stating in dicta that “[i]f the city council . . . had by ordinance declared that a shopping center on the plaintiffs’ property would serve a public use by, for example, increasing legitimate business traffic in the area and providing jobs for neighborhood residents, the city might have been able to acquire plaintiffs’ property through the payment of just compensation, under the power of eminent domain”
How later courts described this case
- stating in dicta that “[i]f the city council . . . had by ordinance declared that a shopping center on the plaintiffs’ property would serve a public use by, for example, increasing legitimate business traffic in the area and providing jobs for neighborhood residents, the city might have been able to acquire plaintiffs’ property through the payment of just compensation, under the power of eminent domain”
- holding that if the Takings Clause applies to an alleged violation, no substantive due process claim applies. “Substantive due process analysis has no place in contexts already addressed by explicit textual provisions of constitu- tional protection, regardless of whether the plaintiff’s poten- tial claims under those amendments have merit.”
- holding that the defendants were 27 entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s substantive due process claims where 28 “substantive due process provides the plaintiffs no additional relief”
- finding “a triable issue of fact as to whether the [city’s] asserted rationale of directing efforts to enforce the housing code in high-crime areas was merely a pretext” to reduce property values for the city to purchase them at a reduced rate
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part, on other grounds by Crown Point Development, Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851 (2007)
75 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“[T]he collateral order doctrine does not provide appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s decision that genuine issues of material fact exist for trial.”), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Crown Point 4 Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 852
Abrogated on other grounds by Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005)
” See Carole Media LLC v. N.J. Transit Corp., 550 F.3d 302, 308 (3d Cir.2008); Rumber v. Dist. of Columbia, 487 F.3d 941, 944 (D.C.Cir.2007); Montgomery v. Carter County, 226 F.3d 758, 766-68 (6th Cir.2000); McKenzie v. City of White Hall, 112 F.3d 313, 317 (8th Cir. 1997); Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1320-21 & n. 5 (9th Cir.1996) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A, Inc., 544 U.S…
The opinion
BEEZER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment:
I concur in all but the Fifth Amendment analysis in Parts III.A.2 and 3 of the court’s opinion.
Identification of a possible Fourth Amendment claim suffices to encompass plaintiffs’ grievances within the ambit of Albright’s limitation on Substantive Due Process claims. Albright v. Oliver, — U.S.-,-, 114 S.Ct. 807, 813 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994).
It is not necessary to analyze any Takings claims which may be available to plaintiffs.