stating that “the determination whether the error ‘prejudiced’ the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea” in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel case
How later courts described this case
- stating that “the determination whether the error ‘prejudiced’ the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea” in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel case
- concluding that if “the appellate filings and the record as a whole ‘compellingly demonstrate’ the improbability of those facts, the Court may discount [appellant’s] factual assertions and decide the legal issue”
- holding that the Court of Criminal Appeals exceeded its authority under Article 66(c), UCMJ, by purporting to resolve conflicting post-trial affidavits but con- cluding that the error caused no prejudice
- stating “if the affidavit is factually adequate on its face but the appellate filings and the record as a whole ‘compellingly demonstrate’ the improbability of those facts, the Court may discount those factual assertions and decide the legal issue”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CRAWFORD, Judge
(concurring in the result):
The issue of whether to order a post-trial hearing requires a delicate balancing of interests. On the one hand, a court must consider the interests in procedural regularity and the finality of judgments. Against these, a court must also weigh the interest in ensuring that defendants are afforded their constitutional rights. A post-trial hearing should be required where (1) a substantial issue is revealed through affidavits; (2) the issue could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and (3) failure to conduct the hearing would undermine the court’s confidence in the determination of guilt or the sentence.
There are a number of exceptions to requiring a post-trial hearing. * One of the *252 exceptions, applied by the majority, is the harmless-error doctrine. Cf. United States v. Simpson, 436 F.2d 162, 164-66 (D.C.Cir. 1970). I agree with its application in this case.
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 625-26 (D.C.Cir.l996)(holding facts that are inherently incredible or speculative do not warrant post-trial hearing and appellant was not prejudiced by attorney's conduct); United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 226 (1st Cir.l993)(holding appellant made "no serious challenge” to facts); United States v. Butt, 731 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir.l984)(denying post-trial hearing because sworn testimony on "record conclusively contra-diets” defendant’s allegations); and United States v. Parman, 461 F.2d 1203, 1205 (D.C.Cir.l971)(holding allegations by appellant clearly inconsistent with record of trial). See also Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 494-95 , 82 S.Ct. 510, 513-14 , 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962)(stating that "[tjhe factual allegations contained in the petitioner’s motion and affidavit, and put in issue by the affidavit filed with the Government’s response, related primarily to pur *252 ported occurrences outside the courtroom and upon which the record could, therefore, cast no real light.”),