holding that defendant's shouting in a Publix supermarket "Is everybody watching this, police brutality, ... Rodney King style" and screaming and cursing at the top of his lungs was insufficient to support a conviction for disorderly conduct
How later courts described this case
- holding that defendant's shouting in a Publix supermarket "Is everybody watching this, police brutality, ... Rodney King style" and screaming and cursing at the top of his lungs was insufficient to support a conviction for disorderly conduct
- holding. a " ‘fighting words' finding ... constitution *892 ally unjustified as a matter of law” where "words neither themselves urged the crowd to respond nor actually had that effect”
- holding a " 'fighting words' finding ... constitutionally unjustified as a matter of law" where "words neither themselves urged the crowd to respond nor actually had that effect"
- holding that words such as “You f* * *ing cops, what the h*ll do you think you’re doing? You are full of bull sh*t” were not fighting words, and compiling fighting words cases
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by WL v. State, 769 So. 2d 1132 (2000)
"As we all know, `[t]he freedom of individuals to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.'" Id. (quoting City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987)).
Distinguished by KAC v. State, 707 So. 2d 1175 (1998)
We reject the State's confession of error, relying on L.A.T. v. State, 650 So.2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), and Livingston v. State, 610 So.2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
The opinion
HUBBART, Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the opinion and judgment of the court, but write separately to agree, as well, with Judge Cope’s concurring opinion. Clearly, L.A.T.’s loud and profane words under the circumstances of this case (1) did not inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace, and (2) did not falsely report some physical hazard so as to create a clear and present danger of bodily harm to others. Because these are the only two circumstances in which one may, consistent with the First Amendment, be found guilty of disorderly conduct under Section 877.03, Florida Statutes (1991), State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641 (Fla.1976), L.A.T.’s delinquency adjudication for disorderly conduct must be reversed.
On this record, L.A.T.’s words were constitutionally protected by the First Amendment for the reasons stated in the court’s opinion — although, as Judge Cope correctly observes, a different case would be presented if L.A.T. had physically interfered with the police officers in their arrest of L.A.T.’s companion or had screamed with such volume as to interfere with the officers’ ability to communicate with one another, with witnesses, or with the arrestee. In that event, L.A.T. could properly be found guilty of violating Section 843.02, Florida Statutes (1991), as nothing in the First Amendment protects a person who, under the guise of verbally protesting another’s arrest, interferes with a police officer’s lawful arrest of a third party.