concluding that at-issue contract was adhesive in light of “stronger party’s refusal to negotiate [the] key term” of arbitration, but declining nonetheless to find procedural unconscion-ability given the advantages of form contracts and the fact that few such contracts “are negotiated one clause at a time”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that at-issue contract was adhesive in light of “stronger party’s refusal to negotiate [the] key term” of arbitration, but declining nonetheless to find procedural unconscion-ability given the advantages of form contracts and the fact that few such contracts “are negotiated one clause at a time”
- holding an arbitration clause valid where there was no evidence that the signatories “were hurried through [the] signature process” and the clause “appeared in standard, rather than fine, print and was not hidden”
- recognizing that few consumer contracts are negotiated item-by-item and noting that form contracts actually can benefit consumers by reducing the cost of doing business and resulting in lower prices
- stating that "Ohio courts recognize a 'presumption favoring arbitration' that arises 'when the claim in dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration provision' "
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Pfeifer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 71} The majority opinion states that “[i]n the case before us, the narrow issue is whether the standard of appellate review of an R.C. 2711.02(B) stay order is de novo or for abuse of discretion when the underlying issue is whether the arbitration clause is unenforceable because of alleged unconscionability.” ¶ 31. I concur with the conclusion in the majority opinion that “[t]he court of appeals correctly identified de novo as the standard of review for a determination of whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable and is therefore unenforceable.” I dissent, however, from the majority opinion’s subsequent conclusion that the trial court “incorrectly applied that standard in this case.” ¶ 38. I believe that only the narrow legal issue is before us and that we should not reach beyond that issue to make a factual determination. Because the court of appeals applied the proper standard, I would affirm its decision.