holding under discovery rule action against the diocese accrues as a matter of law when plaintiff knows that he is assaulted by a priest and the priest is an employee of the diocese
How later courts described this case
- holding under discovery rule action against the diocese accrues as a matter of law when plaintiff knows that he is assaulted by a priest and the priest is an employee of the diocese
- addressing the issue of when a victim of child sexual abuse must file suit against the perpetrator’s employer, given that the victim, at the time of the abuse, knew the identity of the perpetrator, the employer of the perpetrator, and that a battery occurred
- holding that equitable estoppel is available as a shield “only in defense of a legal or equitable right or claim made in good faith,” not a sword
- holding that a defendant need not “come forward with further information about [its] wrongdoing” to avoid tolling the limitations period
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
French, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 55} I respectfully dissent from Part VI of the majority opinion, which addresses Doe’s allegations under the Ohio Corrupt Activities Act. I agree with the dissent that R.C. 2923.34(E), which allows claims to be brought “within five years after the unlawful conduct terminates,” does not prohibit Doe’s claims that the appellants engaged in corrupt activities, apart from the sexual abuse, until 2002. However, I agree with the appellants that Doe has not pleaded those corrupt activities with particularity sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), and for that reason, the corrupt-activities claims should be dismissed. See Manogg v. Spangler (Apr. 19,1994), Licking App. No. 93 CA106, 1994 WL 167933 ; Universal Coach, Inc. v. New York City Transit Auth., Inc. (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 284, 291 , 629 N.E.2d 28 . In all other respects, I concur in the majority opinion.