stating that "general propositions" have little to do with qualified immunity, and the bright line that must be crossed to surrender qualified immunity "is not found in abstractions -- to act reasonably, to act with probable cause, and so forth -- but in studying how these abstractions have been applied in concrete circumstances"
How later courts described this case
- stating that "general propositions" have little to do with qualified immunity, and the bright line that must be crossed to surrender qualified immunity "is not found in abstractions -- to act reasonably, to act with probable cause, and so forth -- but in studying how these abstractions have been applied in concrete circumstances"
- stating that “general propositions” have little to do with qualified immunity, and bright line that must be crossed to surrender qualified immunity “is not found in abstractions -- to act reasonably, to act with probable cause, and so forth -- but in studying how these abstractions have been applied in concrete circumstances”
- stating that in determining whether a prior case creates a clearly established right, “[t]he facts [of the prior case] need not be the same as the facts of the immediate case. But they do need to be materially similar.”
- recognizing that "qualified immunity is a doctrine of practical application to real- life situations" at the time the government conduct occurred and is not evaluated "by hindsight, based on later events"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)
28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc) (same), abrogated on other grounds by Hope, 536 U.S. at 739 & n. 9, 122 S.Ct. 2508;
The opinion
ANDERSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
For purposes of- qualified immunity, the relevant facts are the facts known to the decision-maker. In this case, Lassiter has pointed to no genuine issue of material fact as to what the decision-maker knew. 1 In my judgment, the decision-maker did not know facts which clearly indicated that the contract had been extended by mutual agreement. Thus, the decision-maker did not know facts which clearly indicated that Lassiter had a property interest. Accordingly, I concur in and join the opinion by Judge Edmondson for the court.
. Lassiter apparently testified that he understood . the contract to be a 12 month contract; he implies that the decision-maker would have shared that understanding. However, the contract language itself is clear that the contract extended from May 1, 1985, to September 30, 1985, and that it had to be extended by mutual agreement. Lassiter has pointed to no evidence of which I am aware that the decision-maker had knowledge of facts clearly indicating an extension by mutual agreement.