Watkins v. Department of Youth Services

French, J.,

dissenting.

{¶ 57} I respectfully dissent. With respect to its discussion of the statute of hmitations that applies to sexual-abuse claims filed against the state, I join *492 Justice O’Donnell’s dissenting opinion. The two-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2743.16(A) applies to all civil actions filed against the state, unless a shorter limitations period applies to similar suits between private parties. Although R.C. 2305.111(C) establishes a 12-year statute of limitations for an action for assault or battery brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse, or an action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse asserting any claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse, the two-year statute of limitations applies when such claims are asserted against the state.

{¶ 58} That result is evident from not only the plain language of R.C. 2743.16(A), but also the plain language of R.C. 2305.03(A), which states that a civil action may be commenced only within the period prescribed in R.C. 2305.04 to 2305.22, “unless a different limitation is prescribed by statute.” Here, a different limitation is prescribed by R.C. 2743.16(A), and that ends the matter.

{¶ 59} I nevertheless dissent separately because I would not address the equal-protection challenge that appellant, Uranus Watkins, raises in her merit brief. Watkins argues that application of the R.C. 2743.16(A) two-year statute of limitations to plaintiffs suing the state violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection when the same claims against private entities would be subject to a 12-year statute of limitations. As Justice O’Donnell notes, Watkins did not raise an equal-protection argument in the Court of Claims. Although Watkins did make a perfunctory equal-protection argument before the Tenth District Court of Appeals, that court did not address that argument.

{¶ 60} Courts decide constitutional issues only when absolutely necessary. State ex rel. Essig v. Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 481 , 2004-Ohio-5586 , 817 N.E.2d 5 , ¶ 34, quoting State ex rel. DeBrosse v. Cool, 87 Ohio St.3d 1, 7 , 716 N.E.2d 1114 (1999). A constitutional challenge to a statute not raised in the trial court is waived, and an appellate court need not address that issue. Gibson v. Meadow Gold Dairy, 88 Ohio St.3d 201, 204 , 724 N.E.2d 787 (2000), citing State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120 , 489 N.E.2d 277 (1986). Not only did Watkins not raise an equal-protection challenge in the Court of Claims, she has not raised an equal-protection challenge in a proposition of law before this court; her sole proposition of law states that her claims are not time-barred by the statute of limitations for claims of childhood sexual abuse. In light of Watkins’s failure to raise an equal-protection challenge in the Court of Claims, it was not necessary for the court of appeals to address the equal-protection question, nor is it necessary for this court to opine on the constitutionality of applying the two-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2743.16(A) to Watkins’s claims. Watkins waived that issue by not raising it in the Court of Claims.

{¶ 61} For these reasons, although I agree with Justice O’Donnell’s dissenting opinion that the statute of limitations contained in R.C. 2743.16(A) applies to *493 Watkins’s claims against the state, I would refrain from any discussion of Watkins’s equal-protection challenge.

The Law Office of Jill R. Flagg and Jill R. Flagg, for appellant.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, Peter K. Glenn-Applegate, Deputy Solicitor, and Eric A. Walker, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Landskroner Grieco Merriman, L.L.C., and Drew Legando, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Landskroner Foundation for Children.