holding that when the plaintiff was provided with a pretermination hearing, but failed to apply for an available posttermination hearing and chose instead to pursue a § 1983 claim in federal court, the presence of an adequate state posttermination remedy "mandates that . . . no [pretermination] procedural due process violation occurred" as a result of alleged impropriety in the pretermination hearing
How later courts described this case
- holding that when the plaintiff was provided with a pretermination hearing, but failed to apply for an available posttermination hearing and chose instead to pursue a § 1983 claim in federal court, the presence of an adequate state posttermination remedy "mandates that . . . no [pretermination] procedural due process violation occurred" as a result of alleged impropriety in the pretermination hearing
- concluding that the plaintiffs action asserted claims alleging violations of procedural due process and that “the appropriate remedy in this case is not lost wages and benefits calculated on the basis of McKinney’s remaining working life; rather proper remedies include reinstatement and the correction of any procedural defects in the means by which McKinney was terminated”
- stating that the second Chevron Oil factor requires that "the application of the old rule in the instant case must not contravene the purpose and operation of the provision being interpreted" and that the third factor requires that the "application of the new rule in the instant case must be inequitable" (emphasis added)
- holding that procedural due process claim, in which the plaintiff alleged that decision-makers in his pre-termination hearing were biased, was barred because the plaintiff did not show that post-termination remedies in Florida courts, which could have ordered a new hearing conducted by a fair tribunal, were insufficient
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated in part, on other grounds by County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)
20 F.3d 1550, 1564 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (stating that Florida courts can grant damages and equitable relief and, therefore, pro- vide procedural due process protections), abrogated in part on other grounds by County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833
Abrogated on other grounds by January Littlejohn v. School Board of Leon County Florida, 132 F.4th 1232 (2025)
20 F3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“[A]reas in which substantive rights are created only by state law (as is the case with tort law and employment law) are not subject to substantive due process protection under the Due Process Clause[.]”), abrogated on other grounds as stated in Littlejohn v. School Bd. of Leon County, 132 F4th 1232
Limited by Gardens Country Club, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 712 So. 2d 398 (1998)
Although the McKinney court determined that substantive due process protection did not include rights created by state law only, it specifically limited its holding to "executive acts" and found that its analysis regarding the substantive/procedural distinction would be "inappropriate" for "Legislative" acts.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Eisenberg v. City of Miami Beach, 54 F. Supp. 3d 1312 (2014)
Plaintiffs argue McKinney is inapplicable because this case involves liberty as well as property interests.
Distinguished by BD. OF COM'RS OF EFFINGHAM CTY. v. Farmer, 228 Ga. App. 819 (1997)
McKinney, supra, are distinguishable and not controlling.
The opinion
HATCHETT, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
I join in the judgment holding that McKinney did not present a substantive due process claim according to Supreme Court precedent. I write specially to emphasize the fact that we are not holding that one who suffers a due process violation must first seek relief in state courts, or follow state administrative procedures before bringing a lawsuit in the federal courts. The Supreme Court rejected such a contention over twelve years ago in Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 , 102 S.Ct. 2557 , 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982).