finding no error in the jury instructions for a Title IX case when the court declined to instruct the jury that the school district had to take "prompt" remedial action, reasoning that, implicit in the concept of an appropriate response was that the response must be prompt
How later courts described this case
- finding no error in the jury instructions for a Title IX case when the court declined to instruct the jury that the school district had to take "prompt" remedial action, reasoning that, implicit in the concept of an appropriate response was that the response must be prompt
- holding that “when we are able to conclude that the verdict was not substantially influenced by the alleged error, then we may be quite confident the objecting party’s rights were not prejudiced and may uphold the general verdict”
- finding, with regard to the Department of Education’s obligations under this regulation, that if the Department “deems the allegations in a complaint to have merit,” it will proceed with enforcement proceedings
- finding that Title IX has a sufficiently comprehensive enforcement scheme as to preclude a § 1983 based on the Equal Protection Clause
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 555 U.S. 246 (2009)
Dist. , 163 F.3d 749, 761 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding no error in the jury instructions for a Title IX case when the court declined to instruct the jury that the school district had to take "prompt" remedial action, reasoning that, implicit in the concept of an appropriate response was that the response must be prompt) abrogated on other grounds by Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm. , 555 U.S. 246, 129 S.Ct. 788, 172 L.…
The opinion
OAKES, Senior Circuit Judge:
I concur in Judge Cardamone’s extensive and well-analyzed opinion in its entirety, but *763 write separately to add a few words of expía-nation.
It is irrefutable that Congress could not, by enacting a statute like Title IX, somehow erode or limit a constitutional right such as the right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A careful analysis of Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457 , 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984), indicates that it does not threaten that position. When Smith is analyzed closely, one recognizes that the case held, in part, that “Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for a substantial equal protection claim.” Id. at 1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457 . In other words, because § 1983 is a statutory remedy, and Congress retains authority to repeal or replace it, Title IX may have that effect. Here, as in Smith , there is no issue of “Congress’ ability to preclude the federal courts from granting a remedy for a constitutional deprivation.” Id. at 1012 n. 15, 104 S.Ct. 3457 . This case makes not even the slightest inroad into the well-established jurisprudence to the effect that if Congress were to repeal all statutory remedies for constitutional violations, the federal courts could still grant whatever relief were necessary to remedy the wrong done in violation of the Constitution. See id. (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 , 66 S.Ct. 773 , 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 , 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971); id. at 400-06 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment)).