that the issue of whether the two narcotics offenses constitute the “same felony” for purposes of § 53a-46a (h) (1) is an issue to be resolved by the court, not the jury. The process of statutory interpretation in no way implicates the fact-finding function of the jury but, rather, presents a pure question of law. Consequently, it is a matter within the sole province of the court. The process of comparing statutory provisions to determine whether they are the “same” within the meaning of a third statute is no more a fact-based inquiry than determining the elements of the offenses enumerated therein. 77 We therefore reject *87 the defendant’s contention that the trial court improperly concluded that the court, not the jury, was responsible for determining whether the two offenses constituted the “same felony” within the meaning of § 53a-46a (h) (1). *

4

The Sufficiency of Evidence of the Defendant’s Attempt to Commit the Crime of Sale of a Narcotic Substance During the Course of Committing the Capital Felony

The defendant next claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that the state had proven the elements of § 53a-46a (h) (1) beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the defendant claims that, at most, the evidence supported a finding that he was committing “the felony of attempted possession of cocaine with the intent to sell” when he was stopped by Williams, and not that he was attempting to sell cocaine. This claim also is without merit.

“[B]ecause of the seriousness of any death penalty determination, we will subject a finding of an aggravating factor to the same independent and scrupulous examination of the entire record that we employ in our review of constitutional fact-finding, such as the voluntariness of a confession ... or the seizure of a defendant.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 259 . “However, [e]ven with the heightened appellate scrutiny appropriate for a death penalty case, the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of aggravating circumstances must be reviewed, in the final analysis, by considering the evidence presented at the defendant’s penalty hearing in the light most favorable to sustaining the facts impliedly found *88 by the jury. . . . Furthermore, [i]n viewing evidence which could yield contrary inferences, the jury is not barred from drawing those inferences consistent with [the existence of the aggravating factor] and is not required to draw only those inferences consistent with [its nonexistence]. The rule is that the jury’s function is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1, 64 , 751 A.2d 298 (2000).

On the basis of the evidence adduced by the state at the penalty phase hearing, the jury reasonably could have found that, in the early morning hours of December 18, 1992, both the defendant and Crawford, members of the same drug trafficking organization, were each in possession of approximately 175 bags of cocaine, worth about $3500, for sale to a person who resided on Locust Street in Waterbury. The defendant also was carrying a loaded .38 caliber semiautomatic pistol in his right coat pocket. The two men were walking to the Locust Street address to consummate the drug sale when they were approached by Williams, who ordered them to stop and place their hands on his cruiser. Crawford ignored Williams’ command and walked away. The defendant stopped and placed his left hand on the cruiser, but refused to take his right hand out of his coat pocket, where his gun was concealed. When Williams forcibly tried to remove the defendant’s right hand from the defendant’s pocket, the defendant turned and shot Williams in the head to avoid the discovery of the weapon and the cocaine. These facts amply support the jury’s determination that the defendant shot and killed Williams while he and Crawford were involved in an attempt to sell a narcotic substance, namely, cocaine.

*89 We agree with the defendant insofar as he claims that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that the capital felony occurred during the defendant’s commission of the crime of possession of cocaine with intent to sell. See State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 743 , 631 A.2d 288 (1993) (single act may violate elements of more than one criminal statute). The fact that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant was committing the felony of possession of a narcotic substance with intent to sell when he committed the capital felony does not militate against a finding of the existence of the aggravating factor enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (1), however, in view of the fact that the jury properly determined that the defendant also was committing the felony of attempted sale of a narcotic substance when he committed the capital felony and previously had been convicted of that same felony. We therefore reject the defendant’s evidentiary sufficiency claim.

B

Issues Concerning the Aggravating Factor Enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (4)

1

Evidentiary Insufficiency

The defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he murdered Officer Williams in an “especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner,” as required under § 53a-46a (h) (4). Specifically, the defendant claims that the jury reasonably could not have concluded that he had the intent necessary to satisfy that aggravating factor. We agree with the defendant. 78

*90 “Before we review the evidence adduced by the state [in the present case], we again define the standard by which it is to be measured. As we acknowledged in [Breton I, supra, 212 Conn. 265 ], the phrase ‘in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner’ from § 53a-46a (h) (4) contains an arguably subjective standard that runs the risk of being unconstitutionally vague. Therefore, to avoid constitutional jeopardy [in connection with] this aggravating factor, we adopted a limiting construction of that statutory language. Focusing on the meaning of ‘especially cruel,’ we concluded that an acceptable core construction of this term ‘must include the intentional infliction of extreme pain or torture above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing.’ ” State v. Johnson, supra, 253 Conn. 65 , quoting Breton I, supra, 270. This extreme, additional pain or torture can be physical or, as the state alleged and the jury found in the present case, psychological. 79 E.g., State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 262 . Thus, “in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support *91 the jrny’s finding of [the] aggravating factor [of] § 53a-46a (h) (4), [we must determine] whether the state has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant engaged in intentional conduct that inflicted extreme . . . psychological pain or torture on [Williams] above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing, and that the defendant specifically intended to inflict such extreme pain and torture.” 80 (Emphasis in original.) State v. Johnson, supra, 66.

The defendant contends that the state failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to inflict extreme psychological pain or torture on Williams above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the murder. 81 The state counters that the jury was entitled to make such a finding on the basis of evidence establishing that the defendant, after shooting Williams in the head from close range, continued to fire six additional gunshots at Williams as the defendant fled the crime scene. The state maintains that the evidence of intent, although circumstantial, was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had fired the additional gunshots not with an intent to kill Williams but, rather, with an intent to terrorize him for the purpose of torturing him psychologically.

*92 “In reviewing a claim that the evidence failjed] to support the finding of an aggravating factor specified in [§ 53a-46a (h)]; General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-46b (b) (2) [as amended by Public Acts 1992, No. 92-260, § 23] ; 82 we subject that finding to the same independent and scrupulous examination of the entire record that we employ in our review of constitutional fact-finding, such as the vohmtariness of a confession; State v. Medina, 228 Conn. 281, 294 , 636 A.2d 351 (1994); State v. Smith, [supra, 200 Conn. 478 ]; or the seizure of a defendant. State v. Greenfield, 228 Conn. 62, 68-69 , 634 A.2d 879 (1993); State v. Northrop, 213 Conn. 405, 414 , 568 A.2d 439 (1990). State v. Ross, [supra, 230 Conn. 259 ].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, supra, 253 Conn. 64 . In such circumstances, we axe required to determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. E.g., State v. Medina, supra, 294 ; State v. Smith, supra, 478 .

“Even with the heightened appellate scrutiny appropriate for a death penalty case, the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of aggravating circumstances must be reviewed, in the final analysis, [first] by considering the evidence presented at the defendant’s penalty hearing in the light most favorable to sustaining the facts impliedly found by the jury.” State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 264 . “Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established [the existence of the aggravating factor] beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . This court cannot substitute its own judgment for that *93 of the jury if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 732 , 759 A.2d 995 (2000).

“Furthermore, [i]n viewing evidence which could yield contrary inferences, the jury is not barred from drawing those inferences consistent with [the existence of the aggravating factor] and is not required to draw only those inferences consistent with [its nonexistence], The rule is that the jury’s function is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, supra, 253 Conn. 64 .

“Because [t]he only kind of an inference recognized by the law is a reasonable one [however] . . . any such inference cannot be based on possibilities, surmise or conjecture. ... It is axiomatic, therefore, that [a]ny [inference] drawn must be rational and founded upon the evidence. . . . [T]he line between permissible inference and impermissible speculation is not always easy to discern. When we infer, we derive a conclusion from proven facts because such considerations as experience, or history, or science have demonstrated that there is a likely correlation between those facts and the conclusion. If that correlation is sufficiently compelling, the inference is reasonable. But if the correlation between the facts and the conclusion is slight, or if a different conclusion is more closely correlated with the facts than the chosen conclusion, the inference is less reasonable. At some point, the link between the facts and the conclusion becomes so tenuous that we call it speculation. When that point is reached is, frankly, a matter of judgment.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Copas, 252 Conn. 318, 338-39 , 746 A.2d 761 (2000); accord State v. Niemeyer, 258 Conn. 510, 518 , 782 A.2d 658 (2001).

*94 “[Finally], [i]n [our] process of review, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. ... It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes [the existence of an aggravating factor] in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence. . . . Indeed, direct evidence of the [defendant’s] state of mind is rarely available. . . . Therefore, intent is often inferred from conduct . . . and from the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence and the rational inferences drawn therefrom.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DeCaro, 252 Conn. 229, 239-40 , 745 A.2d 800 (2000); accord State v. Niemeyer, supra, 258 Conn. 517 -18. Guided by these principles, we turn to the merits of the defendant’s claim.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence that the state adduced at the penalty phase hearing established that, while Williams was attempting to subdue the defendant, the defendant bumped Williams in the chest to determine whether Williams was wearing a bulletproof vest. Upon ascertaining that, in fact, Williams was wearing a protective vest, the defendant removed a .38 caliber semiautomatic pistol from his pocket, turned and shot Williams in the head from a distance of one to two feet. The defendant immediately fled and, as he was running away, fired six additional gunshots in Williams’ direction. 83 The defendant *95 ran to Karen Smith’s apartment and, upon arrival, told Robert Bryant that he had shot Williams in the head when he realized that Williams was wearing a bulletproof vest. When Anthony Crawford asked the defendant why he shot Williams, the defendant responded: “[M]y mother didn’t name [me] ‘Kilt’ for nothing.”

The state claims that, in view of the fact that the defendant shot Williams in the head from such close range, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that, as the defendant fled, he knew that Williams lay helpless in the street, dying. The state further contends that, because the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant was aware that Williams had been fatally wounded, it also was proper for the jury to infer that the defendant fired the additional gunshots with an intent to torture Williams psychologically and not with an intent to kill him. The state points to no other evidence in support of its claim.

There can be no doubt that the evidence supported a finding that the defendant shot Williams in the head with the intent to kill him. 84 It also would have been reasonable for the jury to conclude that the defendant probably concluded that Williams was grievously wounded when the defendant turned and fired the additional gunshots in Williams’ direction. Under the circumstances, however, we are not persuaded that the facts warrant a reasonable inference that the defendant fired those additional gunshots with the specific intent of psychologically torturing Williams. In other words, we are not convinced that the correlation between the facts and the conclusion that the defendant had intended to torture Williams psychologically is sufficient to support that inference with the requisite degree of certainty.

*96 The only logical inference to be drawn from the evidence is that the defendant ran from the scene in fear that he would be seen or apprehended, and that he turned and fired toward Williams because he could not be sure that he had killed Williams, or even that he had fully disabled him. Because the defendant fled immediately after seeing Williams fall to the ground, the only reasonable inference is that the defendant did not know for sure whether Williams was too seriously wounded either to unholster his weapon and fire at the defendant as he fled or to seek assistance in apprehending the defendant via radio or by hailing a passerby. Moreover, because the defendant fled so quickly after shooting Williams in the head, the defendant could not be positive that Williams’ wound, though grave, necessarily was fatal. In view of the fact that Williams, if he survived, potentially could have identified the defendant as his assailant, it is very likely that the defendant continued to fire as he ran in hopes that one or more of those gunshots would strike and kill Williams in the event that Williams was not already mortally wounded.

Contrary to the state’s claim, the evidence does not reasonably support the conclusion that the defendant continued to fire at Williams with the intent to torture him psychologically. To reach such a conclusion, it would be necessary for a fact finder to infer, on the basis of the defendant’s conduct, that the defendant’s state of mind changed from an intent to kill to an intent to torture in the brief interval between the point at which the defendant shot Williams in the head and the point at which the defendant fired the additional gunshots in Williams’ direction while fleeing the crime scene. 85 In light of the extraordinarily exigent circum *97 stances that the defendant had created for himself and the exceedingly short time frame during which he could react to those circumstances, the inference that the defendant intended to torture Williams simply is not reasonable even when the evidence is viewed most favorably toward the state’s case.

Of course, “[p]roof of a material fact by inference from circumstantial evidence need not be so conclusive as to exclude every other hypothesis. . . . Thus, in determining whether the evidence supports a particular inference, we ask whether that inference is so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable. ... In other words, an inference need not be compelled by the evidence; rather, the evidence need only be reasonably susceptible of such an inference.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Niemeyer, supra, 258 Conn. 518 -19. As we have indicated, however, we are not persuaded that the evidence in the present case is reasonably susceptible of an inference that the defendant intended to torture Williams.

We acknowledge that it probably would not have been impossible for the defendant to have formulated the intent to torture Williams in the extremely brief period of time between the firing of the first shot and the firing of the additional gunshots. An inference is not legally supportable, however, merely because the scenario that it contemplates is remotely possible under the facts. To permit such a standard would be to sanction fact-finding predicated on mere conjecture or guesswork. Proof by inference is sufficient, rather, only “if the evidence produces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief in the probability of the existence of the material fact.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 519 . Under the circumstances of the present case, the likelihood that the defendant had changed his intent in the brief interval that separated the first shot from the remaining gunshots simply is *98 too remote to be reasonable. We therefore agree with the defendant that the evidence was insufficient to establish the existence of the aggravating factor enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (4). 86

2

Denial of the Defendant’s Prepenalty Phase Motion to Dismiss the Aggravating Factor Enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (4)

The defendant next claims that the panel improperly denied his prepenalty phase motion to dismiss the aggravating factor enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (4) 87 on the ground of evidentiary insufficiency. We disagree.

*99 The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of the defendant’s claim. Prior to the penalty phase hearing, the defendant moved to dismiss, inter alia, the aggravating factor enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (4) on the ground that the “[e]vidence adduced at [his] trial and at other relevant court proceedings as well as discovery provided by the [s]tate” demonstrated that the state could not establish that the defendant had intentionally inflicted physical pain and torture upon Williams above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the killing. The panel denied the defendant’s motion. 88 During the ensuing penalty phase hearing, the state sought to introduce into evidence a number of autopsy photographs for the purpose of assisting the jury in understanding the nature of the gunshot wound that Williams had sustained and the pain and suffering that he had endured. The trial court permitted the state to introduce some of the autopsy photographs but sustained the defendant’s objections to several other photographs. 89 Among the photographs admitted into evidence was a particularly graphic photograph that depicted Williams’ head with his scalp peeled back to expose his skull.

In view of the gruesome nature of the autopsy photographs, the trial court cautioned the jury in relevant part as follows: “[P]art of the evidence consists of . . . slides of the deceased. I would just point out these slides are not offered for their emotional impact but the nature and the extent and the severity of injuries suffered by [Williams]. Emotional impact of the photos should have absolutely no effect on your consideration now and your consideration during deliberation. Cer *100 tainly, you don’t see photos of this nature every day. You don’t see a deceased party in various medical intervention that takes place, so it certainly will have an effect and that’s normal. What I’m saying is it should play no part whatsoever in your deliberations and I think you all understand that. And, in fact, the state doesn’t offer them for any other purpose other than issues in this case, not for emotional impact.”

At the conclusion of the state’s evidence on the aggravating factors, the defendant renewed his motion to dismiss the aggravating factor enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (4). The trial court granted the defendant’s motion limited to the state’s claim regarding the defendant’s alleged intentional infliction of extreme physical pain or torture. Accordingly, the court thereafter instructed the jury that “there is no claim by the state that there exists evidence in this case of the intentional infliction of extreme physical pain beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing.” The court then instructed the jury on the law applicable to the state’s claim concerning the existence of the aggravating factor enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (4) by virtue of the defendant’s allegedly intentional infliction of extreme psychological pain or torture beyond that necessary to accomplish the killing.

On appeal, the defendant contends that the panel improperly declined to dismiss, in advance of the penalty phase hearing, the aggravating factor enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (4), on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant intentionally inflicted extreme physical pain or torture beyond that necessary to accomplish the killing. The defendant further claims that he was prejudiced by the panel’s denial of his motion in advance of the penalty phase hearing because the autopsy photographs that were admitted at that hearing were both prejudicial and irrelevant to any other issue in the case.

*101 Contrary to the defendant’s claim, we are aware of no authority, and the defendant has presented us with none, in support of his assertion that he was entitled to have the panel engage in a prepenalty phase evaluation of the evidentiary sufficiency of one or more of the aggravating factors alleged by the state. Indeed, as a general rule, a capital defendant is not entitled to any such prepenalty phase determination with respect to the evidentiary sufficiency of the aggravating factors alleged by the state. Cf. State v. Solek, 242 Conn. 409, 431 , 699 A.2d 931 (1997) (“[there is] no authority aside from the constitutionally required hearing in probable cause . . . that entitles a defendant to a pretrial judicial determination of ineligibility for the death penalty” [citation omitted]).

Moreover, the photographs were relevant to the state’s claim that the defendant had intentionally inflicted extreme psychological pain or torture on Williams beyond that necessary to accomplish the killing. In order to prove the existence of the aggravating factor enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (4), the state sought to establish that Williams was conscious and, consequently, was able to experience the terror of hearing six additional gunshots 90 being fired at him as he lay critically wounded in the street. In order to show that Williams had suffered extreme psychological torture, the state also had to prove that Williams, despite having been shot at from close range, nevertheless retained the capacity to hear those additional gunshots. To establish that fact, the state adduced testimony from several expert witnesses regarding the precise nature of Williams’ injury and the effect that his wound likely would have had on his ability to hear and to understand what was going on around him immediately after suffering the gunshot wound to his head. Inasmuch as the autopsy photographs revealed the location and extent of Wil *102 liams’ gunshot wound, they were particularly relevant to the jury’s consideration of the expert testimony and generally relevant to the issue of Williams’ psychological suffering. Although there exists a heightened concern for the potential prejudice that may arise from the use of inflammatory photographs in capital cases; see State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 277 ; “even gruesome photographs are admissible if they would prove or disprove a material fact in issue, or illuminate a material inquiry.” 91 Id.

Finally, the trial court strongly cautioned the jurors about the graphic nature of the photographs of Williams and emphasized that they should take particular care to guard against any unduly emotional reaction. Such an instruction likely reduced any possible prejudice to the defendant that might have arisen from the state’s use of the photographs. 92 We conclude, therefore, that *103 the defendant cannot prevail on his claim that he was entitled to the prepenalty phase dismissal of the aggravating factor enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (4) on the ground that the evidence was insufficient, to establish that the defendant had intentionally inflicted extreme physical pain or torture beyond that necessary to accomplish the murder.

C

The Court’s Instructions on Reasonable Doubt

The defendant claims that the trial court’s instructions on reasonable doubt 93 improperly diluted the *104 state’s burden of proving the existence of the aggravating factors in violation of his federal constitutional right to a fair trial. Specifically, the defendant challenges the following portions of the trial court’s charge on the meaning of reasonable doubt: (1) “[a] reasonable doubt is not a doubt . . . suggested by the ingenuity of counsel”; (2) “[a reasonable doubt] is a doubt for which you can in your own mind conscientiously give a reason”; (3) “[a] [Reasonable doubt . . . is areal doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or the lack of evidence”; and (4) “[a reasonable doubt is] the kind of doubt which in the serious affairs which concern you in everyday life you would pay heed to and attention to.” The defendant’s claim is meritless. 94

*105 “It is fundamental that proof of guilt in a criminal case must be beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S. Ct. 1068 , 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970) .... The [reasonable doubt concept] provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence— that bedrock axiomatic and elementary principle whose enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law. . . . [Id.], 363. At the same time, by impressing upon the [fact finder] the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused, the [reasonable doubt] standard symbolizes the significance that our society attaches to the criminal sanction and thus to liberty itself. Jackson v. Virginia, [ 443 U.S. 307, 315 , 99 S. Ct. 2781 , 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)]. [Consequently] [t]he defendants in a criminal case are entitled to a clear and unequivocal charge by the court that the guilt of the defendants must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

“In determining whether a trial court’s charge satisfies constitutional requirements, however, individual jury instructions should not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. . . . The pertinent test is whether the charge, read in its entirety, fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law. . . . Thus, [t]he whole charge must be considered from the standpoint of its effect on the [jurors] in guiding them to the proper *106 verdict . . . and not critically dissected in a microscopic search for possible error. . . . Accordingly, [i]n reviewing a constitutional challenge to the trial court’s instruction, we must consider the jury charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the instruction misled the jury.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195, 205-206 , 749 A.2d 1192 (2000).

As the defendant acknowledges, this court previously has applied this standard of review in rejecting claims identical in all material respects to those advanced by the defendant. E.g., State v. Velasco, 253 Conn. 210, 249 , 751 A.2d 800 (2000) (rejecting constitutional challenge to instruction that reasonable doubt is “a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence” [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Griffin, supra, 253 Conn. 205 (rejecting constitutional challenge to instruction that reasonable doubt is “such a doubt, as in serious affairs that concern you, you would heed, that is, such a doubt as would cause reasonable men and women to hesitate to act in matters of importance” [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Lewis, 245 Conn. 779, 816 , 717 A.2d 1140 (1998) (rejecting constitutional challenge to instruction that reasonable doubt is doubt “for which you can in your own mind conscientiously give a reason” [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 504 , 687 A.2d 489 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121 , 117 S. Ct. 2515 , 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997) (rejecting constitutional challenge to instruction that reasonable doubt “is [not] a doubt suggested by the ingenuity of counsel” [internal quotation marks omitted]). 95 The defendant has presented no persuasive rea *107 son why the challenged language, when viewed in the broader context of the court’s otherwise proper charge on reasonable doubt, dilutes the state’s burden of proving the existence of the aggravating factors. We therefore reject the defendant’s claim of instructional impropriety.

D

Effect of the Jury’s Invalid Finding as to the Existence of One Aggravating Factor on the Jury’s Finding as to the Existence of Another Aggravating Factor

The defendant next claims that he is entitled to a new penalty phase hearing on the existence of the aggravating factor enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (l) 96 in light of our determination that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that the state had proven the existence of the aggravating factor of § 53a-46a (h) (4) beyond a reasonable doubt. In essence, the defendant contends that the jury’s finding with respect to the aggravating factor of § 53a-46a (h) (1) necessarily was tainted by its unsupported finding of the existence of the aggravating factor of § 53a-46a (h) (4). We disagree.

In State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 479-83 , 680 A.2d 147 (1996) (Webb I), we addressed an issue virtually identical to the issue raised by the defendant’s claim 97 *108 and concluded that harmless error analysis applies in circumstances, such as those in the present case, in which the jury’s finding of the existence of one aggravating factor is invalid and the jury’s finding of the existence of another aggravating factor is not otherwise invalid. We concluded in Webb that the determination of whether the impropriety surrounding the invalid aggravating factor improperly affected the jury’s finding with respect to the existence of the valid aggravating factor is to be made on a case-by-case basis. Id., 483 n.63.

Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the state has demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury’s finding concerning the existence of the aggravating factor of § 53a-46a (h) (4) did not improperly affect its finding concerning the existence of the aggravating factor of § 53a-46a (h) (1). Our reasoning in Webb is equally applicable in the present case. First, “the two aggravants are logically and factually distinct, and the trial court’s instructions properly presented the aggravants as separate matters for the jury’s consideration. In this connection . . . the trial court expressly instructed the jury that the state was required to prove only one aggravating factor .... Moreover, the trial court gave separate instructions concerning each aggravant and marshaled the evidence related to each aggravant separately.” Id., 482 . Furthermore, “overwhelming evidence supported the jury’s finding of the aggravating factor set forth in § 53a-46a (h) (1). To find this factor, the jury was required to conclude only that the murder of the victim occurred in the course of an attempted [sale of a narcotic substance]. The evidence in th[e] [present] case unequivocally supports] the jury’s conclusion that the defendant murdered [Officer Williams] during the commission of ... an attempted [narcotics sale].” 98 Id., 483.

*109 The defendant nevertheless contends that the state has failed to show that the invalid finding concerning the existence of the aggravating factor enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (4) was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In support of his claim, the defendant asserts that the evidence adduced by the state pertaining to the gunshots that the defendant fired after he had shot Williams in the head was admissible only to prove the existence of the aggravating factor enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (4), and, therefore, the jury should not have heard that evidence in light of our conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s finding regarding the existence of that aggravating factor. The defendant further contends that the evidence regarding those additional gunshots was unduly harmful.

The simple answer to the defendant’s claim is that the evidence of those additional gunshots was admissible under General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-46a (d), 99 which provides that the jury shall determine whether any alleged mitigating factor is, in fact, mitigating in nature, “considering all the facts and circumstances of the case.” Certainly, the particular manner in which the defendant committed the capital felony is one of the relevant “facts and circumstances of the case” to be considered by the jury in evaluating the defendant’s alleged mitigating factors. Moreover, the evidence of those additional gunshots also was admissible in connection with the state’s allegation of the existence of the aggravating factor enumerated in General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-46a (h) (3), which requires proof that “the defendant committed the [capital felony] and in such commission knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the *110 offense . . . .” 100 Inasmuch as the evidence concerning the additional gunshots properly was admitted for the foregoing purposes, the defendant cannot prevail on his claim that he was harmed by the jury’s consideration of the evidence concerning the additional gunshots or that the jury’s improper finding regarding the existence of the aggravating factor enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (4) otherwise improperly affected its finding of the existence of the aggravating factor enumerated in § 53a-46a (h) (l). 101

E

Three Judge Panel

The defendant next claims that the panel improperly denied his motion to have all three members of the panel preside over the penalty phase hearing rather than just one member. The defendant maintains that § 53a-46a (b) 102 entitled him to have the same three judges who determined his guilt preside over the penalty phase hearing. 103 We disagree.

*111 The defendant relies on the following language of § 53a-46a (b), the statutory provision governing the procedure for the penalty phase in capital cases, to support his claim: “For the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed when a defendant is convicted of . . . a capital felony, the judge or judges who presided at the trial . . . shall conduct a separate hearing to determine the existence of any mitigating factor . . . and any aggravating factor . . . .” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-46a (b). The defendant contends that § 53a-46a (b) clearly directs that the “judges” who decided the guilt phase of the case, that is, the three members of the panel, are to preside over the penalty phase hearing.

We note, preliminarily, that several other statutory provisions and their relationship to § 53a-46a (b) inform our resolution of the defendant’s claim. Under General Statutes § 54-82 (a), 104 a criminal defendant has the option of having his or her guilt or innocence determined by the court instead of a juiy. Pursuant to General Statutes §§ 53a-45 (b) 105 and 54-82 (b), 106 a defendant *112 charged with committing a capital felony who elects a court trial is entitled to have a three judge panel determine guilt. In the present case, the defendant elected to be tried by a three judge panel but elected to have a jury determine his sentence during the penalty phase.

As the panel noted in its decision denying the defendant’s motion, it is true that the first sentence of § 53a-46a (b), when viewed in isolation, may be read to suggest that a capital defendant is entitled to have the three judges who determined the defendant’s guilt also preside over the penalty phase hearing. There is, however, no mention of any such right in the third sentence of § 53a-46a (b), which governs, inter alia, cases such as the present case, in which a defendant, who has elected to have his guilt or innocence determined by a three judge panel, chooses to have a jury determine his sentence at the penalty phase hearing.

To be sure, the first sentence of § 53a-46a (b) provides that the penalty phase hearing shall be conducted by “the judge or judges who presided at” the guilt phase portion of the case. But pursuant to §§ 53a-45 and 54-82, the chief court administrator is responsible for designating one of the members of the panel to be the presiding judge. When §§ 53a-46a, 53a-45 and 54-82 are read together, it is apparent that only the panel member who had been selected to be the presiding judge during the guilt phase shall preside over the penalty phase hearing. Thus, we do not believe that the literal language of § 53a-46a (b) dictates that all three panel members before whom the guilt phase was conducted must preside at a penalty phase hearing that is conducted before a jury. Indeed, we are persuaded that the term “judges” in the first sentence of § 53a-46a (b) does not apply to *113 the first two subdivisions of the third sentence of § 53a-46a (b), both of which contemplate that the penalty phase hearing will be conducted before a jury. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-46a (b) (penalty phase hearing “shall be conducted (1) before the jury which determined the defendant’s guilt, or (2) before a jury impaneled for the purpose of such hearing if (A) the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; (B) the defendant was convicted after atrial before three judges as provided in subsection (b) of section 53a-45; or (C) if the jury which determined the defendant’s guilt has been discharged by the court for good cause”). Rather, we conclude that the term “judges” refers to the final subdivision of the third sentence of § 53a-46a (b), pursuant to which a capital defendant, upon approval of the court and the consent of the state, may elect to have his penalty phase hearing conducted before a court rather than a jury. General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-46a (b) (penalty phase hearing “shall be conducted . . . (3) before the court, on motion of the defendant and with the approval of the court and the consent of the state”).

We reach this conclusion for several reasons. First, the defendant has not proffered an explanation, and we are aware of none, why the legislature would have required all three members of the panel who determined the defendant’s guilt to preside over the penalty phase hearing when that proceeding is to be conducted before a jury. In such circumstances, there simply is no reason to have more than one judge preside over the penalty phase hearing. In contrast, when the court is called upon to serve as the fact finder in a murder case, that function is performed by three judges rather than one for good reason, namely, because the legislature has concluded that the “burden of having a murder case tried to the court, when the accused so elect[s], should *114 not be imposed upon a single judge . . . .” McBrien v. Warden, 153 Conn. 320, 329 , 216 A.2d 432 (1966).

Second, there is no other circumstance under which a three judge panel is authorized to preside over a jury trial. This is hardly surprising in light of the fact that, as we already have explained, there is no justification for having more than one judge preside over a hearing or trial in which a jury, rather than a judge, serves as the fact finder. Because the role of a three judge court is to serve as a substitute for a jury, 107 it would make no sense to establish a scheme whereby three judges preside over a trial in which a jury, not the court, serves as the fact finder. We will not lightly interpret § 53a-46a (b) to reach an untenable result. See, e.g., Southington v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 254 Conn. 348, 360 , 757 A.2d 549 (2000) (“[w]e ordinarily read statutes with common sense and so as not to yield bizarre results”); Interlude, Inc. v. Skurat, 253 Conn. 531, 539 , 754 A.2d 153 (2000) (“[t]he law favors a rational statutory construction and we presume that the legislature intended a sensible result” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Third, there exists a strong reason why there should not be more than one judge presiding over a jury trial, namely, only one judge is necessary to perform the duties of the court. Indeed, to have three judges participate in the time consuming task of jury selection for the penalty phase hearing, and then to require the same three judges to preside over that hearing, would result in a significant waste of judicial resources.

Finally, there is nothing in the relevant statutory genealogy or legislative history to support the defendant’s *115 claim. On the contrary, those considerations militate against the statutory construction urged by the defendant. Prior to 1973, sentencing in capital matters was governed by General Statutes (Rev. to 1972) § 53a-46, 108 which contains no provision for a penalty phase hearing before a jury and a three judge panel. As the legislative history of § 53a-46a reflects, this state enacted a revised capital sentencing scheme in 1973 in response to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 , 92 S. Ct. 2726 , 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972), in which the United States Supreme Court essentially rendered various death penalty statutes throughout the country, including this state’s death penalty statutory scheme, constitutionally infirm. There is nothing in that legislative history to suggest that the legislature intended to change the preexisting scheme in the manner asserted by the defendant. We agree with the state that, if the legislature had intended such a radical departure from the traditional role of the three judge court, it most likely would have articulated that change explicitly and unambiguously.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that, inasmuch as the defendant had elected to have a jury determine his sentence at the penalty phase hearing, the panel properly determined that the defendant was not entitled to have all three members of the panel preside over that hearing. Consequently, we reject the defendant’s claim to the contrary.

F

Excusal of Juror for Cause

The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly granted the state’s request to excuse a prospective *116 juror, M.K., 109 for cause. The defendant contends that the reason that the trial court gave for excusing M.K., namely, that M.K. appeared to be unwilling to return a verdict that would result in the imposition of the death penalty, is not supported by the record and, therefore, M.K.’s dismissal from the panel of venirepersons violated the defendant’s rights under the United States constitution. We disagree. 110

We begin our analysis of the defendant’s claim with a brief review of the governing law. “Our constitutional and statutory law permit each party, typically through his or her attorney, to question each prospective juror individually, outside the presence of other prospective jurors, to determine the venireperson’s fitness to serve on the jury. Conn. Const., art. I, § 19; General Statutes § 54-82f; 111 Practice Book § [42-12]. 112 After the comple *117 tion of the voir dire of a particular venireperson, a party may challenge the venireperson for cause. The court must excuse that juror if the judge ... is of the opinion from the examination that [the] juror would be unable to render a fair and impartial verdict .... General Statutes § 54-82f; Practice Book § [42-12], . . . The trial court is vested with wide discretion in determining the competency of jurors to serve. . . . [T]he exercise of [the trial court’s] discretion will not constitute reversible error unless it has clearly been abused or harmful prejudice appears to have resulted.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Griffin, 251 Conn. 671, 710-11 , 741 A.2d 913 (1999).

“In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 , 105 S. Ct. 844 , 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985) . . . the United States Supreme Court . . . considered the effect [of] a prospective juror’s beliefs concerning the death penalty ... on that individual’s eligibility to serve as a juror in a capital case . . . [and] clarified the standard for determining whether a venireperson properly may be challenged for cause on the basis of his beliefs regarding the death penalty. Specifically, the court concluded that the federal constitution permits the excusa! for cause of venirepersons whose opposition to capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors in accordance with the court’s instructions and the juror’s oath. Id., 424 . . . . [A]s interpreted in . . . Witt , the federal constitution permits the excu *118 sal for cause of venirepersons whose opposition to the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors during either: (1) the guilt phase of the trial; or (2) the sentencing phase of the trial. For a venireperson’s opposition to the death penalty to be considered as preventing or substantially impairing the performance of that individual’s duties as a juror during the sentencing phase of the trial, so as to permit excusa! for cause, the federal constitution does not require that the venireperson explicitly state that ... he automatically would vote not to impose a sentence of death. Instead, the federal constitution permits the excusal for cause of venirepersons whose responses during voir dire raise serious doubt as to their ability to follow the law during the sentencing phase.” 113 (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) State v. Griffin, supra, 251 Conn. 686 -87.

Furthermore, “a trial judge’s finding that a particular venire [person] was not biased and therefore was properly seated [is] a finding of fact .... [T]he question whether a venire [person] is biased has traditionally been determined through voir dire culminating in a finding by the trial judge concerning the venire[person’s] state of mind. . . . [S]uch a finding [also] is *119 based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge’s province. Such determinations [are] entitled to deference even on direct review .... [This] holding applies equally [as] well to a trial court’s determination that a prospective capital sentencing juror was properly excluded for cause.” (Citation omitted.) Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 428 -29.

Applying the foregoing principles to the present case, we conclude that the record fully supports the court’s decision to strike M.K. for cause. First, M.K. stated on his jury questionnaire that he could not serve as a juror because he did not believe in capital punishment. Thereafter, in response to questions by the state’s attorney regarding his views on the subject, M.K. stated that he believed that capital punishment is morally wrong and that he “wouldn’t want to be part of” the process of evaluating the alleged aggravating and mitigating factors for the puipose of determining whether the defendant would be sentenced to death. When the trial court sought

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