holding term "common pocketknife" was not unconstitutionally vague because "in the vast majority of cases, it will be evident . . . whether one's pocketknife is a 'common' pocketknife under any intended definition of that term."
How later courts described this case
- holding term "common pocketknife" was not unconstitutionally vague because "in the vast majority of cases, it will be evident . . . whether one's pocketknife is a 'common' pocketknife under any intended definition of that term."
- concluding "that the term ‘common pocketknife,’ as contained in the statute, does provide persons of ordinary intelligence with fair notice as to what constitutes forbidden conduct”
- stating that "a court may refer to a dictionary to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning which the legislature intended to ascribe to the term"
- stating that when the legislature has not defined a statutory term, a court may refer to a dictionary to ascertain its plain and ordinary meaning
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in State v. A.M.
See L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370, 372 (Fla. 1997) (“[A] court may refer to a dictionary to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning which the [L]egislature intended to ascribe to the term.”) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. A.M., 765 So.2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
The opinion
GRIMES, Justice,
concurring.
In view of the Attorney General’s opinion and the absence of a more definitive description of a common pocketknife, I concur with the majority opinion. It occurs to me, however, that the legislature may wish to address this issue, particularly as it relates to the possession of pocketknives on school grounds. Even a four-inch blade can do a lot of damage.
WELLS, J., concurs.