The opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 94-40119
MANSEL J. CARRIERE and
JANELL L. CARRIERE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY,
Intervenor-Appellant,
versus
CHANDELEUR ENERGY CORPORATION, ET AL.,
Defendants,
and
GREY WOLF DRILLING COMPANY, INC., and
PETROLEUM MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Louisiana
(CA No. 92-1111 L-O)
(December 9, 1994)
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, WIENER, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM*:
*
Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Plaintiffs-Appellants Mansel and Janell Carriere, and
Appellant-Intervenor Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, appeal a
district court order granting the motion of Defendant-Appellee Grey
Wolf Drilling Company for summary judgment. Grey Wolf's motion
sought dismissal of the Carrieres' tort claim for a work-related
injury sustained by Mr. Carriere. The district court granted the
motion based on the statutory employer immunity provision of the
Louisiana workers' compensation law.
The Carrieres and Aetna (collectively, Appellants) challenge
the district court's summary judgment in favor of Grey Wolf,
asserting that the court erred when it decided to apply Louisiana
workers' compensation law rather than the law of Texas. Appellants
insist that their claim against Grey Wolf raises a choice of law
issue that must be resolved according to Louisiana's conflict of
laws provisions. Appellants urge that, when the appropriate
Louisiana conflict of laws provision is applied to the facts of
this dispute, it becomes apparent that the substantive law of Texas
governs their claim against Grey Wolf.
Contrary to the Appellants' assertions, we conclude that the
district court made the proper conflicts choice when it selected
Louisiana law and properly applied it in granting Grey Wolf's
motion for summary judgment based on the immunity extended to
statutory employers under Louisiana workers' compensation law. In
our de novo review of the district court's ruling we conclude that,
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
2
when considered under the totality of the circumstances,
Louisiana's public policy, as manifested in its workers'
compensation law, would be seriously impaired if that law were not
applied to this particular dispute. In light of this
determination, we reach the same result as did the district court
when it granted Grey Wolf's motion for summary judgment of
dismissal.
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff-Appellant Mansel Carriere, a Louisiana resident, was
hired in Louisiana by Chandeleur Energy Corporation, a Texas
corporation, to work at a drill site in Texas. Grey Wolf, another
Texas corporation, conducted the drilling project using personnel
furnished by Chandeleur pursuant to a contract between Chandeleur
and Grey Wolf. Under this contract Chandeleur agreed to provide
Grey Wolf with the laborers and supervisory personnel necessary to
drill the well.
After Carriere was injured at the Texas location, he and his
wife, Janell, brought this diversity jurisdiction suit in federal
district court. The action was grounded in negligence and strict
liability against both Chandeleur and Grey Wolf.
Chandeleur filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that,
as Carriere's direct employer, it is immune from civil tort
liability for its employee's work-related injury by virtue of the
exclusive remedy provisions of Louisiana's workers' compensation
law. The district court granted Chandeleur's motion, concluding
3
that the Carrieres' claim against Chandeleur was governed by
Louisiana workers' compensation law. The district court found that
the Carrieres' sole remedy against Chandeleur was the recovery of
benefits provided by Louisiana's workers' compensation laws. As
Louisiana law immunizes direct employers from civil liability
claims that are covered by workers' compensation, the Carrieres'
suit against Chandeleur was dismissed. This ruling was not
appealed.
After the district court ruled on Chandeleur's summary
judgment motion, Grey Wolf filed its own motion for summary
judgment. It posited that under Louisiana workers' compensation
law, Grey Wolf, as Carriere's "statutory employer," is also immune
from civil liability. The district court agreed with Grey Wolf and
granted its motion for summary judgment based on the immunity
extended to statutory employers under Louisiana law. The Carrieres
and Aetna timely filed this appeal.
II
DISCUSSION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The grant of a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de
novo, using the same criteria employed by the district court.1 In
determining whether the grant of summary judgment was proper, we
view all fact questions in the light most favorable to the
1
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Wigginton, 964 F.2d
487, 489 (5th Cir. 1992); Walker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d
355, 358 (5th Cir. 1988).
4
nonmovant. Questions of law are reviewed de novo.2
B. DIVERSITY AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
The Carrieres, domiciliaries of Louisiana, brought suit
against Grey Wolf, a Texas corporation, in a federal district court
in Louisiana, with jurisdiction grounded in diversity of
citizenship. Federal courts sitting in diversity are bound to
apply the substantive law of the forum state, including the forum
state's conflict of laws provisions.3 Thus, argue appellants (and
none disputes) the court must look to Louisiana's conflict of laws
provisions to determine whether the substantive law of Texas or
Louisiana governs this claim.
1. Article 3544: Financial Protection and Loss Distribution
Appellants assert that, as their dispute involves a choice of
law between the statutory immunity provisions of the workers'
compensation laws of Louisiana and Texas, it fits within the scope
of Civil Code article 3544, the conflict of laws rule covering
issues of loss distribution and financial protection.4 The
2
Walker, 853 F.2d at 358.
3
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487,
496 (1941).
4
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3544 (2)(a) (West 1994) (conflict
of laws provision for issues of loss distribution and financial
protection) (prescribing that if at time of injury, injured person
and person causing injury are domiciled in different states, and
both injury and conduct causing injury occur in one state, laws of
that state govern).
5
Carrieres and Aetna rely on Kennington v. H. Blume Johnson, Inc.,5
which resolved a statutory employer immunity conflict of laws issue
between Louisiana and Texas workers' compensation laws by applying
Civil Code article 3544 to the conflict.6 A threshold issue in
Kennington was whether the appropriate Louisiana conflicts
provision was article 3543, the Civil Code provision governing
standards of conduct and safety, or article 3544, the provision
governing issues of loss distribution and financial protection. In
resolving the choice of law issues by applying article 3544, the
Kennington court reasoned that statutes that provide immunity from
suit are appropriately classified as rules of loss distribution or
financial protection.7 Once the court determined that article 3544
governed the choice of law issue and applied the facts of the
dispute to the provision, it concluded that Louisiana law was the
5
632 So.2d 883 (La. App. 1994) revs'd on other grounds, 638
So.2d. 1966 (La. 1994).
6
Id. at 886. Kennington, a Louisiana employee, was "leased"
by his direct employer (a Louisiana corporation) to the defendant-
appellant (a Louisiana corporation), and was subsequently injured
at a Texas job site. Kennington initially brought suit in
Louisiana. He later tried to dismiss the matter without prejudice
and file suit in Texas, claiming that Texas law, rather than
Louisiana law, governed the case. The trial court determined that,
as the Louisiana-based defendant was Kennington's statutory
employer, the claim was covered exclusively by the Louisiana's
workers' compensation act. Consequently, the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Kennington appealed,
questioning the trial court's application of Louisiana law, and
arguing that Texas law, rather than Louisiana law governed the
dispute. The appellate court resolved the conflict of laws issue
in favor of Louisiana law, and affirmed the summary judgment based
on the immunity extended to statutory employers under Louisiana's
workers' compensation law.
7
Id.
6
substantive law to apply to the dispute.
The Carrieres and Aetna point out that, like the choice of law
issue in Kennington, their dispute against Grey Wolf involves a
conflict between the statutory employer provisions of Texas and
Louisiana workers' compensation law. The appellants suggest that,
as Kennington represents Louisiana's interpretation of the state's
recently revised conflict of laws provisions, we should be led by
the state court's reasoning and resolve the instant conflict
according to the elements of article 3544. They argue that, when
the facts of the instant dispute are plugged into article 3544(2),
the Code mandates that Texas law governs their claim against Grey
Wolf.8
We agree that statutory employer immunity provisions involve
issues of financial protection and loss distribution. We also
agree that article 3544 of the Louisiana Civil Code is the
appropriate conflicts provision with which to begin the choice of
law analysis for this dispute. We do not agree, however, that, for
this particular dispute, the choice of law analysis ends with the
definitive result mandated by article 3544(2). We distinguish the
facts of the instant case from Kennington and, for the reasons
discussed below, conclude that the choice of law issue here
presents an exceptional situation. It thus comes within the scope
8
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3544(2) (West 1994) (when injured
person and person causing injury are from different states (here
Louisiana and Texas), and when injury and conduct that caused it
are in one of those states (Texas), then law of that state (Texas)
governs dispute).
7
of the Code's conflict of laws provision for exceptional cases,
which in this instance requires the application of Louisiana law to
the dispute despite the fact that article 3544(2) mandates that
Texas law applies.
In distinguishing the facts of the instant case from those of
Kennington we first observe that previous adjudication has already
determined that Carriere is entitled to Louisiana workers'
compensation benefits, whereas, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in
reversing and remanding Kennington, concluded that Kennington's
statutory employer was not entitled to evoke Louisiana's statutory
employer defense because it had not satisfied its burden of showing
that Kennington was entitled to Louisiana benefits. In addition,
we consider significantly distinguishable the fact that unlike the
plaintiff in Kennington, Carriere has already received compensation
from his direct employer pursuant to Louisiana's workers'
compensation law. Moreover, we note that, unlike Kennington, in
which the court reasoned that Louisiana law was the appropriate
substantive law to apply because the same result was reached using
either an article 3544 analysis or a separate interest analysis, we
are unable to reach an analogous result.9 We are convinced that
9
In conducting a separate interest analysis the court noted
that Louisiana law was the appropriate law to apply to the dispute
because Louisiana's interests and policies were stronger than those
of Texas. The court considered the following factors in its
analysis: both parties were Louisiana domiciliaries, the
plaintiff's employment was principally in Louisiana, the work in
Texas was temporary, the only nexus between Texas and the parties
was the occurrence of the accident there, and Louisiana has a
strong interest in applying its workers' compensation laws to
regulate the rights and liabilities of the employer and the injured
employee.
8
even though a conflicts analysis under article 3544(2) would
mandate the application of Texas law, a separate interest analysis
reveals that Louisiana law would be most seriously impaired if
Texas law were applied to the dispute. In light of these
incompatible conclusions, we determine that we must look to the
Code's conflict of laws provision that addresses this type of
"conflict within a conflict." Thus, we carry the choice of law
analysis presented in this appeal a step further and analyze it
under article 3547, the Code provision governing "exceptional
cases."10
2. Article 3547: Exceptional Cases
Article 3547 provides the following:
[t]he law applicable under Articles 3543-3546 shall not
apply if, from the totality of the circumstances of an
exceptional case, it is clearly evident under the
principles of Article 3542, that the policies of another
state would be more seriously impaired if its law were
not applied to the particular issue. In such event, the
law of the other state shall apply.11
Commentary to article 3547 notes that the choice of law rules
contained in Articles 3543-3546 were established to avoid the
laborious analysis required by Article 3542, the general rule for
10
We are not concluding that section 3544 never applies to a
dispute involving competing statutory employer immunity provisions.
Neither are we contradicting the Louisiana courts' interpretation
of the code's conflicts provisions. We are merely taking the
conflicts analysis the necessary step further in light of our
conclusion that given the exceptional status of this dispute the
policies of Louisiana would be adversely affected if Texas law was
applied to the dispute.
11
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3547 (West 1994).
9
choice of law issues. The commentary also notes, however, that the
rules contained in Articles 3543-3546 may, in exceptional cases,
produce a result that is incompatible with the principles of
Article 3542. Thus, article 3547 provides an "escape mechanism"
for avoiding otherwise incompatible results in resolving choice of
law issues.
When a court is convinced that the laws of a state other than
the one designated by Articles 3543-3546 would be significantly
impaired if not applied to a dispute, then the law that is
designated by Articles 3542-3546 must yield to Article 3542 and the
law of the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired
governs the particular dispute.12 As we are convinced that
Louisiana law would be most seriously impaired if Texas law were
applied to the dispute, thereby concluding that Texas law must
yield to Louisiana law, we discuss briefly the key elements of
article 3547, namely the principles of Article 3542 and the
totality of the circumstances that lead us to conclude that this is
an exceptional case.
a. Principles of Article 3542: An Interest Analysis
Article 3542 provides that, except as otherwise provided,
issues of delictual or quasi-delictual obligations are governed by
the law of the state whose policies would be most seriously
impaired if its laws were not applied to the issue in dispute.13
12
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3547 commentary (West 1994).
13
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3542 (West 1994).
10
That state is determined by evaluating the strength and pertinence
of the state's policies in light of the pertinent contacts of each
state to the parties and the events giving rise to the dispute,
including the place of conduct and injury; the domicile or place of
business of the parties; the state in which the relationship was
centered; and the policies of Article 3515 (the policies and needs
of interstate systems, the policies of upholding the justified
expectations of the parties, and the policy of minimizing the
adverse consequences that might follow from subjecting a party to
the law of more than one state).
We compare the policies and interests of both Texas and
Louisiana to support our conclusion that, as Louisiana's interests
and contacts are greater than those of Texas, the policies of
Louisiana would be most seriously impaired if its laws were not
applied to the instant dispute. Texas' interests are (1) Grey Wolf
is incorporated in Texas; (2) the place of conduct and injury are
in Texas; and (3) Texas, we surmise, has an interest in deterring
wrongful conduct and repairing the consequences of injurious acts.
Louisiana's interests - stronger by comparison - are (1) Carriere
is domiciled in Louisiana; (2) Grey Wolf is qualified to do
business in Louisiana, and is doing business in Louisiana; (3)
Carriere was working for Grey Wolf pursuant to a Louisiana contract
for hire; (4) Carriere's direct employer, with whom Grey Wolf
established the contractual relationship to "hire" Carriere is
domiciled in Louisiana; (5) Carriere has received workers'
compensation benefits for his injury pursuant to Louisiana law; (6)
11
Louisiana has an interest in protecting both citizens who are
recruited and hired in Louisiana and employers that are doing
business in the state; (7) Louisiana has an interest in protecting
foreign corporations in order to create a friendly business
atmosphere in which to promote commerce and industry; (8) Louisiana
has an interest in the consistent and comprehensive implementation
of its workers' compensation laws; and (9) as articulated by
article 3515, the policies and needs of the interstate system,
which includes the expectations of the parties and the minimization
of adverse consequences that might follow from subjecting a party
to the law of more than one state are best served in this dispute
by the application of Louisiana law. When the totality of these
factors is considered it is evident that the policies of Louisiana
would be more seriously impaired if Texas law were applied to this
dispute than would Texas if Louisiana law were applied.
b. Totality of the Circumstances and Exceptional Cases
To reach our classification of this case as "exceptional," we
analyze it in the perspective of the totality of the circumstances:
Carriere's accident yielded claims against two contractually
related defendants, Chandeleur and Grey Wolf; the Carrieres' claim
against Chandeleur, a foreign corporation and Carriere's direct
employer, was resolved properly by application of Louisiana's
workers' compensation law; Carriere was compensated for his injury
pursuant to Louisiana law; Appellants' claims against Grey Wolf -
which are based on the same accident - are made against a second
defendant which, like Chandeleur, is also a foreign corporation;
12
under Louisiana law - the same law that has already compensated
Carriere for his injury vis á vis the first defendant (Chandeleur)
- the second defendant (Grey Wolf) clearly qualifies as an
immunized statutory employer,14 yet in this dispute, Carriere urges
us to apply Texas law so that he can recover in tort against Grey
Wolf; and finally if, by running Appellants' claims simplistically
through a Civil Code article 3544(2) checklist, we were to conclude
that Texas law applies, we would be guilty of failing to consider
the effect that such a ruling would have on Louisiana's workers'
compensation law - again, the law under which Carriere has already
applied for and received benefits.
c. Analogous Case Law
When an analysis under article 3547 is viewed in conjunction
with Louisiana's interest in the consistent and comprehensive
application of its workers' compensation law we see clearly that,
if Texas law were to be applied to this dispute, Louisiana law and
the policy it embodies would be seriously impaired. The propriety
14
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 A. (1)-(2) (West 1994)
(articulating that remedies provided to employee under statute are
exclusive remedies against employer and statutory employer, thereby
immunizing employer(s) from civil tort liability); see also,
Morgan v. Gaylord Container Corp., 30 F.3d 586, 589 (5th Cir. 1994)
(citing Deal v. International Paper Co., 632 So.2d 870, 871 (La.
App. 1994), rev'd, 637 So.2d 453 (La. 1994)) (reiterating that
statutory employer relationship exists when contract work performed
by employee is integral or essential to principal's trade or
business); see also Salsbury v. Hood Indus., Inc., 982 F.2d 912,
916 (5th Cir. 1993) (articulating that appropriate standard for
determining statutory employer status is "integral relation" test).
The parties do not dispute that under Louisiana law, Grey Wolf
is Carriere's statutory employer, and thus, is immune from civil
tort liability for any claims arising from an injury that is
compensated under the state law.
13
of this conclusion is bolstered by the recognition that once an
injured employee elects to seek and receive worker's compensation
benefits under the workers' compensation law of Louisiana, he is
bound to its provisions, including specifically the exclusivity
provisions.15 Agreeing with the reasoning of the district court in
Crane, we conclude that if, under the totality of its circumstances
of the instant case, Mansel Carriere were permitted to bring suit
against Grey Wolf in Louisiana but were also permitted to have
Texas law apply - despite his having received benefits under the
Louisiana regime - we would not be giving "full faith and credit to
the policies which [Louisiana] wants to preserve in providing for
employer immunity."16
Our Erie-bound decision to protect Louisiana's workers'
compensation law to its full extent comports with an earlier
Louisiana state court case, Wayne v. Olinkraft,17 in which the court
reviewed a choice of law issue almost identical to the one at issue
15
See e.g., Carriere v. C.C. Crane Corp., 812 F. Supp. 90, 91
(S.D. Tex. 1992)(hereinafter, "Crane"). In Crane, Ronald Carriere,
a Louisiana resident, was killed in Texas while working for the
defendant, Grey Wolf, a Texas corporation. As a result of
Carriere's death, his widow began receiving benefits pursuant to
Louisiana workers' compensation laws. Subsequently, Mrs. Carriere
filed a claim against Grey Wolf for death benefits under Texas law.
The district court granted Grey Wolf's motion for summary judgment,
holding that once Mrs. Carriere began receiving Louisiana workers'
compensation benefits she was bound to Louisiana workers'
compensation law. As Louisiana law immunized Grey Wolf from civil
liability for Carriere's death, the district court would not permit
Mrs. Carriere to sustain a tort action against Grey Wolf based on
Texas law. Id. at 90 - 93.
16
Id. at 92.
17
293 So.2d 896 (La. App. 1974).
14
in the instant case.18 In Wayne the state appellate court discussed
the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws in detail before holding
that an employee who accepts an award under the workers'
compensation scheme of a given state may be bound by the provisions
of that scheme insofar as immunity from tort and wrongful death
liability is concerned.19 The state court concluded that the
18
See id. The plaintiff in Wayne was the widow of an employee
whose employer had contracted out its services (and employees) to
the defendant corporation. The deceased employee, a Louisiana
domiciliary, was hired in Louisiana by his direct employer, a
Louisiana corporation, but was killed while working in Arkansas for
the defendant, his statutory employer. The employee's widow filed
for, and began receiving, Louisiana workers' compensation benefits
under the direct employer's compensation insurance policy.
Subsequently, she brought a tort action against the defendant in
Louisiana. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment based on Louisiana's statutory employer immunity.
The plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment,
asserting that Arkansas law rather than Louisiana law governed the
dispute. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment based on Louisiana workers' compensation law,
holding that as plaintiff had received Louisiana benefits, she was
bound to the full extent of Louisiana law.
19
Id.at 900. The court in Wayne recognized that there are
occasions when conflict of laws provisions permit tort actions in
one state even though another state declares the defendant immune.
See e.g., Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, § 183
(articulating that a state is not precluded from permitting an
action in tort or wrongful death by the fact that party would be
immune under a sister state's workers' compensation laws).
The Wayne court based its holding, however, on the distinction
noted in section 184 of the Restatement, which reads as follows:
Recovery for tort or wrongful death will not be permitted
in any state if the defendant is declared immune from
such liability by the workmen's compensation statute of
a state under which the defendant is required to provide
insurance against the particular risk and under which
(a) the plaintiff has obtained an award for the injury, or
(b) the plaintiff could obtain an award for the injury,
if this is the state (1) where the injury occurred, or
(2) where employment is principally located, or (3) where
the employer supervised the employee's activities from a
place of business in the state, or (4) whose local law
15
principles of the Restatement offered a logical, fair, and stable
solution to the conflict of laws issue.20
We are satisfied that Crane and Wayne still tender "good law"
despite their antedating the substantial revision of the Louisiana
Civil Code's conflict of laws provisions. These cases highlight
the exceptional status of this dispute, provide analogous support
for our conclusion that Louisiana law would be seriously impaired
if Texas law were applied to the instant dispute, and dictate our
ultimate conclusion that once an injured employee applies for and
receives benefits from the workers' compensation laws of a given
state, the laws of that state apply in full to related claims of
the injured employee.
Today's holding should not be interpreted, however, as blanket
protection for foreign corporations under Louisiana law. Rather,
it is a particularized response to an exceptional case; a response
that avoids the piecemeal application of different laws to an
equally piecemeal attempt to obtain double - or at least
governs the contract of employment under the rules of ss
187-188 and 196.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 184 (1969).
Commentary to the Restatement notes that this rule applies to
actions brought against immediate employers and indirect employers.
In addition, the rule applies whether the defendant is required to
obtain workers' compensation itself, or whether a third party is
required to obtain the necessary insurance. Id. at comment a.
20
Wayne, 293 So.2d at 900. The courts in Crane and Wayne both
note that to deny a person the immunity granted him by a workers'
compensation statute of a given state frustrates the efforts of
that state to restrict the cost of industrial accidents and to
afford a fair basis for predicting what those costs will be.
Carriere v. C.C.Crane Corp., 812 F. Supp. 90, 92 n.5 (S.D. Tex.
1992); Wayne, 293 So.2d at 900.
16
overlapping - recovery for the same injury.
III
CONCLUSION
When we consider this case in light of the totality of the
underlying circumstances, we are convinced that Carriere's suit
against Grey Wolf is an exceptional conflict of laws case, and that
Louisiana workers' compensation law would be seriously impaired if
it were not applied to this particular dispute. Consequently, we
are convinced that a Louisiana court, pursuant to Louisiana Civil
Code article 3547, would apply Louisiana substantive law to
Carriere's dispute against his statutory employer, Grey Wolf. We
affirm, therefore, the district court's order granting Grey Wolf's
motion for summary judgment on the rationale that under Louisiana
law Grey Wolf is immune from civil tort liability for the same
injuries that are already covered and compensated under Carriere's
workers' compensation claim.
AFFIRMED.
17