stating in response to defendants' claim that relief sought by plaintiff from defendant chief court administrator "would supersede the rule-making power of the judges of the Superior Court" that "we are unconvinced that the plaintiff's first claim for relief necessarily would result in or be tantamount to an impermissible encroaching by [the defendant chief court administrator] upon judicial rule-making authority"
How later courts described this case
- stating in response to defendants' claim that relief sought by plaintiff from defendant chief court administrator "would supersede the rule-making power of the judges of the Superior Court" that "we are unconvinced that the plaintiff's first claim for relief necessarily would result in or be tantamount to an impermissible encroaching by [the defendant chief court administrator] upon judicial rule-making authority"
- explaining that court orders pertaining to judicial resources are not improper merely because ‘‘there are many competing constraints upon the resources the judicial department has available with which to satisfy other constitutional mandates’’
- stating that "[w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged"
- "[i]n ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186 (2010)
244 Conn. 296, 314 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child’s physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against interest in preserving family integrity), abrogated on other grounds by Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186 , 994 A.2d 106
The opinion
PALMER, J.,
concurring. I join the opinion of the majority. I write separately only because I would take a different approach than the majority with respect to our resolution of the claim of nonjusticiability by the defendant Linda D’Amario Rossi, commissioner of children and families (commissioner).
For the reasons articulated by Justice Borden in his concurring and dissenting opinion, there exists a serious question as to whether the claims of the plaintiff, Pamela B., against the commissioner are justiciable. As the majority points out, however, the commissioner never made the argument in favor of nonjusticiability that Justice Borden finds persuasive; consequently, the plaintiff never has had the opportunity to address that argument. In such circumstances, I, like the majority, am reluctant to decide the question. If, however, Justice Borden is correct that the plaintiffs claims against the commissioner are nonjusticiable, then we do not have subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. Accordingly, I would order the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the issue so that we properly may decide it. Because my colleagues do not share the view that supplemental briefs are appropriate, however, and because I am not absolutely certain, absent any input from the plaintiff, that Justice Borden is correct in his conclusion that the plaintiffs claims against the commissioner are nonjusticiable, I concur with the majority that we should not decide this issue.