holding that “third-party reprisals” can amount in some circumstances to retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.
How later courts described this case
- holding that “third-party reprisals” can amount in some circumstances to retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.
- holding that an employee whose employment was terminated after his fiancée, a co-employee, filed a complaint with the EEOC had standing to pursue a Title VII retaliation claim
- concluding that Thompson falls within the zone of interests protected by Title VII because he is a person aggrieved with standing to sue
- finding that the fired spouse of an individual that filed a workplace discrimination complaint could bring a title VII retaliation claim
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Gaub v. Professional Hospital Supply, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (2012)
First, Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 863, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011), is inapplicable to Mr. Gaub’s hostile environment claim.
The opinion
SEPARATE OPINION
[ 562 U.S. 179 ]
Justice Ginsburg,
with whom Justice Breyer joins, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion, and add a fortifying observation: Today’s decision accords with the longstanding views of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency that administers Title VII. In its Compliance Manual, the EEOC counsels that Title VII “prohibit[s] retaliation against someone so closely related to or associated with the person exercising his or her statutory rights that it would discourage or prevent the person from pursuing those rights.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12-13 (quoting EEOC Compliance Manual § 8-11(C)(3) (1998)). Such retaliation “can be challenged,” the Manual affirms, “by both the individual who engaged in protected activity and the relative, where both are employees.” Id., at 25-26 (quoting Compliance Manual § 8-II(B)(3)(c)). The EEOC’s statements in the Manual merit deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 , 65 S. Ct. 161 , 89 L. Ed. 124 (1944). See Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399-400 , 128 S. Ct. 1147 , 170 L. Ed. 2d 10 (2008). The EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII, I further note, is consistent with interpretations of analogous statutes by other federal agencies. See, e.g., NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1088-1089 (CA7 1987) (adopting NLRB’s position that retaliation against a relative violates the National Labor Relations Act); Tasty Baking Co. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 114, 127-128 (CADC 2001) (same), cited in Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11.