The opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 95-20009
Summary Calendar
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ROBERT D. DAWSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
KLEIN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT and DONALD COLLINS,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(CA-H-93-3137)
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July 31, 1995
Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Robert Dawson appeals from the adverse summary judgment on his
state and federal constitutional claims against the Klein
Independent School District. We AFFIRM.
I.
Dawson was terminated from his position as tax assessor-
collector for the District on April 21, 1992. The termination
followed a hearing, at Dawson's request, by the District's Board of
1
Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that rule, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
Trustees. Thereupon, Dawson filed this action against the District
and its superintendent, Donald Collins, claiming, among other
things, that he was terminated without procedural due process. The
district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
holding, inter alia, that, as a matter of law, Dawson was afforded
both notice and an opportunity to respond, and that Collins was
entitled to qualified immunity.
II.
First, Dawson challenges the summary judgment against his
procedural due process claim.2 Our review is de novo. Calpetco
1981 v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 989 F.2d 1408, 1412 (5th Cir.
1993).
As the district court noted, the required process before
termination of a government employee consists of two elements:
notice and an opportunity to respond. Cleveland Bd. of Education
v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-46 (1985). Dawson received both.
As early as June 4, 1991, more than ten months before his
termination, Dawson received notice of numerous complaints
regarding his professional demeanor (offensive remarks, loss of
temper) and work activity (playing cards and performing outside
work while on duty). On February 25, 1992, he was notified of
additional complaints, and was reassigned as a "business officer",
2
The District suggests that the summary judgment was not a
final, appealable order because its counterclaim for attorneys'
fees, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, is still pending. "[A]
decision on the merits is final for purposes of appeal irrespective
of the determination of attorneys' fees." Bogney v. Jones, 904
F.2d 272, 273 n.1 (5th Cir. 1990).
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pending an investigation. On March 4, he received written notice
from Collins that he was recommending Dawson's dismissal to the
Board of Trustees. And, on March 12, the Board of Trustees
informed Dawson of their acceptance of Collins' recommendation, and
of Dawson's right to a hearing. Dawson requested a hearing; and,
pursuant to his attorney's request, the hearing was moved from
April 7 to April 21, 1992. Dawson was aware of his right to call
and cross-examine witnesses, and exercised those rights at the
hearing.
Dawson claims that, prior to his hearing, he was not notified
of the specific reasons for his dismissal. We disagree. He was
notified, well over a month before his hearing, that his pending
termination arose from: (1) failure to meet the District's
standards of professional conduct, (2) failure to comply with
administrative regulations, (3) failure to comply with official
directives, and (3) conducting private for-profit business during
work time. Additionally, he received full disclosure of the
evidence to be presented against him at his hearing, and was given
additional time to prepare his defense. Given the four charges,
together with the specific evidence against him, Dawson's notice
was more than sufficient for him to present his defense. E.g.
Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1971).3
3
Dawson also challenges the district court's conclusion that
Collins is entitled to qualified immunity. As a government
official, Collins is entitled to qualified immunity unless his
conduct violated Dawson's clearly established rights, e.g.,
Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir.
1987). Because of our due process holding, we need not address
this issue.
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III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
The district court's summary judgment also dismissed the other
related federal and state constitutional claims in Dawson's
complaint. Dawson has not addressed them on appeal; therefore,
they are abandoned.
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