stating, "[w]e agree with [section] 335 that liability in negligence for a dangerous condition on land will attach only if the possessor has actual or constructive knowledge that ‘trespassers constantly intrude[d] upon a limited area of the land’ " and "[w]e note that the recognition by this court of [section] 334 supports our conclusion that the materially identical language employed in [section] 335 should also be adopted” (citations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating, "[w]e agree with [section] 335 that liability in negligence for a dangerous condition on land will attach only if the possessor has actual or constructive knowledge that ‘trespassers constantly intrude[d] upon a limited area of the land’ " and "[w]e note that the recognition by this court of [section] 334 supports our conclusion that the materially identical language employed in [section] 335 should also be adopted” (citations omitted)
- holding that "[k]nowledge of trespassers to other areas cannot ... be the basis for imposing liability" under section 335
- ‘‘a possessor of land is under no duty to keep his or her land reasonably safe for an adult trespasser, but has the duty only to refrain from causing injury to a trespasser intentionally, or by willful, wanton or reckless conduct’’ [footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]
- “Despite the presence of picnickers and vandals, the government had little reason to foresee that thieves might climb power poles to steal copper wires.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MCDONALD, J.,
concurring. I wish to add that when a person goes onto another’s property for the purpose of committing a larceny, that person’s purpose is to avoid detection, apprehension and prosecution. A thief s objective, ultimately, is to go unnoticed. This is hardly a circumstance where constructive notice should arise to impose landowner liability for the condition of the property. A burglar inherently endangers himself or herself and others when committing an offense. It makes no sense that a person committing a crime should receive a greater level of protection than that given to a person playing in a sporting event. See, e.g., Jaworski v. Kiernan, 241 Conn. 399 , 696 A.2d 332 (1997). Landowners simply should not be required to keep their property safe for burglars else they be held liable for negligence.
In the words of a justice of the Ohio Supreme Court, “[i]t shocks the conscience of a civilized nation that a criminal can recover large damage awards for an injury incurred while committing a crime.” Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St. 3d 116, 129 , 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997) (Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
*569 I believe we should state unequivocally on policy grounds that a landowner is not liable for negligence in such circumstances. I therefore agree with the result reached by the majority.