Common Cause v. Rucho

Before WYNN, Circuit Judge, and OSTEEN, District Judge, and BRITT, Senior District Judge.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WYNN, Circuit Judge, wrote the opinion, in which BRITT, Senior District Judge, concurred.

*799 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. BACKGROUND...801

A. THE MODERN HISTORY OF REDISTRICTING IN NORTH CAROLINA ...801

B. THE DRAWING OF THE 2016 PLAN ...803

C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...810

II. JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENTS...814

A. STANDING ...814

1. Equal Protection Clause...815

2. First Amendment...828

3. Article I...831

B. JUSTICIABILITY ...836

1. Governing Law...837

2. Legislative Defendants' Arguments Against Justiciability...843

III. EQUAL PROTECTION...860

A. BACKGROUND LAW ...861

1. Discriminatory Intent...861

2. Discriminatory Effects...864

3. Lack of Justification...867

B. APPLICATION ...868

1. Statewide Evidence...868

2. District-Specific Evidence...923

IV. FIRST AMENDMENT...923

A. BACKGROUND LAW ...924

B. LEGAL STANDARD AND APPLICATION ...929

1. Intent To Burden Speech and Associational Rights...929

2. Burden on Speech and Associational Rights...930

3. Causation...935

V. ARTICLE I...935

A. BACKGROUND LAW ...937

B. APPLICATION ...937

VI. REMEDY...941

In these consolidated cases, two groups of Plaintiffs allege that North Carolina's 2016 Congressional Redistricting Plan (the "2016 Plan") constitutes a partisan gerrymander in violation of Article I of the Constitution, the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After conducting a four-day trial and carefully considering the parties' evidence and briefing, this Court awarded judgment in Plaintiffs' favor on all of their claims and enjoined the State from using the 2016 Plan in future elections. Common Cause v. Rucho , 279 F.Supp.3d 587 , 598 (M.D.N.C. 2018), vacated sub nom. Rucho v. Common Cause , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 2679 , --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2018) (mem.). On July 25, 2018, the Supreme Court vacated that judgment, and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Gill v. Whitford , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1916 , --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2018), which addressed what evidence a plaintiff must put forward to establish Article III standing to lodge a partisan vote dilution claim under the Equal Protection Clause.

As further explained below, we conclude that, under the test set forth in Gill , at least one Plaintiff registered to vote in each of the thirteen districts in the 2016 Plan has standing to assert an Equal Protection challenge to each of those districts. In particular, such Plaintiffs introduced evidence establishing that each of their districts is "packed or cracked" and, as a result, that their votes "carry less weight than [they] would carry in another, hypothetical district." Id. at 1931 . We further conclude that Gill did not call into question-and, if anything, supported-this Court's previous determination that Plaintiffs have standing to assert partisan gerrymandering claims under Article I and the First Amendment.

*800 As to the merits, a common thread runs through the restrictions on state election regulations imposed by Article I, the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause: the Constitution does not allow elected officials to enact laws that distort the marketplace of political ideas so as to intentionally favor certain political beliefs, parties, or candidates and disfavor others. In particular, Article I preserves inviolate the right of "the People" to elect their Representatives, and therefore bars the States from enacting election regulations that "dictate electoral outcomes" or "favor or disfavor a class of candidates." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton , 514 U.S. 779 , 833-34, 115 S.Ct. 1842 , 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995). Similarly, the First Amendment prohibits election regulations that "restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others." Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S. 1 , 48-49, 96 S.Ct. 612 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam). And the Equal Protection Clause embodies the foundational constitutional principle that the State must govern "impartially"-that "the State should treat its voters as standing in the same position, regardless of their political beliefs or party affiliation." Davis v. Bandemer , 478 U.S. 109 , 166, 106 S.Ct. 2797 , 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That the framers of the Constitution and the Reconstruction Amendments sought to protect this principle through three different constitutional provisions only reinforces its centrality to our democratic system.

Partisan gerrymandering-"the drawing of legislative district lines to subordinate adherents of one political party and entrench a rival party in power," Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2652 , 2658, 192 L.Ed.2d 704 (2015) -strikes at the heart of this foundational constitutional principle. By definition, partisan gerrymandering amounts to an effort to dictate electoral outcomes by favoring candidates of one party and disfavoring candidates of another. Thornton , 514 U.S. at 833 -34 , 115 S.Ct. 1842 . By intentionally ensuring that Representatives from one party have a disproportionate voice in Congress, it also "restrict[s] the speech of some elements of our society"-voters who do not support the policies embraced by the favored party-and "enhance[s] the relative voice of others"-voters who support the favored party. Buckley , 424 U.S. at 48 -49 , 96 S.Ct. 612 . And by favoring the viewpoints of one group of voters over another, it runs afoul of the Government's constitutional duty to "treat its voters as standing in the same position, regardless of their political beliefs or party affiliation." Davis , 478 U.S. at 166 , 106 S.Ct. 2797 .

Put differently, by intentionally seeking to entrench a favored party in power and make it difficult-if not impossible-for candidates of parties supporting disfavored viewpoints to prevail, partisan gerrymandering "seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion." Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C. , 512 U.S. 622 , 641, 114 S.Ct. 2445 , 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994). But " '[t]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,' and the people lose when the government is the one deciding which ideas should prevail ." Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 2361 , 2375, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2018) (emphasis added) (quoting Abrams v. United States , 250 U.S. 616 , 630, 40 S.Ct. 17 , 63 L.Ed. 1173 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ). Partisan gerrymanders, therefore, "raise the specter that the Government may effectively *801 drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace." Turner Broad. , 512 U.S. at 641 , 114 S.Ct. 2445 (internal quotation marks omitted).

That is precisely what the Republican-controlled North Carolina General Assembly sought to do here. The General Assembly expressly directed the legislators and consultant responsible for drawing the 2016 Plan to rely on "political data"-that is, past election results specifying whether, and to what extent, particular voting precincts had favored Republican or Democratic candidates, and therefore were likely to do so in the future-to draw a districting plan that would ensure Republican candidates would prevail in the vast majority of the State's congressional districts, and would continue to do so in future elections. Ex. 1007. And the Republican-controlled General Assembly achieved that goal. As detailed below, the 2016 Plan led to Republican candidates prevailing by "safe" margins in the vast majority of the State's thirteen congressional districts. Put differently, the General Assembly's Republican majority "decid[ed] which ideas [w]ould prevail" in the State's congressional elections. Becerra , 138 S.Ct. at 2375 . In doing so, they deprived Democratic voters "of their natural political strength" by making it difficult for such voters to raise money, attract strong candidates, and motivate fellow party members and independent voters to campaign and vote. Gill , 138 S.Ct. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring).

Legislative Defendants 1 drew a plan designed to subordinate the interests of non-Republican voters not because they believe doing so advances any democratic, constitutional, or public interest, but because, as the chief legislative mapdrawer openly acknowledged, the General Assembly's Republican majority "think[s] electing Republicans is better than electing Democrats." Ex. 1016, at 34:21-23. But that is not a choice the Constitution allows legislative mapdrawers to make. Rather, "those who govern should be the last people to help decide who should govern." McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n. , 572 U.S. 185 , 134 S.Ct. 1434 , 1441-42, 188 L.Ed.2d 468 (2014) (plurality op. of Roberts, C.J.). Indeed, "the core principle of [our] republican government [is] that the voters should choose their representatives, not the other way around." Ariz. State Leg. , 135 S.Ct. at 2677 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, and as further explained below, we conclude, with one narrow exception, 2 that Plaintiffs prevail on all of their constitutional claims. 3

I. BACKGROUND

A. THE MODERN HISTORY OF REDISTRICTING IN NORTH CAROLINA

Over the last 30 years, North Carolina voters repeatedly have asked state and federal courts to pass judgment on the constitutionality of the congressional districting plans drawn by their state legislators. The first such challenge involved a redistricting plan adopted by the North Carolina General Assembly after the 1990 census, which increased the size of North *802 Carolina's congressional delegation from 11 to 12 members. See Shaw v. Reno ( Shaw I ), 509 U.S. 630 , 633-34, 113 S.Ct. 2816 , 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993). When the General Assembly set out to redraw the state's congressional districts to incorporate the new seat, the Department of Justice, pursuant to its "max-black" policy, pushed for the creation of a second majority-black district to augment, it maintained, the representation of the state's African-American voters in Congress. Id. at 635 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 . In response, the General Assembly prepared a revised district map that included the majority-black First and Twelfth Districts (the "1992 Plan"). Id.

Several dozen North Carolina voters, most of whom were Republican, challenged the 1992 Plan as a partisan gerrymander, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, and Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. Pope v. Blue , 809 F.Supp. 392 , 394-95, 397-98 (W.D.N.C. 1992), aff'd 506 U.S. 801 , 113 S.Ct. 30 , 121 L.Ed.2d 3 (1992). A divided three-judge panel dismissed the action, holding that the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege that the redistricting plan had a legally cognizable "discriminatory effect" on any "identifiable political group," under the standard set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Bandemer , 478 U.S. 109 , 127, 106 S.Ct. 2797 , 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986) (plurality op.). Pope , 809 F.Supp. at 397 .

Separately, a group of North Carolina voters challenged the 1992 Plan as a racial gerrymander, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Shaw I , 509 U.S. at 636 -37 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 . After several years of litigation, the Supreme Court held that the General Assembly's use of race as the predominant factor in drawing the second majority-black district in the 1992 Plan violated the Equal Protection Clause, and enjoined the use of that district in future elections. Shaw v. Hunt ( Shaw II ), 517 U.S. 899 , 905-18, 116 S.Ct. 1894 , 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996). In 1997, a politically divided General Assembly enacted a remedial plan expected to elect six Republican and six Democratic Representatives, rendering each party's share of the state's congressional delegation proportional to its share of the statewide vote in the most recent congressional election. Cromartie v. Hunt , 133 F.Supp.2d 407 , 412-13 (E.D.N.C. 2000), rev'd sub nom. Easley v. Cromartie , 532 U.S. 234 , 121 S.Ct. 1452 , 149 L.Ed.2d 430 (2001) ; id. at 423-24 (Thornburg, J., dissenting). In 2001, after several more years of litigation, the Supreme Court approved that remedial plan. See Easley , 532 U.S. 234 , 121 S.Ct. 1452 (holding that three-judge panel's finding that race constituted the predominant motivation in redrawing remedial districts was not supported by substantial evidence).

Just as litigation regarding the 1992 Plan came to an end, the results of the 2000 census entitled North Carolina to another seat in Congress, and the General Assembly again set out to redraw the state's congressional districts to include the additional seat. The resulting plan, which was adopted in 2001 (the "2001 Plan"), was used in each of the State's congressional elections between 2001 and 2010. In all but one of these elections, the party receiving more statewide votes for their candidates for the House of Representatives also won a majority of the seats in North Carolina's congressional delegation (the only exception being the 2010 election, in which Republicans won 54 percent of votes statewide but only 6 of the 13 seats). Exs. 1021-25. Although the 2001 Plan did not include any majority-black districts, black voters in the First and Twelfth Districts were consistently successful in electing their preferred candidates. Harris v. McCrory , 159 F.Supp.3d 600 , 606-07 (M.D.N.C. 2016), aff'd sub *803 nom. Cooper v. Harris , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1455 , 197 L.Ed.2d 837 (2017). Unlike the 1992 Plan, the 2001 Plan did not generate significant federal litigation. Id. at 607.

B. THE DRAWING OF THE 2016 PLAN

In 2010, for the first time in more than a century, North Carolina voters elected Republican majorities in both the North Carolina Senate and the North Carolina House of Representatives, giving Republicans exclusive control over the decennial congressional redistricting process. 4 See id. at 607. The House of Representatives and Senate each established redistricting committees, which were jointly responsible for preparing a proposed congressional redistricting plan. Id. Representative David Lewis, in his capacity as the senior chair of the House Redistricting Committee, and Senator Robert Rucho, in his capacity as senior chair of the Senate Redistricting Committee, were responsible for developing the proposed redistricting plan. Id.

Through private counsel, the committees engaged Dr. Thomas Hofeller, who had previously worked as the redistricting coordinator for the Republican National Committee, to draw the new congressional districting plan. Id. Concurrent with his work on the 2011 North Carolina congressional redistricting plan, Dr. Hofeller also served on a "redistricting team" established as part of the national Republican State Leadership Committee's ("RSLC") Redistricting Majority Project, commonly referred to as "REDMAP." Ex. 2015, at ¶ 13. According to RSLC, REDMAP sought to elect Republican candidates to state legislatures so that Republicans would control such legislatures' redistricting efforts and thereby "solidify conservative policymaking at the state level and maintain a Republican stronghold in the U.S. House of Representatives for the next decade." Id. at ¶ 10. With regard to North Carolina, in particular, REDMAP sought to "[s]trengthen Republican redistricting power by flipping [state legislative] chambers from Democrat to Republican control." Ex. 2020.

Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho, both of whom are Republican, orally instructed Dr. Hofeller regarding the criteria he should follow in drawing the new districting plan. Dep. of Thomas B. Hofeller ("Hofeller Dep.") 20:7-19, Jan. 24, 2017, ECF Nos. 101-34, 110-1. According to Dr. Hofeller, Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho's "primar[y] goal" in drawing the new districts was "to create as many districts as possible in which GOP candidates would be able to successfully compete for office." Id. at 123:1-7.

In accordance with Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho's instructions, Dr. Hofeller testified that he sought "to minimize the number of districts in which Democrats would have an opportunity to elect a Democratic candidate." Id. at 127:19-22. In order to minimize the electoral opportunities of Democratic candidates, Dr. Hofeller used the results of past statewide elections to predict whether a particular precinct or portion of a precinct was likely to vote for a Republican or Democratic congressional candidate in future elections. See id. at 132:22-134:13, 159:20-160:12. According to Dr. Hofeller, "past voting behavior," as reflected in "past election results," is "the best predictor of future election success." Ex. 2037. Past election data have become "the industry standard" for predicting the partisan performance of a districting plan, he explained, because "as more and more voters ... register non-partisan or independent," party registration data have decreased in predictive value. Id.

*804 Using past election data to "draw maps that were more favorable to Republican candidates," Dr. Hofeller moved district lines "to weaken Democratic strength in Districts 7, 8, and 11 ... by concentrating Democratic voting strength in Districts 1, 4, and 12." Ex. 2043, at 33-34. Additionally, according to Dr. Hofeller, "[t]he General Assembly's goal [in 2011] was to increase Republican voting strength in New Districts 2, 3, 6, 7, and 13. This could only be accomplished by placing all the strong Democratic [census voting districts ("VTDs") ] 5 in either New Districts 1 or 4." Hofeller Dep. 116:19-117:25; Ex. 2036, at 4 (Dr. Hofeller averring that "[t]he Republican strategy was to weaken Democratic strength in Districts 7, 8, and 11; and to completely revamp District 13, converting it into a competitive GOP district."). Dr. Hofeller testified that to "improve[ ] GOP voting strength" in Districts 2 and 9, he "concentrat[ed] Democratic voting strength in Districts 1, 4 and 12." Ex. 2036, at 4. Dr. Hofeller conceded that, by making these changes, the 2011 Plan "diminished ... [t]he[ ] opportunity to elect a Democratic candidate in the districts in which [he] increased Republican voting strength." Hofeller Dep. 128:17-21. All told, Dr. Hofeller testified that he redrew Districts 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, and 13 to increase Republican voting strength in those districts, and, to do so, he concentrated Democratic voters in Districts 1, 4, and 12.

Claiming (incorrectly) that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act required the creation of majority-black districts "where possible," Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho also directed Dr. Hofeller to draw two majority-black districts in the state. Harris , 159 F.Supp.3d at 608 . This goal worked hand-in-hand with the General Assembly's partisan objective because, as Legislative Defendants acknowledge, "race and politics are highly correlated." Ex. 2043, at ¶ 120. Thus, Dr. Hofeller drew the map to further concentrate black voters, who are more likely to vote for Democratic candidates, into District 1 and District 12, where Dr. Hofeller already was planning to concentrate Democratic voting strength. Harris , 159 F.Supp.3d at 607 -09 . As a result, the proportion of black voters in those districts increased from 47.76 percent to 52.65 percent and from 43.77 percent to 50.66 percent, respectively. Id. The General Assembly enacted the 2011 Plan on July 28, 2011. Id. at 608 .

North Carolina conducted two congressional elections using the 2011 Plan. In 2012, Republican candidates received a minority of the statewide vote (49%), Ex. 3023, but won a supermajority of the seats in the State's congressional delegation (9 of 13), Ex. 1020. In 2014, Republican candidates received 54 percent of the statewide vote, and won 10 of the 13 congressional seats. Ex. 1019.

Meanwhile, voters living in the two majority-black districts challenged the 2011 Plan in both state and federal court, alleging that lines for the two districts constituted unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. Harris , 159 F.Supp.3d at 609 -10 . The Supreme Court of North Carolina twice ruled that the 2011 Plan did not violate the state or federal constitution. Dickson v. Rucho , 368 N.C. 481 , 781 S.E.2d 404 , 410-11 (2015), vacated , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2186 , 198 L.Ed.2d 252 (2017) (mem.);

*805 Dickson v. Rucho , 367 N.C. 542 , 766 S.E.2d 238 (2014), vacated , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1843 , 191 L.Ed.2d 719 (2015) (mem.). However, on February 5, 2016, a three-judge panel presiding in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina struck down Districts 1 and 12 as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders and enjoined their use in future elections. Harris , 159 F.Supp.3d at 627 . Following argument, the Supreme Court affirmed the Harris panel's decision in its entirety. Cooper v. Harris , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1455 , 197 L.Ed.2d 837 (2017).

With both chambers of the North Carolina General Assembly still controlled by Republicans-and elected under one of the most widespread racial gerrymanders ever confronted by a federal court, Covington v. North Carolina , 316 F.R.D. 117 , 124 (M.D.N.C. 2016), aff'd --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2211 , 198 L.Ed.2d 655 (2017) -Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho again took charge of drawing the remedial districting plan. On February 6, 2016, Representative Lewis once more engaged Dr. Hofeller to draw the remedial plan. Dep. of Rep. David Lewis ("Lewis Dep.") 44:2-4, Jan. 26, 2017, ECF Nos. 101-33, 108-3, 110-3, 110-4; see also Ex. 4061. Soon thereafter, Representative Lewis spoke with Dr. Hofeller over the phone regarding the drawing of the new plan. Lewis Dep. 44:12-24; Ex. 4061. Even before he spoke with Representative Lewis, Dr. Hofeller had begun working on a remedial plan using redistricting software and data on his personal computer. Hofeller Dep. 130:2-9.

On February 9, 2016, Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho met with Dr. Hofeller at his home and provided him with more detailed oral instructions regarding the criteria he should follow in drawing the remedial plan. Ex. 4061; Lewis Dep. 48:19-49:7; Dep. of Sen. Robert Rucho ("Rucho Dep.") 170:13-170:17, Jan. 25, 2017, ECF Nos. 101-32, 110-5. Once again, Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho did not reduce their instructions to Dr. Hofeller to writing. Lewis. Dep. 60:1-13. In addition to directing Dr. Hofeller to remedy the racial gerrymander, Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho again directed Dr. Hofeller to use political data-precinct-level election results from all statewide elections, excluding presidential elections, dating back to January 1, 2008-in drawing the remedial plan. Ex. 2043, at ¶ 38; Lewis Dep. 162:24-163:7; Hofeller Dep. 100:3-102:5, 180:10-16. Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho further instructed Dr. Hofeller that he should use that political data to draw a map that would maintain the existing partisan makeup of the state's congressional delegation, which, as elected under the racially gerrymandered plan, included 10 Republicans and 3 Democrats. Ex. 2043, at ¶ 38; Lewis Dep. 162:24-163:7; Hofeller Dep. 175:19-23, 178:14-20, 188:19-190:2. And Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho instructed Dr. Hofeller "to change as few" of the district lines in the 2011 Plan as possible in remedying the racial gerrymander. Lewis Dep. 75:25-76:2.

With these instructions, Dr. Hofeller continued to prepare draft redistricting plans on his personal computer. To achieve Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho's partisan objectives-and in accordance with his belief that "past voting data" best predict future election results-Dr. Hofeller drew the draft plans using an aggregate variable he created to predict partisan performance. For each census block, the variable compared the sum of the votes cast for Republican candidates in seven statewide races occurring between 2008 and 2014 with the sum of the average total number of votes cast for Democratic and Republican candidates in those same races. Exs. 1017, 2002, 2039, 2043 at ¶¶ 18, 47, 49, 50; Dep. of Thomas Hofeller, Vol. II ("Hofeller *806 Dep. II") 262:21-24, Feb. 10, 2017, ECF No. 110-2.

Dr. Hofeller testified that he used the averaged results from the seven elections so as "to get a pretty good cross section of what the past vote had been," Hofeller Dep. 212:16-213:9, and "[t]o give [him] an indication of the two-party partisan characteristics of VTDs," Hofeller Dep. II 267:5-6. Dr. Hofeller explained that "he had drawn numerous plans in the state of North Carolina over decades," and in his "experience[,] ... the underlying political nature of the precincts in the state does not change no matter what race you use to analyze it." Ex. 2045, at 525:6-10; Hofeller Dep. at 149:5-18. "So once a precinct is found to be a strong Democratic precinct, it's probably going to act as a strong Democratic precinct in every subsequent election. The same would be true for Republican precincts." Ex. 2045, at 525:14-17; see also Hofeller Dep. II at 274:9-12 ("[I]ndividual VTDs tend to carry ... the same characteristics through a string of elections.").

When he drew district lines, Dr. Hofeller was constantly aware of the partisan characteristics of each county, precinct, and VTD. Displaying the partisanship variable on his computer screen by color-coding counties, VTDs, or precincts to reflect their likely partisan performance, Ex. 5116, at ¶ 8, fig. 1; Hofeller Dep. 103:5-105:24; Hofeller Dep. II 267:18-278:4, Dr. Hofeller would use the partisanship variable to assign a VTD "to one congressional district or another," Hofeller Dep. 106:23-107:1, 132:14-20, and "as a partial guide" in deciding whether and where to split VTDs or counties, id. at 203:4-5; see also id. at 202:2-5; Hofeller Dep. II at 267:10-17. Dr. Hofeller further averred that partisanship considerations were the principal factor governing his placement of district lines within split counties. Ex. 5001, at 7-8 ("For the most part, the internal boundaries of split counties were drawn using a composite percentage of seven statewide political races.").

In assigning a county, VTD, or precinct to a particular district, Dr. Hofeller also sought to preserve the "core" constituency of the districts in the 2011 Plan. Ex. 5001, at ¶ 31. Using his partisanship variable-and in accordance with his effort to preserve the "cores" of the districts in the 2011 Plan-Dr. Hofeller drew, for example, Districts 1, 4, and 12 to be "predominantly Democratic," as those districts had been under the 2011 Plan. Hofeller Dep. 192:7-16. After drawing a draft plan, Dr. Hofeller also would use his seven-election variable to assess the partisan performance of the plan on a district-by-district basis and as a whole. Id. at 247:18-23; Hofeller Dep. II 283:15-19, 284:20-285:4. Dr. Hofeller then would convey his assessment of the partisan performance of each district to Representative Lewis. Hofeller Dep. II 290:17-25.

The following day, February 10, 2016, Dr. Hofeller met with Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho and showed them several draft redistricting plans. Rucho Dep. 31:16-31:18, 37:7-37:8. "Nearly every time" he reviewed Dr. Hofeller's draft maps, Representative Lewis assessed the partisan performance of the 2016 Plan as a whole and each "individual voter district[ ]" using the results from North Carolina's 2014 Senate race between Senator Thom Tillis and former Senator Kay Hagan, which was, in Representative Lewis's opinion, "the closest political race with equally matched candidates who spent about the same amount of money." Lewis Dep. 63:9-64:17. Representative Lewis visited Dr. Hofeller's house several more times over the next few days to review additional draft remedial plans. On either February 12 or February 13, Dr. Hofeller presented the near-final 2016 Plan to Representative *807 Lewis, which Representative Lewis found acceptable. Id. at 77:7-20. Using the results of the Tillis-Hagan race, Representative Lewis concluded that the 2016 Plan would yield the "10-3 Republican advantage" the Chairs had intended. Id. at 128:29.

On February 12, 2016, the leadership of the North Carolina General Assembly appointed Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho as co-chairs of a newly formed a Joint Select Committee on Congressional Redistricting (the "Committee"), comprised of 25 Republican and 12 Democratic legislators, to draw the remedial district plan. Ex. 2009. On February 15, 2016-two days after Dr. Hofeller completed drawing the 2016 Plan-the co-Chairs held a public hearing on the redistricting effort. Ex. 1004. Dr. Hofeller did not attend the public hearing. Rucho Dep. 55:4-6. The Committee also solicited written comments regarding the redistricting efforts on its website. Id. at 55:10-23. Dr. Hofeller was not apprised of any of the comments made at the public hearing or in the written submissions. Id. at 55:4-56:13. Because Dr. Hofeller finished drawing the 2016 Plan before the public hearing and the opening of the window for members of the public to submit written comments, Hofeller Dep. 177:9-21, the 2016 Plan did not reflect any public input.

On February 16, 2016-three days after Dr. Hofeller, at Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho's direction, had completed drawing the remedial maps, id. ; Ex. 5001, at ¶ 33-the Committee met for the first time. At that meeting, Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho proposed the following criteria to govern the drawing of the remedial districts:

Equal Population : The Committee will use the 2010 federal decennial census data as the sole basis of population for the establishment of districts in the 2016 Contingent Congressional Plan. The number of persons in each congressional district shall be as nearly as equal as practicable, as determined under the most recent federal decennial census.

Contiguity : Congressional districts shall be comprised of contiguous territory. Contiguity by water is sufficient.

Political Data : The only data other than population data to be used to construct congressional districts shall be election results in statewide contests since January 1, 2008, not including the last two presidential contests. Data identifying the race of individuals or voters shall not be used in the construction or consideration of districts in the 2016 Contingent Congressional Plan. Voting districts ("VTDs") should be split only when necessary to comply with the zero deviation population requirements set forth above in order to ensure the integrity of political data.

Partisan Advantage : The partisan makeup of the congressional delegation under the enacted plan is 10 Republicans and 3 Democrats. The Committee shall make reasonable efforts to construct districts in the 2016 Contingent Congressional Plan to maintain the current partisan makeup of North Carolina's congressional delegation.

Twelfth District : The current General Assembly inherited the configuration of the Twelfth District from past General Assemblies. This configuration was retained because the district had already been heavily litigated over the past two decades and ultimately approved by the courts. The Harris court has criticized the shape of the Twelfth District citing its "serpentine" nature. In light of this, the Committee shall construct districts in the 2016 Contingent Congressional Plan that eliminate the current configuration of the Twelfth District.

*808 Compactness : In light of the Harris court's criticism of the compactness of the First and Twelfth Districts, the Committee shall make reasonable efforts to construct districts in the 2016 Contingent Congressional Plan that improve the compactness of the current districts and keep more counties and VTDs whole as compared to the current enacted plan. Division of counties shall only be made for reasons of equalizing population, consideration of incumbency and political impact. Reasonable efforts shall be made not to divide a county into more than two districts.

Incumbency : Candidates for Congress are not required by law to reside in a district they seek to represent. However, reasonable efforts shall be made to ensure that incumbent members of Congress are not paired with another incumbent in one of the new districts constructed in the 2016 Contingent Congressional Plan.

Ex. 1007. No other criteria were discussed by the Committee or in legislative debate on the 2016 Plan.

Representative Lewis explained the relationship between the "Political Data" and "Partisan Advantage" criteria as follows: the Partisan Advantage criterion "contemplate[s] looking at the political data ... and as you draw the lines, if you're trying to give a partisan advantage, you would want to draw lines so that more of the whole VTDs voted for the Republican on the ballot than they did the Democrat." Ex. 1005, at 57:10-16. And he further explained that "to the extent [we] are going to use political data in drawing this map, it is to gain partisan advantage." Id. at 54. Representative Lewis "acknowledge[d] freely that this would be a political gerrymander," which he maintained was "not against the law." Id. at 48:4-6.

Democratic state Senator Floyd McKissick, Jr., objected to the "Partisan Advantage" criterion, stating that "ingrain[ing]" the 10-3 advantage in favor of Republicans was not "fair, reasonable, [or] balanced" because, as recently as 2012, Democratic congressional candidates had received more votes on a statewide basis than Republican candidates. Id. at 49:16-50:5, 50:14-22. In response, Representative Lewis said that he "propose[d] that [the Committee] draw the maps to give a partisan advantage to 10 Republicans and 3 Democrats because [he] d[id] not believe it[ would be] possible to draw a map with 11 Republicans and 2 Democrats." Id. at 50:7-10. Democratic Committee members also expressed concern that the Partisan Advantage criterion would "bake in partisan advantage that was achieved through the use of unconstitutional maps." Id. at 62:1-3. In response, Representative Lewis again reiterated that "the goal" of the criterion "is to elect 10 Republicans and 3 Democrats." Id. at 62:18-19.

That same day, Committee members adopted, on a bipartisan basis, the Equal Population, Contiguity, Twelfth District, and Incumbency criteria. Id. at 14:16-18:3, 21:9-24:18, 91:17-94:17, 95:15-98:20. The remaining two criteria-Political Data and Partisan Advantage-were adopted on party-line votes. Id. at 43:21-47:5, 67:2-69:23. Additionally, the Committee authorized the chairmen to engage a consultant to assist the Committee's Republican leadership in drawing the remedial plan. Ex. 2003.

Also on February 16, 2016, after receiving authorization to hire a redistricting consultant, Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho sent Dr. Hofeller an engagement letter, which Dr. Hofeller signed that same day. Ex. 2003. Upon his formal engagement, Dr. Hofeller downloaded the 2016 Plan, which he had completed several days earlier, from his personal computer onto a legislative computer. Lewis Dep.

*809 138:6-8; Ex. 1009, at 45:7-45:11; Ex. 1014, at 21:10-21:24; Ex. 4061. Democratic Committee members were not allowed to consult with Dr. Hofeller nor were they allowed access to the state computer systems to which he downloaded the 2016 Plan. Ex. 1011, at 36:9-20; Ex. 1014, at 44:23-45:15; Ex. 2008. According to Representative Lewis, Senator Rucho, and Dr. Hofeller, the 2016 Plan adhered to the Committee's Partisan Advantage and Political Data criteria. Ex. 1014, at 36:25-37:6; Ex. 1016, at 37:3-7; Hofeller Dep. 129:14-15.

The following day, Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho presented the 2016 Plan to the Committee. Ex. 1008. As part of the presentation, Representative Lewis provided Committee members with spreadsheets showing the partisan performance of the proposed districts in twenty previous statewide elections. Ex. 1017. Representative Lewis stated that he and Senator Rucho believed that the 2016 Plan "will produce an opportunity to elect ten Republican members of Congress," but it was "a weaker map than the [2011 Plan]" from the perspective of Partisan Advantage. Ex. 1008, at 12:3-7. The Committee approved the 2016 Plan by party-line vote. Id. at 67:10-72:8.

On February 19, 2016, the North Carolina House of Representatives debated the 2016 Plan. During that debate, Representative Lewis further explained the rationale behind the Partisan Advantage criterion, stating: "I think electing Republicans is better than electing Democrats. So I drew this map to help foster what I think is better for the country." Ex. 1016, at 34:21-23. Following that debate, the North Carolina Senate and North Carolina House of Representatives approved the 2016 Plan, with one slight modification, 6 on February 18 and February 19, respectively, in both cases by party-line votes. Ex. 1011, at 110:13-22; Ex. 1016, at 81:6-16.

The 2016 Plan splits 13 counties and 12 precincts. Ex. 5023. Under several mathematical measures of compactness, the districts created by the 2016 Plan are, on average, more compact than the districts created by the 2011 Plan. Ex. 5048. In accordance with the Chairs goals of protecting incumbents and preserving the "cores" of the districts in the 2011 Plan, 10 of the 13 districts (Districts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12) in the 2016 Plan retain at least 50 percent of the population in their corresponding 2011 version. Ex. 5001, Table 1. Representative Lewis acknowledged as much, testifying that "[m]any of the[ districts in the 2016 Plan] look basically the same as they did in the 2011 map." Lewis Dep. 61:15-16. For example, Representative Lewis noted that, like the 2011 Plan, the 2016 Plan split Buncombe County and the City of Asheville, where Democratic voters are concentrated, between Districts 10 and 11. Id. at 62:11-19. Notwithstanding the General Assembly's stated goal of protecting incumbents, the 2016 Plan paired 2 of the 13 incumbents elected under the unconstitutional 2011 Plan (David Price previously elected in District 4 and George Holding previously elected in District 13). Ex. 2010, at 15-19.

The Harris plaintiffs filed objections to the Plan with the three-judge court presiding over the racial gerrymandering case. Harris v. McCrory , No. 1:13-cv-949, 2016 WL 3129213 , at *1 (M.D.N.C. June 2, 2016). Among those objections, the Harris plaintiffs asked the court to reject the 2016 *810 Plan as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. Id. at *2. Noting that the Supreme Court had not agreed to a standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims and that the "plaintiffs ha[d] not provided the Court with a 'suitable standard' " for evaluating such claims, the court rejected the partisan gerrymandering objection "as presented." Id. at *3 (quoting Ariz. State Leg. , 135 S.Ct. at 2658 ). The court twice made clear, however, that its "denial of plaintiffs' objections does not constitute or imply an endorsement of, or foreclose any additional challenges to, the [2016 Plan]." Id. at *1, *3 (emphasis added).

In November 2016, North Carolina conducted congressional elections using the 2016 Plan. In accordance with the objective of the Partisan Advantage criterion, Republican candidates prevailed in 10 of the 13 (76.92%) congressional districts established by the 2016 Plan. Ex. 1018. Republican candidates received 53.22 percent of the statewide vote. Ex. 3022. Republican candidates prevailed in each of the ten districts Dr. Hofeller and the Chairs intended and expected Republican candidates to prevail (Districts 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 13), and Democratic candidates prevailed in each of the three districts Dr. Hofeller and the Chairs intended and expected to be "predominantly Democratic" (Districts 1, 4, and 12). Exs. 3022, 5116.

C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 5, 2016, Common Cause, the North Carolina Democratic Party, and fourteen North Carolina voters 7 (collectively, "Common Cause Plaintiffs"), filed a complaint alleging that the 2016 Plan constituted a partisan gerrymander. Compl., Common Cause v. Rucho , No. 1:16-CV-1026, Aug. 5, 2016, ECF No. 1. The League of Women Voters of North Carolina (the "League") and twelve North Carolina voters 8 (collectively, "League Plaintiffs," and together with Common Cause Plaintiffs, "Plaintiffs") filed their partisan gerrymandering action on September 22, 2016. Compl., League of Women Voters of N.C. v. Rucho , No. 1:16-CV-1164, Sept. 22, 2016, ECF No. 1. Both parties named as defendants Legislative Defendants; A. Grant Whitney, Jr., in his official capacity as Chairman of the North Carolina State Board of Elections (the "Board of Elections"); the Board of Elections; and the State of North Carolina (collectively, with Chairman Whitney and the Board of Elections, "State Defendants," and with Legislative Defendants, "Defendants").

In their operative complaints, both Common Cause Plaintiffs and League Plaintiffs allege that the 2016 Plan violates the Equal Protection Clause, by intentionally diluting the electoral strength of individuals who previously opposed, or were likely to oppose, Republican candidates, and the First Amendment, by intentionally burdening and retaliating against supporters of non-Republican candidates on the basis of their political beliefs and association. First Am. Compl. for Decl. J. and Inj. Relief ("Common Cause Compl.") ¶¶ 25-45, Common Cause v. Rucho , No. 1:16-CV-1026, Sept. 7, 2016, ECF No. 12; Am. Compl. ("League Compl.") ¶¶ 69-83, *811 League of Women Voters of N.C. v. Rucho , No. 1:16-CV-1164, Feb. 10, 2017, ECF No. 41. Plaintiffs allege that the General Assembly diluted the votes of supporters of non-Republican candidates through "cracking"-dispersing members or supporters of a disfavored party or group across a number districts so that they are relegated to minority status in each of those districts-and "packing"-concentrating members or supporters of the disfavored party or group in a particular district or limited number of districts so as to dilute the voting strength of supporters of the disfavored party or group in the remaining districts. Common Cause Compl. ¶ 35; League Compl. ¶ 6.

Common Clause Plaintiffs further allege that the 2016 Plan violates Article I, section 2 of the Constitution, which provides that members of the House of Representatives will be chosen "by the People of the several States," by usurping the right of "the People" to select their preferred candidates for Congress, and Article I, section 4, by exceeding the States' delegated authority to determine "the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections" for members of Congress. Common Cause Compl. ¶¶ 46-54.

On February 7, 2017, this Court consolidated the two actions for purposes of discovery and trial. Order, Feb. 7, 2017, ECF No. 41. Three days later, League Plaintiffs amended their complaint to reflect the results of the 2016 congressional election conducted under the 2016 Plan and empirical analyses of those results.

On February 21, 2017, Defendants moved to dismiss both complaints under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), principally asserting that (1) Pope v. Blue , 809 F.Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992), which the Supreme Court summarily affirmed, 506 U.S. 801 , 113 S.Ct. 30 , 121 L.Ed.2d 3 (1992), required dismissal of Plaintiffs' actions, and (2) the Supreme Court's splintered opinions regarding the justiciability of-and, to the extent such claims are justiciable, the legal framework for-partisan gerrymandering claims foreclosed Plaintiffs' claims. Mot. to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, Feb. 21, 2017, ECF No. 45. In a memorandum opinion and order entered March 3, 2017, this Court denied Defendants' motions to dismiss. Common Cause v. Rucho , 240 F.Supp.3d 376 (M.D.N.C. 2017) ; Order, Mar. 3, 2017, ECF No. 51.

Beginning on October 16, 2017, this Court held a four-day trial, during which the Common Cause Plaintiffs, League Plaintiffs, and Legislative Defendants introduced evidence and presented testimony from their expert witnesses. The parties also stipulated to the admission of numerous additional exhibits as well as extensive deposition testimony. Although counsel for the State Defendants attended trial, they did not participate and took no position as to how this Court should resolve the case.

In post-trial briefing, League Plaintiffs set forth a single, three-part test for determining whether a state congressional redistricting plan violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Under their proposed test, a plaintiff alleging that a state redistricting body engaged in unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering bears the burden of proving: (1) that the redistricting body enacted the challenged plan with the intent of discriminating against voters who support candidates of a disfavored party and (2) that the challenged plan had a "large and durable" discriminatory effect on such voters. League of Women Voters Pls.' Post-Trial Br. ("League Br.") 3, Nov. 6, 2017, ECF No. 113. If the plaintiff makes such a showing, then the burden shifts to the governmental defendant to provide (3) a legitimate, non-partisan justification *812 for the plan's discriminatory effect. Id.

League Plaintiffs pointed to the Political Advantage and Partisan Advantage criteria as well as the chairmen's official explanations of those criteria as evidence of the General Assembly's intent to discriminate against voters who support Democratic candidates. Id. at 7-8. As to the plan's discriminatory effects, League Plaintiffs introduced expert analyses of the 2016 Plan's alleged "partisan asymmetry" to establish that the plan makes it substantially more difficult for voters who favor Democratic candidates to translate their votes into representation, and that this substantial difficulty is likely to persist throughout the life of the 2016 Plan. Id. at 12-16. Finally, League Plaintiffs asserted that Legislative Defendants failed to provide any evidence of a legitimate justification for the 2016 Plan's alleged partisan asymmetry, such as the state's political geography or other legitimate redistricting goals. Id. at 21-24.

By contrast, Common Cause Plaintiffs advanced distinct legal frameworks for their First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Article I claims. Regarding the First Amendment, Common Cause Plaintiffs asserted that the 2016 Plan's disfavoring of voters who previously opposed Republican candidates or associated with non-Republican candidates or parties amounts to viewpoint discrimination and passes constitutional muster only if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Common Cause Pls.' Post-Trial Br. ("Common Cause Br.") 5-8, Nov. 6, 2017, ECF No. 116. According to Common Cause Plaintiffs, the General Assembly's use of individuals' past voting history to assign such individuals to congressional districts with the purpose of advantaging Republican candidates on a statewide basis constitutes evidence of viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 7-15. Common Clause Plaintiffs further contended that Legislative Defendants provided no compelling interest justifying such viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 9.

Turning to the Equal Protection Clause, Common Cause Plaintiffs suggested that the level of scrutiny to which a court must subject a redistricting plan turns on the degree to which the redistricting body intended to pursue partisan advantage. Id. at 15-17. According to Common Cause Plaintiffs, the General Assembly predominantly pursued partisan advantage in drawing the 2016 Plan, warranting application of strict scrutiny. Id. Under that standard, Legislative Defendants must show that the plan was narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest, Common Cause Plaintiffs maintained. Id. As proof of the General Assembly's predominant intent to burden voters who support non-Republican candidates, Common Cause Plaintiffs pointed to the Political Data and Partisan Advantage criteria, the chairmen's explanations of the purpose behind those criteria, and expert analyses showing that the 2016 Plan is an " extreme statistical outlier " with regard to its pro-Republican tilt relative to thousands of other simulated districting plans conforming to non-partisan districting principles. Id. at 17. Common Cause Plaintiffs further argued that, even if this Court found that the General Assembly did not draw the 2016 Plan with a predominantly partisan motive, the 2016 Plan nonetheless failed constitutional muster under intermediate or rational basis scrutiny. Id. at 18-19.

Finally, Common Cause Plaintiffs alleged that the 2016 Plan exceeds the General Assembly's delegated authority under Article I, section 4-commonly referred to as the "Elections Clause"-because it amounts to an unconstitutional effort " 'to dictate electoral outcomes' " and " 'to favor ... a class of candidates.' " Id. at 20-21 (quoting *813 Cook v. Gralike , 531 U.S. 510 , 523-24, 121 S.Ct. 1029 , 149 L.Ed.2d 44 (2001) ). And Common Clause Plaintiffs further asserted that the 2016 Plan violates Article I, section 2 because it gives voters who favor Republican candidates " 'a greater voice in choosing a Congressman' " than voters who favor candidates put forward by other parties. Id. at 22-23 (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders , 376 U.S. 1 , 13-14, 84 S.Ct. 526 , 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964) ).

In response, Legislative Defendants first argued that both sets of Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to assert any of their claims. Legislative Defs.' Post-Trial Br. ("Leg. Defs.' Br.") 12, Nov. 6, 2017, ECF No. 115. With regard to Plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim, in particular, Legislative Defendants asserted that the Equal Protection Clause does not permit statewide standing for partisan gerrymandering claims and that Plaintiffs lacked standing to lodge district-by-district partisan gerrymandering challenges, notwithstanding that at least one individual Plaintiff who is a registered Democrat resided in each of the State's thirteen congressional districts. Id. at 12-14 .

Legislative Defendants next contended that, even if Plaintiffs have standing, neither set of Plaintiffs had offered a judicially manageable standard under any constitutional provision for evaluating a partisan gerrymandering claim; therefore, they claimed, Plaintiffs' actions must be dismissed as raising nonjusticiable political questions. Id. at 9 . To that end, Legislative Defendants criticized Plaintiffs' expert statistical analyses, in particular, on grounds that such analyses are "a smorgasbord of alleged 'social science' theories" that fail to answer what Legislative Defendants see as the fundamental question in partisan gerrymandering cases: "how much politics is too much politics in redistricting?" Id. at 2, 9-11 . As to the merits, Legislative Defendants asserted that the 2016 Plan was not a "partisan gerrymander"-as they define that term-because, among other reasons, (1) the General Assembly did not try to "maximize" the number of Republican seats, and (2) the districts created by the 2016 Plan conform to a number of traditional redistricting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and adherence to county lines. Id. at 3, 7-8 .

In a memorandum opinion and order entered January 9, 2018, this Court first rejected Legislative Defendants' justiciability and standing arguments, holding that Plaintiffs had put forward judicially manageable standards for adjudicating their claims and that the individual and organizational Plaintiffs had standing to assert district-by-district and statewide challenges to the 2016 Plan under each of the constitutional provisions under which Plaintiffs seek relief. Common Cause , 279 F.Supp.3d at 608-36 . The Court then unanimously held that the 2016 Plan violated the Equal Protection Clause and Article I of the Constitution. Id. at 636-72 , 683-90 ; id. at 693-96, 698 (Osteen, J., concurring in part). And a majority of the panel further concluded that the 2016 Plan violated the First Amendment. Id. at 672-83 (majority op.). Having found that the 2016 Plan violated the Constitution, the Court enjoined the State from conducting further elections using the 2016 Plan and gave the General Assembly an opportunity to draw a (second) remedial plan for use in the 2018 election. Id. at 690 .

Soon thereafter, Legislative Defendants unsuccessfully moved this Court to stay our order pending review by the Supreme Court. Common Cause v. Rucho , 284 F.Supp.3d 780 , 782 (M.D.N.C. 2018). Legislative Defendants then successfully sought a stay from the Supreme Court.

*814 Rucho v. Common Cause , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 923 , 199 L.Ed.2d 619 (2018) (mem.). Several months later, on June 25, 2018, the Supreme Court vacated this Court's judgment, remanding the case for reconsideration in light of Gill , which addressed what evidence a plaintiff must put forward to establish Article III standing to assert a partisan gerrymandering claim under the Equal Protection Clause based on a vote dilution theory.

This Court invited the parties to submit briefing regarding the impact of Gill on our January 9, 2018, opinion and order striking down the 2016 Plan as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. Having carefully considered the Supreme Court's opinion in Gill and the parties' briefing, we conclude that at least one of the named Plaintiffs residing in each of the State's thirteen congressional districts has standing to lodge a partisan vote dilution challenge under the Equal Protection Clause to each district in the 2016 Plan. And we further hold that Gill does not call into question our earlier conclusions that Plaintiffs have standing to assert First Amendment and Article I challenges to the 2016 Plan, and that all of Plaintiffs' constitutional claims are justiciable.

Turning to the merits, we conclude that Plaintiffs' evidence establishes that 12 of the 13 districts in the 2016 Plan violate the Equal Protection Clause because, in drawing each of those 12 districts, the General Assembly's predominant intent was to dilute the votes of voters who favored non-Republican candidates; the General Assembly's manipulation of each of those district's lines has had the effect of diluting such voters' votes; and no legitimate state interest justifies that dilution. We further reaffirm our previous conclusion that the 2016 Plan violates the First Amendment by unjustifiably imposing burdens on Plaintiffs based on their previous and ongoing political expression and affiliation. Finally, we again hold that the 2016 Plan violates Article I by exceeding the scope of the General Assembly's delegated authority to enact congressional election regulations and interfering with the right of "the People" to choose their Representatives.

II. JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENTS

Before addressing the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, we first address Legislative Defendants' threshold standing and justiciability arguments. As detailed below, we conclude that some, but not all, Plaintiffs have standing to assert partisan vote dilution claims under the Equal Protection Clause; that Plaintiffs have standing to assert partisan gerrymandering claims under the First Amendment; and that Common Cause Plaintiffs have standing to assert their claims under Article I of the Constitution. We further conclude that Plaintiffs' partisan gerrymandering claims are not barred by the political question doctrine, either in theory or as proven.

A. STANDING

Article III's "case" or "controversy" requirement demands that a plaintiff demonstrate standing-that the plaintiff has "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186 , 204, 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). To establish standing, a plaintiff first must demonstrate "an 'injury in fact'-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, ... and (b) 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.' " Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555 , 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 , 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted). "Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be 'fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of *815 the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.' " Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. , 426 U.S. 26 , 41-42, 96 S.Ct. 1917 , 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976) ). "Third, it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.' " Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quoting Simon , 426 U.S. at 38 , 43 , 96 S.Ct. 1917 ). Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing their standing. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno , 547 U.S. 332 , 342, 126 S.Ct. 1854 , 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006).

Importantly, the Supreme Court repeatedly has admonished that courts must assess a plaintiff's standing on a claim-by-claim basis. Gill , 138 S.Ct. at 1934 ("[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross." (internal quotation marks omitted) ). Put differently, "a plaintiff who has been subject to injurious conduct of one kind [does not] possess by virtue of that injury the necessary stake in litigating conduct of another kind, although similar, to which he has not been subject." Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343 , 358 n.6, 116 S.Ct. 2174 , 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky , 457 U.S. 991 , 999, 102 S.Ct. 2777 , 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) ).

With regard to each of Plaintiffs' three claims, Legislative Defendants do not dispute that to the extent Plaintiffs suffered an injury-in-fact, the injury was caused by the 2016 Plan. Nor do they dispute that, for each of Plaintiffs' claims, the asserted injuries are redressable by a favorable decision of this Court. Accordingly, we must determine whether Plaintiffs have suffered an injury-in-fact for each of the three claims at issue: (1) that the 2016 Plan violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by diluting Plaintiffs' votes on the basis of invidious partisanship; (2) that the 2016 Plan violates the First Amendment by burdening Plaintiffs' rights to engage in political speech and association; and (3) that the 2016 Plan violates Article I of the Constitution by "dictat[ing] electoral outcomes," by "favor[ing] ... a class of candidates," Cook , 531 U.S. at 523 , 121 S.Ct. 1029 , and by giving voters who favor Republican candidates "a greater voice in choosing a Congressman" than voters who favor candidates put forward by other parties, Wesberry , 376 U.S. at 14 , 84 S.Ct. 526 .

1. Equal Protection Clause

a. Background

In Gill , the Supreme Court addressed what constitutes an injury-in-fact sufficient to give rise to Article III standing to assert a partisan gerrymandering claim under the Equal Protection Clause based on a vote dilution theory. 138 S.Ct. at 1930-31. There, twelve Wisconsin voters lodged a statewide challenge to all ninety-nine districts in the State Assembly districting plan, principally alleging that the plan as a whole violated the Equal Protection Clause by intentionally diluting the votes of individuals who supported Democratic candidates. Id. at 1923-24. Four of the plaintiff-voters further alleged in the complaint that "they lived in State Assembly districts where Democrats have been cracked or packed." Id. at 1924. At trial, however, the plaintiffs' evidence focused on the mapmakers' intent to draw a plan that would favor Republican candidates statewide and on the statewide partisan effects of the map. Id. at 1931-32. And none of the individual plaintiffs "sought to prove that he or she lived in a cracked or packed district." Id. at 1932. Following trial, the district court held that each of the plaintiffs suffered an injury-in-fact giving rise to Article III standing to assert a statewide Equal Protection challenge to the districting plan because their evidence established that, "[a]s a result of the statewide partisan gerrymandering, Democrats do not *816 have the same opportunity provided to Republicans to elect representatives of their choice to the Assembly" and therefore that "the electoral influence of plaintiffs and other Democratic voters statewide has been unfairly [and] disproportionately ... reduced for the life of [the districting plan]." Whitford v. Gill , 218 F.Supp.3d 837 , 927-28 (W.D. Wisc. 2016) (first three alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated 138 S.Ct. at 1929, 1934.

The Supreme Court rejected the district court's holding that a plaintiff challenging a districting plan on grounds that it violates the Equal Protection Clause by diluting the plaintiff's vote on the basis of partisanship has standing to challenge a plan statewide. Gill , 138 S.Ct. at 1931 . Emphasizing "that a person's right to vote is 'individual and personal in nature,' " the Court held that "[t]o the extent the plaintiffs' alleged harm is the dilution of their votes, that injury is district specific." Id. at 1930 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims , 377 U.S. 533 , 561, 84 S.Ct. 1362 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) ). When a plaintiff alleges that a districting plan dilutes his vote on the basis of partisanship, the Court explained, "[t]hat harm arises from the particular composition of the voter's own district, which causes his vote-having been packed or cracked-to carry less weight than it would carry in another, hypothetical district." Id. at 1931. Put differently, the injury giving rise to such a claim "arises through a voter's placement in a 'cracked' or 'packed' district." Id.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court explicitly analogized partisan gerrymandering claims premised on vote dilution to Shaw -type racial gerrymandering claims, for which the Court has "held that a plaintiff who alleges that he is the object of a racial gerrymander-a drawing of district lines on the basis of race-has standing to assert only that his own district has been so gerrymandered." Id. at 1930 (citing United States v. Hays , 515 U.S. 737 , 744-45, 115 S.Ct. 2431 , 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995) ). In a Shaw -type racial gerrymandering case, a plaintiff can establish that the lines of her district were drawn on the basis of race "through 'direct evidence' of legislative intent, 'circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and demographics,' or a mix of both." Cooper v. Harris , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1455 , 1464, 197 L.Ed.2d 837 (2017) (quoting Miller v. Johnson , 515 U.S. 900 , 916, 115 S.Ct. 2475 , 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995) ). And like Gill 's reference to "hypothetical district[s]," 138 S.Ct. at 1931, a plaintiff in such a racial gerrymandering case can establish a burden on her Fourteenth Amendment rights by introducing an alternative districting plan, which conforms to a legislature's legitimate districting objectives and traditional redistricting criteria, under which the plaintiff's vote would not have been diluted based on her race. See, e.g., Cooper , 137 S.Ct. at 1478 -81 ; Easley v. Cromartie , 532 U.S. 234 , 258, 121 S.Ct. 1452 , 149 L.Ed.2d 430 (2001).

Applying this precedent, the Gill Court concluded that several forms of evidence relied on by the plaintiffs failed to establish an injury-in-fact. First, the Court held that testimony by one named plaintiff, William Whitford, that the districting plan undermined his ability "to engage in campaign activity to achieve a [Democratic] majority in the Assembly and the Senate" did not establish an injury in fact for two reasons: (a) Whitford conceded on cross examination that his district was not cracked or packed and that the plan "did not affect the weight of his vote" and (b) the Supreme Court never has recognized a "shared interest in the composition of 'the legislature as a whole' " as an individual legal interest. Gill , 138 S.Ct. at 1924-25, 1932 . Second, the Court said that the plaintiffs' direct evidence that the mapmakers intended the districting plan to *817 strengthen the electoral prospects of Republican candidates did not support standing because the injury-in-fact requirement "turns on effect, not intent, and requires a showing of a burden on the plaintiffs votes that is actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. at 1932 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, the Court said that the plaintiffs' statistical analyses of the districting plan's "partisan asymmetry"-that the plan does not allow supporters of the two principal parties to translate their votes into representation with equal effectiveness-did not establish the requisite district-specific injury because the analyses "are an average measure" and therefore "do not address the effect that a gerrymander has on the votes of particular citizens." Id. at 1933 .

The instant case meaningfully differs from Gill . To begin, unlike the plaintiffs in Gill who "failed to meaningfully pursue their allegations of individual harm," id. at 1932, Common Cause Plaintiffs, in particular, have alleged, argued, and proven district-specific injuries throughout the course of this litigation. For example, each individual Common Cause Plaintiff alleged in their complaint that his or her vote is "diluted or nullified as a result of his placement in [his or her particular district]." Common Cause Compl. ¶¶ 2(d)-(q). The Common Cause Complaint further alleged that the 2016 Plan "pack[s] as many Democratic voters as possible in the First, Fourth, and Twelfth Congressional Districts" and "dilut[es] or nullif[ies] the votes of the remaining Democratic voters who reside outside of these three districts by dispersing (or 'cracking') all remaining Democratic voters among the other ten districts," and therefore that "[t]he 2016 Plan as a whole, and each of the thirteen individual districts " are unconstitutional. Id. ¶¶ 35, 37, 45 (emphasis added).

Common Cause Plaintiffs also sought, obtained, and introduced at trial-before the Supreme Court decided Gill -district-specific evidence of cracking and packing. For example, Common Cause Plaintiffs requested that Defendants admit, for each district, that Dr. Hofeller included or excluded counties and parts of counties in particular districts or divided counties between particular districts to achieve the General Assembly's partisan objective for each district. Ex. 2043, at 23-33. Additionally, Common Cause Plaintiffs deposed Dr. Hofeller and Representative Lewis regarding why boundaries for specific districts were drawn in a specific location and the political consequence of those boundaries. E.g. , Hofeller Dep. 1927-12; Lewis Dep. 50:20-51:1, 62:2-19, 64:10-17. And Common Cause Plaintiffs' statistical evidence provides not only an "average measure" of the 2016 Plan's cracking and packing, but also district-specific evidence of cracking and packing. Ex. 3040, at 18, 30, 39.

Common Cause Plaintiffs' pre-trial Proposed Findings of Fact also forecasted that they would introduce numerous pieces of evidence establishing that the 2016 Plan manipulated lines of specific districts and thereby cracked and packed likely Democratic voters solely for the benefit of the Republican Party. Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law Filed by the Common Cause Pls. 21, 28, 36-37, No. 1:16-CV-1026, June 5, 2017, ECF No. 65. And Common Cause Plaintiffs' post-trial Proposed Findings of Fact likewise asked this Court to make numerous district-specific findings as to the discriminatory burden imposed by each of the districts in the 2016 Plan. Common Cause Pls.' Post-Trial Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law ("Common Cause FOF") 12-16, 28-36, No. 1:16-CV-1026, Nov. 6, 2017, ECF No. 117. There can be no question that Common Cause Plaintiffs have "meaningfully pursued" a district-by-district vote dilution claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Gill , 138 S.Ct. at 1932 .

*818 Additionally, unlike the Gill plaintiffs, who resided in a small minority of the State Assembly districts that they challenged, see id. at 1923, 1931 , named Common Cause Plaintiffs reside and are registered to vote in each of the 13 congressional districts included in the 2016 Plan, Exs. 3024-38. Accordingly, unlike the Gill plaintiffs, the Common Cause Plaintiffs are not complaining of gerrymandering in districts in which they do not reside.

In contrast, prior to Gill , League Plaintiffs framed their Equal Protection claim as a statewide challenge, rather than a district-specific challenge. See, e.g. , League of Women Voters of N.C. Pls.' Final Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law ("League FOF") 81, No. 1:16-CV-1026, Nov. 6, 2017, ECF No. 112 ("Plaintiffs' injury is concrete and particularized because as a result of the statewide partisan gerrymandering, Democrats do not have the same opportunity provided to Republicans to elect representatives of their choice to Congress."). And several League Plaintiffs testified that their vote was diluted because Democratic candidates' share of the State's congressional delegation was not proportionate to the share of congressional votes cast for Democratic candidates statewide. E.g. , Dep. of Elliott J. Feldman ("Feldman Dep.") 20:8-16, Mar. 24, 2017, ECF No. 101-20; Dep. of Annette Love ("Love Dep.") 12:3-18, Apr. 7, 2017, ECF No. 101-1.

But unlike in Gill -which did not include an organizational plaintiff and in which the individual plaintiffs resided in a small minority of the districts challenged-Defendants stipulated prior to trial that the League has members in each of the State's thirteen congressional districts, and that at least one League member in each of those districts is registered as a Democrat and supports and votes for Democratic candidates. See Trial Tr. II, at 140-41; Ex. 4080. Also unlike the plaintiffs in Gill -who failed to develop any district-specific evidence of cracking or packing-League Plaintiffs alleged that specific districts were cracked or packed and introduced district-specific evidence to support such allegations. In their complaint, for example, League Plaintiffs stated that "[a]mong 'cracked' districts in which the prevailing candidate received less than 60 percent of the vote Republican candidates won all six of them (Districts 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 13). Conversely, the one 'packed' district in which the prevailing candidate received more than 70 percent of the vote (District 1) was won by a Democratic candidate." League Compl. ¶ 64.

Additionally, League Plaintiffs introduced into evidence-again, before the Supreme Court decided Gill -numerous county or county group maps color-coded on a precinct-by-precinct basis using Dr. Hofeller's partisanship variable to demonstrate that a particular district group in the 2016 Plan divided (or cracked) concentrations of non-Republican voters in the county or that a particular district in the 2016 Plan packed concentrations of non-Republican voters in the county. Exs. 4008, 4066 (Buncombe County); Exs. 4009, 4067 (Cumberland County); Exs. 4010, 4068 (Guilford County); Exs. 4011, 4069 (Johnston County); Exs. 4012, 4070 (Mecklenburg County); Exs. 4013, 4071 (Pitt County), Exs. 4014, 4072 (Wake and Durham Counties); Exs. 4015, 4073 (Wilson County); Ex. 4074 (Bladen County). And Mary Trotter Klenz, who is a Democratic voter and member of the League, testified that she believes the congressional district in which she is registered to vote, District 9, is the product of invidious partisan gerrymandering because it is a result of a legislative effort to divide Mecklenburg County along partisan lines and thereby render Democratic candidates "less competitive" than they were in the previous version of her district. 30(b)(6) Dep. of the League of *819 Women Voters of N.C. by Mary Trotter Klenz ("Klenz Dep.") 65:23-66:12, Apr. 4, 2017, ECF No. 101-28 ("[T]he way the district is drawn ... this little, bitty piece is in Mecklenburg County in my neighborhood and then goes all the way ... along the state line over to Bladen County ... so it's even less competitive. When it was more in Mecklenburg, at least you had the ... continuity of Mecklenburg ... [b]ut now its so spread out that it's just ridiculous."). Several other League Plaintiffs also testified to district-specific injuries. E.g. Dep. of Carol Faulkner Fox ("Fox Dep.") 19:25, 20:9-12, Mar. 22, 2017, ECF No. 101-4; Dep. of Aaron J. Sarver ("Sarver Dep.") 25:2-26:18, Apr. 10, 2017, ECF No. 101-23.

Likewise, League Plaintiffs introduced into evidence several alternative districting plans generated through computer simulation by Dr. Jowei Chen, a political science professor at the University of Michigan-all of which conform to the General Assembly's non-partisan districting criteria, see infra Part III.B.1.a-or created by Dr. Hofeller that did not display the same degree of cracking and packing of Democratic voters in particular districts as the 2016 Plan, exs. 4016-33. Based on that evidence, League Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact asked this Court to make numerous findings that, in specific counties, the lines of particular districts were drawn to pack or crack likely Democratic voters. League FOF ¶¶ 125-35.

And after the Supreme Court vacated this Court's opinion and judgment for reconsideration in light of Gill , League Plaintiffs proffered additional evidence to support their standing to lodge a district-by-district vote dilution claim under the Equal Protection Clause to each district in the 2016 Plan. In particular, a declaration by the director of the League identified specific precincts in each of the thirteen congressional districts in which at least one League member is registered to vote and regularly votes as a Democrat. Decl. of Walter L. Salinger 2-4, July 10, 2018, ECF No. 129-1. Furthermore, a supplemental declaration by Dr. Chen demonstrated that, in all but one of those League members' districts, the votes of those members would have carried more weight, as measured by Dr. Hofeller's precinct-level partisanship variable, in the districting plan generated by Dr. Chen that maximally advances, subject to certain constraints, the General Assembly's non-partisan redistricting objectives ("Plan 2-297"). Supp. Decl. of Jowei Chen ("Second Chen Decl.") 2-3, 6-7, July 11, 2018, ECF No. 129-2. 9 10

*820 The most significant difference between this case and Gill , however, is that, as demonstrated below, Plaintiffs who reside and vote in each of the thirteen challenged congressional districts testified to, introduced evidence to support, and, in all but one case, ultimately proved the type of dilutionary injury the Supreme Court recognized in Gill. See infra Part II.A.1.b. And all of those Plaintiffs identified at least one alternative districting plan-and in many cases hundreds of alternative districting plans-that more effectively conforms to the General Assembly's non-partisan redistricting criteria, but nonetheless places the Plaintiff in a district in which the Plaintiff's vote would "carry [more] weight." 11 Gill , 138 S.Ct. at 1931 .

*821 b. Plaintiffs' District-Specific Standing Evidence

District 1 runs along the eastern side of North Carolina's border with Virginia. Ex. 1001. As discussed more fully below, District 1 amounts to a successful effort by the General Assembly to concentrate, or pack, voters who were unlikely to support a Republican candidate, and thereby dilute such voters' votes. See infra Part III.B.2.a. Common Cause Plaintiff Larry Hall resides in District 1, is a registered Democrat, and typically votes for Democratic candidates. Ex. 3031; Dep. of Larry Hall ("Hall Dep.") 12:8-9, 8:11-14, 30:17-19, 32:10-22, 17:22-24, Apr. 5, 2017, ECF No. 101-2. Hall testified that the 2016 Plan's packing of Democratic voters in District 1 had the effect of diluting his vote. Hall Dep. at 15:8-14 ("[T]he 2016 Plan ... changed the district, and the impact of my vote ... was reduced."). Hall's vote would have carried greater weight in numerous other "hypothetical district[s]," Gill , 138 S.Ct. at 1931 -of 2,000 simulated districting plans generated by Dr. Chen to conform to the General Assembly's nonpartisan redistricting criteria all but 3 of the plans, including Plan 2-297, would have placed Hall into a less Democratic-leaning district, as measured by Dr. Hofeller's precinct-level partisanship variable, Third Chen Decl. 4, 6-8, 11.

District 2 includes all or part of six counties running along the border between North Carolina's piedmont and coastal plains regions. Ex. 1001. As explained more fully below, District 2 reflects a successful effort by the General Assembly to crack concentrations of Democratic voters, and thereby dilute such voters' votes. See infra Part III.B.2.b. Common Cause Plaintiff Douglas Berger, who is registered as a Democrat and usually votes for Democratic candidates, resides in District 2. Ex. 3024; Dep. of Douglas Berger ("Berger Dep.") 29:6-9, 34:7-13; 65:13-18; 67:20-25, 69:3-9, Apr. 21, 2017, ECF No. 101-8. Berger testified that prior to the 2011 redistricting, he was assigned to a highly competitive district, with the prevailing candidate in the 2010 election winning by "just a few hundred votes." Berger Dep. 32:5-22. But his district is no longer "competitive" as a result of the redistricting, he testified, with Democratic candidates lacking any meaningful chance at prevailing. Id. at 6:14-20 (noting that District 2 was "the secondmost competitive district ... which involved a 13 percentage point loss by the Democratic candidate"); see also id. at 73:2-8 (stating that the General Assembly's "primary focus has been to look at how each of the people in this district have voted and ... all the people that have certain a political view or view similar to my view, we've been ... aggregated and relegated to a position where we can't have our views reflected"). By contrast, over 99 percent of the simulated districting plans generated by Dr. *822 Chen, including Plan 2-297, would have assigned Berger to a more Democratic-leaning district. Third Chen Decl. 4, 6-8, 11.

District 3 encompasses a number of counties in northeast North Carolina, many of which border the Atlantic Ocean or Intracoastal Waterway. Ex. 1001. As explained more fully below, Plaintiffs alleged, and ultimately proved, that in drawing District 3 the General Assembly cracked likely Democratic voters and submerged such voters in a district in which a Republican candidate would prevail. See infra Part III.B.2.c. Common Cause Plaintiff Richard Taft-who resides in District 3 and is a registered Democrat who typically votes for Democratic candidates-testified that "District 3 is still designed ... to disperse [his Democratic] vote around," and that his "vote really is meaningless ... because the Republican majority is set and there is no way a candidate who is a Democrat can win in that district." Ex. 3036; Dep. of Richard Taft, MD ("R. Taft Dep.") 14:12-14, 24:25-25:11, Mar. 30, 2017, ECF No. 101-10. Mr. Taft's wife, Cheryl Lee Taft, likewise testified that the manipulation of District 3's lines adversely affected the weight of her vote. Dep. of Cheryl Taft ("C. Taft Dep.") 26:1-5, Mar. 30, 2017, ECF No. 101-11. By contrast, over 95 percent of the 2,000 simulated districting plans generated by Dr. Chen, including Plan 2-297, would have placed the Tafts in a more Democratic-leaning district. Third Chen Decl. 4, 6-8, 11.

District 4 runs through the center of Wake County, southern Durham County, and Orange County, connecting concentrations of Democratic voters in the Cities of Raleigh, Durham, and Chapel Hill. Exs. 1001, 3019. As detailed more fully below, Dr. Hofeller, acting at Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho's direction, intended to and did in fact pack likely Democratic voters in District 4 and, in doing so, diluted such voters' votes. See infra Part III.B.2.d. League Plaintiff Carol Fox-who lives in Durham County in District 4 and votes for Democratic candidates-testified that District 4 "was packed"-i.e., "drawn so that all of the Democrats are smooshed together so that they're going win with a huge surplus of votes needed." Fox Dep. 19:25, 20:9-12. Common Cause Plaintiff Alice Bordsen also is registered to vote in District 4 and has historically voted for Democratic congressional candidates. Ex. 3026; Dep. of Alice Louise Bordsen ("Bordsen Dep.") 37:1-2, Apr. 18, 2017, ECF No. 101-15. Bordsen testified that she believes District 4 is the product of "intentional packing" and is "super pack[ed]." Bordsen Dep. at 33:8-16, 34:16-17. Approximately, 80 percent of the districting plans in Dr. Chen's 2,000-plan sample would have placed Bordsen in a district with fewer likely Democratic voters. 12 Third Chen Decl. 4, 6-8.

*823 District 5 spans ten whole counties in the northwest corner of the State. Ex. 1001. Plaintiffs introduced evidence, but ultimately fail to prove, that District 5 reflects an effort by the General Assembly to submerge Democratic voters in a safe Republican district. See infra Part III.B.2.e. Common Cause Plaintiff William H. Freeman lives in District 5, is registered as a Democrat, and voted against the Republican congressional candidate in the 2016 election. Ex. 3029; Dep. of William Halsey Freeman ("Freeman Dep.") 6:24-7:7, Apr. 7, 2017, ECF No. 101-14. Freeman testified that as a result of the redistricting plans drawn by Dr. Hofeller, Representative Lewis, and Senator Rucho, the lines of District 5 are "much worse" for Democratic candidates. Freeman Dep. 18:25-19:3, 19:14-23. Freeman further testified that "because of the way [District 5 is drawn], there is no remote chance of any Democrat winning, so my vote is just a total waste." Id. at 17:17-25. More than half of the 2,000 simulated districting plans generated by Dr. Chen placed Freeman in a district more favorable to Democratic candidates. Third Chen Decl. 4, 6-9. And in Dr. Chen's Plan 2-297, the Republican vote share in Freeman's district, as measured by Dr. Hofeller's partisanship variable, would decline from 56.15 percent to 49.30 percent. Id. at 11.

District 6 spans all or part of six counties in central North Carolina. Ex. 1001. As explained more fully below, District 6 reflects a successful effort by the General Assembly to crack likely Democratic voters and thereby dilute their votes by submerging them in a safe Republican district. See infra Part III.B.2.f. Common Cause Plaintiff Meltzer A. Morgan, Jr., is affiliated with the Democratic Party and typically votes for Democratic candidates. Ex. 3034; Dep. of Melzer Aaron Morgan, Jr. ("Morgan Dep.") 5:11-14, 15:7-17, 16:2-7, April 7, 2017, ECF No. 101-16. Between 2002 and 2010, Morgan was assigned to District 13, which consistently elected Democratic candidates. See Morgan Dep. 10:18-23. But as a result of the redistricting, Morgan now is assigned to District 6, which he characterized as "tilted" for Republicans and "not competitive." Id. at 23:7-8. By contrast, approximately 78 percent of the 2,000 simulated districting plans generated by Dr. Chen would have placed Morgan in a district less favorable to Republican candidates. Third Chen Decl. 4, 6-9. For example, the predicted Republican vote share in Morgan's district in Plan 2-297 (51.49%) is approximately three percentage points lower than the predicted Republican vote share in District 6 (54.46%). Id. at 11.

District 7 includes all or part of nine counties located in the southeast corner of the State. Ex. 1001. As detailed below, District 7 cracks concentrations of Democratic voters and has the effect of submerging such voters in a safe Republican district. See infra Part III.B.2.g. Common Cause Plaintiff Cynthia Boylan-who resides in District 7, is a registered Democrat, and typically votes for Democratic candidates, Ex. 3027-testified that although Democratic candidates historically prevailed in the district by narrow margins, "the way [District 7] was redrawn was to give the Republican nominee the advantage of being elected in the ... [d]istrict,"

*824 Dep. of Cynthia Boylan ("Boylan Dep.") 18:1-9, Apr. 5, 2017, ECF No. 101-17. Nearly 64 percent of the 2,000 districting plans generated by Dr. Chen, including Plan 2-297, placed Boylan in a district more favorable to Democratic candidates, as measured by Dr. Hofeller's partisan performance variable. Third Chen Decl. 4, 6-9, 11.

District 8 takes on a snake-like shape, running through all or part of seven counties in south central North Carolina. Ex. 1001. As explained more fully below, District 8 was intended to, and does in fact, dilute the voting strength of Democratic voters by cracking concentrations of likely Democratic voters. See infra Part III.B.2.h. Common Cause Plaintiff Coy E. Brewer, Jr., lives in Cumberland County-which is in District 8-is a registered Democrat, and typically votes for Democratic candidates. Ex. 3025; Dep. of Coy E. Brewer, Jr. ("Brewer Dep.") 44:15-16, Apr. 18, 2017, ECF No. 101-18. Brewer testified that historically "all" of the congressional districts that included parts of Cumberland County were "reasonably competitive." Brewer Dep. 50:1-7. But as a result of the redistricting, which split a concentration of likely Democratic voters in Cumberland County, District 8 is no longer "competitive" for Democratic candidates, according to Brewer. Id. at 51:9-17. By contrast, over 99 percent of the districting plans generated by Dr. Chen to conform to the General Assembly's non-partisan districting criteria, including Plan 2-297, placed Brewer in a district that was less heavily tilted in favor of Republicans. Third Chen Decl. 4, 6-9, 11.

District 9 runs through all or part of eight counties that lie directly south of District 8, connecting the southern portion of the City of Charlotte with rural Bladen County. Ex. 1001. As detailed more fully below, Plaintiffs alleged, and ultimately proved, that in drawing District 9, the General Assembly cracked likely Democratic voters and submerged them in a district in which a Republican candidate was much more likely to prevail. See infra Part III.B.2.i. The 2016 Plan places Common Cause Plaintiff John Morrison McNeill-who lives in Robeson County, is affiliated with the Democratic party, and typically votes for Democratic candidates, ex. 3033; Dep. of John Morrison McNeill ("McNeill Dep.") 33:3-7, April 5, 2017, ECF No. 101-19-in District 9, ex. 3033. McNeill testified that unlike earlier districting plans, the version of District 9 in the 2016 Plan connects south Charlotte, which is predominantly Republican, and Robeson County, which he said includes low-income, rural voters who favor Democratic policies like Obamacare-areas that have "little in common." McNeill Dep. 26:9-27:14. More than 97 percent of the 2,000 districting plans generated by Dr. Chen, including Plan 2-297, placed in McNeill in a more Democratic-leaning district. Third Chen Decl. 4, 6-9, 11. Similarly, League member Klenz, who lives in the Mecklenburg County section of District 9, testified that the General Assembly redrew District 9 to make Democratic candidates "less competitive" by connecting "a little, bitty piece" of Mecklenburg County, which is composed of heavily Republican precincts, with rural counties many miles away, including Bladen County. Klenz Dep. 65:23-66:12. And Plan 2-297 demonstrates that it was possible for the General Assembly to draw a districting plan that does not join Mecklenburg County's predominantly Republican precincts, including the precinct in which Klenz lives, with predominantly rural counties in Eastern North Carolina like Bladen and Robeson, where McNeill lives. See Second Chen Decl. 2-3.

District 10 spans all or part of eight counties, running from Charlotte's eastern suburbs to the foothills of the Appalachian *825 Mountains. Ex. 1001. As explained below, in drawing District 10, the General Assembly intended to, and did in fact, dilute the voting strength of Democratic voters by cracking concentrations of such voters and submerging those voters in a safe Republican district. See infra Part III.B.2.j. League Plaintiff John Quinn, III, resides in Buncombe County in District 10, is member of the Democratic Party, and voted for the Democratic congressional candidate in the 2016 election. Dep. of John J. Quinn, III ("Quinn Dep.") 10:18-11:2, 11:10-18, 17:1-3, 21:24-25, 37:20-25, Apr. 10, 2017, ECF No. 101-22. Quinn testified that the 2016 Plan splits Buncombe County and the City of Asheville between District 10 and District 11, and thereby cracks a concentration of voters that are politically cohesive (and tend to vote Democratic), unlike his previous district which did not divide Buncombe County and was "the single most competitive district in the State." Quinn Dep. 26:17-23, 38:20-25. Quinn further testified that District 10 is "certainly not compact at all." Id. at 26:25. Plan 2-297 does not divide Buncombe County and assigns Quinn to a district that is more favorable to Democratic candidates. Second Chen Decl. 2, 4-7 (reporting that district that includes Asheville in Plan 2-297, District 1, has predicted Republican vote share of 52.62 percent, as opposed to predicted Republican vote share of 58.17 percent in District 10 of the 2016 Plan)

District 11 encompasses almost all of the southwest corner of the State, with the sole exception being a bulbous protrusion of District 10 that takes in a portion of Buncombe County and the City of Asheville. Ex. 1001. As explained more fully below, District 11 reflects a successful effort by the General Assembly to crack a naturally occurring concentration of Democratic voters, and thereby create a safe Republican district. See infra Part III.B.2.k. The 2016 Plan assigned Common Cause Plaintiff Jones P. Byrd, who is a registered Democrat and typically votes for Democratic congressional candidates, to District 11. Ex. 3028; Dep. of Jones P. Byrd ("Byrd Dep.") 27:2-4, Apr. 20, 2017, ECF No. 101-24. Prior to 2011, District 11 included all of Buncombe County, Byrd testified, but the 2016 Plan, like the 2011 Plan, "sliced and diced" Buncombe County by "mov[ing] a core of the Democratic concentration out of the district, and put[ting] it in a district where it would be diluted." Byrd Dep. 20:4-5, 20:23-21:16, 21:22-22:1, 31:14-32:3. Under the 2016 Plan, Democratic "votes don't really matter in either [district]," he further explained, because both districts were drawn to ensure Republican candidates would prevail. Id. at 32:15-18. Notably, all 2,000 districting plans generated by Dr. Chen, including Plan 2-297, would have placed Byrd into a district more favorable to Democratic candidates, as measured by Dr. Hofeller's partisanship variable. Third Chen Decl. 4, 6-11. Similarly, League Plaintiff Aaron Sarver-who resides in Asheville in District 11 and is a registered Democrat who votes for Democratic candidates, Sarver Dep. 25:2-9, 45:15-17, 47:14-48:6-testified that because "Asheville is divided into two Congressional Districts the political voice is diluted" and "the 10th or 11th are not winnable" for Democratic candidates, id. at 25:2-26:18. Plan 2-297 does not divide the City of Asheville or Buncombe County and assigns Sarver to a district that is more favorable to Democratic candidates. Second Chen Decl. 3, 4-7 (reporting that district that includes Asheville in Plan 2-297, District 1, has predicted Republican vote share of 52.62 percent, as opposed to predicted Republican vote share of 57.11 percent in District 11 in the 2016 Plan).

District 12 contains all of Mecklenburg County, with the exception of a pizzaslice-shaped section of predominantly Republican precincts in the southeastern portion of the county, which are assigned to District *826 9. Exs. 1001, 3017. As explained below, District 12 amounts to a successful effort by the General Assembly to pack Mecklenburg County voters who were unlikely to support a Republican congressional candidate and thereby dilute such voters' votes. See infra Part III.B.2.l. Common Cause Plaintiff John W. Gresham lives in District 12 and is a registered Democrat who typically votes for Democratic candidates. Ex. 3030; Dep. of John West Gresham ("Gresham Dep.") 8:7-9, 9:16-18, 37:12-14, Mar. 24, 2017, ECF No. 101-24. Gresham testified that the 2016 Plan "pack[s]" likely Democratic voters in Mecklenburg County, and thereby "diluted" his vote. Gresham Dep. 25:5, 37:18-21. By comparison, over 99 percent of the districting plans in Dr. Chen's 2,000-plan sample, including Plan 2-297, placed Gresham into a district with fewer likely Democratic voters. Third Chen Decl. 4, 6-11.

Finally, District 13 includes all or parts of five counties in central North Carolina. Ex. 1001. As demonstrated more fully below, Plaintiffs' evidence proves District 13 was intended to, and does in fact, dilute the voting strength of Democratic voters by cracking concentrations of likely Democratic voters. See infra Part III.B.2.m. Common Cause Plaintiff Russell Walker, Jr., resides in District 13, is a registered Democrat, and typically votes for Democratic candidates, including in the 2016 congressional election. Ex. 3037; Dep. of Russell Grady Walker, Jr. ("Walker Dep.") 29:24, Apr. 7, 2017, ECF No. 101-27. Walker testified that the 2016 Plan "diluted" his vote because "there was no chance for a qualified person who was not a Republican to have much of a shot at" winning in District 13. Walker Dep. 29:17-23. Nearly 90 percent of the 2,000 districting plans generated by Dr. Chen, including Plan 2-297 placed Walker in a district more favorable to Democratic candidates. Third Chen Decl. 4, 6-11; Clarification Regarding Paragraph Describing Plaintiff Russell Walker in July 11, 2018 Supp. Decl. of Jowei Chen 2, July 24, 2018, ECF No. 136-1.

Because Plaintiffs in each of the State's thirteen congressional districts both testified that and introduced direct and circumstantial evidence that "the particular composition of the voter's own district ... caus[ed] his [or her] vote-having been packed or cracked-to carry less weight than it would carry in another, hypothetical district," Gill , 138 S.Ct. at 1931 , we conclude that such Plaintiffs have standing to assert partisan vote dilution claims under the Equal Protection Clause to each of those districts. 13 Additionally, *827 because at least one of these Plaintiffs-who, again, reside in each of the State's thirteen congressional districts-is affiliated with the Democratic Party, we further conclude that Plaintiff North Carolina Democratic Party has standing to raise a partisan vote dilution challenge to each district in the 2016 Plan. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt'l Servs. (TOC), Inc. , 528 U.S. 167 , 181, 120 S.Ct. 693 , 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). ("An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit."). Likewise, at a minimum, the League has standing to assert a partisan vote dilution challenge to District 9 because, as explained above, League member Klenz lives in that district and testified to and provided evidence that her vote was diluted on the basis of invidious partisanship. 14 Id.

c. Several Individual and Organizational Plaintiffs Lack Standing under Gill

We further conclude that, under Gill , several named Plaintiffs lack standing to lodge a partisan vote dilution claim under the Equal Protection Clause. In particular, several named Plaintiffs testified that they believe their vote was diluted by the 2016 Plan as a whole , rather than by the lines of their particular district. For example, League Plaintiff Elliot Feldman-who resides in District 9 and is a registered Democrat, Ex. 4055-testified that he was "aggrieved [by] the present situation whereby Democrats can have ... 51, 52 percent of the vote for ... congressional *828 [candidates], and then wind up [with] about 30 percent [of the seats] here on the congressional level," Feldman Dep. 20:8-13. Feldman further agreed this his "problem with the districts is that the number of Republicans elected is not proportional to the vote that Republicans receive in statewide elections." Id. at 30:12-16. Similarly, League Plaintiff Annette Love, who resides in District 1, testified that her "problem is with the plan as a whole, not [her] specific district ." Love Dep. 12:16-18 (emphasis added). According to Love, the 2016 Plan is "unfair" to supporters of Democratic candidates, like herself, because "we have 3 representatives [in Washington] versus I believe it's 10" Republican representatives. Id. at 12:10-15.

Other individual Plaintiffs similarly testified that they felt injured by the plan as a whole -not the boundaries of their specific district-because the partisan composition of the State's congressional delegation was not proportionate to the two-party share of the statewide vote. Dep. of William Collins ("Collins Dep.") 16:5-19, Mar. 30, 2017, ECF No. 101-5 (League Plaintiff who lives in District 1 stating he believes "statewide the plan is not fair because "10 to 3" ratio of Republicans to Democrats in congressional delegation "doesn't really project the right numbers."); Dep. of Elizabeth Evans ("Evans Dep.") 21:14-22:18, Apr. 7, 2017, ECF No. 101-7 ("I have a problem with the plan statewide.... I'm part of a majority party [Democratic] in North Carolina, but I have only three representatives."); Dep. of Willis Williams ("Williams Dep.") 26:13-27:22, March 30, 2017, ECF No. 101-6 ("[T]he problem with the plan is that statewide it disadvantages Democrats."). And organizational plaintiff Common Cause likewise testified that its Equal Protection Clause challenge was solely premised on a statewide theory of injury. 30(b)(6) Dep. of Common Cause by Bob Phillips ("Phillips Dep.") 16:24-17:4, Apr. 14, 2017, ECF No. 101-29.

As explained above, see supra Part II.A.1.a, Gill held that partisan vote dilution claims under the Equal Protection Clause must proceed district-by-district, and therefore that a plaintiff cannot rely on an alleged "statewide" injury to support such a claim, 138 S.Ct. at 1931, as these specific Plaintiffs seek to do. Likewise, Gill stated that the Supreme Court never has recognized a "shared interest in the composition of the legislature as a whole" as an individual interest giving rise to a vote dilution claim, 138 S.Ct. at 1924-25, 1932 (internal quotation marks omitted), meaning that these Plaintiffs cannot rely on the composition of the State's congressional delegation to establish their individual injury. Accordingly, these Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a partisan vote dilution claim under the Equal Protection Clause. 15

2. First Amendment

Having concluded that at least one Plaintiff has standing to lodge a partisan vote dilution challenge under the Equal Protection Clause to each of the thirteen districts in the 2016 Plan, we next address whether Plaintiffs have standing to assert their First Amendment claims. Partisan gerrymandering implicates the "the First Amendment interest of not burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the electoral process, their voting history, their association with a political party, or their expression of *829 political views." Vieth v. Jubelirer , 541 U.S. 267 , 314, 124 S.Ct. 1769 , 158 L.Ed.2d 546 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Put differently, "significant 'First Amendment concerns arise' when a State purposely 'subject[s] a group of voters or their party to disfavored treatment.' " Gill , 138 S.Ct. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Vieth , 541 U.S. at 314 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 ).

Among other types of "burden[s]" on First Amendment rights, partisan gerrymandering " purposely dilut[es] the weight of certain citizens' votes to make it more difficult for them to achieve electoral success because of the political views they have expressed through their voting histories and party affiliations." Shapiro v. McManus , 203 F.Supp.3d 579 , 595 (D. Md. 2016) (three-judge panel). This dilutionary aspect of the First Amendment injury associated with partisan gerrymandering echoes the district-specific injury giving rise to a partisan vote dilution claim under the Equal Protection Clause. See id. (explaining that "while a State can dilute the value of a citizen's vote by placing him in an overpopulated district, a State can also dilute the value of his vote by placing him in a particular district because he will be outnumbered there by those who have affiliated with a rival political party. In each case, the weight of the viewpoint communicated by his vote is 'debased' " (quoting Bd. of Estimate of City of N.Y. v. Morris , 489 U.S. 688 , 693-94, 109 S.Ct. 1433 , 103 L.Ed.2d 717 (1989) ). As detailed above, at least one Plaintiff in each of the State's thirteen congressional districts has adequately alleged such a dilutionary injury. See supra Part II.A.1.b.

Partisan gerrymandering also implicates "distinct," non-dilutionary First Amendment injuries, such as infringing on "the ability of like-minded people across the State to affiliate in a political party and carry out that organization's activities and objects." Gill , 138 S.Ct. at 1939 (Kagan, J., concurring); id. at 1938 ("[T]he associational harm of a partisan gerrymander is distinct from vote dilution."); see also Williams v. Rhodes , 393 U.S. 23 , 30, 89 S.Ct. 5 , 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968) (explaining that the Supreme Court "ha[s] repeatedly held that freedom of association is protected by the First Amendment," including "the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs"). These associational harms "ha[ve] nothing to do with the packing or cracking of any single district's lines." Gill , 138 S.Ct. at 1939 . Rather, "the valued association and the injury to it are statewide, [and] so too is the relevant standing requirement." Id.

Individual Plaintiffs testified to legally cognizable non-dilutionary injuries to their First Amendment right to engage in political association. In particular, individual Plaintiffs testified to decreased ability to mobilize their party's base, persuade independent voters to participate, attract volunteers, raise money, and recruit candidates. For example, League Plaintiff Elizabeth Evans, who served as the Secretary of the Granville County Democratic Party and worked on the Democratic Party's canvassing and get-out-the-vote efforts, testified that she had difficulty convincing fellow Democrats to "come out to vote" because, as a result of the gerrymander, "they felt their vote didn't count." Evans Dep. 12:24-16:12. Common Cause Plaintiff Melzer Morgan, who is a member of the Democratic Party, testified that "[t]he drawing of the districts mean[s] that ... you don't have a very vibrant Democratic Party because there is not much hope of prevailing at various levels" as a result of the gerrymander. Morgan Dep. 23:2-5, 27:21-24. Morgan further testified that individuals inclined to support Democratic candidates have refused to give money to the Democratic congressional candidate in *830 his Greensboro district, in particular, because they say there is "no sense in us giving money to that candidate because [she] is unlikely to prevail, notwithstanding the merit of [her] position." Id. at 23:20-25. And League Plaintiff John Quinn, who is "very active" in his local Democratic Party in District 11, testified that he has had difficulty "rais[ing] money," "recruit[ing] candidates," and "mobiliz[ing] a campaign" for a Democratic candidate in his district because the district was drawn to strongly favor Republican candidates. Quinn Dep. 24:13-14, 38:20-39:34.

Other individual Plaintiffs who support and work on behalf of the Democratic Party and Democratic candidates also testified at length regarding the adverse effects of the 2016 Plan on the ability of their party to perform its core functions. Berger Dep. 73:11-74:1, 79:10-13; Brewer Dep. 52:2-13; Fox Dep. 51:18-52:9; Palmer Dep. 27:4-29:21, 32:13-34:17 50:10-23; Dep. of Gunther Peck ("Peck Dep.") 27:8-24, 34:6-20, March 22, 2017, ECF No. 101-3; Quinn Dep. 31:19-32:3, 37; C. Taft Dep. 17:6-11; Sarver Dep. 26:9-27:23, 34:8-15, 37:18-39:4; Walker Dep. 29:17-30:8. The Supreme Court has recognized that these types of non-dilutionary harms constitute cognizable First Amendment injuries. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze , 460 U.S. 780 , 792, 103 S.Ct. 1564 , 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983) (finding that plaintiff was injured by election law that made "[v]olunteers ... more difficult to recruit and retain, media publicity and campaign contributions ... more difficult to secure, and voters ... less interested in the campaign").

As Justice Kagan recognized in Gill , "what is true for party members may be doubly true for party officials and triply true for the party itself (or for related organizations)." 138 S.Ct. at 1938 ; see also Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn. , 479 U.S. 208 , 214, 107 S.Ct. 544 , 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986) ("The freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments includes partisan political organization."). "By placing a state party at an enduring electoral disadvantage, the gerrymander weakens its capacity to perform all its functions." Gill , 138 S.Ct. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring). That is the case here. The North Carolina Democratic Party testified that "with the way the congressional districts were drawn, it indicates that only three [districts] would elect Democrats and the others will not be able to elect Democrats [which] makes it extremely difficult to raise funds and have resources and get the attention of the national congressional campaign committees and other lawful potential funders for congressional races in those districts." See 30(b)(6) Dep. of N.C. Democratic Party by George Wayne Goodwin ("Goodwin Dep.") 97:18-98:5, April 17, 2017, ECF Nos. 110-7, 101-30. Additionally, "[t]he way the districts are drawn these days, it's harder to recruit candidates given that the deck seems to be stacked, at least in congressional districts," the party testified. Id. at 27:17-20; see also id. at 42:12-25 (identifying particular districts in which Democratic Party had difficulty recruiting candidates).

Plaintiff organizations the League and Common Cause also testified to associational injuries attributable to the 2016 Plan. The League engages in statewide voter education, registration, and "get out the vote" efforts. Klenz Dep. 44:15-25, 59:16-17. Due to a lack of voter interest attributable to the gerrymander, the League had difficulty fulfilling its mission of "inform[ing] ... [and] engag[ing] voters in the process of voting and civic participation in their government." Id. 59:16-17. Additionally, as a result of the 2016 Plan, the League has had difficulty providing opportunities for its members and other *831 voters to interact with "candidate[s] that [were] expected to win and projected to win," because those candidates were often not "motivated" to participate "in voter forums, debates, [or] voter guides, because the outcome is so skewed in favor or in disfavor of one or the other." Id. at 60:6-10. Accordingly, the League has established that the 2016 Plan's invidious partisan discrimination burdens its mission. See Ohio A Philip Randolph Inst. v. Smith , No. 1:18-CV-357, 2018 WL 3872330 , at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 2018) (three-judge panel) (finding, post- Gill , that the Ohio League of Women Voters had standing to assert First Amendment partisan gerrymandering claim because "the map makes it more difficult to engage voters through their education, registration, and outreach efforts, and by deterring and discouraging their members and other Ohio voters from engaging in the political process" (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) ); League of Women Voters of Mich. v. Johnson , slip op. at 13, No. 2:17-CV-14148 (E.D. Mich. May 16, 2018), ECF No. 54 (three-judge panel) (same, in case in which Michigan League of Women Voters asserted partisan gerrymandering challenge to Michigan districting plan).

Common Cause and its members work, on a statewide basis, to educate the public about voting-related issues and "advocate for more open, honest and accountable government." Phillips Dep. 35:9-10, 37:25-39:9, 71:6-8, 150:2-7. As part of that effort, Common Cause has long advocated for redistricting reform, and legislation providing for non-partisan redistricting. Id. at 20:20-21:13. In North Carolina, in particular, Common Cause worked with Republican legislators in the 2000s and Democratic legislators in the 2010s to enact legislation providing for non-partisan redistricting, and Common Cause developed and advocated for a non-partisan congressional districting plan as an alternative to the 2016 Plan. Id. at 21:9-13, 29:6-11, 150:8-15. As a redistricting plan expressly designed to achieve "Partisan Advantage," Ex. 1007, the 2016 Plan runs directly contrary to the non-partisan approach to redistricting-and the open and accountable government-for which Common Cause and its members have long advocated. Accordingly, the 2016 Plan has burdened the rights of members of the League and Common Cause "to associate for the advancement of political beliefs." Williams , 393 U.S. at 30 , 89 S.Ct. 5 .

In sum, we conclude both individual and organizational Plaintiffs have standing to assert their First Amendment challenge to the 2016 Plan. And we further conclude that because these injuries are statewide, such Plaintiffs have standing to lodge a First Amendment challenge to the 2016 Plan as a whole. Gill , 138 S.Ct. at 1939 .

3. Article I

The injuries underlying Common Cause Plaintiffs' Article I claims-which allege that the 2016 Plan exceeds the General Assembly's authority under the Elections Clause and usurps the power of "the People" to elect their representatives-also do not stop at a single district's lines. In invoking Article I, Plaintiffs allege that North Carolina's districting map upsets a fundamental balance established by the Constitution. As explained in more detail below, the grant of power to state legislatures to regulate federal elections in Article I, section 4 is akin to an enumerated power of Congress. See infra Part V; Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition , 30 NOVA L. REV. 253, 263-64 (2006). This is "[b]ecause any state authority to regulate election to [congressional] offices could not precede their very creation by the Constitution"; accordingly, "such power 'had to be delegated to, rather than reserved by, the States.' " Cook v. Gralike , 531 U.S. 510 , 522, 121 S.Ct. 1029 , 149 L.Ed.2d 44 (2001) (quoting *832 Thornton , 514 U.S. at 804 , 115 S.Ct. 1842 ). Thus, "the States may regulate the incidents of elections ... only within the exclusive delegation of power under the Elections Clause." Id. at 523, 121 S.Ct. 1029 . Here, Common Cause Plaintiffs allege that the General Assembly's partisan gerrymandering exceeds the scope of that power and therefore upsets the constitutional balance established by Article I.

These Plaintiffs' Article I claim, therefore, is premised on federalism. "The Framers understood the Elections Clause as a grant of authority to issue procedural regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade important constitutional restraints." Thornton , 514 U.S. at 833 -34 , 115 S.Ct. 1842 ; see also Cook , 531 U.S. at 527 , 121 S.Ct. 1029 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[A state] simply lacks the power to impose any conditions on the election of Senators and Representatives, save neutral provisions as to the time, place, and manner of elections pursuant to Article I, § 4."). Accordingly, if Plaintiffs are correct in their assertions about the General Assembly's actions, then, in enacting the 2016 Plan, the General Assembly acted beyond its constitutional authority in direct contravention of a delicate balance of governmental powers established in Article I. See Thornton , 514 U.S. at 841 , 115 S.Ct. 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("That the States may not invade the sphere of federal sovereignty is as incontestable ... as the corollary proposition that the Federal Government must be held within the boundaries of its own power when it intrudes upon matters reserved to the States."). Establishing such a structural harm can confer standing. See Bond v. United States , 564 U.S. 211 , 221-22, 131 S.Ct. 2355 , 180 L.Ed.2d 269 (2011) ("An individual has a direct interest in objecting to laws that upset the constitutional balance between the National Government and the States when the enforcement of those laws causes injury that is concrete, particular, and redressable."); see also Ariz. State Leg. , 135 S.Ct. at 2695 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have never passed on a separation-of-powers question raised directly by a governmental subunit's complaint. We have always resolved those questions in the context of a private lawsuit in which the claim or defense depends on the constitutional validity of action by one of the governmental subunits that has caused a private party concrete harm.").

To be sure, bringing a claim that implicates a structural harm does not absolve litigants from the requirement to allege particularized injuries. See Lance v. Coffman , 549 U.S. 437 , 440, 127 S.Ct. 1194 , 167 L.Ed.2d 29 (2007) (per curiam). In Lance , the Colorado state legislature was initially unable to agree on a new congressional redistricting map after the 2000 census, so the state court drew and implemented a new map. See id. at 437-38 , 127 S.Ct. 1194 . Several years later, in 2003, the state legislature finally passed a new redistricting plan. See id. at 438 , 127 S.Ct. 1194 . The state attorney general, however, sought to enjoin implementation of the map on grounds that the Colorado Constitution prohibits more than one redistricting after each census. See id. The state supreme court held that the new map indeed violated the state constitution and could not take effect. See id. Subsequently, four voters brought suit in federal court alleging that the ruling of the Colorado Supreme Court violated the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution by preventing the Colorado legislature from exercising its constitutionally-granted power of regulating elections. See id. at 441 , 127 S.Ct. 1194 . But the Supreme Court held that the voters lacked standing to bring such a suit because "[t]he only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law-specifically the Elections Clause-has not been followed."

*833 Id. at 442 , 127 S.Ct. 1194 . The Court described the voters' claims as "precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of the government" that is insufficient to confer standing. Id. Rather, the voters needed to cite more than "the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law." Id. at 440 , 127 S.Ct. 1194 .

In Lance , the Supreme Court specifically differentiated the generalized injuries of the plaintiffs in that case from the individualized injuries alleged by the plaintiffs in Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186 , 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). In Baker , the plaintiffs lived in five Tennessee counties and challenged the state districting plan "apportioning the members of the General Assembly among the State's 95 counties." 369 U.S. at 187-88 , 204 , 82 S.Ct. 691 . The alleged injury was based on a vote dilution theory: "appellants assert ... that [the current apportioning] disfavors the voters in the counties in which they reside, placing them in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable inequality vis-à-vis voters in irrationally favored counties." Id. at 207-08 , 82 S.Ct. 691 . And although the entire state map was ultimately redrawn in that case, Gill clarified that the Baker plaintiffs' claims were only brought on a district-by-district basis, because they were based on an alleged injury of vote dilution. See Gill , 138 S.Ct. at 1930-31 .

Unlike the plaintiffs in Lance -and like the plaintiffs in Baker -at least one Plaintiff residing in each district in the 2016 Plan alleges and offers proof of the type individualized dilutionary injuries the Court recognized in Gill. See supra Part II.A.1.b. Those injuries-in-fact establish such Plaintiffs' standing to lodge their structural claim under Article I. Bond , 564 U.S. at 221 -22 , 131 S.Ct. 2355 .

Plaintiffs also allege and prove additional non-dilutionary injuries, including injuries to their associational rights. See supra Part II.A.2. As discussed above, these injuries include, among others, difficulty recruiting candidates due to the perceived lack of competitiveness of elections, difficulty raising money, and difficulty encouraging people to vote on account of widespread belief that electoral outcomes are foregone conclusions. Id. And, as Justice Kagan made clear, such injuries, if statewide in scope, admit statewide standing. See id.

Several circuits also have relied on these types of associational injuries when finding that organizations had standing to assert claims under Article I. For example, in Texas Democratic Party v. Benkiser , 459 F.3d 582 (5th Cir. 2006), the Republican Party of Texas declared that one of its candidates, who had already won the primary election for the U.S. House of Representatives in one of Texas' districts, was no longer eligible to run due to a change in his residency. See id. at 584-85 . The Texas Republican Party thus sought to replace the candidate on the general election ballot with a new candidate. See id. Before the Republican Party could do so, however, the Democratic Party sought injunctive relief. See id. at 585 . The district court found that the Republican Party had impermissibly added a residency requirement to running for the U.S. House of Representatives, which the Qualifications Clause of the Constitution prohibited. See id. Accordingly, the district court permanently enjoined the chairwoman of the Republican Party from finding the first candidate to be ineligible and from replacing him on the ballot with another Republican candidate. See id.

The Republican Party appealed. Among its arguments was that the residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives was a permissible use of the authority conferred to the State under *834 the Elections Clause. See id. at 590-91 . The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument. The court found that the Republican Party's actions were not performed in a " 'nondiscriminatory, politically neutral fashion,' " id. at 590 (quoting Miller v. Moore , 169 F.3d 1119 , 1125 (8th Cir. 1999) ), nor did they fall within the limited grant of power provided by the Elections Clause, id. at 591.

Relevant here, the Fifth Circuit found that the Texas Democratic Party had standing to bring these claims. For direct standing, the court found that the Democratic Party would suffer an economic injury because "it would need to raise and expend additional funds and resources to prepare a new and different campaign in a short time frame." Id. at 586 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the Party would also have standing as a result of "harm to its election prospects." Id. More specifically, "if the [Republican Party] were permitted to replace [the original candidate] with a more viable candidate, then [the Democratic Party's] congressional candidate's chances of victory would be reduced." Id. Additionally, other "Democratic candidates, like county commissioners and judges, would suffer due to the change's effect on voter turnout and volunteer efforts." Id.

Like the Legislative Defendants here, the Republican Party in Benkiser argued that such ill effects were not injuries-in-fact sufficient to confer standing. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, admonishing that "[v]oluminous persuasive authority shows otherwise." Id. at 587 & n.4 (collecting cases). The court held that "a political party's interest in a candidate's success is not merely an ideological interests. Political victory accedes power to the winning party, enabling it to better direct the machinery of government toward the party's interest. While power may be less tangible than money, threatened loss of that power is still a concrete and particularized injury sufficient for standing purposes." Id. (internal citation omitted). The same is true in this case. The North Carolina Democratic Party has an interest in electing its candidates to office, and the inability to recruit candidates, raise funds, and get voters to the polls create injuries-in-fact sufficient to confer standing. 16 See supra Part II.A.2.

Two challenges to a Kansas law requiring proof of citizenship to register to vote-decided by two separate circuits-similarly establish that an individual who suffers an injury-in-fact as a result of an election regulation has standing to assert a structural challenge to the regulation under Article I. See League of Women Voters of the U.S. v. Newby , 838 F.3d 1 , 9 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that because the "new obstacles" created by the Kansas law "unquestionably make it more difficult for the Leagues to accomplish their primary mission of registering voters, they provide injury for purposes both of standing and irreparable harm"); see also Fish v. Kobach , 840 F.3d 710 , 716 n.5 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that Plaintiffs, including the League of Women Voters of Kansas, have standing to challenge the law). Further still, although the Supreme Court did not specifically address standing in Thornton , the Court nonetheless ruled on the merits of the case when several citizens and the League of Women Voters of Arkansas *835 brought suit challenging a law that violated both the Qualifications Clause and the Elections Clause. See 514 U.S. 779 , 115 S.Ct. 1842 . Several other cases provide similar tacit support. See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc. , 570 U.S. 1 , 133 S.Ct. 2247 , 186 L.Ed.2d 239 (2013) (addressing the merits in a case brought by a collection of non-profit organizations to a state law that fell outside the scope of the Elections Clause); Tashjian , 479 U.S. at 217 (addressing the merits in a case brought by the Republican Party challenging a law outside the scope of the Elections Clause and stating that although "[t]he Constitution grants to the States a broad power to prescribe the 'Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,' Art. I, § 4, cl. 1," that power "does not justify ... the abridgment of fundamental rights, such as the right to vote [or] the freedom of political association." (citing Wesberry , 376 U.S. at 6 -7 , 84 S.Ct. 526 ) ); Anderson , 460 U.S. at 792 , 103 S.Ct. 1564 (finding that plaintiff was injured by an election law that made "[v]olunteers ... more difficult to recruit and retain, media publicity and campaign contributions ... more difficult to secure, and voters ... less interested in the campaign").

In sum, as the Supreme Court held in Bond , citizens have standing in cases "assert[ing] injury from governmental action taken in excess of the authority that federalism defines," 564 U.S. at 220 , 131 S.Ct. 2355 -that is, when a "government acts in excess of its lawful powers," id. at 222 , 131 S.Ct. 2355 -so long as the plaintiffs still have the requisite injury-in-fact. Here, Common Cause Plaintiffs' Article I claim is grounded in that same principle of federalism. They claim that the North Carolina General Assembly has overstepped the limited grant of power provided by the Elections Clause, thereby giving it too much influence over the National Legislature. Like in Wesberry , these actions, if true, "defeat [a] principle solemnly embodied" in the Constitution. 376 U.S. at 14 , 84 S.Ct. 526 ; see also Cook , 531 U.S. at 528 , 121 S.Ct. 1029 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The dispositive principle in this case is fundamental to the Constitution, to the idea of federalism, and to the theory of representative government. The principle is that Senators and Representatives in the National Government are responsible to the people who elect them, not to the States in which they reside.... The idea of federalism is that a National Legislature enacts law which bind the people as individuals, not as citizens of a State; and, it follows, freedom is most secure if the people themselves, not the States as intermediaries, hold their federal legislators to account for the conduct of their office"); Thornton , 514 U.S. at 842 , 115 S.Ct. 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Nothing in the Constitution or The Federalist Papers, however, supports the idea of state interference with the most basic relation between the National Government and its citizens, the selection of legislative representatives"). The harm suffered by Plaintiffs as a result of this potential violation of the Constitution's structure, however, manifests itself through individual dilutionary and associational injuries. Accordingly, we find that such injuries are sufficient injuries-in-fact on behalf of the individual plaintiffs, as well as on behalf of the Democratic Party of North Carolina and Common Cause. Furthermore, because these structural and associational harms have statewide implications, we find that such injuries are sufficient to confer standing on a statewide basis. See Gill , 138 S.Ct. at 1938-40 (Kagan, J., concurring).

* * * * *

In conclusion, we find and conclude that individual and organizational Plaintiffs in each congressional district have alleged and suffered dilutionary injuries-in-fact attributable *836 to the 2016 Plan, and, based on those injuries, have standing to assert a partisan vote dilution challenge to each of those districts. We further find and conclude that individual and organizational Plaintiffs have standing to assert a statewide First Amendment claim. And those Common Cause Plaintiffs who have alleged and proven injuries-in-fact also have standing to seek relief under Article I.

B. JUSTICIABILITY

Next, Legislative Defendants argue that although partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable "in theory," Plaintiffs' specific partisan gerrymandering claims should be dismissed because, as alleged and proven, they raise nonjusticiable political questions. Leg. Defs.' FOF 93. The political question doctrine dates to Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison , 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 , 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), and rests on the principle that certain disputes are not appropriate for or amenable to resolution by the courts because they raise questions constitutionally reserved to the political branches, id. at 170 ("Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.").

The political question doctrine has played a central role in apportionment cases. The Supreme Court set forth its current test for determining whether a claim raises a political question in a case dealing with the justiciability of one-person, one-vote claims. See Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186 , 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). Prior to Baker , in Colegrove v. Green , 328 U.S. 549 , 66 S.Ct. 1198 , 90 L.Ed. 1432 (1946), several Justices took the position that certain apportionment challenges raised political questions because the Constitution expressly delegated authority over apportionment to the States, subject to the supervision of Congress, thereby leaving no place for judicial review. 17 Id. at 553-55 , 66 S.Ct. 1198 .

Baker confronted a one-person, one-vote challenge under the Equal Protection Clause to a state legislative districting plan. The Court concluded such claims were justiciable, and distinguished Colegrove on grounds that Colegrove involved a challenge under the Guaranty Clause, Article IV, Section 4, which the Court had previously held was not "the source of a constitutional standard for invalidating state action." 369 U.S. at 209-10 , 223 , 82 S.Ct. 691 (citing Taylor v. Beckham , 178 U.S. 548 , 20 S.Ct. 890 , 44 L.Ed. 1187 (1900) ). In concluding that one-person, one-vote apportionment claims are justiciable, Baker held that an issue poses a political question if there is:

A textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

Id. at 217 , 82 S.Ct. 691 . Applying this test, the Court concluded one-person, one-vote claims were justiciable under the Fourteenth Amendment because they involved a determination of "the consistency of state action with the Federal Constitution"-a question constitutionally assigned *837 to the Judiciary. Id. at 226 , 82 S.Ct. 691 . The Court further emphasized that the resolution of the question was "judicially manageable" because "[j]udicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action." Id. The Court subsequently extended Baker 's justiciability holding to one-person, one-vote challenges to congressional districts under Article I, Section 2. See Wesberry , 376 U.S. at 5 -6 , 84 S.Ct. 526 .

1. Governing Law

In Davis v. Bandemer , 478 U.S. 109 , 106 S.Ct. 2797 , 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986), the Supreme Court applied the Baker framework to partisan gerrymandering claims, holding that such claims do not raise nonjusticiable political questions, see id. at 123 , 106 S.Ct. 2797 (plurality op.); id. at 161-65 , 106 S.Ct. 2797 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Writing for the Court, Justice White emphasized that the Court had previously concluded that one-person, one-vote and racial gerrymandering claims were justiciable, thereby establishing that apportionment claims implicating "issue[s] of representation" are justiciable. Id. at 124 , 106 S.Ct. 2797 (plurality op.). Justice White further stated that there was no reason to believe that the "standards ... for adjudicating this political gerrymandering claim are less manageable than the standards that have been developed for racial gerrymandering claims." Id. at 125 , 106 S.Ct. 2797 . Although the Court recognized the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims under the Equal Protection Clause, a majority could not agree as to the substantive standard for proving such claims. Compare id. at 127-37 , 106 S.Ct. 2797 , with id. at 161-62 , 106 S.Ct. 2797 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The Court revisited the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims in Vieth v. Jubelirer , 541 U.S. 267 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 , 158 L.Ed.2d 546 (2004). Conceding "the incompatibility of severe partisan gerrymanders with democratic principles," id. at 292 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 (plurality op.), a four-justice plurality nonetheless took the position that no judicially manageable standard exists to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims and therefore would have reversed Bandemer 's holding of justiciability, id. at 281 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 . Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality that the Vieth plaintiffs had failed to put forward a legally cognizable standard for evaluating partisan gerrymandering claims, therefore warranting dismissal of the action for failure to allege "a valid claim on which relief may be granted." Id. at 306, 313 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). But Justice Kennedy rejected the plurality's conclusion that partisan gerrymandering claims are categorically nonjusticiable. See id. at 309-10 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 . And the remaining four Justices agreed with Justice Kennedy's refusal to reverse Bandemer 's justiciability holding. Id. at 317 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[F]ive Members of the Court ... share the view that, even if these appellants are not entitled to prevail, it would be contrary to precedent and profoundly unwise to foreclose all judicial review of similar claims that might be advanced in the future."). Two years later, the Supreme Court again refused to revisit Bandemer 's holding that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry ( LULAC ), 548 U.S. 399 , 414, 126 S.Ct. 2594 , 165 L.Ed.2d 609 (2006). And the Supreme Court's most recent partisan gerrymandering decision, Gill , expressly declined to address the justiciability of *838 such claims, 138 S.Ct. at 1929 (majority op.), with Justice Kagan, joined by three other Justices, reaffirming that "[c]ourts have a critical role to play in curbing partisan gerrymandering," id. at 1941 (Kagan, J., concurring).

Accordingly, under controlling Supreme Court precedent, a challenge to an alleged partisan gerrymander presents a justiciable case or controversy. See Common Cause , 240 F.Supp.3d at 387 . For good reason.

As the Supreme Court recently held, " 'partisan gerrymanders ... are incompatible with democratic principles.' " Ariz. State Leg. , 135 S.Ct. at 2658 (quoting Vieth , 541 U.S. at 292 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 (plurality op.) ) (alterations omitted). That statement accords with the unanimous conclusion of the Justices in Vieth . See 541 U.S. at 292 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 (plurality op.) (recognizing "the incompatibility of severe partisan gerrymanders with democratic principles"); id. at 312, 316-17 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If a State passed an enactment that declared 'All future apportionment shall be drawn so as most to burden Party X's rights to fair and effective representation, though still in accord with one-person, one-vote principles,' we would surely conclude the Constitution had been violated."); id. at 326 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("State action that discriminates against a political minority for the sole and unadorned purpose of maximizing the power of the majority plainly violates the decisionmaker's duty to remain impartial"); id. at 345 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he increasing efficiency of partisan redistricting has damaged the democratic process to a degree that our predecessors only began to imagine."); id. at 360 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (holding that redistricting plan violates Constitution if it amounts to an " unjustified use of political factors to entrench a minority in power").

On its most fundamental level, partisan gerrymandering violates "the core principle of republican government ... that the voters should choose their representatives, not the other way around." Ariz. State Leg. , 135 S.Ct. at 2677 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Powell v. McCormack , 395 U.S. 486 , 540-41, 89 S.Ct. 1944 , 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969) ("[T]he true principle of a republic is, that the people should choose whom they please to govern them." (quoting Alexander Hamilton in 2 Debates of the Federal Constitution 257 (J. Elliott ed. 1876) ) ). Put differently, partisan gerrymandering represents " 'an abuse of power that, at its core, evinces a fundamental distrust of voters, serving the self-interest of the political parties at the expense of the public good.' " LULAC , 548 U.S. at 456 , 126 S.Ct. 2594 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Balderas v. Texas , Civ. Action No. 6:01CV158, App. to Juris. Statement 209a-10a (E.D. Tex. 2006) ). To that end, partisan gerrymandering leads to a "cascade of negative results ...: indifference to swing voters and their views; extreme political positioning designed to placate the party's base and fend off primary challenges; the devaluing of negotiation and compromise; and the impossibility of reaching pragmatic, bipartisan solutions to the nation's problems." Gill , 138 S.Ct. at 1940 (Kagan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Partisan gerrymandering runs contrary to both the structure of the republican form of government embodied in the Constitution and fundamental individual rights preserved by the Bill of Rights. As detailed more fully below, partisan gerrymandering of congressional districts constitutes a structural violation because it insulates Representatives from having to respond to the popular will, and instead renders them responsive to state legislatures or, as in this case, political factions thereof. See infra Part V. Unlike the Senate, *839 which, at the time of the founding, represented the interests of the States, the Framers intended for the House of Representatives to be the governmental body directly responsive to "the People." U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2; see also Wesberry , 376 U.S. at 13 , 84 S.Ct. 526 (explaining that "William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut had summed [the Great Compromise] up well: 'in one branch the people, ought to be represented; in the other, the States' "). As James Madison explained, "it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the [House of Representatives] should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people ." See The Federalist No. 52 (James Madison), at 295 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (emphasis added). On this point, both the Federalists and Anti-Federalists agreed. See e.g. , James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 39 (W. W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1787) (hereinafter " Debates ") (reporting that George Mason "argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the government."); id. at 167 (reporting that James Wilson stated that he "considered the election of the first branch by the people not only as the corner Stone, but as the foundation of the fabric: and that the difference between a mediate and immediate election was immense"). "When that moment does not come-when legislators can entrench themselves in office despite the people's will-the foundation of effective democratic governance dissolves." Gill , 138 S.Ct. at 1940-41 (Kagan, J., concurring).

Emphasizing that the House of Representatives was the repository of the People's power, the Framers repeatedly expressed concern about state legislatures, or political factions thereof, interposing themselves between Representatives and the People. For example, James Madison explained that "[i]t is essential " that a Republican government "derive[ its powers] from the great body of society, not from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it ; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans and claim for their government the honorable title of republic." The Federalist No. 39 (James Madison), at 209 (second emphasis added); Debates at 40 (reporting that James Wilson stated that "[a]ll interference between the general and local government should be obviated as much as possible"). The Framers expressed particular concern that State legislatures would seek to influence Congress by enacting electoral regulations that favored candidates aligned with, and responsive to, the interests of the legislatures, rather than the public at large. See Debates at 167 (reporting that Rufus King expressed concern that "the Legislatures would constantly choose men subservient to their own views as contrasted to the general interest; and that they might even devise modes of election that would be subversive of the end in view"). Surveying these and other founding era authorities, the Supreme Court recognized that "[i]t would defeat the principle solemnly embodied in the Great Compromise ... to hold that, within the states, legislatures may draw the lines of congressional districts in such a way as to give some voters a greater voice in choosing a Congressman than others." Wesberry , 376 U.S. at 14 , 84 S.Ct. 526 . Partisan gerrymandering-drawing district lines to enhance the electoral power of voters who support a favored party and diminish the electoral power of voters who support disfavored parties-amounts to a legislative effort "to give some voters a greater voice in choosing a Congressman than others," id. , contrary to the republican system put in place by the Framers.

*840 Partisan gerrymandering also runs afoul of rights that "are individual and personal in nature," Reynolds , 377 U.S. at 561 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 , because it subverts the foundational constitutional principle that the State govern "impartially"- that "the State should treat its voters as standing in the same position, regardless of their political beliefs or party affiliation." Davis , 478 U.S. at 166 , 106 S.Ct. 2797 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also infra Part III. And partisan gerrymandering infringes on core political speech and associational rights by "burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the electoral process, their voting history, their association with a political party, or their expression of political views." Vieth , 541 U.S. at 314 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also infra Part IV.

That partisan gerrymandering encroaches on these individual rights by undermining the right to vote-the principle vehicle through which the public secures other rights and prevents government overreach-magnifies the constitutional harm. As the Supreme Court explained in Wesberry , "[o]ur Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges [the right to vote]" because "[o]ther rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined." 376 U.S. at 17 -18 , 84 S.Ct. 526 . To that end, the Supreme Court long has held that "legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co. , 304 U.S. 144 , 152 n.4, 58 S.Ct. 778 , 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938).

A partisan gerrymander that is intended to and likely has the effect of entrenching a political party in power undermines the ability of voters to effect change when they see legislative action as infringing on their rights. And as James Madison warned, a legislature that is itself insulated by virtue of an invidious gerrymander can enact additional legislation to restrict voting rights and thereby further cement its unjustified control of the organs of both state and federal government. 18 See *841 Debates at 424 ("[T]he inequality of the Representation in the Legislatures of particular States, would produce like inequality in their representation in the Natl. Legislature, as it was presumable that the Counties having the power in the former case would secure it to themselves in the latter."). That is precisely what occurred in the late Eighteenth Century when Democratic legislatures used aggressive partisan gerrymanders to secure Democratic control of the House of Representatives and then, by virtue of that control, restrict earlier federal efforts to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment in the South, thereby facilitating the return of de jure and de facto segregation. See Erik J. Engstrom, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Construction of American Democracy 94-121 (2013).

The Constitution sharply curtails restrictions on electoral speech and the right to vote because, in our republican form of democracy, elected representatives in power have a strong incentive to enact legislation or policies that preserve their position and those of their fellow partisans, at the expense of public interest. As Justice Scalia explained, "[t]he first instinct of power is the retention of power, and, under a Constitution that requires periodic elections, that is best achieved by the suppression of election-time speech." McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n , 540 U.S. 93 , 263, 124 S.Ct. 619 , 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Casting a vote and associating with a political party are among the most fundamental forms of "election-time speech." See Williams , 393 U.S. at 30 , 89 S.Ct. 5 (recognizing "the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively"); Reynolds , 377 U.S. at 555 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 ("The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government."); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute , 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245 , 254 (1961) ("The revolutionary intent of the First Amendment is ... to deny to [the government] authority to abridge the freedom of the electoral power of the people."). Partisan gerrymandering is no different than legislative efforts to curtail other forms of election-time speech because in both cases "[p]oliticians have deep-seated incentives to bias translation of votes into seats." Engstrom, supra at 192. Accordingly, because partisan gerrymandering encroaches on individuals' right to engage in "election-time speech"-including the right to vote-allegations of partisan gerrymandering "must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized" by the judiciary. Reynolds , 377 U.S. at 562 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 .

*842 Because partisan gerrymandering targets voting rights, the deference to the policy judgments of the political branches animating the political question doctrine is inapplicable. In Wesberry , the defendant state asserted that claims premised on malapportionment of congressional districts raise political questions because the Elections Clause-which empowers state "Legislatures," subject to congressional regulation, to "prescribe[ ] ... The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for ... Representatives"-textually commits districting and apportionment questions to Congress and the States. 376 U.S. at 6 -7 , 84 S.Ct. 526 . In rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court refused to "support ... a construction [of the Elections Clause] that would immunize state congressional apportionment laws which debase a citizen's right to vote from the power of courts to protect the constitutional rights of individuals from legislative destruction, a power recognized at least since our decision in Marbury v. Madison ." Id. In sum, "[t]he right to vote is too important in our free society to be stripped of judicial protection by such an interpretation of Article I." Id.

Further, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" of authority to a coordinate branch provides the strongest basis for treating a claim as a political question. Vieth , 541 U.S. at 278 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 (plurality op.) (characterizing the "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" test as the most "importan[t] and certain[ ]" test for the existence of a political question). Given that the Supreme Court has recognized that the importance of the right to vote warrants not treating malapportionment claims as political questions, notwithstanding the alleged textual commitment of such claims in the Elections Clause, a purported lack of judicially manageable standards provides an even weaker basis for "stripp[ing] of judicial protection" the right to vote when a legislature seeks to destroy that right through partisan gerrymandering. 19 Wesberry , 376 U.S. at 6 -7 , 84 S.Ct. 526 .

Importantly, and contrary to Legislative Defendants' claims, the judiciary's refusal *843 to treat alleged infringements on the right to vote-like claims of partisan gerrymandering-as political questions reflects an effort to advance the interests served by the political question doctrine, rather than usurp the role of the political branches. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he voting rights cases, indeed, have represented the Court's efforts to strengthen the political system by assuring a higher level of fairness and responsiveness to the political processes, not the assumption of a continuing judicial review of substantive political judgments entrusted expressly to the coordinate branches of government." Gilligan v. Morgan , 413 U.S. 1 , 11, 93 S.Ct. 2440 , 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973). Put differently, because the judiciary jealously protects the right to vote-and thereby ensures that the People retain the means to counteract any encroachment by the political branches on substantive individual rights-the judiciary can give the political branches greater latitude to make substantive policy decisions. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 102 (1980) (explaining that by "devoting itself instead to policing the mechanisms by which [our constitutional] system seeks to ensure that our elected representatives will actually represent," the judiciary "recognizes the unacceptability of the claim that appointed and life-tenured judges are better reflectors of conventional values than elected representatives").

In sum, partisan gerrymandering infringes on a variety of individual rights and does so by targeting the right to vote-the constitutional mechanism through which the People repel legislative encroachment on their rights. The Supreme Court long has recognized that when the Constitution preserves individual rights, courts have an obligation to enforce those rights. Marbury , 5 U.S. at 166 ("[W]here a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy."). We find no basis to disregard that obligation here.

Notably, the State defendant in Reynolds made arguments against judicial oversight of state redistricting identical to those advanced by Legislative Defendants here-namely, that it is improper for courts to embroil themselves in inherently political issues and that courts lack the capability of identifying a judicially manageable standard to determine whether, and to what degree, malapportionment violates the Constitution. Rejecting each of these arguments, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle first recognized by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury : "We are cautioned about the dangers of entering into political thickets and mathematical quagmires. Our answer is this: a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our office require no less of us." Reynolds , 377 U.S. at 566 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 . Our oath and our office impose that same obligation here.

2. Legislative Defendants' Arguments Against Justiciability

Legislative Defendants nonetheless argue that, regardless of whether partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable "in theory," this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' claims as nonjusticiable because Plaintiffs have failed to put forth a "judicially manageable standard" for resolving their claims. Leg. Defs.' Br. 2, 11, 17; Leg. Defs.' FOF 93. Legislative Defendants argue that the analytical frameworks and empirical analyses advanced by Plaintiffs fail to provide a judicially manageable standard for three reasons. First, Legislative Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' legal frameworks and expert analyses fail to address, much less resolve, what Legislative *844 Defendants see as the fundamental question bearing on the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering: "how much politics is too much politics in redistricting"? Leg. Defs.' Br. 2, 9-11. Second, Legislative Defendants argue that the empirical analyses on which Plaintiffs rely-which Legislative Defendants characterize as "a smorgasbord of alleged 'social science' theories"-lack any constitutional basis, and instead amount to "academically inspired proposed judicial amendments to the Constitution." Id. at 2, 17. Finally, Legislative Defendants maintain that allowing the judiciary to strike down a redistricting plan as a partisan gerrymander would interfere with the political branches' decision, rendered pursuant to Congress's authority under the Election Clause, to require election of representatives from single-member districts. Id. at 13. We reject all three arguments.

a. Failure To Draw Line Between Acceptable and "Too Much" Partisanship

Legislative Defendants' assertion that any judicially manageable partisan gerrymandering framework must distinguish "reasonable" partisan gerrymandering from "too much" partisan gerrymandering rests on the premise that some degree of invidious partisan gerrymandering-again, defined by the Supreme Court as "the drawing of legislative district lines to subordinate adherents of one political party and entrench a rival party in power," Ariz. State Leg. , 135 S.Ct. at 2658 -is constitutionally permissible. To justify that premise, Legislative Defendants assert that (i) the Elections Clause assigns election regulation-and districting, in particular-to political bodies, and thereby contemplates that politics will play a role in the drawing of district lines, rendering questions of partisan gerrymandering "best left to the political branches," Leg. Defs.' FOF 93; (ii) historical practice indicates that the founding generation viewed some amount of partisan gerrymandering as constitutionally permissible; and (iii) the Supreme Court repeatedly has sanctioned at least some degree of partisan gerrymandering. None of these three claims is correct.

i.

Legislative Defendants are correct that the Elections Clause delegates primary responsibility to state legislatures-or other redistricting bodies established pursuant to state law-to draw congressional districts. See Ariz. State Leg. , 135 S.Ct. at 2668, 2677 . But neither founding era authorities nor Supreme Court precedent supports Legislative Defendants' contentions that the Elections Clause's assignment of election regulation to political bodies contemplates such bodies engaging in some degree of invidious partisan discrimination in the regulation of elections-the conduct at issue here-or that such efforts would be immune from judicial review.

On the contrary, scholars agree that "[t]he idea of political parties, representing institutionalized divisions of interest, was famously anathema to the Framers, as it had long been in Western political thought." Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers , 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311 , 2320 (2006) (emphasis added); see also, e.g. , James A. Gardner, Can Party Politics Be Virtuous , 100 Colum. L. Rev. 667 , 667 (2000) ("The generation of Americans that founded the United States and wrote its Constitution feared and despised political parties."); Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions , 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1479 , 1484-85 (1994) ("The Framers of our Constitution were quite outspoken in voicing their dislike for 'factions' and 'parties.' ").

For example, James Madison, the principal author of the Constitution, characterized "factions" as a "disease" and a *845 dangerous vice that "tainted our public administration." The Federalist No. 10, at 46 (James Madison). In defending the Elections Clause, Alexander Hamilton similarly decried the "diseases of faction." The Federalist No. 61, at 343 (Alexander Hamilton). And in his 1796 Farewell Address, George Washington spoke at length about the "baneful effect of the spirit of party" and the "interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it." George Washington, Farewell Address (1796), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp. 20

As illustrated by Washington's address, "[t]he founders' antipathy toward political parties rested on their belief that parties were the vehicles by which self-interested groups and individuals-'factions,' in their terminology-coordinated and pressed their efforts to seize political power." Gardner, supra at 668. "Once in possession of power, factions could be expected to use it to pursue their own private self-interest at the expense of the common good, a course of behavior that political theorists since Aristotle have judged to be a defining characteristic of bad government." Id.

This "antipathy" for political parties played a central role in the drafting of the Elections Clause, in particular: the most hotly contested issue at the constitutional convention regarding the Election Clause dealt with whether, and to what extent, the federal government should be empowered to displace the States' authority to administer and regulate elections. On the one hand, James Madison argued that "the Legislatures of the States ought not to have the uncontrouled right of regulating *846 the times places and manner of holding elections [as i]t was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the discretionary power." Debates at 423. "Whenever the State Legislatures had a favorite measure to carry, they would take care so to mould their regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed ," Madison explained. Id. at 424 (emphasis added). Likewise, Alexander Hamilton argued that the federal government should have some supervisory authority over the States' regulation of elections because there was no reason to believe that "it is less probable that a predominant faction in a single State should, in order to maintain its superiority, incline to a preference of a particular class of electors , than that a similar spirit should take possession of the representatives of thirteen States, spread over a vast region, and in several respects distinguishable from each other by a diversity of local circumstances, prejudices, and interests." The Federalist No. 61, at 342 (emphasis added).

On the other hand, delegates who opposed federal intrusion on state regulation of elections saw such intrusion "as an avenue through which Congress might perpetuate itself in power or ... institute unfair at-large voting methods in the states so as to favor particular interests ." Jamal Greene, Note, Judging Partisan Gerrymanders Under the Elections Clause , 114 Yale L.J. 1021 , 1036 (2005) (emphasis added); Br. of Amici Curiae Historians in Supp. of Appellees ("Historians' Br.") at 14, Gill v. Whitford , No. 16-1161, 2017 WL 4311107 (S. Ct. Sept. 5, 2017) ("Importantly, delegates arguing against Madison['s position on the Elections Clause] did not claim that such entrenchment was a state's right or somehow acceptable-rather, they countered that the greater fear was that Congress might abuse its power to entrench itself."). Thus, although the delegates disagreed as to whether, and to what extent, to place authority over the regulation of congressional elections in the federal government, they were united in their view that the Constitution should be drafted

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