stating that in order for a declarant's statement to qualify under Evid. R. 804(B)'s exceptions to hearsay, it must be shown that the declarant is unavailable as a witness
How later courts described this case
- stating that in order for a declarant's statement to qualify under Evid. R. 804(B)'s exceptions to hearsay, it must be shown that the declarant is unavailable as a witness
- analyzing circumstances indicating untrustworthiness, such as circumstances added using hindsight, where the appellant has something to gain by inculpating another for a crime, and an attempt to shift the blame for the crime
- where a subpoenaed co-defendant who refused to testify after pleading his rights under the Fifth Amendment was considered unavailable, his confession was admissible as a statement against interest
- "trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and unless it has clearly abused its discretion and the defendant has been materially prejudiced thereby, an appellate court should not disturb the decision of the trial court"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Pfeifer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. As I stated in dissent in State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 562 , 747 N.E.2d 765, 813 , restricting the universe of cases this court reviews when conducting proportionality review “continually lower[s] the bar of proportionality.” This case then will enable prosecutors to go where they have never been before. For in this case, after conducting proportionality review, a majority of this court has upheld a sentence of death even though the defendant was not the principal offender, even though the principal offender did not receive the death penalty, even though the defendant was not present when the murder took place, and even though the murder victim’s wife, who allegedly initiated the murder by paying the defendant to get a gun, was acquitted.
None of this is to suggest that Issa is not culpable for the murder. He is, and I vote to affirm his convictions. He was an active participant in the planning of the murder and the murder almost certainly would not have occurred without him. However, the facts remain: Issa did not kill; Issa was not present during the killing; the actual killer did not receive the death penalty. If ever a sentence *76 of death deserved to be vacated because of proportionality, this is it. But of course, we cannot consider the case in which Issa’s accomplice received a life sentence because he received a life sentence, and we cannot consider the case in which the victim’s wife was acquitted because she was acquitted.
Never mind that the facts are exactly the same; never mind that Issa was not the trigger man, he was eligible to be charged with capital murder, he was convicted of capital murder, and he was sentenced to death. All the rest, according to the majority, is irrelevant. I beg to differ.
R.C. 2929.021 requires clerks of courts to file with this court certain basic information concerning each case in which a capital indictment is filed. R.C. 2929.03(F) requires trial courts to file a separate opinion here when they impose a life sentence under R.C. 2929.03(D). This information would be helpful to this court but it is seriously incomplete. We should also receive information on every case in which a capital'indictment could have been sought. We also should be informed of the ultimate resolution of each potential or actual capital case. Without this information, our ability to conduct serious and thorough proportionality review is significantly compromised.
Issa’s death sentence should be reversed because it is disproportionate to those received by his accomplices. He should be sentenced to life in prison. I dissent.