Opinion

State v. J.P.

  • 907 So. 2d 1101
  • 2004 Fla. LEXIS 2529
Court
Supreme Court of Florida
Filed
Nov 18, 2004
Status
Published
Author
Wells
On the bench
Anstead, Cantero, Lewis, Pariente, Quince, Wells
Cited by
59 cases
Authority
More cited than 1.0%

holding that "the imposition of criminal sanctions” for curfew violations is not the least restrictive means to further local governmental entities’ compelling interests because ”[t]he same goals could be achieved by imposing a civil penalty”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that "the imposition of criminal sanctions” for curfew violations is not the least restrictive means to further local governmental entities’ compelling interests because ”[t]he same goals could be achieved by imposing a civil penalty”
  • noting that standing, at a “constitutional minimum,” requires a concrete, actual or imminent “injury in fact” that can be remedied by the judicial relief sought
  • recognizing a state “right to intrastate travel” including “the inherent right to window shop, saunter down a sidewalk, and wave to friends and passersby with no fear of arrest” (citation omitted)
  • applying strict scrutiny to juvenile curfew ordinances based on Florida Constitution’s enumerated right to privacy and right of freedom of movement

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

WELLS, J.,

dissenting.

I join in Justice Cantero’s dissent.

I write only in respect to the majority’s footnote 1 and the majority’s comments relying upon stare decisis. I believe it must be noted that although this Court’s opinion in T.M. v. State, 784 So.2d 442 (Fla.2001), which was the lead case and which J.P. v. State, 788 So.2d 953 (Fla.2001), followed, did use the phrase “we agree,” the opinion contains no analysis. My vote in those earlier cases was a recognition of the State’s concession which was made in this Court. The concession had not been made in the district court. The case was remanded to the district court for consideration in light of the State’s concession. Under the circumstances of the limited previous review of this issue in this Court, I do not believe that the doctrine of stare decisis should control the present decision.

A comparison of the present majority opinion with the opinion in T.M. illustrates my point. In T.M., the analysis consumed one paragraph. In the present opinion, the analysis is many, many pages, which demonstrates that there is really no basis upon which to rely on T.M. as controlling precedent.

CANTERO, J., concurs.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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