Opinion

K.D. v. State

  • 779 So. 2d 468
  • 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 13825
Court
District Court of Appeal of Florida
Filed
Oct 27, 2000
Status
Published
Author
Patterson
On the bench
Altenbernd, Patterson, Stringer
Cited by
14 cases
Authority
More cited than 89.7%

holding that when multiple offenses constitute the basis for a delinquency adjudication, the trial court must enter a separate disposition order for each offense

How later courts described this case

  • holding that when multiple offenses constitute the basis for a delinquency adjudication, the trial court must enter a separate disposition order for each offense

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PATTERSON, Chief Judge.

The appellant, K.D., challenges the order adjudicating him to be a delinquent child and committing him to the Department of Juvenile Justice. We affirm his adjudication of guilt without discussion, but reverse the restitution order and the single disposition order and remand for further proceedings.

The State charged K.D. with one count of armed burglary and five counts of burglary. The juvenile court adjudicated K.D. delinquent on all six counts and ordered that he be committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice. On July 13, 1999, K.D. filed a notice of appeal. Although divested of jurisdiction, the juvenile court entered an order of restitution on August 6, 1999, which was rendered on November 23, 1999. This was error. A trial court does not have jurisdiction to hold a restitution hearing or enter an order of restitution after a notice of appeal has been filed. See Edwards v. State, 734 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Colson v. State, 711 So.2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Therefore, we strike the order of restitution. However, because the trial court reserved jurisdiction to hold a restitution hearing, restitution may be reimposed on remand. See Marinetti v. State, 706 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

We also note that the court erred by failing to enter separate orders of disposition as to KD.’s six separate offenses. See E.Y. v. State, 670 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Thus, we reverse the single general order of disposition and remand for the entry of separate disposition orders. K.D. need not be present for this purely ministerial act.

*469 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

STRINGER, J., Concurs.

ALTENBERND, J., Concurs specially.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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