Opinion

State v. Murrell

  • 94 Ohio St. 3d 489
  • 764 N.E.2d 986
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Filed
Apr 3, 2002
Status
Published
Author
Pfeifer
On the bench
Cook, Douglas, Moyer, Pfeifer, Resnick, Stratton, Sweeney
Cited by
74 cases
Authority
More cited than 15.3%

observing that “[t]he majority acknowledges that the occupant must first be removed from the automobile and placed under arrest before the police officer may search the automobile. Therefore, since the occupant is already under arrest and separated from the vehicle, the Chimel justifications for the search, i.e., police officer safety and the protection of evidence, disappear”

How later courts described this case

  • observing that “[t]he majority acknowledges that the occupant must first be removed from the automobile and placed under arrest before the police officer may search the automobile. Therefore, since the occupant is already under arrest and separated from the vehicle, the Chimel justifications for the search, i.e., police officer safety and the protection of evidence, disappear”
  • "Concerns about a possible lack of probable cause to conduct a search in a Belton situation are eased by the fact that probable cause must have been present to arrest the occupant of the vehicle in the first place."
  • overruling previous case law and joining majority of other states in adopting Belton under state constitution
  • “The Fourth Amendment and Section 14, Article I contain virtually identical language” and “should be harmonized whenever possible.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Pfeifer, J.,

dissenting. This court’s holding in State v. Brown (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 349 , 588 N.E.2d 113 , should control this case. The Brown opinion is measured and wise, and allows for the search of the interior of an automobile incident to a driver’s arrest when necessary. Under Brown , police officers can search an automobile if there is probable cause to suspect that the vehicle contains contraband, if there is a suspicious item in plain view, or if an officer is searching for weapons within the immediate control of the suspect. These are all reasonable exceptions to the Fourth Amendment prohibition against warrantless searches. The majority’s holding today seems inclined to skirt the Fourth Amendment rather than work within it. I dissent and also join the dissent of Chief Justice Moyer.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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