Opinion

Student Loan Marketing Ass'n v. Riley

  • 104 F.3d 397
  • 322 U.S. App. D.C. 354
  • 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 351
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Jan 10, 1997
Status
Published
On the bench
Ginsburg, Wald, Williams
Cited by
26 cases
Authority
More cited than 17.2%

reading the applicable Supreme Court precedent to say that “in cases involving straightforward mandates of cash payment to the government, courts may reasonably infer either that Tucker Act jurisdiction has been withdrawn or at least that any continued availability does not wipe out equitable jurisdiction.”

How later courts described this case

  • reading the applicable Supreme Court precedent to say that “in cases involving straightforward mandates of cash payment to the government, courts may reasonably infer either that Tucker Act jurisdiction has been withdrawn or at least that any continued availability does not wipe out equitable jurisdiction.”
  • holding that under certain circumstances an agency letter that adopts an interpretation of law is a final agency action
  • Department of Education’s letters interpreting statute imposing offset fee on principal amount of each student loan held by Sallie Mae were final, for purposes of judicial review, as Secretary of Education endorsed interpretation set forth in letters, position was stated unequivocally, and interpretation was product of agency deliberation informed by Sallie Mae’s position
  • entertaining declaratory relief request where alleged taking involved "straightforward mandate[] of cash payment to the government"

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

ORDER ON REHEARING

March 11, 1997

Sallie Mae petitions for rehearing, noting that because the district court held that the statute did not embrace securitized loans, that court should not have addressed the constitutionality of the fee as applied to such loans. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 , 56 S.Ct. 466, 483 , 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). We agree. Similarly, as we rejected the Secretary’s grounds for applying the fee to securitized loans, nothing in our decision should be taken as expressing any opinion on the constitutionality of the fee in that context, nor on whether there is any distinction, for constitutional purposes, between securitized loans and ones “held” by Sallie Mae in the most conventional sense of the term.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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