finding petitioner did not satisfy the miscarriage-of-justice exception necessary to reach the merits of a successive habeas petition where the evidence of actual innocence was an affidavit from a codefendant which was made six years after the codefendant had been convicted and was made only after he was no longer subject to further punishment for his actions for these crimes
How later courts described this case
- finding petitioner did not satisfy the miscarriage-of-justice exception necessary to reach the merits of a successive habeas petition where the evidence of actual innocence was an affidavit from a codefendant which was made six years after the codefendant had been convicted and was made only after he was no longer subject to further punishment for his actions for these crimes
- holding that petitioner’s “renewed attacks on [a] trial witness[’s] . . . credibility . . . do not provide proof of ‘actual innocence’ sufficient to excuse an abuse of the writ
- holding that petitioner’s “renewed attacks on [a] trial witness [‘s] ... credibility ... do not provide proof of ‘actual innocence’”
- finding that an attack on a trial witness’s credibility did not provide proof of actual innocence
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I am convinced beyond doubt, that this court must carefully explore whether Byrd can satisfy the legal standard that would *578 entitle him to file a second habeas petition. The complexity of the issues raised by the petitioner are of such scope and magnitude as to demand a careful and exhaustive analysis. I believe that the petition squarely implicates a question of fundamental fairness. Thus, a stay of execution is imperative. Byrd should not be put to death before this court is able to give full consideration to the issues raised in his case. Steffen v. Tate, 39 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir.1994).
I dissent.