finding defendants to be on notice when complaint addressed the defendant officers as “individual defendants” “acting for themselves,” and when plaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss clarifying that the defendant officers were being sued in their individual capacities
How later courts described this case
- finding defendants to be on notice when complaint addressed the defendant officers as “individual defendants” “acting for themselves,” and when plaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss clarifying that the defendant officers were being sued in their individual capacities
- holding that, “[w]hen a § 1983 plaintiff fails to affirmatively plead capacity in the complaint,” we apply a “course of proceedings” test to determine whether the plaintiff brought the suit against the governmental officer in his official or individual capacity
- holding that failure to explicitly state in complaint whether a defendant is being sued in his or her individual capacity “is not fatal if the course of the proceedings otherwise indicate that the defendant received sufficient notice”
- finding that defendant officials had notice that they were being sued in their individual capacities in part because the caption listed defendants without providing their official titles
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GILMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion, and I agree with much of its reasoning. In particular, the adoption of the “course of proceedings” test to determine the capacity in which a public official is sued, and the holding that the district court erred in refusing to allow Moore to amend his complaint, strike me as the proper rulings in this case.
I write separately, however, to express my agreement with the following point made by the dissent: “Although the majority pays lip-service to the Wells rule, what it is really doing is adopting a course of proceedings test. It is disingenuous to do so without explicitly overruling Wells.” Dissenting Op. at 39. The majority sitting en banc, of course, is perfectly free to abandon the rule in Wells (and the dissent does not claim otherwise), but it would be preferable to do so forthrightly. To do otherwise leaves the court open to the criticism that it is denying the obvious until an objective observer cries out that “the emperor has no clothes.” Hans Christian Andersen, The Emperor’s New Clothes, in The Little Mermaid and Other Fairy Tales (1963).