The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1895-20
JUDY A. TEWIAH,
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and
PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY
INSURANCE CO.,
Respondents.
_____________________________
Submitted May 31, 2022 – Decided July 29, 2022
Before Judges Sumners and Firko.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of
Labor, Docket No. 218347.
Judy Tewiah, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General, attorney
for respondent (Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Sean P. Havern, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Judy Tewiah appeals from the final agency decision of the Board of
Review (the Board) affirming the Appeal Tribunal's decision that she was
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)
because she left her employment at Progressive Casualty Insurance Company
(Progressive) voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. We
affirm.
In accordance with N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), an employee who resigns is
entitled to unemployment benefits so long as the resignation for "good cause
attributable to" the work. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 218 (1997);
N.J.A.C. 12:17--9.1(c). "Good cause" means "cause sufficient to justify an
employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks
of the unemployed." Condo v. Bd. of Review, 158 N.J. Super. 172, 174 (App.
Div. 1978).
Having conducted a telephonic hearing in which Tewiah, her supervisor
Christine Leonard, and human resources consultant Molly Kranys testified, the
Appeal Tribunal denied Tewiah's claim that she was entitled to unemployment
benefits because she involuntarily resigned due to discrimination, a hostile work
environment, and retaliation affecting her medical condition that required
surgery; and the denial of her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act
A-1895-20
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(FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. Tewiah had worked at Progressive for nearly
four years when she gave three weeks' notice of her resignation to Leonard and
Kranys. Tewiah stated that she asked for accommodations when she had to take
time off to care for a sick family member and was "basically refused ." Kranys
disagreed, testifying that Tewiah never filed for FMLA or requested
accommodations. Tewiah responded that she did not realize she could use
FMLA and that management should have explained it to her.
The Appeal Tribunal found Tewiah did not provide any evidence of her
medical condition or Progressive's allowance of a hostile work environment.
The Appeal Tribunal found it was undisputed that Tewiah complained to her
supervisors in 2018 about mistreatment by her peers and Progressive attempted
to investigate the situation; however, she did not provide the information
necessary for the employer to complete the investigation. In addition, the
Appeal Tribunal determined Progressive did in fact reprimand a manager in
response to Tewiah's complaints regarding the manager's inappropriate
comments towards her. Regarding Tewiah's complaint that she was not
promoted, the Appeal Tribunal found she was not promised nor entitled to a
promotion. Additionally, while Tewiah claimed she was forced to resign
because she was not provided accommodations, the Tribunal derermined that
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3
"the undisputed testimony of both parties showed that . . . [Tewiah] received an
accommodation from . . . [Progressive] based on [its] needs."
Applying our limited scope of review, In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182
(2011) (citation omitted), we conclude Tewiah's arguments are without
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
We are satisfied that the Board's decision was not arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable, unsupported by substantial credible evidence as a whole, or
inconsistent with the enabling statute or legislative policy. See Brady, 152 N.J.
at 210-11. There is no basis to disturb the Board's decision, and we affirm
substantially for the reasons expressed by the Appeal Tribunal as adopted by the
Board.
Affirmed.
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