explaining that indirect civil contempt proceedings are commonly initiated by the filing of a petition for rule to show cause, which would effectively violate a criminal contemnor’s right not to testify, by placing upon him the burden of proving that he should not held in contempt
How later courts described this case
- explaining that indirect civil contempt proceedings are commonly initiated by the filing of a petition for rule to show cause, which would effectively violate a criminal contemnor’s right not to testify, by placing upon him the burden of proving that he should not held in contempt
- stating that a petition for rule to show cause should not be used for an indirect criminal contempt proceeding because the offending party in a criminal contempt proceeding cannot be required to testify
- setting forth in detail the procedural rights of persons charged with indirect criminal contempt and holding that “[i]ndirect criminal contempt proceedings must generally conform to the same constitutionally mandated procedural requirements as other criminal proceedings”
- stating that unlike criminal contempt, civil contempt focuses only on actions taken after the order, with which the party did not comply, is entered
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE LUND, specially concurring:
I disagree with my esteemed brethren’s conclusion that the TRO did not go beyond what was necessary to preserve the status quo. A temporary restraining order (TRO) without notice is not favored and should go no further than is essential to safeguard the rights of the plaintiff. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 11—101; Geesbreght v. Geesbreght (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 37 , 379 N.E.2d 738 ; 21A Ill. L. & Prac. Injunctions §142 (1977).) Even with notice, it should only be as broad as is essential to safeguard the rights of the plaintiff. (Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 1 , 426 N.E.2d 824 .) The TRO should be justified upon the basis of preserving the status quo. (Continental-Midwest Corp. v. Hotel Sherman, Inc. (1957), 13 Ill. App. 2d 188 , 141 N.E.2d 400 ; 21A Ill. L. & Prac. Injunctions §142 (1977).) The TRO, without hearing, should have been limited in scope to do only what was necessary, and that was to prohibit going forth in Cook County, not the dismissal of a pending action. If John had, in a hearing after the entry of the TRO, established that his former wife had in fact removed from the Eleventh Judicial Circuit to Cook County, then proper venue could have been established in Cook County. (See section 512(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 512(c)).) The status quo would have been maintained by delaying the Cook County proceedings.
However, erroneous court orders must be obeyed until stayed, reversed, or vacated. Allendorf v. Daily (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 577 , 129 N.E.2d 673 ; Welch v. City of Evanston (1989), 181 Ill. App. 3d 49, 54 , 536 N.E.2d 866, 870 .