denying petition because “[d]isqualifying a judge because his examination of a witness on relevant matters gives a clue as to how he may be inclined to rule at the end of the evidence would wreak administrative havoc in the circuit court by inviting mid-hearing motions for recusal”
How later courts described this case
- denying petition because “[d]isqualifying a judge because his examination of a witness on relevant matters gives a clue as to how he may be inclined to rule at the end of the evidence would wreak administrative havoc in the circuit court by inviting mid-hearing motions for recusal”
- recognizing that judges are “expected to be influenced by real life experiences”
- noting disbelief in witness’ testimony is ordinarily no basis for disqualification
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BASKIN, Judge
(dissenting).
The majority holds that “appellate review offers an adequate remedy” for correcting an erroneous judgment. If that proposition disposed of the issue before us, section 38.10, Florida Statutes (1989), and rule 1.432, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, would be unnecessary. Where, as here, petitioner has articulated a reasonable fear that she will not receive a fair trial, Florida law mandates recusal of the trial judge. By waiting until the end of trial to set forth her complaints based on her reasonable fears, a litigant forfeits her bias objection. Lawson v. Longo, 547 So.2d 1279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Petitioner has correctly employed the procedures for recusal; her constitutional right to a fair trial should rest not on the empathy of trial — or even appellate — judges, but on the remedy available to all reasonably fearful litigants. This court should not curtail Mrs. Nateman’s exercise of her rights.
For the sake of maintaining uniformity with this court’s prior decisions, I would grant en banc review and afford petitioner the relief she requests.
BARKDULL, J., concurs.