stating that 18 students’ “right to be free from sexual abuse at the hands of a public school teacher is clearly protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”
How later courts described this case
- stating that 18 students’ “right to be free from sexual abuse at the hands of a public school teacher is clearly protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”
- stating that students’ “right to be free from sexual abuse at the hands of a public school teacher is clearly protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”
- defining customs under Monell as “[d]eeply embedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy” (alteration in original) (quoting Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369 , 60 S.Ct. 968 , 84 L.Ed. 1254 (1940))
- requiring “the existence of a clear and persistent pattern of sexual abuse by school employees” coupled with “tacit approval” of that unconstitutional conduct
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the holding found in Part II of the majority opinion, that plaintiff enjoyed a clearly established fundamental substantive due process right “to personal security and to bodily integrity.” I question the wisdom of the majority in placing this court on record as saying that commission of a state law sexual assault crime amounts to a constitutional tort under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . Furthermore, that holding runs contrary to this court’s discussion of the question in United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1388-89 (6th Cir.1996) (en banc).
It follows, then, that I concur in Parts II and III of the opinion to the extent that the majority affirms the dismissal of claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .,
I concur in the balance of the opinion.