discussing dual requirements under strict-scrutiny analysis that, in order to justify government interference with the fundamental right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their children, the State must have a "compelling state interest" and the State's interference must be "narrowly tailored to the protection of the compelling state interest"
How later courts described this case
- discussing dual requirements under strict-scrutiny analysis that, in order to justify government interference with the fundamental right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their children, the State must have a "compelling state interest" and the State's interference must be "narrowly tailored to the protection of the compelling state interest"
- recognizing that state must use the most narrowly tailored means of serving compelling state interest of protecting the best interests and welfare of children
- opining that court-ordered grandparent visitation should be narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest of avoiding substantial harm that would occur to the child absent the court-ordered visitation
- holding that the judiciary could adopt a construction of a statute that would uphold its constitutionality
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CRAWLEY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. As I have stated in my earlier writings in J.S. v. D.W., [Ms. 2990431, May 4, 2001]-So.2d-,-(Ala.Civ.App.2001) (Crawley, J., concurring in the result), and R.S.C. v. J.B.C., 812 So.2d 361, 371 (Ala.Civ.App.2001) (Craw-ley, J., concurring in the result), I believe that the grandparent-visitation statutes in Ala.Code 1975, §§ 30-3-4.1 and 26-10A-30, are unconstitutional per se.