Buckley v. Valeo

BAZELON, Chief Judge, filed a separate opinion dissenting from Part V — A—2 of the per curiam opinion.

TAMM, Circuit Judge, joined by WIL-KEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the per curiam opinion, and concurring in the result only of Part V.

MacKINNON, Circuit Judge, filed a separate opinion dissenting from Part VII of the per curiam opinion.

Summary

This case presents for review the latest, and by far the most comprehensive, reform legislation passed by Congress concerning the election of the President, Vice-President and members of Congress. The plaintiffs have asked this court to enter a declaratory judgment holding unconstitutional key provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.

Under the challenged legislative scheme, contributions are limited to $1000 per candidate with an overall limitation of $25,000 per contributor. The statute also establishes an overall ceiling on campaign spending by candidates and convention spending by political parties. There are also elaborate requirements for disclosure of contributions and expenditures to a newly established full-time agency — the Federal Election Commission. Finally, the legislative scheme provides public funding for qualified candidates and political parties.

Under a special statutory provision for expedited judicial review, the plaintiffs’ challenge to the key provisions of the Act reached this court in the form of twenty-eight certified constitutional questions. After subjecting the issues to “exacting judicial scrutiny,” the court today upholds the core provisions of the legislative scheme, holds one incidental provision unconstitutional, and declines to rule on other provisions for lack of a ripe controversy.

Limitations on Contributions and Expenditures

As to the statutory limitations on contributions and expenditures, the court finds that “the power of Congress to regulate federal elections embraces, in our view, the power to adopt per candidate and overall limitations on the *183 amount that an individual or political committee may contribute in the context of federal elections and primaries.” Its review of the history of campaign abuses and the evolution of a comprehensive legislative scheme designed to “preserve the purity” of the electoral process leads the court to conclude that there is a “compelling governmental interest, both as to need and public perception of need, that justifies any incidental impact on First Amendment freedoms” that results from the statutory limitations. As to the contention that disclosure requirements combined with limits on contributions are sufficient to solve the problem of campaign abuses, the court finds that a number of factors, especially the fact that “limitations on contributions and disclosure requirements pose almost insuperable enforcement problems if not supplemented by limits on expenditures,” provide a “validating context for the judgment of Congress that expenditures must be subject to reasonable regulation.” 171 U.S.App.D.C. pp. 202-213, 519 F.2d pp. 851-862.

Disclosure Requirements

In considering the certified questions concerning the disclosure requirements, the court, relying on the Supreme Court’s opinions in Burroughs and Cannon v. United States and Harriss v. United States, finds that the “governmental interest in preserving the democratic process” justifies the particular disclosure scheme enacted by the Congress. The court recognizes that disclosure has an “impact on personal privacy in political association,” but concludes that this is “outweighed” by the compelling state interest. “It is pertinent to . the political process, as elsewhere in the marketplace of ideas, that meaningful competition depends on openness.” The court also considered the argument that minor parties are constitutionally exempt from disclosure requirements since they need to be protected from presumed oppression and retaliation from the party which wins the election and from the public generally. The court concludes, however, that the provision requiring disclosure by all parties is constitutional on its face, noting that a minor party may in the future “demonstrate such harassment to itself or to its supporters as to underpin a ruling that disclosure in those circumstances cannot constitutionally be required.”

But the court does find unconstitutionally vague and overbroad a statutory provision (Section 437a of Title 2 of the United States Code) that is “susceptible to a reading necessitating reporting by groups whose only connection with the elective process arises from completely nonpartisan public discussion of issues of public importance.” The court sustains the other disclosure provisions of the Act because the government has demonstrated a substantial and legitimate interest in protecting the integrity of its elections, “an interest closely connected to and plainly advanced by those provisions.” But section 437a seeks to compel disclosure by groups that do no more than discuss issues of public importance on a wholly nonpartisan basis, a point at yhich the nexus between the governmental interest and the challenged provisions may be more tenuous. The court attempted to construe the statute narrowly, but it is unable “to supply the precision essential to constitutionality.” Since “the terms of the statute inhibit free and robust discussion of issues,” the court holds Section 437a unconstitutional. 171 U.S.App.D.C. pp. 213-230, 519 F.2d pp. 862-879.

Public Financing Provisions

The court considered a number of challenges to the public financing provisions of the Act, which establish a Fund derived from voluntary tax “check-offs” by individual taxpayers, who may, but need not, direct that one dollar of their tax liability go to the Fund. The court holds that Congress acted within its power when it “determined that providing public funding for the three stages of the Presidential selection process would advance the general welfare of the nation by reducing the reliance of *184 Presidential candidates on large contributors, thus reducing their influence on the outcome of elections and on the operation of government.” The court also finds no constitutional infirmity in the fact that the taxpayer has no freedom to designate which party or candidate will receive his checked-off dollar. “If the taxpayer wants to avoid any conception that some part of ‘his’ tax money will benefit candidates he does not favor, then he can simply refrain from checking off his dollar for the Fund.”

The court recognizes that “provisions for public funding of Presidential campaigns, like provisions regulating access to the ballot, could operate to give an unfair advantage to the established parties, thus reducing, to the nation’s detriment, what the Supreme Court has called the ‘potential fluidity of American political life.’ ” But after careful consideration of the public financing scheme, the court does not find it to be invidiously discriminatory. Nevertheless, it also recognizes the “necessity for all concerned to maintain a careful scrutiny as the provisions are implemented.” 171 ILS.Ápp.D.C. pp. 230-238, 519 F.2d pp. 879-887.

The Federal Election Commission

In the final part of its opinion, the court considers the constitutional challenge to the newly-established Federal Election Commission. The court recognizes that, “as might be expected in an area as novel and complex as this, which implicates all segments of the federal establishment, the manner of constituting [the Commission], the tasks assigned to it, and the authority conferred upon it are in many respects unique.” But the court also believes that the new agency is “so essential to the effective functioning of the overall scheme” that it should not be declared unconstitutional unless “wholly without legitimacy in the very terms by which it is brought into being.”

The plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the method of appointing members of the Commission on the grounds that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers and Article II of the Constitution in that Congress has appointed four members of an agency that performs judicial and executive as well as legislative functions. The court concludes that the Commission is a constitutional legislative agency that performs primarily legislative functions. The court recognizes that some of the powers delegated to the Commission, “when and if exercised in a concrete context, may be in conflict with the Constitution” in that they are dominantly executive or judicial, or unrelated to the exercise of the Commission’s legislative functions. But since the Commission has not yet exercised most of the challenged powers, the court postpones consideration of the constitutionality of those grants of authority until such time as there is a ripe controversy. The court does conclude, however, that the Commission does have the power to continue rendering advisory opinions, which advise certain persons as to whether planned activities or transactions will violate federal statutes governing the electoral process. 171 U.S.App. D.C. pp. 238-247, 519 F.2d pp. 887-896.

PER CURIAM:

In this extraordinary case, plaintiffs 1 brought an action in the District Court seeking a declaratory judgment holding unconstitutional key provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 2 which was overhauled by the *185 FECA Amendments of 1974. 3 Plaintiffs also asked that the defendants 4 be enjoined from enforcing these Acts. Three organizations and eight individuals in leadership positions with those organizations 5 have intervened in support of the challenged legislation.

Under attack are provisions that broadly require disclosure of and put ceilings on contributions and expenditures inuring to the benefit of candidates for federal office. Also under attack are the public financing provisions inserted into the Internal Kavenue Code 6 so as to provide public financing for the primary, convention, and general election stages of the Presidential selection process.

District Judge Howard Corcoran, acting pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437h 7 (a special judicial review provision in FECA) transmitted the entire case to this court. 8 *186 Upon joint motion of the defendants and intervening defendants, we remanded the record for completion of certain evidentiary steps and for the formulation of constitutional questions to be certified to this court. 9 Judge Corcoran, with all counsel cooperating, moved expeditiously. Constitutional questions have now been certified and the parties have addressed them in briefs and oral argument before this court en bane. 10 This novel procedure permits timely appeal to the Supreme Court.

The unique posture of this litigation requires a unique opinion, cast in a structure of twenty-eight constitutional questions or sub-questions, which we either answer or conclude are not ripe for decision. Our order is reprinted for convenience as Appendix A.

The opinion is per curiam. That term ' is conventionally reserved for cases of lesser significance. It also has useful application to cases like this one, where the issues are so significant and far-reaching that the crafting of the opinion reflects the fact of participation of various judges, so that no single judge could fairly be designated as the author. Compare Nixon v. Sirica, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 58 , 487 F.2d 700 (1973).

We have organized our discussion of the issues in this case into six major sections: a synopsis of the statutory provisions, in limine questions, questions concerning contribution and expenditure limitations, questions concerning disclosure requirements, questions concerning public financing provisions, and questions concerning the composition and powers of the newly-established Federal Election Commission. But in order to place this recent legislation in proper perspective, we begin with an overview.

I. Overview

The statutory provisions under attack, while separable, were combined by Congress as a comprehensive approach to a set of conditions and abuses that have spread over the years to infect the nation’s federal election campaigns. “Speaking broadly, what is involved here is the integrity of our electoral process, and, not less, the responsibility of the individual citizen for the successful functioning of that process. The case thus raises issues not less than basic to a democratic society.” 11 These solemn words, uttered in 1957 by Justice Frankfurter in a Supreme Court opinion considering limitations on federal election campaigns, are an apt prologue to our ■momentous task.

Our task is the more awesome, and these words opportune, in that we are pondering legislation passed and reviewed at a time of transition and crisis. The Nation has experienced the shock waves of momentous revelations concerning events of the last Presidential campaign. It is preparing in 1976 not only for another campaign, but for a time of bicentennial that sharpens our awareness of our heroic experiment in democracy. Abraham Lincoln has immortalized our dedication to the concept of a government of the people, by the people and for the people, our recognition that it is dependent on the consent of the governed and our resolution to take measures to preserve and to vitalize that system. What nourishes and invigorates democracy is the root of widespread popular participation.

No one can doubt the compelling government interest in preserving the integrity of the system of elections through which citizens exercise the core right of a free democracy of selecting the officials who will make and execute the laws under which we all must live.12 Yet subjection of election campaigns to rules of law means restraints, and those restraints are assailed as a misguided un *187 dermining of the constitutional foundations of our free society.

Our vigorous and recurring election campaigns are a pulse beat of the strength of democracy. Keen men of this century have sought to preserve health by intervening against feverish excess. Justice Frankfurter’s 1957 opinion recounts the origins of our present legislation in the steps taken around the turn of the century to cope with the abuses spawned by the disparities and aggregations of wealth. We identify some highlights.

The popular feeling that the power of wealth “unduly influenced politics, an influence not stopping short of corruption” 13 led to public disclosure laws. But these “were found to be futile.” 14 In quest of more effective measures, Elihu Root proposed that New York prohibit contributions by corporations, to cope with “the great aggregations of wealth” seeking to influence elections toward “the advancement of their interests as against those of the public.” He put it: 15

It strikes at a constantly growing evil which has done more to shake the confidence of the plain people of small means of this country in our political institutions than any other practice which has ever obtained since the foundation of our Government.

Concern over the size and source of campaign funds in the 1904 campaign “crystallized popular sentiment for federal action to purge national polities of what was conceived to be the pernicious influence of ‘big money’ campaign contributions. * * * President Theodore Roosevelt quickly responded to this national mood.” 16 His annual messages of 1905 and 1906 urged laws to stop political contributions by corporations, and a 1907 law enacting such a measure as to national campaigns was “the first concrete manifestation of a continuing congressional concern for elections ‘free from the power of money.’ ” 17

In view of the issues now pending, we add and underline President Roosevelt’s 1907 address on the need for public financing of election campaigns to effectuate the underlying objective.

Under our form of government voting is not merely a right but a duty, and, moreover, a fundamental and necessary duty if a man is to be a good citizen. It is well to provide that corporations shall not contribute to Presidential or National campaigns, and furthermore to provide for the publication of both contributions and expenditures. There is, however, always danger in laws of this kind, which from their very nature are difficult of enforcement; the danger being lest they be obeyed only by the honest, and disobeyed by the unscrupulous, so as to act only as a penalty upon honest men. Moreover, no such law would hamper an unscrupulous man of unlimited means from buying his own way into office. There is a very radical measure which would, I believe, work a substantial improvement in our system of conducting a campaign, although I am well aware that it will take some time for people so to familiarize themselves with such a proposal as to be willing to consider its adoption. The need for collecting large campaign funds would vanish if Congress provided an appropriation for the proper and legitimate expenses of each of the great national parties, an appropriation ample enough to meet the necessity for thorough organization and machinery, which requires a large expenditure of money. Then the stipulation should be made that no party receiving campaign funds from the Treasury should accept more than a fixed amount from any individual sub *188 scriber or donor; and the necessary publicity for receipts and expenditures could without difficulty be provided. 18

The tale of measures passed, and to some extent bypassed, is related in Appendix C. It suffices here to say that over a span of almost 70 years Congress enacted a number of limited statutes; provisions for disclosure and reporting of contributions and expenditures were enacted and amended; in due time Congress imposed a ban on contributions by corporations, followed by a ban on contributions by labor unions; successive statutes put limits on the amounts an individual could contribute to candidates for federal office, and in 1939 an absolute limit ($3 million) was put on annual expenditures by national political committees.

The achievements of the statutes were overmatched by what proved to be wholesale circumvention, including notably the invention and proliferation of political committees that purported to be independent and outside the knowledge and control of the candidates and designated campaign committees. The infinite ability to multiply committees eviscerated statutory limitations on contributions and expenditures. 19

The escalation of the 1972 election and the shock of its aftermath led to a call for comprehensive corrective measures. Congress found that federal election campaigns have become enormously expensive, with costs increasing at an “alarming” 20 rate. An estimated $400 million was spent in 1972 for nomination and election campaigns — almost a 300% increase since 1952, in a period when the consumer price index rose 57.6%. In 1972, Presidential campaign spending alone totaled $94.4 million — up 67 percent from $56.4 million in 1968; up 147 percent from $38.1 million in 1964; and up 247 percent from $27.2 million in 1960. Findings IIA, ¶ 51; I, ¶¶89, 93; Brief for Intervening Defendants at 34.

Congress found — in the words of the House Report:

The unchecked rise in campaign expenditures coupled with the absence of limitations on contributions and expenditures, has increased the dependence of candidates on special interest groups and large contributors. Under the present law the impression persists that a candidate can buy an election by simply spending large sums in a campaign. 21

The record documents the interaction of ever-increasing campaign expenditures, and reliance on large contributions from monied and special interests. • By 1974, as the agreed findings establish, one percent of the people accounted for 90 percent of the dollars contributed to federal candidates, political parties and committees. 22 Just 2-3 percent, the wealthiest people in the country, are responsible for about 95 percent of the financing for Congressional elections. 23

The sheer volume of special interest group money is enormous. The findings identify for the 1972 and 1974 elections not only the millions of total contributions by labor groups, business groups, health groups and agricultural groups, 24 but also how large they loom to individual candidates. 25

Plaintiffs say the need to seek contributions is a democratic check on candi *189 dates. The contention has some merit, dependent on moderation. In practice, however, candidates were compelled to allot to fund raising increasing and extreme amounts of time and energy. Senator Hollings testified that survival required candidates for national office to “set down a policy where they won’t go see people other than those who can give money.” 26 Joseph Cole, finance chairman for the Democratic National Committee, testified from his experience in some four or five Presidential campaigns, how dog-tired candidates must arise early in pursuit of large contributions, and continue “all day long and all night long.” — “[How] much time do you think a Presidential candidate spends on fund raising? ... at least 70 percent of his time, and I think all of his waking hours. It is really demeaning, demeaning to go through it.” 27

In advocating public subsidy to relieve candidates of “potentially corroding dependence on personal or family fortune or the gifts of special interest backers,” Senator Biden referred to the pressure on candidates to avoid speaking out on issues lest campaign funds be cut off. 28

Senator Russell Long pinned the pervasive problem in these words: 29

[W]hen you are talking in terms of large campaign contributions . the distinction between a campaign contribution and a bribe is almost a hair’s line difference

The quality of political contributions as denotive of freedom of thought and association must be reappraised realistically, so far as large contributions are concerned, in the light of the common practice of many large donors of contributing to both candidates for the same office. The agreed findings establish that during the 1974 Congressional elections, 120 registered interest groups gave contributions on 278 occasions, totaling over $676,000, to two or more candidates running for the same office. 30 Contributions to both parties were made in 1972 by Gulf Oil (illegal contributions — to President Nixon, Senator Jackson, and Congressman Mills), and by American Milk Producers, Inc., a large dairy cooperative whose legal and illegal contributions were made to Nixon, Mills, and Humphrey. 31

Large contributions are intended to, and do, gain access to the elected official after the campaign for consideration of the contributor’s particular concerns. 32 Senator Mathias not only describes this but also the corollary, that the feeling that big contributors gain special treatment produces a reaction that the average American has no significant role in the political process. 33

The concepts of political trust (trust in government) and its converse, political cynicism and alienation, are the subject of agreed findings. Illustrative is the trend revealed by the polls seeking responses to this question.

*190 Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? 34

1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974

For benefit of all 64.0% 53.0% 51.8% 40.6% 43.4% 21.3%

Few big interests 29.0 34.0 39.2 49.6 48.4 69.9

Other/Depends/Both Checked 4.0 6.0 4.6 , 5.0 2.5

Don’t Know 3.0 7.0 4.3 4.8 5.8 8.8

TOTAL 100.0%' 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Congress and the public had become informed of the various aspects of the 1972 campaign. 35 Revelations of huge contributions from the dairy industry, 36 a number of corporations 37 (illegally) and ambassadors and potential ambassadors, *191 38 made the 1972 election a watershed for public confidence in the electoral system. Such matters dramatize rather than define the widespread concerns over the problem of undue influence. After extensive investigation, Congress concluded that such corrupt and pernicious practices are more likely to occur when there are no effective limits on amount of campaign expenditure. In short, big-spending campaigns pull like a magnetic field.

Congress knew there were no absolute guarantees that its reforms — the combination of strengthened disclosures, shrinkage of total campaign expenditures, and provision of public funds in amounts (hopefully sufficient for the purpose) authorized by taxpayers — would achieve the objective of curbing the excesses of campaign financing permeated by contributions of monied and special interests.

But Congress knew, too, that the perfect can be the enemy of the good, and that inaction, for whatever reason, may breed a noxious reaction. The statute was responsive to Congress’s finding of “a definite need for effective and comprehensive legislation in this [campaign finance] area to restore and strengthen public confidence in the integrity of the political process” — confidence that had declined, at least in part, because of campaign financing abuses. 39

Standard for Review of Campaign Measures Passed by Congress

It is a salient contention of plaintiffs that political contributions and expenditures are so permeated with the freedoms of speech, press and political association 40 guaranteed by the First Amendment that they are not constitutionally subject to restriction in amount.

We disagree. In our view, the pertinent standard is that set forth by the Supreme Court, albeit in another context, in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 , 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1679 , 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (footnotes omitted):

This Court has held that when “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must.appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free *192 expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

The constitutional power of Congress to regulate federal elections (including the pre-election stages) is extensive. 41 Here the Government has a clear and compelling interest in safeguarding the integrity of elections and avoiding the undue influence of wealth. Both the reality and appearance of electoral corruption justify Congressional intervention.

Ours is a nation that respects the drive of private profit and the pursuit of gain, but does not exalt wealth thereby achieved to undue preference in fundamental rights. The right to vote cannot be conditioned on a poll tax. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 , 86 S.Ct. 1079 , 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966). No compelling interest justifies restriction of voting on general obligation municipal bonds to real property taxpayers. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 , 90 S.Ct. 1990 , 26 L.Ed.2d 523 (1970). In Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 , 92 S.Ct. 849 , 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972), the Court held that huge filing fees as a condition of getting on the ballot were an unconstitutional impediment to candidates based on disparity of wealth. Even a moderate fee cannot be required of an impecunious candidate without providing a reasonable alternative means of ballot access. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 , 94 S.Ct. 1315 , 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974). The principle of equality in political suffrage rights has the constitutional footing of the “one man, one vote” principle. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 526 , 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964).

It would be strange indeed if, by extrapolation outward from the basic rights of individuals, the wealthy few could claim a constitutional guarantee to a stronger political voice than the unwealthy many because they are able to give and spend more money, and because the amounts they give and spend cannot be limited.

The Constitution also takes account of the governmental interest in curbing the appearance of undue influence, in order to avoid the corrosion of public confidence that is indispensable to democratic survival. In Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 , 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2890 , 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973), Justice White articulated this:

[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.

There is a positive offset to plaintiffs’ invocation of the First Amendment in the presentation by intervening defendants that the statute taken as a whole affirmatively enhances First Amendment values. By reducing in good measure disparity due to wealth, the Act tends to equalize both the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes, and the opportunity of all interested citizens to become candidates for elective federal office. This broadens the choice of candidates and the opportunity to hear a variety of views.

*193 We are not here concerned with a complete ban on political activity—such as has been adopted for corporations, labor unions, and government employees. In 1973 the Court reaffirmed the ban on government employees on the principle that the balance struck by Congress was permissible, in view of the important interests served, “if the Government is to operate effectively and fairly [and] elections are to play their proper part in representative government . . . ,” 42 Here, however, we are not concerned with a ban on political activity, but with a limitation on amount, without any discrimination based on party or orientation of speech or activity.

To the extent that prohibitions and restraints—imposed by the Act in service of the compelling government interest in insuring the integrity of federal elections against undue influence—-work incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms, these constraints, broadly considered, are necessary to assure the integrity of federal elections. 43

Plaintiffs rely on a contention, derived from Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 , 81 S.Ct. 247 , 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960), that the legislature’s end “can be more narrowly achieved” with “less drastic means” and less restriction on freedoms.

The doctrine of “less drastic means” has particular scope when the court is concerned with the types of regulatory methods used by the legislature. If it is satisfied that some limit on contributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000. On questions of degree, of drawing the line, sound doctrine gives Congress latitude for reasonable judgments 44 unless the degree of regulation is so stark as to border on prohibition. 45

Ultimately it is plaintiffs’ position that the legislation under attack is doomed by its comprehensiveness 46 and that reporting and disclosure are sufficient intrusion. However, the combination of measures reflects a legislative conviction that the intermesh of reinforcing measures is needed to cope with the grave abuses. We see no principled basis on which a court can displace the legislative judgment that reporting and disclosure are necessary, but not sufficient, remedies to achieve the objective of trammeling “the pernicious influence of ‘big money’ campaign contributions.” 47 The judgments of Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root 48 have been borne out by our experience—for in large part the circumvention of this century’s legislation has led in practice to *194 little more than reporting requirements. If to some extent more recent measures would have closed earlier gaps, there remains the inherent dilemma of handling the familiar phenomenon of contributions consummated and reported in the closing stages of a campaign. More important still is the legislative conviction that full reporting will not cope with the undue influence problem inherent in the conditions of the 1970’s, with massive campaigns escalating in volume, and candidates increasingly driven to concentrate on ever-mounting contributions. The wiles of ambitious office seekers and their supporters are not easily cabined.

The provisions for public financing, which will be discussed in some detail, are not to be viewed in isolation, but as part of a series of reinforcing measures to protect elections against the abuse of corruption and undue influence. So, too, with the mechanism provided by Congress for monitoring its objectives — the Federal Election Commission. Certain constitutional questions are presented by this agency’s structure, and they will be considered. In assessing the past ineffectiveness of federal election legislation, Congress was rightfully concerned with the need for continuous bi-partisan monitoring, and with the problems posed if total responsibility is assigned to a President whose election may be the product of practices that demand review.

Defendants go too far in saying that this is ordinary legislation, entitled to the conventional presumption of validity that would be applicable, say, to economic regulation. In view of the interests involved, both the compelling government interest needed to sustain such provisions, and the associational freedoms that are impinged, strict judicial scrutiny of the challenged provisions is appropriate.

The need for exacting judicial scrutiny is underscored by the plaintiffs’ contention that the legislation is a composite of measures that serve the interests of the “ins” — members of Congress already elected — in resisting the incursions of the “outs.” Such a contention, if substantial, is a warning signal that dilutes the deference courts give to legislatures, at least until the matter is painstakingly considered. In any event, we are aware that serious constitutional questions are raised by measures that may inhibit potential candidates. 49 And in pondering the certified questions we have closely scrutinized plaintiffs’ contentions.

In the light of this scrutiny, we do find one section, 2 U.S.C. § 437a, unconstitutional on First Amendment right of association and free speech grounds. Section 437a was injected by the Conference Committee, is not a core section and is plainly severable from the balance of the legislation. With this exception, it is the view of the court, considering only those challenged provisions now ripe for judicial examination because they exert an “inhibitory effect” 50 *195 by their very existence, that the core provisions of the challenged acts do not violate the First Amendment’s guarantees of fundamental freedoms. We discuss them briefly below, especially those provisions the facial meaning of which has given us difficulty; we leave for future litigation framed in the context of concrete facts the validity of other provisions and of all provisions as applied.

II. Synopsis of the Key Provisions of the Challenged Acts

Because the statutory provisions in suit are complex, comprehensive, and interrelated, we present a brief outline of the statutory framework before turning to the certified constitutional questions.

Contribution and Expenditure Limitations

A person 51 may make a contribution 52 of up to $1000 to a candidate 53 for a *196 federal office 54 in his or her primary race, and another contribution of up to $1000 for his or her general election. 18 U.S.C. § 608 (b)(1). This is because the law treats general, special, primary, and runoff elections as separate, distinct elections. Id. § 591(a). There is an exception to this rule for the various state Presidential primaries, which are all treated as a single primary for contribution purposes only. Id. § 608(b)(5). 55

The law allows an individual to make contributions of up to $25,000 in any calendar year, id. § 608(b)(3), which would mear., for example, $1000 for a Presidential candidate’s primary, $1000 for a Presidential candidate’s November election, and up to twenty-three other primary or general election contributions of up to $1000 to candidates for federal office (Senate and House) around the country. For purposes of the $25,000 ceiling, the law treats all contributions made in connection with the same election season as made in the year of the general election. Id. And it treats contributions to a Vice Presidential candidate as contributions to his Presidential running mate. Id. § 608(b)(4)(B). No contribution of currency may, in the aggregate, exceed $100. Id. § 615(a).

In addition to making political contributions of up to $25,000 per year, a person may make unlimited outlays to voice his views on public issues and campaign issues, subject only to the limitation that if he makes an expenditure 56 “relative *197 to a clearly identified candidate” and “advocating the election or defeat of such candidate” all expenditures relative to that candidate may not exceed $1000. Id. § 608(e). There is no provision analogous to the $25,000 ceiling on contributions, so presumably a person may make expenditures of up to $1000 relative to an unlimited number of candidates for federal office.

A political committee 57 may make contributions of up to $5000 to a candidate, provided that the committee has been registered with the Federal Election Commission for more than six months. Id. § 608(b)(2).

Candidate expenditure ceilings permit overall spending of $10,000,000 in all Presidential primaries, although in any *198 given state the ceiling is twice the Senatorial primary ceiling. Id. § 608(c)(1)(A). Candidates for President in the general election may spend no more than $20,-000,000. Id. § 608(c)(1)(B). Those seeking nomination for election as Senator may expend only eight cents times the voting age population of the state, or one hundred thousand dollars if that sum is larger. Id. § 608(c)(1)(C). In Senatorial general elections, the expenditure limitation is twelve cents times the voting age population, or one hundred fifty thousand dollars if that sum is larger. Id. § 608(c)(1)(D). In House races in states entitled to only one Representative, the Senatorial limits apply. Id. § 608(c)(1)(C), (D). In all other House races, the candidate may spend seventy' thousand dollars in the primary, and the identical sum in the general election. Id. § 608(c)(1)(E). 58 In addition to the sums specified above, each candidate may spend up to twenty per cent of the applicable expenditure limit under section 608(c) solely for the purpose of soliciting contributions, without those disbursements being considered “expenditures” and therefore without their being counted against the candidate’s overall expenditure ceiling. Id. § 591(f)(4)(H).

Notwithstanding any of the above provisions or limitations, the national committee of a political party and a state committee or its geographic subdivisions may make the following expenditures with respect to the general elections of affiliated candidates for federal office:

1.For President: not greater than two cents times the voting age population (VAP) of the United States by the national committee only (at the present time, the VÁP of the United States is approximately 141 million, providing a sum in excess of $2.8 million).

2. For Senator, or Representative in a state entitled to only one Representative: two cents times the voting age population of the state, or $20,000 if greater.

3. For all other House races: $10,000.

Id. § 608(f). The expenditure ceilings set for candidates and national and state party committees shall be annually adjusted to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index. Id. § 608(d). 59

As indicated above, no national bank or corporation organized by authority of any law of Congress may make political contributions or expenditures of any sort in any federal, state, or local election. Id. § 610. All corporations and labor organizations are prohibited from making any contribution or expenditure in Presidential, Senatorial or House primaries, caucuses, conventions or general elections. Id. Voluntary segregated funds to which shareholders of a corporation or members of a labor union contribute are excepted from this ban and treated as political committees. Id.; see id. § 591(d).

Section 9008 of Subtitle H limits the national convention expenditures of national committees of major and minor parties to $2 million, adjusted annually for changes in the cost of living. 26 U.S.C. § 9008 . The Commission may au *199 thorize an exception to this limitation if, “due to extraordinary and unforeseen circumstances, such expenditures are necessary to assure the effective operation of the presidential nominating convention by such committee.” Id. § 9008(d)(3).

In addition to the individual contribution and independent expenditure limits discussed above, the law tightly limits the use of personal and immediate family funds by candidates. No more than $50,000 of such monies can be expended by a candidate for President or Vice President, $35,000 in the case of a Senatorial candidate or a House candidate in a state entitled to only one Representative, and $25,000 in the case of a House candidate in any other state. 18 U.S.C. § 608 (a)(1). This ceiling is an overall limit, and thus the candidate may not apply it to each separate stage of the electoral process, i. e. nomination, convention, and election. Id. Immediate family “means a candidate’s spouse, and any child, parent, grandparent, brother, or sister of the candidate, and the spouses of such persons.” Id. § 608(a)(2).

Disclosure Requirements

Political committees must keep detailed records of individuals contributing in excess of $10, and these nondisclosed records are subject to audit by the Commission. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432 , 438. The political committee must disclose the name, occupation and principal place of business of anyone who contributes in excess of $100. Id. § 434(b)(2). All persons who contribute or expend in excess of $100 must file with the Commission if their transaction was not with a political committee or candidate. Id. § 434(e). Members of Congress, however, are not required to report either as contributions received or expenditures made, the value of photographic or recording services furnished to officeholders by the House and Senate bureaucracies or the national party Congressional committees, except in the year of an election. Id. § 434(d).

Persons (other than individuals) who expend funds or do acts directed to the public for the purpose of influencing the election or advocating election or defeat of candidates shall file with the Commission in the same manner as a political committee. Id. § 437a. Government publications, news stories, commentaries, and editorials in bona fide publications are exempt. Id.

Public Financing

Unlike the contribution and expenditure limitation provisions and the disclosure requirements, which apply to all campaigns for federal elective office, the public financing provisions apply only to contests for the Presidency.

The Presidential Election Campaign Fund, established by section 9006 of Subtitle H, is funded with revenue monies that are transferred to the Fund by the Secretary of the Treasury in accord with the wishes of taxpayers checking off one and two dollar sums on their income tax returns under 26 U.S.C. § 6096 . Individuals and joint taxpayers may express only a desire to transfer monies to the Fund, or to withhold them; unlike earlier proposals, the statute does not authorize them to indicate a candidate or party preference.

Federal funds are to be applied to three stages of ballot access and election in the Presidential campaign: Presidential primaries, nominating conventions, and the general election itself. Pursuant to priorities established in id. §§ 9008(a), 9037(a), monies must first be expended to finance the national nominating conventions, then the general election, and, if sums remain, the primary races.

Chapter 95 of Subtitle H establishes three categories of parties — major parties, minor parties, and new parties — for the purpose of allocating monies from the Presidential Election Campaign Fund. A major party is defined as one whose candidate in the preceding Presidential election received 25 percent or more of the total popular vote. Id. § 9002(6). A minor party is defined as one whose candidate for President in the previous election received 5 percent or more of the popular vote, but less than *200 25 percent. Id. § 9002(7). All other parties are deemed “new parties.” Id. § 9002(8).

Section 9008 of Subtitle H, which limits major party convention spending to $2 million, provides an identical sum as the public funding entitlement of a major party for its national convention. The convention financing entitlement of a minor party is determined by computing the ratio between the minor party’s share of the previous popular vote and the average share of all major parties. No comparable funding is provided for nominating conventions for new parties, or for parties which choose not to conduct a convention, or for independent candidacies. Major and minor parties may receive payments beginning on July 1 of the year prior to the convention. Id. § 9008(e).

The major-minor-new party division, which attempts to apportion public funding for conventions without allowing raids upon the Fund by wholly frivolous or doomed candidacies, is also used to establish threshold requirements for general election funding. A provision of Subtitle H provides equal general election funding of $20 million for all major party candidates. Id. § 9004(a). As a condition of public funding, however, a candidate must agree to furnish to the Commission, upon request by the Commission, certain books, records, and evidence of qualified expenses (defined at id. § 9002(11)), and also to submit to a Commission audit of his qualified campaign expenses. Id. § 9003(a). Further, a major party candidate may not incur qualified campaign expenses in excess of his public funding entitlement. Id. § 9003(b)(1). And a major party candidate must certify that he will not accept private funding, except to the ■ extent that the Fund is incapable of providing the full entitlement of public monies. Id. § 9003(b)(2).

The entitlement of the minor party candidates to public funding in the general election is computed on the basis of the ratio of the minor party’s share of the popular vote in the previous Presidential election to the average share of the major parties. Id. § 9004(a)(2)(A). Unlike major party candidates, those of minor parties, who are not entitled to full public funding, need not certify that they will not accept private funding, but must certify that they will abide by the overall Presidential expenditure ceiling. Id. § 9003(c).

Subtitle H also provides for retroactive payments to candidates of minor or new parties who either garner more votes than their track record would have indicated (minor parties) or who had no previous track record (new parties). To discourage frivolous campaigns designed to obtain public funding, 5 percent of the total popular vote is the minimum cutoff for public financing, and candidates who fail to meet that cutoff are not entitled to retroactive funding. Minor party candidates receiving pre-election funding are entitled, post-election, only to the difference between the entitlement based upon previous track record and the entitlement reckoned on actual vote count. Id. § 9004(a)(3).

Subtitle H establishes different paths to general election funding by defining “candidate” in two different ways: either the nominee of a major party, or an individual qualified to have his name (or those of electors pledged to him) on the ballot of 10 or more states. Id. § 9002(2). Thus, while candidacies of independents, new parties, or minor parties not holding conventions are not entitled to any analog of public funding for conventions, they may be entitled to general election funding (albeit after the election in the case of a nonestablished candidacy).

The third stage of the Presidential selection process which may receive public funding is the nominating primary (actually a series of state-by-state primaries). Because the number of participants is largest at this earliest stage of a campaign, the law imposes stringent threshold requirements to restrict public expenditures to the category of serious contenders.

*201 Chapter 96 of Subtitle H is known as the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act. As with general election funding, certification that the candidate will abide by the overall and state-by-state expenditure ceilings is a prerequisite for eligibility. Id. § 9033. Public payments for primaries draw upon a simple matching fund; for every qualified dollar raised in private contributions, the Account will give the candidate one dollar in public funds. Although every eligible candidate is entitled to receive contributions of up to $1000 from every individual, 18 U.S.C. § 608 (b)(1), the Act provides matching funds only for the first $250 of each contribution. 26 U.S.C. § 9034 (a).

The threshold formula is also somewhat complex. Chapter 96 clearly deems eligible for matching funds only a candidate “seeking nomination by a political party for election to the office of President of the United States.” Id. § 9033(b)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, any candidate claiming to pursue an independent (nonparty) route to the ballot is ineligible for this portion of public financing. To be eligible for matching, a candidate is required to have raised $5000 in private primary contributions in each of at least 20 states, and only the first $250 of any person’s contribution counts toward this $5000.

The public funding provisions of Subtitle H manifestly dovetail with the contribution and expenditure ceilings set in FECA, and they should be viewed as complementary stratagems.

III. In Limine Questions

Our first inquiry must be into the meaning and application of the major review provision of FECA, section 315(a), codified as 2 U.S.C. § 437h. 60 By its plain words, the first sentence is a broad grant of legislative standing to sue, 61 embracing any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of President. However, this does not entitle the eligible plaintiffs to raise any conceivable constitutional issue with respect to the Act and the relevant criminal sections, no matter how remote or speculative. We perceive no congressional intent to waive article Ill’s requirement that there be a present “case or controversy.” 62 The declaratory judgment, often seen as the outer limits of article III jurisdiction, nevertheless requires that there be an actual controversy. 63

In answer to Constitutional Question No. I, 64 therefore, we reply that since nothing *in the first sentence of Section 437h must be read to require rendering an advisory opinion, no violation of the “case or controversy” requirement of article III, section 2 appears. Congress was concerned with the inhibitory effect of a massive rearrangement of regulations operating upon federal campaigns *202 and elections, 65 and wanted election participants to be permitted expeditiously to test the facial validity of limitations and requirements imposed by the challenged Acts. Consistent, however, with the underlying need for “case or controversy,” actions are not to be decided unless the inhibitory effects of the challenged provisions are “definite and concrete,” “touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests,” and “admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character.” 66

Seen through the lens of “inhibitory effect,” Question No. 2 67 may be answered, “Yes, subject to considerations of ripeness.” Each of the plaintiffs has shown enough injury to maintain a “case or controversy” as to one or more issues — but not for all issues, since a number of issues are held not ripe for resolution in the factual context underlying certification.

IV. Contribution and Expenditure Limitations

Limitations on Contributions

The ample power of Congress to regulate federal elections 68 embraces, in our view, the power to adopt per candidate and over-all limitations on the amount that an individual or political committee may contribute in the context of federal elections and primaries.

Question 3(b) 69 certifies the question whether FECA’s limitations on contributions to or for a candidate are constitutional. We believe that in the context of past abuses and present needs the statutory contribution limit of $1,000 per candidate per election 70 (with primary and general elections counted as two separate elections) 71 serves a com *203 pelling governmental interest. Nor do we find constitutionally infirm the provision limiting to $25,000 the total contributions permitted in any calendar year. 72

Limitations on Independent Expenditures Relative to a Clearly Identified Candidate

Question 3(d) 73 inquires as to the validity of the $1,000 limitation upon expenditures “relative to a clearly identified candidate,” 74 (as distinguished from contributions 75 ).

This provision is new, and its importance arises from the strict limitation in FECA upon contributions for the benefit of a candidate, whether made directly, to an agent, or to any political committee supporting him. 18 U.S.C. § 608 (b)(6). Prior to FECA, the limitations on contributions were widely circumvented by the multiplication of so-called independent committees. With FECA’s closing of this loophole, Congress foresaw another: that large independent expenditures by individuals and groups advocating the candidate’s election or urging defeat of his opponent might effectively circumvent the individual contribution limitations of section 608(b) and the candidate expenditure ceilings of section 608(c). An expenditure may obviously inure to the benefit of a candidate even though the expenditure was not directed by the candidate and the candidate was not in *204 control of the expenditure or of the goods or services purchased.

We hold that the limitation on expenditures relative to a clearly identified candidate is a necessary and constitutional means of closing a loophole that would otherwise destroy the effectiveness of other statutory provisions. 76 But section 608(e) is a loophole-closing provision only, and it bars only those expenditures directly relative to a clearly identified candidate. We underline the statute’s phrase “advocating the election or defeat of such candidate” and give it a restrictive reading.

Section 608(e) parallels the general $1,000 limit on contributions so as to cover an expenditure by a person that is “relative to a clearly identified candidate” even though it was not made at the request of a candidate or his agent or authorized committee. The term “clearly identified” requires a clear reference to the candidate — either by name, photograph, or drawing, or some other unambiguous reference. In our view, in addition to a clear and unambiguous reference, the expenditure must clearly be “advocating the election or defeat of such candidate.” Further, expenditures relative to clearly identified candidates stand in contradistinction to expenditures relating primarily to issues of public policy, and the latter are not limited at all by the challenged Acts. An expenditure relating primarily to issues of public policy does, not become subject to the $1,000 limitation merely because it contains a clear and unambiguous reference to a candidate, unaccompanied by a message advocating election or defeat; e. g., a list of those in support of or in opposition to the relevant issue position. The test, then, is whether the expenditure (or the publicity which it buys) taken as a whole amounts to a clear advocacy of the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.

Limitations on Use of Personal Funds of Candidate and Family

We next consider Question 3(a) 77 , which focuses on the provisions in section 608(a) 78 limiting candidate out-of-pocket and out-of-family-pocket expenditures. These provisions were added by *205 the FECA of 1971 79 to a scheme that did not then include either contribution limits or overall expenditure ceilings.

Plaintiffs attacked these provisions in the First Amended Complaint as too restrictive, 80 and in brief as a lax loophole in the $1,000 contribution ceiling. 81 Clearly, the personal and family funds expenditure limitation of the FECA of 1971 and the contribution limitations of the FECAA of 1974 operate together to avoid any gaping loophole such as plaintiffs suggest. In fact, the out-of-pocket and out-ofrfamily-pocket expenditure provisions merely serve to relax the $1,000 per candidate contribution limit for a candidate and his immediate family. Section 608(a) does not serve, however, to relax the section 608(b)(3) $25,-000 contribution ceiling. The latter provision, enacted after the limitation on out-of-pocket and out-of-family-pocket expenditures, contains no exception for a candidate’s family members. Thus, a family member’s participation in the candidate’s § 608(a)(1) expenditures must be deemed a “contribution” under § 608(b), and counted against the family member’s § 608(b)(3) $25,000 contribution ceiling.

Similarly, § 608(c), 82 which establishes the candidate's overall campaign expenditure ceilings, was enacted after the FECA of 1971 personal funds limitation and contains no exception for personal and family funds. Thus, a candidate entitled to make expenditures from personal or family funds in his race for federal office must count those expenditures towards the applicable overall expenditure ceiling.

Furthermore, section 608(a) does not affect at all the operation of section 608(e), 83 which was enacted after the FECA of 1971 and which limits expenditures relative to a clearly identified candidate to $1,000. Candidates and their family members are treated identically with other persons; the right of family members to make up to $1,000 in independent expenditures relative to a clearly identified candidate (whether within the family or not) is unfettered.

Thus read, it can be seen that the chief strength of these provisions is that they provide a candidate the opportunity to raise quickly, free of the $1,000 limitation on loans as well as gifts, 84 a portion of the applicable overall expenditure limit for use as either “seed money" or an end-of-campaign countercharge cushion. 85 We believe that Congress may treat the personal monies of a candidate and family monies attributed *206 to a candidate differently, to some extent, from monies raised from the public at large, and could conclude with good reason that the flexibility section 608(a) provides a candidate is beneficial. Manifestly, the core problem of avoiding undisclosed and undue influence on candidates from outside interests has lesser application when the monies involved come from the candidate himself or from his immediate family. Congress was not acting unreasonably when it chose to make some reasonable distinction on this basis and to give the candidate and family a greater latitude to “contribute” while still subjecting such intrafamily transactions to the flat contribution ceiling and to the limitation upon independent expenditures.

If these provisions governed only the personal funds of candidates, they might favor the wealthy, but given the number of individuals who are considered to be within his “immediate family”, even a candidate in modest circumstances obtains the flexibility to raise useful sums, while a wealthy one is restricted by the family ceiling as to the percentage of family assets that may be brought to bear. Moreover, the ratio of permitted family expenditures to overall expenditure ceilings is such that in all federal election campaigns not wholly publicly-funded, a candidate desiring to conduct a hard-hitting campaign will be compelled to go to the populace to raise most of his funds. Thus, section 608(a) establishes additional candidate options without raising barriers to more modestly circumstanced candidacies and without substantially undermining movement toward equalized spending by very rich and very poor candidates.

Limitations on Volunteers’ Incidental Expenses

Question 3(c) 86 asks whether constitutional rights are''violated by the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 591 (e) 87 and § 608(b), 88 which limit the incidental expenses that volunteers working in a political campaign may incur to amounts specified in the statute. As background, we note that the challenged provisions treat volunteer campaign assistance differently from the donation of money. *207 We believe that it is rational for Congress to do so, because the history of campaign abuses recently brought to light reflects major abuses in campaign financing, not in volunteer activities. Plaintiffs contend that donation of money and volunteering of services must be treated similarly because they are substantially fungible. But we believe that the differences outweigh the similarities, particularly with respect to the potential for abuse, and that those differences are a valid basis for differential treatment. The possibility of abuse in volunteer activities is at present conjectural and speculative. When and if such abuses develop, the court, taking into account whatever Congress does or fails to do, can consider such legal attacks as may then lie.

With the basis for this distinction in mind, we turn to the specific issue raised by the certified question. Under section 591(e)(5)(A), “the value of services provided without compensation by individuals who volunteer a portion or all of their time” is specifically excluded from the definition of “contribution.” Thus, no estimate is made of the dollar worth of a volunteer’s time nor is that amount counted against the volunteer’s section 608(b) per candidate contribution limitation of $1,000. But certain categories of financial outlays by volunteers are excluded from the definition of “contribution” only to the extent that they do not exceed $500. Thus, if a volunteer provides a candidate or political committee with coffee-klatch type functions in the volunteer’s residence, see id. § 591(e)(5)(B), or supplies food or beverages to the campaign at cost (thereby foregoing a normal vendor’s profit), see id. § 591(e)(5)(C), or makes unreimbursed travel expenses while rendering personal services, see § 591(e)(5)(D), the value of those activities will be deemed a contribution from volunteer to candidate to the extent that it exceeds' $500. That contribution is then chargeable to the volunteer’s section 608(b) limit of $1,000 with respect to the recipient candidate.

It can readily be seen that “contribution” treatment for incidental volunteer expenses in excess of some reasonable amount is a necessary loophole-closing provision, designed to prevent contributions by indirection. To allow a volunteer no financial elbow room would tend to reduce desirable political participation, but the specific sum chosen as the cutoff point for non-contribution treatment is reasonable legislative line-drawing. We view this loophole-closing device in light of the concerns of the Congress, and we conclude that it allows sufficient flexibility for effective volunteer campaign assistance, without opening the door to wholesale circumvention of contribution and expenditure limits.

Limitations on Convention Expenditures

Question 3(f) 89 asks whether Subtitle H violates constitutional rights in that it limits a national committee’s expenditures with respect to its national nominating convention for President. 90 *208 That limitation is contained in 26 U.S.C. § 9008 (d), which establishes a $2 million ceiling on convention expenditures for both major and minor parties. 91 If public funding is available, 92 major parties are entitled to receive $2 million, and minor parties are entitled to a pro rata share based on voting success in the preceding Presidential election. All entitlements are subject to cost-of-living adjustments.

The primary purpose of a national convention is, of course, to select a party’s candidates for President and Vice-President. The national convention, a democratic and open feature of the American political process, is thus a great occasion when the adherents of a party come together from the various states, formally and informally, to weld a national party.

Clearly, the legislation challenged in this suit reflects a recognition by Congress of the value of and need for national nominating conventions. Indeed, in establishing limitations on convention expenditures, Congress sought to assure an adequate source of funds for conducting the convention while at the same time preventing massive convention expenditures that would serve to launch and promote the campaign of its nominees. 93 We do not believe that Congress acted unreasonably in attempting to prevent circumvention of the limitations in section 608 on candidate campaign expenditures, especially given Congressional awareness of the ingenuity displayed in the past in circumventing campaign control measures.

As is often the case with loophole-closing provisions, the question thus becomes one of degree. On the basis of the record before us, especially in light of the fact that no party has challenged the $2 million ceiling as inadequate on the ground that it does not provide sufficient funds with which to conduct a convention, we have no basis for holding that the statutory limitation is unconstitutional.

Time Restriction on Higher ($5,000) Contribution Limit For Political Committees

Question 3(h) 94 asks whether there is a constitutional violation in the statute’s requirement, 18 U.S.C. § 608 (b)(2), 95 that a political committee be registered for “not less than 6 months” before being entitled to the higher ($5,000) contribution limit under the challenged Acts. Clearly, this provision only incidentally impedes the freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, because it does not prevent individuals from drawing together to act as a political committee at any time. Rather, it is a loophole-closing provision intended to prevent proliferation of dummy committees, each of a few persons, in support of federal candidacies. Otherwise, two or three persons could acquire the $5,000 committee contribution authority of section 608(b)(2) merely *209 by organizing themselves as a political committee. The challenged Act limits such bootstrapping by interposing a six-month protective shield. During the waiting period, such political committees would be subject to the reporting and disclosures provisions of 2 U.S.C. § 434 .

Suggestion that “Contribution” Definition Limits News Stories

Question 3(g) asks whether there is a constitutional infirmity in specifically exempting news stories, commentaries, and editorials from limits applied to “expenditures,” without a parallel exemption from “contribution” treatment. 96 Plaintiff Human Events, Inc., a publisher of political matter, contends that its First Amendment rights are violated by this unequal statutory treatment. It suggests that it will be exposed to charges of illegal corporate contributions based on publication of copy respecting candidates for federal office. This contention, however, is based on a misunderstanding. The concept of “contribution” 97 extends only to placing something of value into the control of a candidate or his agents. Since a news story, commentary, or editorial is not within the control of the candidate or his agents, it is not a contribution, despite the obvious fact that it might redound to his benefit. The plain and simple reality is that Congress had no intention of controlling an independent press by this statute.

Since the concept of “expenditure” 98 is far broader, however, including even spending by a private citizen in support of a candidate where nothing of value is placed within the candidate’s control, publishing a news story, commentary, or editorial might arguably constitute an expenditure to benefit a candidate for federal office, and the specific exemption to foreclose that reading therefore makes sense. With the statute thus explained, plaintiffs have no reason to fear exposure to charges of illegal corporate contributions based on the publication of copy respecting a candidate for federal office.

Limitation on Expenditures by Candidates

Question 4(a) 99 asks about limitations upon overall campaign expenditures by candidates, provisions that in large measure track those addressed to contribution limits. Plaintiffs suggest that the governmental interest in preserving the purity of the electoral process by limiting skyrocketing campaign expenditures is not compelling. Moreover, plaintiffs argue that corruption can be controlled by less restrictive measures, such as bribery statutes and disclosure requirements. We disagree, and uphold the expenditure ceilings imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 608 (c) 100 as an essential *210 ingredient in the regulatory scheme propounded by this comprehensive legislation, one which reduces the incentive to circumvent direct contribution limits and bans.

From 1911 through the repeal of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act by FECA in 1972, overall expenditure ceilings were in effect for Senate and House races. 101 In the only prosecution ever brought thereunder, ceilings were held unconstitutional as applied to primary elections, on the ground that a party primary was not a federal election. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 247, 258 , 41 S.Ct. 469 , 65 L.Ed. 913 (1921). Federal authority to regulate primaries for federal office was established in the case of United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 , 61 S.Ct. 1031 , 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941). After Newberry , Congress acted to update federal election law, and enacted the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, which contained expenditure ceilings for general elections. Upholding that Act in Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 , 54 S.Ct. 287 , 78 L.Ed. 484 (1934), the Supreme Court said: “[I]t seems plain that the statute as a whole is calculated to discourage the making and use of contributions for purposes of corruption.” Id. at 548 , 54 S.Ct. at 291 . Although Burroughs did not involve a First Amendment challenge, and although the Court did not specifically discuss the overall expenditure ceilings, the case has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court in upholding the strictures of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act against attack on the grounds of denial of freedom of speech and association. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 , 74 S.Ct. 808 , 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). From the repeal of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act in 1972 until the effective date of the FECAA of 1974, Congress tried limitations upon media expenditures (which are presumably easier to track) in place of overall campaign ceilings. 102 In the FECAA of 1974, however, Congress again imposed overall limits.

*211 Plaintiffs suggest that Congress lacks the power to decide when a candidate for office has had “too much communication with the voters.” They argue that if the public is to benefit from full and robust debate of public issues and personalities, then the range of debate may not be limited. But given the power of money and its various uses, and abuses, in the context of campaigns, there is a compelling interest in its regulation notwithstanding incidental limitations on freedom of speech and political association.

Plaintiffs would buttress their argument by asserting that overall expenditure ceilings also infringe the right of potential donors to participate in the political process, by making it impossible or nugatory for them to give additional dollars to a candidate or campaign which has reached its expenditure limit. This latter argument avails plaintiffs nothing, for 2 U.S.C. § 439a 103 permits an officeholder or successful candidate for federal office to apply unspent contributions to “defray any ordinary and necessary expenses incurred by him in connection with his duties as a holder of Federal office,” or to contribute those funds in turn to any organization described in 26 U.S.C. § 170 (c), or to use the funds for any other lawful purpose. Such applications of unspent contributions must be disclosed to the Federal Election Commission. Under this provision, the private citizen is not deterred from giving his statutory maximum contribution, even if the maximum has already been spent on the campaign by the candidate. Further, if there are any political advantages to the donee candidate in receiving such donations, or in the association symbolized by accepting them, they can be realized. Overall expenditure ceilings allow the candidate to be selective as to which donors’ gifts he will accept.

In the context of overall expenditure ceilings, therefore, a discussion of the rights of the contributor is misplaced; overall expenditure limits primarily bear upon the candidate’s putative right to unlimited campaigning and the right of access to the political system for candidates of only modest means, since unlimited spending by an opponent may discourage challengers.

In the broad, our answer to the question concerning the limitation on candidate campaign expenditures is set forth in Part I of this opinion. The material there amply demonstrates a compelling) governmental interest, both as to need and public perception of need, that justifies any incidental impact on First Amendment freedoms. Plaintiffs argue that the Congressional objective may be achieved by a refined disclosure statute. 104 In view of the history of federal election laws and their circumvention, we have no principled basis for displacing the considered judgment of Congress that what was required in the national interest was a broader, more comprehensive approach.

*212

Claims of Discrimination in Favor of Incumbents

We have considered the charge that the limits set by Congress work an undue discrimination in favor of incumbents. Although plaintiffs sought findings in support of this theory, Judge Corcoran properly declined to provide such findings in light of the speculative nature of the assertions. The material available to the court looks both ways. 105 The political scientists draw diametric conclusions from the available information. Plaintiffs contend that only by immense expenditures can an unknown candidate compete. This may be correct for some candidates, in some situations. But it also is true that at other times a newcomer has achieved political momentum without large contributions. In a broad sense, the statute may favor relative newcomers, by limiting the access of incumbents to large donations. 106 Any advantage gained by incumbents from service to their constituents is neither *213 novel nor pernicious. Indeed, this may be a vindication of the principles of democracy.

Plaintiffs say that limits on contributions by individuals, with disclosure, suffice to avoid abuses of large contributions, and there is no warrant for controlling expenditures, with attendant restrictions on communication. Congress was of the view that limitation on expenditures was a key ingredient in control of abuses. Realistically, limitations on contributions and disclosure requirements pose almost insuperable enforcement problems, if not supplemented by limits on expenditures. The huge and escalating expenditures are a magnet for large contributions, and for circumventions. Expenditures must come out in public, at least when significant. Candidates who wish to forge links of association, and widen political appeal, are free to solicit modest contributions without limit. These several considerations provide a validating context for the judgment of Congress that expenditures must be subject to reasonable regulation.

V. Disclosure

A. Major Provisions

1. General Application

Question 7 107 asks the court to rule on the validity of the provisions in the challenged statutes requiring disclosure, in connection with elections for federal office, of contributions and expenditures in excess of stated cut-off points. Question 7(a) 108 addresses the statutory requirement that political committees keep, and make available for inspection and audit, lists of individuals who contribute more than $10. 109 The major disclosure provision, section *214 434(b), 110 is the subject of Question 7(b). 111 This provision requires candidates and political committees 112 to disclose the name, occupation, and place of *215 business of any person contributing in excess of $100.

Reporting and disclosure provisions were among the earliest measures passed by Congress (in 1910) and they have persisted, with changes from time to time, to the present day. The validity of such measures was sustained in Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547-48 , 54 S.Ct. 287 , 78 L.Ed. 484 (1934). Although the precise issue there decided was different from those urged today, the Burroughs opinion brings out the importance of the underlying governmental interest:

The power of Congress to protect the election of President and Vice-President from corruption being clear, the choice of means to that end presents a question primarily addressed to the judgment of Congress. . Congress reached the conclusion that public disclosure of political contributions, together with the names of contributors and other details, would tend to prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections. The verity of this conclusion reasonably cannot be denied. When to this is added the requirement . . . that the treasurer’s statement shall include full particulars in respect of expenditures, it seems plain that the statute as a whole is calculated to discourage the making and use of contributions for purposes of corruption.

Burroughs was cited with approval twenty years later in United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 816 , 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954), where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Warren, upheld against a First Amendment challenge an act requiring disclosure of contributions for lobbying:

[Congress] acted in the same spirit and for a similar purpose in passing the Federal Corrupt Practices Act — to maintain the integrity of a basic governmental process. See Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 , 54 S.Ct. 287, 290 , 78 L.Ed. 484 .

Now another twenty years has passed and we are asked to say that those decisions are subject to intervening rulings on the First Amendment freedom of political expression. We shall discuss this issue presently. It suffices at this juncture to say that, as a division of this court recently held, the Burroughs and Harriss decisions establish the facial validity of FECA’s requirement for reporting disclosure of contributions, in the absence of a factual record undercutting their standing. United States v. Finance Committee to Reelect the President, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 371 , 507 F.2d 1194 (1974). We are broadly in accord with the reasoning in Stoner v. Fortson, 379 F.Supp. 704 (N.D.Ga.1974), where a three-judge district court found that the governmental interest in preserving the democratic process justified a state statute requiring disclosure of contributions of $101 or more.

With that general background, we turn to particular aspects of FECA, and begin with the record keeping and auditing provisions that permit the Federal Election Commission to inspect the lists kept by political committees of individuals who contribute more than $10. These audit provisions neither explicitly nor implicitly authorize disclosure by the Commission of contribution *216 records. Consequently, the confidential status of those records precludes any claim of real or threatened injury to plaintiffs’ First Amendment interests arising from public disclosure. We discern no basis in the statute for authorizing disclosure outside the Commission in the absence of probable cause to suspect a violation, and hence no substantial “inhibitory effect” operating upon plaintiffs at this time. Whether upon discovery of an apparent violation disclosure may be made as an incident of audit is a question that does not have sufficient “ripeness” at this time. The point of audit is soon enough to raise specific issues about the constitutionality of the audit provisions.

As to the provisions for disclosure of contributions over $100, plaintiffs suggest that they do not disagree that the concept of disclosure is constitutional, but argue that the threshold values in FECA are too low, and therefore not minimally intrusive. We disagree. Since the individual contribution limit is set at $1000, disclosure limited to amounts in excess thereof would be tantamount to requiring those committing a crime to file reports of their offense. A disclosure law serves the function of informing the electorate, 113 and must also function as an effective enforcement tool and loophole-closing device. Unless the disclosure threshold is set substantially below the contribution limit, patterns of giving (such as by all or most of the members of an interest group) will pass unnoticed. The legislature must have reasonable latitude as to where to draw the line.

In this case, the legislature dispensed with routine reporting of contributions of $100 or less — an exemption that reaches a large percentage of contributions, permits substantial participation by those concerned with political privacy, and provides elbow room for parties to raise substantial funds from modest contributions. In view of these considerations, we have no basis for holding that this approach by the legislature to the complex problems involved in drawing the line exceeded the bounds of reasonable latitude.

2. Minor Parties

The argument is made that whatever the validity of the reasons for disclosure with respect to major parties they have no application to minor parties, new parties and independents, and that new parties and independents in particular should be allowed to carry on their financial affairs secretly to protect their contributors from presumed oppression and retaliation from the party who wins the election and from the public generally; otherwise, their contributors will be discouraged from contributing. 114

*217 We begin by noting that the record in this case presents only scant evidence tending to show a “chilling effect” resulting from the major disclosure requirements, and only a skimpy indication of harassment of those whose contributions were disclosed 115 in the 1972 and 1974 elections where almost identical provisions applied. 116 This showing is not sufficient to override the application *218 of provisions that are facially constitutional and supported by compelling governmental interests — informing the electorate and preventing the corruption of the political process. Although disclosure of contributions has an impact on personal privacy in political association, this is outweighed by the compelling state interest in disclosure to the public. 117 Indeed, it would be ironic if First Amendment rights were extended so as to prevent the kind of public awareness that is the overreaching objective of the First Amendment.

Disclosure laws are predicated on the proposition that money effectively used can influence voters and that the voters sought to be influenced ought to know where the money is coming from, and be able to take into account the social, economic, and political interests of the contributors. It is pertinent to the political process, as elsewhere in the marketplace of ideas, that meaningful competition depends on openness.

The FECA disclosure provisions are reasonably calculated to prevent the election secrecy so essential to the appearance and reality of influence dealing. They require disclosure of contributions that are substantial in amount, albeit below the $1000 maximum, in order to prevent the disguising of a pattern of substantial giving by “splitting” contributions among members of a group. They apply to parties and candidates across the board, be they majority and established or minority and newly formed. Equal treatment of differently circumstanced parties is not always appropriate, but here we approve in the broad Congress’s consistent and longstanding approach of providing uniform treatment. Minority and independent candidacies have a real impact on the election process that cannot be measured by tallied votes alone. They can affect election outcomes by diverting votes from better supported candidates as well as by occasionally winning the contested office. 118 They can be deliberately formed to take a stalking horse role, or their position can be used to that end by others. Any broad exemption from disclosure could subvert the interlocking regulatory provisions of FECA by increasing the incentives to exploit the consequent lax area of regulation, while underlining public suspicions that any opportunity for evading the regulatory scheme will be utilized.

We recognize that disclosure may prompt some potential donors to reduce their contributions to minority parties. 119 This may, indeed, also apply to contributions to major parties, although *219 this is not a matter addressed by the record. So far as unpopular minor parties are concerned, disclosure does indeed infringe their First Amendment freedom to associate to advocate unorthodoxy. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 , 77 S.Ct. 1203 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957). But the right of political association is subject to reasonable restriction for reasons of compelling state interest, and the opinion of Chief Justice Warren in Sweezy must be read alongside his statement in Harriss indicating approval of disclosure requirements in federal corrupt practices legislation. So, too, with Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Harriss . 120

The public stake in the election process is a basic premise of our democratic society, and those seeking to influence it directly are proper objects of public concern. We do not perceive a tenable rationale for assuming that the public interest in minority party disclosure of contributions above a reasonable cut-off point is uniformly outweighed by potential contributors’ associational rights. New parties and candidates are not always what they pretend to be. Disclosure requirements may have a prophylactic effect in deterring or exposing stalking horses or “dirty tricks.” The present law reflects an effort to tighten pertinent provisions and enhance their effectiveness.

It may well be that a party (or candidate) can demonstrate such harassment to itself or to its supporters as to underpin a ruling that disclosure in particular circumstances cannot constitutionally be required. Compare NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 , 78 S.Ct. 1163 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958). Whether the Commission through its regulations or its advisory opinions can appropriately address this situation is a question we do not decide in the absence of concrete facts. In any event, courts sit to act in such cases when presented with a proper record.

3. Other Issues

Question 7(c) 121 addresses the provisions in 2 U.S.C. § 434 (d) 122 exempting from reporting requirements the value of certain services rendered by Congressional recording studios, by an individual in the pay of either chamber, or by the parties’ congressional committees. It specifically does not apply to services furnished during the calendar year in which the member could run for reelection. Such services rendered in other years obviously have some political worth, but the line drawn by the legislature was intended to separate activities designed to win elections from activities designed to make a Congressman known and available to his constituents. It is certainly appropriate for Congress to as *220 sure that steps taken to diminish incumbency advantage do not have the result of eroding representation or the effectiveness of a legislator in communicating with his constituents.

Question 7(d) 123 bids us consider section 434(e) 124 , which requires every person (other than a political committee or candidate) who makes contributions or expenditures in excess of $100 per calendar year, other than by contribution to a political committee or candidate, to file a report with the Commission disclosing those contributions or expenditures. This presumably would include volunteers whose incidental expenses exceed $600 (a $500 exemption under § 431(e) and a $100 exemption under this provision). Such disclosure assists in the enforcement of limitations set out in 18 U.S.C. § 608 (e) (dealing with expenditures relative to a clearly identified candidate), and parallels the threshold for disclosure of direct contributions to political committees or candidates. Further, it takes away from independent expenditures any cloak of secrecy which would otherwise make them favored over direct contributions. Our scrutiny leads us to find no objection to this provision. If, as we hold, Congress has both the authority and a compelling interest to regulate independent expenditures under section 608(e), surely it can require that there be disclosure to prevent misuse of the spending channel.

B. Reports by Certain Persons: Section 437a

We therefore uphold the major disclosure provisions of the Act. Those thus far examined are carefully tailored to minimize intrusion upon interests sheltered by the First Amendment. They exact disclosure only when plainly and closely related to a substantial governmental interest long recognized by the courts: protection of the integrity of federal elections. Compare Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 , 54 S.Ct. 287 , 78 L.Ed. 484 (1934); Stoner v. Fortson, 379 F.Supp. 704, 712 (N.D.Ga.1974).

The same cannot be said for section 308 of the Act, codified as 2 U.S.C. § 437a, which is the, subject of Question 7(e). 125 That section, by its terms, covers a much broader range of groups and activities than do the core disclosure requirements. It provides in part:

Any person (other than an individual) who expends any funds or commits any act directed to the public for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election, or who publishes or broadcasts to the public any material referring to a candidate (by name, description, or other reference) advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, setting forth the candidate’s position on any public issue, his voting record, or other official acts (in the case of a candidate who holds or has *221 held Federal office), or otherwise designed to influence individuals to cast their votes for or against such candidate or to withhold their votes from such candidate shall file reports with the Commission as if such person were a political committee. The reports filed by such person shall set forth the source of the funds used in carrying out any activity described in the preceding sentence in the same detail as if the funds were contributions within the meaning of section 431(e) of this title, and payments of such funds in the same detail as if they were expenditures within the meaning of section 431(f) of this title. 126

Analysis Of The Section

Dissecting the statutory language, it is seen that section 437a’s demand for disclosure is activated — without any “expend[ing] [of] any funds” whatever 127 —(1) by “any act directed to the public for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election”; or (2) by “any material” “publishe[d] or broadcast ] to the public” which “refer[s] to a candidate (by name, description, or other reference)” and which (a) “advocat[es] the election or defeat of such candidate,” or (b) “set[s] forth the candidate’s position on any public issue, his voting record, or other official acts (in the ease of a candidate who holds or has held Federal office),” or (c) is “otherwise designed to influence individuals to cast their votes for or against such candidate or to withhold their votes from such candidate.” Notwithstanding the exemption of some activities, subsequently considered, 128 the scope of section 437a is potentially expansive.

Clearly a group engaging in “any act directed to the public for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election” must file the statutory report. So also, with equal clarity, -must a group publishing or broadcasting to the public “any material” in reference to a candidate which “advocate[s] the election or defeat of such candidate” or which is “otherwise designed to influence individuals to cast their votes for or against such candidate or to withhold their votes from such candidate.” In each of these instances, the activity summoning the report is calculated to exert an influence upon an election. But section 437a is susceptible to a reading necessitating reporting by groups whose only connection with the elective process arises from completely nonpartisan public discussion of issues of public importance. For while the reporting requirement plainly obtains when a group publishes or broadcasts to the public material “set[ting] forth a candidate’s position on any public issue, his voting record, or other official acts” with a “designO to influence” voting at an election, it is not at all certain that the requirement is inoperative where those activities are unaccompanied by any such design. 129

Thus section 437a calls for disclosure, for example, by plaintiff Human Events, Inc., the publisher of a weekly newspaper devoted primarily to events of political importance and interest, and to discussion of public issues, public officials, political leaders and candidates. Findings III, Winter ¶ 2. In its offerings to the public, Human Events endorses, explicitly or implicitly, candidates for federal office, id. ¶¶ 5, 8, an activity “advocating the election ... of [a] candidate.” But even if Human Events discontinued that kind of advocacy, it still might be subject to section 437a because it also takes positions on issues and at *222 tempts to influence public opinion. The latter may be deemed activities which are “directed to the public for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election,” and which are “designed to influence individuals to cast their votes for candidate[s].”

As another example, section 437a may also demand disclosure by plaintiff New York Civil Liberties Union. The District Court found that this organization is forbidden by the constitution and policies of its parent body from endorsing or opposing any candidate for public office, but that it does engage publicly in nonpartisan activities which “frequently and necessarily refer to, praise, criticize, set forth, describe or rate the conduct or actions of clearly identified public officials who may also happen to be candidates for federal office.” Findings III, Glasser ¶¶ 3 — 4. The organization also publicizes in newsletters and other publications the civil liberties voting records, positions and actions of elected public officials, some of whom are candidates for federal office. Id. ¶¶ 5, 8. Since the published material regularly gives “candidate[s’] positions] on . public issue[s], [their] voting record[s], or other official acts,” the organization may be subject to section 437a. 130

In no lesser degree, section 437a may affect group activity extending from one end of the spectrum of public issue-discussion to the other. If the section is given the widest scope its language could bear, the result would be an enormous interception of groups and activities not unlike that which the Second Circuit found likely in the wake of another provision of the 1971 Act. “[E]very position on any issue, major or minor, taken by [any candidate] would be a campaign issue and any comment upon it in, say, [an unexempted] newspaper editorial or an advertisement would be subject to proscription unless the registration and disclosure regulations of the Act . . . were complied with.” United States v. National Committee for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135, 1142 (2d Cir. 1972). 131 We might add to the list of publications potentially affected by such comment trade and professional journals, campus newspapers, union newsletters and even church bulletins, among a host of others. Indeed, “every little Audubon Society chapter [might] be [intercepted], for ‘environment’ is an issue in one campaign or another. On this basis, too, a Boy Scout troop advertising for membership to combat ‘juvenile delinquency’ or a Golden Age Club promoting ‘senior citizens’ rights’ [might] fall under the Act.” Id.

To be sure, section 437a specifies exemptions for “any publication or broadcast of the United States Government,” and for “any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of a broadcasting station or a bona fide newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication.” 132 The latter excep *223 tion, however, cannot be construed so broadly as to materially curtail the section’s application to activities of issue groups. For, after stating that exemption, section 437a expressly qualifies and narrows the definition of “bona fide periodical publications” in such fashion as to leave but a scant reduction in the group activities affected. It first provides that, for the purppses of the section, a publication is not “bona fide” if it “is primarily for distribution to individuals affiliated by membership or stock ownership with the [group] distributing it or causing it to be distributed, and not primarily for purchase by the public at newsstands or by paid subscription.” 2 U.S.C. § 437a(l). Thus, for example, the newsletter which is commonplace among issue groups like the New York Civil Liberties Union continues to bind the organization to the disclosure requirements of the Act, as it does with respect to countless other groups. Section 437a further provides that the exemption shall not apply if “the news story, commentary, or editorial is distributed by a [group which] devotes a substantial part of [its] activities to attempting to influence the outcome of elections, or to influence public opinion with respect to matters of national or State policy or concern.” Id. § 437a(2). So, as another example, Human Events remains within the ambit of section 437a as long as its newspaper retains its present format. Similarly, section 437a still requires disclosure by any issue group placing an advertisement mentioning candidate positions with nearly any newspaper or magazine, to say nothing of pamphleteering in any of its innumerable forms. And, seemingly, section 437a also imposes its disclosure demands on the newspapers and magazines with respect to publication of their own materials. 133

Constitutional Doctrine

It is well established that compelled disclosure of the kind of information section 437a exacts can work a substantial infringement of the associational rights of those whose organizations take public stands on public issues. E. g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 , 78 S.Ct. 1163 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-524 , 80 S.Ct. 412 , 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960). To say this is not to denigrate our action upholding the Act’s disclosure requirements applicable to “political committees” and to “contributions” and “expenditures” as those terms are defined therein. We have sustained those provisions although compliance with them may impose a burden that is more than trivial, and may portend a deterrence that arouses some concern. Our holdings supporting the Act’s central disclosure requirements are grounded on our recognition that the government has demonstrated a substantial and legitimate interest in protecting the integrity of its elections, an interest closely connected to and plainly advanced by those provisions.

Section 437a, however, seeks to impose the same demands where the nexus may be far more tenuous. As we have said, it may undertake to compel disclosure by groups that do no more than discuss issues of public interest on a wholly nonpartisan basis. To be sure, any discussion of important public questions can *224 possibly exert some influence on the outcome of an election preceding which they were campaign issues. But unlike contributions and expenditures made solely with a view to influencing the nomination or election of a candidate, see 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 (e), 431(f), issue discussions unwedded to the cause of a particular candidate hardly threaten the purity of elections. Moreover, and very importantly, such discussions are vital and indispensable to a free society and an informed electorate. Thus the interest of a group engaging in nonpartisan discussion ascends to a high plane, while the govej .mental interest in disclosure correspondingly diminishes.

The Supreme Court has indicated quite plainly that groups seeking only to advance discussion of public issues or to influence public opinion cannot be equated to groups whose relation to political processes is direct and intimate. In United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 , 73 S.Ct. 543 , 97 L.Ed. 770 (1953), the Court upheld a resolution authorizing a House committee to inquire into lobbying activities after construing it narrowly to apply only to representations made directly to Congress, and not to indirect efforts to influence legislation by changing the climate of public opinion. On that basis it affirmed the reversal of a conviction for failure to furnish the committee with financial records of an organization. In the course of its opinion, the Court stated:

Surely it cannot be denied that giving the scope to the resolution for which the Government contends, that is, deriving from it the power to inquire into all efforts of private individuals to influence public opinion through books and periodicals, however remote the radiations of influence which they may exert upon the ultimate legislative process, raises doubts of constitutionality in view of the prohibition of the First Amendment.

Id. at 46 , 73 S.Ct. at 546 . Cf. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 , 74 S.Ct. 808 , 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954).

More recently, in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 , 86 S.Ct. 1434 , 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966), the Court struck down a state statute prohibiting publication of any newspaper editorial on election day despite its obvious propensity under ordinary conditions to sway the outcome of the election. Said the Court:

Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should]be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes.

Id. at 218-219 , 86 S.Ct. at 1437.

Two additional decisions addressing a disclosure feature of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 point up the grave constitutional difficulties section 437a engenders. In United States v. National Committee for Impeachment, supra, the government argued that the defendant organization was a political committee, within the meaning of section 301(d) of the 1971 Act, (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (d), and left substantially unchanged by the FECAA of 1974) on the basis of an advertisement placed in The New York Times criticizing President Nixon’s actions in Vietnam, calling for his impeachment, and reciting an “Honor Roll” of members of Congress who had supported an impeachment resolution. Section 431(d) defines “political committee” as including organizations accepting “contributions” or making “expenditures” exceeding $1,000 annually, and sections 431(e) and (f) define “contributions” and “expenditures” as distributions “made for the purpose of influencing” federal nominations and elections. 134 The government sought to enjoin acceptance of contributions and disbursements of monies by the organization until it filed the report described in *225 the Act. Recognizing that such a broad reading of the definition of “political committee” would raise serious constitutional problems, the court construed the term as applicable only where the group acted with consent or authorization of a candidate or where the major purpose of the group was the nomination or election of candidates. 469 F.2d at 1139 — 1142. Likewise, in ACLU v. Jennings, 366 F.Supp. 1041 (D.D.C.1973), vacated as moot sub nom. Staats v. ACLU, 422 U.S. 1030 , 95 S.Ct. 2646 , 45 L.Ed.2d 686 (1975), a three-judge district court in this circuit was faced with a similar challenge. It perceived the same constitutional obstacles and adopted the same narrow interpretation of section 431(d) propounded in National Committee for Impeachment, 366 F.Supp. at 1054-1057 .

In the latter two cases, the courts were able to avoid a decision on constitutionality of the statutory provision involved by construing it narrowly enough to eliminate doubt on that score. And here it is our duty to follow the same path if section 437a may fairly be limited in that fashion. E. g., United States v. Rumely, supra, 345 U.S. at 45 , 73 S.Ct. 543 ; United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 120-121 , 68 S.Ct. 1349 , 92 L.Ed. 1849 (1948). Accordingly, we have given special attention to language in the section which at first glance appears to allow for a limiting construction.

Section 437a initially demands disclosure when a group acts publicly “for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election.” 135 It then seems to call for disclosure by any group which publishes or broadcasts, inter alia, “a candidate’s position on any public issue, his voting record, or other official acts” 136 — without more a very sweeping provision. But the clause immediately following speaks of material “otherwise designed to influence individuals to cast their votes for or against, such candidate or to withhold their votes from such candidate.” 137 Although the extent of this qualification is not entirely clear from the structure of the sentence, it is possible to read it as applicable to the previous clause as well — that is, that disclosure is required only of groups publicizing information of the quoted types with a “design[] to influence” individuals in casting their votes. For present purposes we adopt that reading as the narrowest interpretation feasible. The pivotal element, then, is the “purpose” or “design[ ]” “to influence,” and we believe that such a “purpose” and such a “design[ ]” are functionally identical. The question thus is whether the requirement of “purpose” or “design[ ]” “to influence” is sufficiently certain in meaning to save section 437a from constitutional condemnation.

Validity of The Section

The principles charting our course are well settled. “Vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity,” Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 , 86 S.Ct. 1407, 1410 , 16 L.Ed.2d 469 (1966) (footnote omitted), and commonly in the First Amendment area doubly so. There, perhaps more than elsewhere, statutory vagueness and statutory over-breadth are constitutional vices often related and sometimes functionally inseparable. See, e. g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 423-433 , 83 S.Ct. 328 , 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). For “where a vague statute ‘abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms’ it ‘operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms,’ ” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2299 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972), quoting in turn Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 , 84 S.Ct. 1316 , 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964) and Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 , 82 S.Ct. 275 , 7 L.Ed.2d 285 (1961); and “[u]ncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to ‘ “steer far wider of the unlawful zone” . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden area were clearly marked.’ ” Grayned v. City *226 of Rockford, supra, 408 U.S. at 109, 92 S.Ct. at 2299 , quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, supra, 377 U.S. at 372, 84 S.Ct. 1316 , in turn quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 , 78 S.Ct. 1332 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958) (footnote omitted). See also Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 , 92 S.Ct. 1103 , 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 , 87 S.Ct. 675 , 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967); Speiser v. Randall, supra, 357 U.S. at 526, 78 S.Ct. 1332 ; NAACP v. Button, supra, 371 U.S. at 433 , 83 S.Ct. 328 . “The danger of that chilling effect upon the exercise of vital First Amendment rights must be guarded against by sensitive tools which clearly inform [citizens of] what is being proscribed.” Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra, 385 U.S. at 604 , 87 S.Ct. at 684 .

Consequently, “standards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression.” NAACP v. Button, supra, 371 U.S. at 432 , 83 S.Ct. at 337 . “Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity,” id. at 433 , 83 S.Ct. at 339 ; “[precision of regulation must be the touchstone in [that] area . . . .” Id. at 438 , 83 S.Ct. at 340 . See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra, 385 U.S. at 603-604 , 87 S.Ct. 675 . “[T]he statute must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to [proscribe] only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected expression.” Gooding v. Wilson, supra, 405 U.S. at 522, 92 S.Ct. at 1106 ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 , 60 S.Ct. 900 , 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). “When First Amendment rights are involved,” a court must “look even more closely lest, under the guise of regulating conduct that is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech or of the press suffer.” Ashton v. Kentucky, supra, 384 U.S. at 200, 86 S.Ct. at 1410 (footnote omitted).

Section 437a, with a “purpose of influencing” and a “design[] to influence” as criteria undertaking to partially shape its operation, does not meet thp governing standards. These criteria do not mark boundaries between affected and unaffected conduct “with narrow specificity”; they do not “clearly inform [of] what is being proscribed.” Rather, they leave the disclosure requirement open to application for protected exercises of speech, and to deterrence of expression deemed close to the line. Public discussion of public issues which also are campaign issues readily and often unavoidably draws in candidates and their positions, their voting records and other official conduct. Discussions of those issues, and as well more positive efforts to influence public opinion on them, tend naturally and inexorably to exert some influence on voting at elections. In this milieu, where do “purpose” and “design[ ]” “to influence” draw the line? Do they connote subjectively a state of mind, or objectively only a propensity to influence? Do they require, irrespective of state of mind, a capability of influencing, and if so how substantial a capability? What do they demand with respect to materials which “advocate] the election or defeat of [a] candidate,” or which “set[] forth the candidate’s position on [a] public issue” or “his voting record,” beyond the inherent tendency of those materials to influence? What references to “other official acts” of the candidate, with what mental element, bring the section into play? To these questions, among a multitude of others, neither the text nor the legislative history of section 437a supplies any clear answer. And while we have continued our struggle for an interpretation of section 437a which might bypass its vagueness and overbreadth difficulties, we have been unable to do so.

• The crucial terms, “purpose of influencing the outcome of an election” and “design[ ] to influence” individuals in voting at an election, are not defined in the section. Ordinarily we would seek guidance, then, from the judicial interpretation of highly similar language in National Committee for Impeachment and ACLU v. Jennings, supra. Those cases, we reiterate, construed the words “made *227 for the purpose of influencing [the nomination or election of federal candidates]” as applicable only to expenditures made under the control or with the consent of a candidate, and to contributions received and expenditures made for the major purpose of nominating or electing such candidates. If we were to look only to section 437a itself, such an interpretation of its key language might indeed be possible, and it might avoid the constitutional difficulties which arise from the apparent reach of the section to purely issue-discussion groups.

But we cannot view section 437a in isolation, and therein lies the reason why those cases do not save the day here. Construction of section 437a in the fashion just advanced would reduce it to a pale repetition of the major disclosure provisions of the Act. With trivial exceptions, 138 any group thus required to report under section 437a would already be required to report under section 434(a); having made expenditures under the control of a candidate, or having received contributions or made expenditures for the major purpose of nominating or electing candidates, such a group would already be a political committee as defined in section 431. While we have some latitude in interpreting the words of a statute, we cannot construe them in such a fashion as to reduce them to elaborate redundancy. See Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307-308 , 81 S.Ct. 1579 , 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961); Wilderness Society v. Morton, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 121, 135-136 , 479 F.2d 842, 856-857 (en banc), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 , 93 S.Ct. 1550 , 36 L.Ed.2d 309 (1973).

Moreover, a construction of section 437a which would merely reproduce almost identically the requirements of section 434 would be particularly inappropriate here, where Congress has made it abundantly clear that it intended section 437a to reach beyond the other disclosure provisions of the Act. For example, a group covered by section 437a is to report “as if it were a political committee,” a directive making no sense if the section touches only the groups which are already political committees. The legislative history indicates even more emphatically the congressional intent to command disclosure for group activities not otherwise covered. The report of the Conference Committee, which formulated section 437a and inserted it into the Act, describes its breadth in no uncertain terms. 139 On the floor of the *228 House, following the action in conference, Representative Frenzel, a conferee, specifically named “Common Cause, the American Conservative Union, the American Civil Liberties Union and the environmental groups which sponsor the ‘dirty dozen’ list” as groups encompassed by section 437a, and declared that “[t]his provision is to apply indiscriminately and will bring under the disclosure provisions many groups, including liberal, labor, environmental, business and conservative organizations.” 120 Cong.Rec. H10333 (daily ed., Oct. 10, 1974). 140 We are satisfied that by the addition in 1974 of section 437a to the Act, Congress intended to range far beyond the 1971 disclosure requirements. 141

Thus the crucial terms — “purpose of influencing the outcome of an election” and “design[ ] to influence” voting at an election — stand without any readily available narrowing interpretation. Viewing this section against the backdrop of section 434(a), and keeping in mind the unmistakable congressional intention to broaden section 437a beyond section 434, we are unable to supply the *229 precision essential to constitutionality by a limiting construction. 142 Were uncertainty about the breadth of section 437a without further consequence, we might consider waiting for interpretations from the Federal Election Commission in the hope that constitutional problems would be dissipated. See Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 575 , 93 S.Ct. 2880 , 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973). But the problem is not merely one of awaiting application through enforcement proceedings, since the terms of the statute as such inhibit free and robust discussion of issues. Besides, as we have stated elsewhere, “if the words of the statute or its legislative history ma[k]e it indisputably clear that Congress intended a result which is unconstitutional, we would have to exercise our responsibility to invalidate the law.” United States v. Thompson, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 1 , 9, 452 F.2d 1333, 1341 (1971). We face up to that responsibility here; we hold section 437a unconstitutional and answer Question 7(e) in the affirmative.

The only question remaining is whether the invalidity of section 437a destroys the entire Act or just that section. We encounter no difficulty in concluding that only the section is affected. “Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as law.” Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 234 , 52 S.Ct. 559, 565 , 76 L.Ed. 1062 (1932). The basic disclosure provisions derive from the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act, and were in effect for three years before section 437a was added by the 1974 Amendments. Even in 1974, the section 437a provision was injected by the Conference Committee when the amending process had been virtually completed. The Act contains an express severability clause, 2 U.S.C. § 454 , and the plaintiffs concede that this section is severable. 143 We accordingly hold section 437a invalid, but severable, and the rest of the statute stands for consideration.

VI. Public Financing and Subtitle H

The major constitutional objections lodged against the public financing provisions 144 may be categorized un *230 der two heads: first, that providing public funds for Presidential campaigns 145 and party conventions exceeds the bounds of Congress’s powers to tax and spend under article I, section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution; 146 and second, that even if Congress has power to provide for public financing of elections, the scheme used here discriminates against minor and new parties and independent candidates. 147

A. Congress’s Power to Provide for Public Financing

The Supreme Court has held that the power of Congress to tax and spend for the “general Welfare of the United States” is entitled to a broad construction. That power is not limited to the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 , 56 S.Ct. 312 , 80 L.Ed. 477 (1936). The Congress has determined that providing public funding for the three stages of the Presidential selection process would advance the general welfare of the nation by reducing the reliance of Presidential candidates on large contributors, thus reducing their influence on the outcome of elections and on the operation of government. We are in no position to quarrel with that judgment. As the Supreme Court has observed in a slightly different context: “Viewing the myriad governmental functions supported from general revenues, it is difficult to single out any of a higher order than the conduct of elections at all levels to bring forth those persons desired by their fellow citizens to govern.” Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 148-149 , 92 S.Ct. 849, 858 , 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972).

The plaintiffs suggest, however, that the particular means chosen by Congress to allocate tax monies to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund requires that we invalidate the overall spending scheme. The Fund derives from voluntary “tax checkoffs” by individual taxpayers, who may, but need not, direct that one dollar of their tax liability go to the Fund. 26 U.S.C. § 6096 . Payments from the Fund issue on the basis of objective formulae established in 26 U.S.C. §§ 9004 , 9006, 9008 and 9034, regardless of candidate or party preferences of the taxpayers who have checked off the dol *231 lars. The objection seems to be that the voluntary checkoff is not sufficiently voluntary, that the taxpayer must have the freedom to designate which party or candidate will receive his checked-off dollar.

It is true that some plans for public financing, such as the “voucher” system suggested by Senator Metcalf (see Brief for Amicus Curiae Senator Lee Metcalf at 24 — 25), do allow the taxpayer this choice. We assume that Congress might well have adopted that system, without constitutional objection, but we cannot say that the Constitution requires that the taxpayer have such an option. If it is established that the Congress has power under article I, section 8, clause 1, to expend money to fund candidate campaigns, then surely Congress could do so simply by appropriating the sums to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund without giving individual taxpayers any control at all. A fortiori Congress can establish a system which gives the taxpayer some choice— in affecting the total amount of public funds to be distributed on the Congressional formula — without going all the way to permit each taxpayer complete authority over the disposition of his dollar of tax obligation. If the taxpayer wants to avoid any conception that some part of “his” tax money will benefit candidates he does not favor, then he can simply refrain from checking off his dollar for the Fund.

B. Discrimination Against Third Parties and Independents

A more serious objection to the public financing provisions lies in the charge that they unfairly discriminate against minor and new party candidates and against independents. The federal courts have often indicated the importance to the American political system of minor parties and independent candidates. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-251 , 77 S.Ct. 1203 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (plurality opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Warren); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 , 89 S.Ct. 5 , 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). More recently the Supreme Court has emphasized that legitimate governmental interests in protecting the electoral process “must be achieved by a means that does not unfairly or unnecessarily burden either a minority party’s or an individual candi- ■ date’s equally important interest in the continued availability of political opportunity.” Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 , 94 S.Ct. 1315, 1320 , 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974). To this end, the courts have traditionally scrutinized carefully state schemes for regulating access to the ballot, and have not hesitated to strike down a scheme when it placed unreasonable obstacles in the way of candidates or parties. Williams v. Rhodes, supra; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 , 92 S.Ct. 849 (1972).

We are, of course, well aware that provisions for public funding of Presidential campaigns, like provisions regulating access to the ballot, could operate to give an unfair advantage to established parties, thus reducing, to the nation’s detriment, what the Supreme Court has called the “potential fluidity of American political life.” Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 439 , 91 S.Ct. 1970, 1974 , 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). Therefore we have given careful consideration to the framework of the public financing provisions. We do not find them, on their face, to be invidiously discriminatory. At the same time, we recognize the necessity for all concerned to maintain a careful scrutiny as the provisions are implemented.

The statutory scheme 148 gives evidence that here Congress has made a serious and conscientious attempt to implement a system that recognizes appropriate dif *232 ferences among parties but permits flexibility and change. It allows for new parties to grow and for old ones to wither and die; within reasonable bounds, the funding levels will follow these patterns of popular support. Moreover, Congress has chosen to have funding levels depend upon objectively measurable indicators of support — voting levels, past or current, in the case of the general election; 149 contribution levels, within limits, in the case of the funding of primary campaigns. 150

The plaintiffs argue that minor parties and new parties 151 are harmed by the provisions for funding of candidates in primaries and in the general election and certain nominating conventions. We examine general election funding first.

General Election Provisions

We start with the recognition that Congress, in order to provide public funds for some candidates for President, is surely not required to provide equal funds to all who declare themselves Presidential candidates. Such a system would not only make it easy to raid the United States Treasury, it would also artificially foster the proliferation of splinter parties. “[A] State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies.” Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 , 92 S.Ct. 849, 857 , 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). So too does the federal government. And the Supreme Court has said expressly that a state has a “compelling” interest in protecting the stability of its political system by refraining from encouraging “splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism.” Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 , 94 S.Ct. 1274 , 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974).

In Jenness v. Fortson, supra, the Court recognized that “[s]ometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly alike . . . .” Id. 403 U.S. at 442 , 91 S.Ct. at 1976 . Congress was therefore entitled to take into account the obvious fact that there are differences in support among political movements. And to reflect those differences, Congress placed reliance, for the funding of general elections, on a system quite similar to the one Georgia has used to regulate access to its ballot, a system upheld without dissent in Jenness .

In the general election, major party candidates (candidates of parties which received at least 25 percent of the electoral vote at the preceding general election) are entitled to an equal level of funding up to the statutory maximum, $20 million plus adjustments for inflation. 26 U.S.C. § 9004 (a). Minor party candidates (candidates of parties which received between 5 percent and 25 percent of the vote in the last election) receive pre-election funding at a level proportionate to their showing in the previous election. Id. § 9004(a)(2)(A). New party candidates (parties which did not achieve a 5 percent showing) are not entitled to pre-election funding, but they are entitled to post-election funding if they achieve 5 percent or more of the vote; the amount will be in proportion to their vote total relative to that of the major party candidates. Id. § 9004(a)(3). A similar provision allows minor party *233 candidates to receive additional post-election monies if they improve their vote percentage over the last election. Id.

We recognize that under this scheme pre-election funding will depend on figures almost four years old. But other devices which might have been chosen to make the figures more current have their own potential deficiencies. Reliance, for example, on opinion polls or on more subjective determinations of current support by the Commission has obvious drawbacks, and could only lead to controversy that would divert energies and resources from the campaigns themselves. Moreover, support for a candidate at an early stage is often shallow. The differences that develop between candidates as they take to the stump often changes their appeal, for better or worse. So early prophecies are chancy and later may seem foolish. On the other hand, funding candidates on indications of early strength creates the danger of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Evidencing support by petition signatures may provide an objective and more current measure, but again it would siphon off considerable campaign energies into a petition drive. A system of matching grants, based on the private contributions a candidate or party was receiving, similar to the system for public funding of primary campaigns, 152 is a more eligible alternative. But it too yields a more cumbersome system, and Congress was acting within proper bounds when it chose to relieve serious candidates of at least some of the burdens of fund raising once they had achieved nomination, and to make it clear to all candidates from the beginning what level of funding would be available to each and to each of his or her competitors. 153 Whatever alternative system might have been possible, the legislative history indicates that Congress had in mind the Supreme Court’s specific approval in Jenness of a system which bases differential treatment on “demonstrated relative strength” in prior elections. S.Rep.No. 93-689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974). In light of Congress’s adherence to Jenness , we cannot say it acted improperly.

It was noted by the court in Jenness that even if a candidate failed to garner enough petition support to win a place on the printed ballot, he still had an alternative path open toward eventual election. He could be elected on the strength of write-in votes. Jenness v. Fortson, supra, at 434, 91 S.Ct. 1970 . There was, of course, no suggestion that a write-in candidacy was as attractive as appearing on the ballot. Similarly, under the general election funding established by the challenged statutes, a third party or independent candidate retains alternative means of getting his message across to the voters — through private funding. No one asserts that this option is as attractive as full public financing, but it should be borne in mind that smaller parties are likely to be the major beneficiaries of another part of the statutory scheme, the expenditure ceilings. Those ceilings have been set at a level significantly below major party spending in the 1972 election. 154 Even relying on private funding, then, third party and independent candidates are now in a better position to approach the spending levels of the major parties. Chapter 95 makes it clear that the expenditure limits are an integral part of the overall public financing scheme. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 9003 (b)(1), 9004(a)(1). Viewed in this context we are not prepared to say that the provisions for general election funding invidiously discriminate against third parties and independents. 155

*234

Convention Funding

The major parties are entitled to receive full public funding for their conventions (up to $2 million plus inflation adjustments), id. § 9008(b)(1), and minor parties are entitled to a percentage of that amount using the same formula that applies for general election candidates. Id. § 9008(b)(2). For the same reasons that we found persuasive in upholding the general election financing provisions, we find no constitutional infirmity here. The provisions are a reasonable way of recognizing differences in strength among parties, and once again minor and new parties are not barred from putting on just as elaborate a convention as major parties, although they would have to fund all or part of it with private funds. The ceiling on convention expenditures puts equivalent convention spending more within their grasp, if they choose to apply their funds in this fashion. Id. § 9008(d). Unlike the general election provisions, the convention financing sections allow for no post-election reimbursement of convention expenses, no matter how well a new or minor party fares in the election. But this is not fatal to the statute. The fact that Congress has chosen to adopt an adjustment provision in one part of the scheme does not mean that it is required to do so as to all portions. 156

Whatever doubts there might otherwise be about these provisions are put to rest by the Supreme Court’s decision in American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 , 94 S.Ct. 1296 , 39 L.Ed.2d 744 (1974). White held that a state could fund the expenses major parties incurred in selecting their candidates for the general election, without being required to “finance the efforts of every nascent political group seeking to organize itself to win a place on the general election ballot.” Id. at 794 , 94 S.Ct. 1312 .

Primaries

The challenged statutes also provide for public financing of the primary election campaigns of candidates who meet the threshold requirements of the act. Plaintiffs do not contend that a primary funding plan is invalid unless it provides funds to all persons who declare themselves candidates; indeed, such a contention could not be sustained. See American Party of Texas v. White, supra, at 793-794, 94 S.Ct. 1296 . Rather, they level their attack at the particulars of the requirements a primary candidate must meet before qualifying for public funds. To be eligible, a candidate must certify that he is seeking the nomination of a political party for the office of President and that he has received $5000 in contributions in each of 20 states. 26 U.S.C. § 9033 (b)(3). Only the first $250 of the contribution of any individual may be counted toward the $5000 total. Id. § 9033(b)(4). Once a candidate qualifies, he or she is eligible for public funding on a matching basis: each dollar contributed privately will be matched by a dollar from the Presidential Election Campaign Fund. Again, only $250 of any one individual’s contribution will be matched. Id. § 9034.

We find nothing invidiously discriminatory about these provisions. They simply require that a candidate demonstrate a “significant modicum of *235 support,” Jenness v. Fortson, supra, 403 U.S. at 442 , 91 S.Ct. 1970 , before becoming entitled to public funding. Since many primary candidates (unlike major and minor parties) would not have a track record of voting support in the previous election, Congress had to choose a different measure to assure that funding went only to serious national contenders. The device it chose — the level of small contributions — is workable, and obtaining small contributions is certainly an avenue open to all contenders. Nor is there anything unusual in the provision for matching payments; matching federal payments have become familiar in programs of federal aid to states and localities. 157 We note, moreover, that the primary funding provisions do not discriminate between candidates of major, minor, and new parties; once the threshold level is achieved, contributions to a candidate who seeks the nomination of a small party will be matched on exactly' the same ratio as that available to major party candidates: one public dollar for one private dollar, up to $250 per contributor. Nor do we think that Congress has set the threshold amount, in absolute dollar terms, at an unreasonably high level. The statute requires that a total of $100,000 be raised (with appropriate geographic distribution — a factor we consider below) before matching federal funds start to flow. That figure is a mere one percent of the expenditure ceiling for primary campaigns, $10 million. 18 U.S.C. § 608 (c)(1)(A). In light of the history of high costs of Presidential campaigns, 158 Congress was certainly permitted to conclude that a candidate had not demonstrated a “significant modicum” of support until he or she achieved the $100,000 level.

It is not enough under the statute, however, to gather $100,000 in contributions of $250 or less. That amount must be collected in amounts of at least $5000 in each of at least 20 states. 26 U.S.C. § 9033 (b)(3). As plaintiffs point out, this is a significant qualification; because of it a candidate with substantial support concentrated primarily in a few, but heavily populated, states might be unable to qualify for public funding. Plaintiffs argue strenuously that Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 , 89 S.Ct. 1493 , 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969), requires that we invalidate this provision of the primary financing scheme. We disagree.

In Moore , the Supreme Court invalidated a provision of Illinois’s ballot access law which required a wide geographic dispersal of voters who signed nominating petitions for candidates for statewide office. It was not sufficient for candidates to present petitions with the requisite total of signatures; they had to obtain signatures from at least 200 voters in each of at least 50 counties. 159

The Illinois provision required a demonstration of support from nearly 50% of the state’s geographic subdivisions; the primary financing scheme here requires a superficially similar showing from 40% of the jurisdictions. But we cannot mechanically apply the Moore holding, which dealt with a race for statewide office, to a scheme which operates for *236 the election of a President. 160 “Presidential elections differ from state elections and in a sense are sui generis.” Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota, 287 F.Supp. 794, 803 (D.Minn.), aff’d, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968). The major difference, as the Irish court noted, lies in the fact that Presidents are chosen by the electoral college.

A successful Presidential candidate is not necessarily the one who gains a majority of the popular vote; he must win a majority in the electoral college. Since a state’s electoral votes traditionally go in a block to the candidate who wins the popular vote in that state, whether the margin of victory is one vote or 100,000,-a serious national candidate cannot avoid the need for broadening his base of support beyond a few states. Campaign strategy must be aimed at carrying states, not simply at increasing popular vote totals.

Moore was decided against a background of cases which have been uniformly hostile to state election schemes which give unequal weight to the votes of citizens, depending upon what section of the state they live in. See, e. g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 , 83 S.Ct. 801 , 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). Moore simply extended the equal protection principle of those cases to a ballot access scheme which gave unequal weight to the signatures of voters, depending upon their county of residence. But this equal protection principle cannot apply with the same force to Presidential elections, since it is the Constitution itself which provides for the electoral college, and the electoral college is not based upon strict adherence to an equal population formula. The Supreme Court has been ■sensitive to this difference, and to the unique historical circumstances which gave rise to the electoral college system. It has not allowed the states to use the electoral college analogy as a justification for schemes which give unequal weight to the votes of people in various subdivisions of a state. See Gray v. Sanders, supra, 372 U.S. at 378-379 , 83 S.Ct. 801 . See also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 9-14 , 84 S.Ct. 526 , 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964). The reverse is also true: one must be extremely careful in applying cases which strike down state voting (or ballot access) disparities to federal schemes where the electoral college is properly a factor.

We have held that it is permissible for national parties, in apportioning convention delegates among states, to depart from strict adherence to a population principle and to rely, in part at least, on an allocation scheme which reflects a state’s strength in the electoral college. Bode v. National Democratic Party, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 373, 379-380 , 452 F.2d 1302, 1308-09 , cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 , 92 S.Ct. 684 , 30 L.Ed.2d 668 (1972). We based our holding on the fact that the convention delegates convene “to nominate candidates, not for state or county offices, but for President and Vice-President, whose very elections are to be made by the electoral college.” Id. If the national parties may take the electoral college into consideration in allocating delegates among states, then surely Congress may take the same factor into account in allocating public funds to candidates in Presidential primaries. The 20-state requirement simply reflects the realities of Presidential campaigning. It looks to geographic dispersal of support among “sovereign States,” *237 which are represented as such in the electoral college, not among “non-autonomous creatures of the State,” 161 like the Illinois counties involved in Moore . Since the requirement provides a means for limiting public funding to serious national candidates, we do not find it to be invidiously discriminatory. 162

Alleged Discrimination Against Independents

To this point we have been concerned primarily with impact of the public financing provisions on minor or new parties. The plaintiffs also challenge the public financing provisions on the grounds that they discriminate against independent candidates with respect to convention and primary funding. Obviously, an independent candidate who by definition participates in no primaries and is not nominated at a convention is ineligible for convention and primary funding. It is true that party candidates may obtain some lingering benefit from the public funds that were expended during the primary campaign which carries over to the general election race, a benefit unavailable to independents. But we do not think that an incidental difference of this sort constitutes invidious discrimination. It is simply a byproduct of the fact that party nomination and independent candidacy constitute alternative routes to the November ballot, each with its distinctive advantages and disadvantages. 163 Congress may reasonably choose to apply public financing only to the more common route, leaving to another day consideration of financing alternative routes. American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 , 94 S.Ct. 1296 , 39 L.Ed.2d 744 (1974) provides solid authority for this proposition. Texas law required that major parties (defined as those which received more than 200,-000 votes in the last election) nominate their candidates by primary election. All other parties and independent candidates had to seek access to the ballot by other means — either by precinct, county, and state conventions or by petition; they were not permitted to hold primaries. 164 The law provided that the state *238 would pay the costs which parties incurred in primaries, but not the costs of conventions or petition drives; the legislature appropriated over $3,000,000 to the two major parties to pay their expenses in connection with the 1972 primary election. Id. at 792 , 94 S.Ct. 1296 . The Supreme Court upheld the law:

They [the minority parties] must undergo expense, to be sure, in holding their conventions and accumulating the necessary signatures to qualify for the ballot, but we are not persuaded that the State’s refusal to reimburse for these expenses is any discrimination at all against the smaller parties and if it is', that it is also a denial of the equal protection of the laws

[W]e cannot agree that the State, simply because it defrays the expenses of party primary elections, must also finance the efforts of every nascent political group seeking to organize itself and unsuccessfully attempting to win a place on the general election ballot.

Id. at 793-794 , 94 S.Ct. at 1312. 165

A more serious potential problem relative to independent candidates inheres in the provisions for general election funding. On their face, they provide funding only to candidates of “parties” — major, minor, or new. This is also true of the crucial provision (so far as independents are concerned) providing post-election funding for minor and new parties based on receiving 5 percent or more of the votes cast in the current election. 26 U.S.C. § 9004 (a)(3).' If these provisions would in fact operate to prevent independents from obtaining public funding, no matter what their showing, or if they would require that independents go to the trouble of creating elaborate party machinery in order to obtain public funding, then they would raise serious constitutional questions. See Storer v. Brown, supra, 415 U.S. at 745-746, 94 S.Ct. 1274 . But the statute does not command that interpretation. The term “political party” is not defined in the public financing provisions. There is thus ample room for the Commission or the officials in charge of disbursing funds to find that even informal committees formed to support independent candidates for President constitute political parties for the purposes of Chapter 95. 166 Until it is shown that a narrower definition is being applied, to the detriment of independent candidates who would otherwise qualify, we are in no position to invalidate the public financing provisions of the statute.

VII. Federal Election Commission

In the initial section of this opinion, we drew attention to a distinctive feature of this effort by Congress to deal with the evils of uncontrolled campaign financing, namely, the multipronged nature of the attack. To the expanded and tightened requirements of disclosure — an approach which has heretofore failed to do the job — there have been added measures designed to shrink the sheer volume of dollars going into the election process by limitations upon both giving and spending, and by substituting public for private money. One would be bold to assert that this greatly broadened strategy is certain to be successful, but we, in common with most observers, have credited Congress with legitimate objectives and a visible degree of rationality in its choice of means to achieve them. We have, in consequence, conceived the circumstances to be such that a court should be slow to stop the experiment in its tracks by findings of facial unconstitutionality.

*239 We now address an equally distinctive element — and conceivably one of the most hopeful aspects-of that experiment. That is the creation, for the first time in the history of federal legislation relating to campaign financing, of a full-time agency authorized and empowered to make it work. As might be expected in an area as novel and complex as this, which implicates all segments of the federal establishment, the manner of constituting that agency, the tasks assigned to it, and the authority conferred upon it are in many respects unique. It may eventually prove to be true that some of that authority may be found, when and if exercised in a concrete context, in conflict with the Constitution. But so essential to the effective functioning of the overall legislative scheme is the existence of the new agency contrived to monitor and administer it that a court should be alert to the relationship of the agency to that scheme. The one without the other risks the frustrations and failures of the past. Unless it can clearly find that the agency is wholly without legitimacy in the very terms by which it is brought into being, the court’s hand should be stayed.

Montesquieu, in formulating his great concept of the separation of powers, had no prevision of the problem of money in popular elections. Indeed, the Framers when they embraced that concept did not even envision the advent of political parties. It would be unfortunate if a judicial preoccupation with the deceptive neatness of the dividing lines assumed by the doctrine were permitted to obscure the common interest of all branches in the purity of the process by which political power is achieved and transferred.

The FECA Amendments of 1974 established an eight member Federal Election Commission to administer, obtain compliance with, and formulate policy with respect to FECA and certain election law crimes codified in title 18 of the United States Code. 167 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(l), (b). The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House are ex officio nonvoting members of the Commission. 168 Id. § 437c(a)(l). Of the six remaining members, two are appointed by the Senate, two by the House, and two by the President, 169 with a safeguard against the members in each “group” being affiliated with the same political party. Id.

Congress has delegated to the Commission a broad range of powers to enable it to accomplish its statutory responsibilities. See id. §§ 437d — h, 438, 456. Included among its major powers are rule-making, 170 subpoena, a power to require submission of written reports, a power to *240 conduct investigations and hearings, a power to initiate civil actions to enforce FECA, 171 a power to request the Attorney General to institute civil actions to obtain compliance with FECA and certain election law criminal provisions, 172 and a power to issue advisory opinions. 173 Congress has also given the Commission the power to impose a temporary disqualification on any candidate for election to federal office if the Commission finds that the individual, while a candidate, failed to file a report required by title III of FECA. Id. § 456.

The District Court has certified six separate questions concerning the powers and method of appointment of the Commission. 174 We reach only the questions concerning the method of appointment of the Commission, its power to issue advisory opinions, and its power to authorize convention expenditures in excess of the limits established by-§§ 9008(d)(1), (2) of Subtitle H. We conclude that the other questions concerning specific powers of the Commission are not presently ripe for adjudication.

Question 8(a) asks us to determine whether the method of appointment of the Commission is constitutional. 175 Plaintiffs argue strenuously that the method of appointment violates article II, section 2 of the Constitution. Their argument is strikingly syllogistic: Under article II, section 2 the power of appointment of civil officers of the United States is a Presidential power; the members of the Commission are civil officers; therefore, the appointment of four members of the Commission by the legislative branch of government violates article II, section 2. So construed, article II, section 2 would deprive Congress of all power to appoint its own inferior officers to carry out appropriate legislative functions. We believe that the records of the Constitutional Convention fail to support that construction.

We begin our inquiry into the constitutional history of the appointment power with the Articles of Confederation. Under Article IX of that charter, Congress alone had the power to appoint “such other committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States . .” The merits of that allocation of power were raised and considered at the Constitutional Convention, and the Framers of the Constitution eventually substituted the method of appointment embodied in article II, section 2:

*241 [The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

The debates of the Convention evidence two competing concerns that led the Framers to substitute the present appointment process for Article IX — a fear that the appointment power could not be effectively and responsibly managed by a group as numerous and diverse as the legislature, 176 and a fear that centralization of the appointment power in the executive could lead to despotism. 177 The compromise that emerged — appointment of civil officers by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate — reflects both a desire to provide the executive with a role in the appointment process and a concern that the legislature retain some control over executive appointments. Read against the background of these competing concerns, we are not convinced that the Framers intended article II, section 2 to deprive the legislative branch of all power to appoint inferior officers to perform appropriate legislative functions.

Although article II, section 2 is not in terms a bar to the appointment of inferior civil officers by the legislative branch, neither is it an affirmative grant of power to appoint the Federal Election Commission. We conclude, however, that Congress draws sufficient authority from the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution to establish such a Commission to aid in the execution of its power “to provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to . prevention of fraud and corrupt practices . . . .” Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 , 52 S.Ct. 397, 399 , 76 L.Ed. 795 (1932) (interpreting article I, section 4, clause 1). See Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 544-45 , 54 5.Ct. 287, 78 L.Ed. 484 (Congress possesses the power to safeguard Presidential elections from the “improper use of money”); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 317-320 , 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1039 , 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941) (Congress has the power to regulate primary elections “where the state law has made the primary an integral part of the procedure of choice; or where in fact the primary effectively controls the choice . . . .”).

We thus conclude that Congress has the constitutional authority to establish and appoint the Federal Election Commission to carry out appropriate legislative functions. 178 As to this part of *242 our holding, Judges Tamm, MacKinnon, and Wilkey are apparently in agreement. 179 Judge MacKinnon expressly notes in his dissent that the members of the Commission need not be appointed in conformity with article II, section 2 to the extent that the Commission is performing a “legislative function.” 180 And Judge Tamm’s characterization of the Commission’s powers as “executive,” “quasi-judicial,” and “outside the ambit of Congress’ basic constitutional role in the conduct of the federal electoral process” 181 implies that his concern is not that Congress has chosen to appoint members of a commission but rather that Congress has chosen to appoint members of a commission that performs other than appropriate “legislative functions.”

Whether the Commission is actually empowered to perform other than appropriate legislative functions is the basic issue raised by Questions 8(b) through 8(e). Question 8(b) 182 focuses on the broad grant of administrative and enforcement powers in 2 U.S.C. §§ 437d, 437g, while Questions 8(c) through 8(e) 183 deal with specific grants of power to the Commission. Plaintiffs have asked us to answer these questions by in effect holding that a statutory grant of other than legislative functions to the Commission is invalid on its face. We believe that the grant of quasi-judicial and quasi-executive functions to a “legislative agency” does not justify a holding that the statute is invalid on its face, and we postpone actually testing certain specific powers of the Commission against the appropriate constitutional standard until such time as those issues are ripe for determination.

At the outset, we emphasize that Congress cannot constitutionally appoint the members of a commission or agency that performs primarily executive or judicial functions. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 , 48 S.Ct. 480 , 72 L.Ed. 845 (1928). Any other conclusion would be contrary to article II, section 2 of the Constitution. But the Federal Election Commission performs at least some primarily legislative functions. Several of the Commission’s major responsibilities include gathering and *243 auditing information concerning the financing of federal election campaigns. 184 It is certainly within the sphere of appropriate legislative activity for Congress to gather and audit information to aid it in the process of “preventing fraud and corruption” in federal elections and in formulating legislation to accomplish that goal. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 , 79 S.Ct. 1081, 1085 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1115 (1959) (“[t]he scope of the power of inquiry is . .as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.”); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 125, 175 , 47 S.Ct. 319, 329 , 71 L.Ed. 580 (1927) (“[a] legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.”). The Commission is also responsible for certifying eligibility for public campaign finance funds and for overseeing the repayment of overpayments or improperly spent funds. 185 These certification and audit functions are quite similar to those exercised by the Comptroller General, a recognized legislative officer. 186 See Reorganization Act of 1949, § 7, 63 Stat. 205 ; 31 U.S.C. § 65 (d); United States v. Stewart, 234 F.Supp. 94, 99 (D.D.C.), aff’d, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 254 , 339 F.2d 753 (1964).

The problem in this case is that the Commission has also been delegated various quasi-judicial and quasi-executive powers, and the question thus becomes whether Congress can establish and appoint a commission that performs quasi-judicial and quasi-executive functions m addition to the exercise of its primary legislative functions. The Supreme Court answered that question in Springer v. Philippine Islands, supra, concluding that the issue was not whether a function was judicial or executive but rather whether the particular function was sufficiently related to the exercise of an appropriate legislative function. “It may be stated then, as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional system, that, unless otherwise expressly provided or incidental to the powers conferred, the legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial power . . . .” 277 U.S. at 201 , 48 S.Ct. at 482 (emphasis added). See 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 3.06 (4th ed. Sands 1972).

We therefore find ourselves unable to invalidate on its face a statutory provision that confers quasi-executive or quasi-judicial power upon a legislative agency. Whether particular powers are predominantly executive or judicial, or insufficiently related to the exercise of appropriate legislative power is an abstract question that would be better decided in the context of a particular factual controversy.

This is not to say that the specific powers at issue in Questions 8(b) through 8(e) are presumptively incidental (in a constitutional sense) to the exercise of legislative power. Indeed, some of the provisions — for example, those conferring civil enforcement and candidate disqualification powers on the Commission — raise very serious constitutional *244 questions. 187 But those questions can only be addressed and answered when the issues are ripe for adjudication. In its present stance, this litigation does not present the court with the concrete facts that are necessary to an informed decision. No party has been joined in a civil enforcement action initiated by the Commission (Question 8(c)), 188 no one has been disqualified from running for office (Question 8(e)); 189 the Commission has enacted no rules (Question 8(d)); 190 nor has any party been adversely affected by the exercise of most of the Commission’s broad powers under 2 U.S.C. §§ 437d, 437g (Question 8(b)). In- fact, some of the issues presented to us in the certified questions may never reach a stage at which they would be ripe for adjudication. The Commission suggested at oral argument, for example, that it would not uti

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