holding that the parents' postjudgment motion that was filed 30 days after the entry of the termination-of-parental-rights judgment was untimely and did not suspend the time for filing their notice of appeal
How later courts described this case
- holding that the parents' postjudgment motion that was filed 30 days after the entry of the termination-of-parental-rights judgment was untimely and did not suspend the time for filing their notice of appeal
- rejecting the father’s argument that ‘maintaining the situation the children had been in for the six years before the termination hearing by leaving them to be raised by family members’ was a viable alternative to termination when the father had failed to consistently support or visit with the children and his situation was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future
- rejecting the father argument that "maintaining the situation the children had been in for the six years before the termination hearing by leaving them to be raised by family members" was a viable alternative to termination when the father had failed to consistently support or visit with the children and his situation was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future
- noting that the custodians who sought termination of parental rights were seeking to give the child “permanency and security” and that maintaining the status quo and permitting the parent additional time to adjust his circumstances was not a viable alternative to termination
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PITTMAN, Judge,
concurring specially.
Under Rule 6(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which are made generally applicable to the juvenile courts under Rule 1(A), Ala. R. Juv. P., a trial court “may not extend the time for taking any action under Rules ... 59(b), (d), and (e),” Ala. R. Civ. P., which govern postjudgment motions for a new trial or to alter, amend, or vacate a judgment, “except to the extent and under the conditions stated in” Rule 59. Thus, any enlargement of time granted by the juvenile court’s action upon the appellants’ motion is referable only to the time for taking an appeal, which may be enlarged under certain circumstances pursuant to Rule 77(d), Ala. R. Civ. P. Because a notice of appeal was not filed within the additional time granted by the juvenile court, I concur in the main opinion’s conclusion that the appeal is untimely and must be dismissed.