explaining that current three-judge panel was “bound” by prior ease interpreting state law that was decided by a three-judge Ninth Circuit panel, even though it was doubtful that the prior case “was correctly decided”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that current three-judge panel was “bound” by prior ease interpreting state law that was decided by a three-judge Ninth Circuit panel, even though it was doubtful that the prior case “was correctly decided”
- finding that a question of law was preserved where parties had fully briefed the issue to the court, even though one party made an error of legal interpretation
- applying Oregon state law definition and declining to treat an “appraisal” as an *1079 arbitration
- “The FAA governs any written provision in a ‘contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract.’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge,
special joinder in concurrence:
Although I am the author of the opinion, I join in Judge Tashima’s concurrence because I question the vitality of Wasyl, Inc. v. First Boston Corp., 813 F.2d 1579 (9th Cir.1987). At issue is a question of statutory interpretation. Whether this appraisal contract calls for an “arbitration” within the scope of the FAA therefore strikes me as a question of federal law. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym *1092 outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 , 105 S.Ct. 3346 , 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985) (holding courts determine whether parties agreed to arbitration under FAA’s “substantive law of arbitrability”) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 , 103 S.Ct. 927 , 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)).