Opinion

Furrer v. Brown

  • 62 F.3d 1092
  • 1995 WL 478274
Court
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Filed
Aug 15, 1995
Status
Published
Author
Bennett
On the bench
Bennett, Bowman, Fagg
Cited by
33 cases
Authority
More cited than 17.0%

“ “When legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies.’ ”

How later courts described this case

  • “ “When legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies.’ ”
  • noting that Cort is only a guide to determining Congressional intent, citing Thompson and Touche Ross
  • denying plaintiffs a remedy for costs they incurred in a clean-up because court could not find congressional intent for such a remedy
  • “Section 6972 gives the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction to hear citizen suits where specific equitable remedies are sought: prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief ‘to enforce,’ ‘to restrain,’ and ‘to order . . . other action . . . necessary”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

BENNETT, District Judge,

concurring.

Judicial fathoming of Congressional intent is often a treacherous voyage. That is not so here. I wholeheartedly agree with Judge Bowman’s well-reasoned and carefully crafted opinion holding that Congress did not intend to create in § 6972 an implied private right of action for the recovery of cleanup costs. I join this opinion unreservedly for I find Judge Bowman’s application of the factors identified in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), and his divination of Congressional intent, to be unassailable.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 523 (9th Cir.1995), and Judge Fagg, in dissent here, may well be right that it may be “unfair and poor public policy to interpret § 6972(a)(1)(B) as barring restitution actions.” However, I would add that under our tripartite system of government, it is for Congress, not the federal courts, to make such policy choices. See, e.g., Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 377 U.S. 386, 395 , 84 S.Ct. 1273, 1279-80 , 12 L.Ed.2d 394 (1964); Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 353 U.S. 325, 331 , 77 S.Ct. 842, 846 , 1 L.Ed.2d 862 (1957); Black Hills Institute Of Geological Research v. South Dakota School of Mines & Technology, 12 F.3d 737, 744 (8th Cir.1993). The role of the federal courts, “of course, is as interpreters of the words chosen by Congress, not as policymakers or enlargers of congressional intent.” United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir.1994).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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